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Abstract 
There has been an increased interest on the electronification of payments systems in the last 
two decades in general and on electronic money (e-money) on particular in the last decade 
with increased computing power and decreased cost of communication. E-money did not only 
attract attention from the academicians but also from central bankers, financial supervisory 
authorities, treasuries, finance ministries and innovators and operators all around the world. 
The purpose of this thesis is fourfold. Firstly, it seeks to define and critically assess e-money 
including the expected functions, necessary features, its potentials and major implications for 
different sides of financial system. Secondly, it tries to present empirical evidence on the 
current stage of e-money technology with two case studies, namely Mondei and Digicash. 
Thirdly, it investigates the perception of e-money innovators and operators with an 
assumption that they have the power and influence on the future shape of e-money. This 
section includes the analysis of two European surveys and one additional comparative survey 
conducted in Miami, the US. Lastly, it studies the free banking implications of e-money 
covering the impact on monetary policy framework and monetary policy instruments 
including whether e-money should be regulated or not. 
The research finds that the current definitions given to the e-money phenomenon is 
incomplete and defines the necessary functions and features for the future success of e-money 
applications. It describes e-money trends in Europe and compares it to the US perception 
finding no serious differences although the FED and the ECB have different approaches to e- 
money. Another conclusion the thesis reached is that e-money may result in a new approach 
to central banking with a contestable framework through the synergies with free banking. 
Finally, e-money is not seen as a danger for the successful conduct of monetary policy and the 
thesis underlines that when it is `representative', regulation is possible whereas `independent' 
e-money issuance may manage to stay out of the coverage of conventional regulatory 
frameworks. 
X111 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis investigates developments in electronic money (e-money) that have been 
emerging rapidly especially in the last decade. E-money has drawn increasing attention from 
almost all national central banks in the developed world and international organisations, such as 
the Bank for International Settlement (BIS). The latter has recently published a survey on e- 
money developments (BIS, 2000). The impact of e-money on financial regulation has already 
been felt with a European Union (EU) directive, which has been finalised in content and awaits 
published of the Official Gazette. Additionally, as the importance of payment systems and 
payment systems infrastructure has been recognised as been increasingly important for 
international financial integration, developing countries have been trying to establish the 
potential implications of e-money. There will be impacts on financial service provision and 
monetary policy frameworks, and policy instruments. As a result, e-money has emerged as a 
phenomenon that should not be ignored. It should be analysed carefully in order to understand 
its potential and its limits for the future of money and central banking. 
This thesis first sets on the motivation for the research including the questions, aims and 
contributions and follows those with the research methods and data sources. Then, it gives a 
theoretical framework and literature review on e-money. This section looks at the definition of 
conventional money with its functions and features. It covers a wide range of definitions given 
to e-money in order to underline the general confusion about the current development, and 
critically tries to provide a new approach for a new definition that may cover independent issue 
of e-money as well. It then applies a systemic approach to e-money in order to describe a 
bridge between conventional money and its electronification and describe the necessary 
functions and features for e-money in order for successful implementation for its full potential. 
It later looks at the sources of demand for e-money and analyses the current problems 
surrounding its development and concludes with a short summary of the implications of e- 
money for central banking. 
After the theoretical framework and literature review, the thesis looks at two major 
examples of e-money implementation. The first one is Mondex, which is the company that held 
the first e-money trials ever at Swindon in the UK in 1995 and still tries to develop an e-money 
version that is compatible all around the world with interoperable e-money equipment 
including smart cards and card readers. The section covers many interviews with Mondex. 
1 
officials in the last two and a half years at different times and a field search that was conducted 
in the summer of 1998 at Exeter in order to observe the Mondex close-circuit trial at the 
University. 
The second case study concentrates on a network-based solution to e-money 
implementation with Digicash. The company has had an interesting story and seems to be the 
right choice in order to follow the developments on e-money business. It failed on its first 
business model and declared bankruptcy. Within a short time, all the intellectual property was 
bought by eCash Technologies and the project is still alive with adjustments to the new 
conditions and further development of the network-based e-money. These two case studies will 
investigate in details these two particular e-money proposals but the coverage of the thesis 
includes other proposals such as electronic gold (e-gold), Beenz, and the like when seem 
appropriate. 
Chapter 6 is on three surveys that have been conducted in two different continents. Two 
of the surveys were from England during "Smar99cards" and "Smartcard2000", and the third 
survey was held in Miami, the US during "CTST2000". The first survey aimed to look at the 
innovators' and operators' perceptions of e-money; and the second survey was an extension of 
the first. The third survey in the US compared the findings to the European surveys in order to 
find out whether the differences between the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Federal 
Reserve (FED) are shared by e-money innovators and operators or not. 
Chapter 7 considers the possibility of e-money developing like free banking. It develops 
the concept of contestable central banking after describing the relevance of e-money to free 
banking, and the synergy between free banking and e-money. Second part of this chapter notes 
the impact of e-money on monetary policy. It first looks at the current developments on money 
and the payment system technologies, then it investigates the money multiplier, and monetary 
base velocity implications of e-money. Finally, the latest developments with the current 
monetary policy framework is analysed from an e-money point of view, and official reaction of 
the Bank of England (BOE) to e-money is reflected with the help of a questionnaire. 
The last section before the conclusion discusses the regulation of e-money. The chapter 
first investigates the regulation of banks and financial services in general and considers the new 
financial service regulation framework in the UK 
-the Financial Services Authority (FSA). 
After noting the current trends in the regulation of e-money, the FSA approach is analysed with 
a help of a questionnaire and interview notes. The chapter concludes with the discusion 
whether e-money could be regulated. 
2 
The final section of the thesis concludes with some indications for further directions for 
the research. 
1.1. MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
The important role of money in an economy is generally accepted with few exceptions. 
Schwartz (1987), for example, pointed out the evidence that the quantity of money has a 
significant influence on the level of economic activity in the UK economy. As e-money 
emerges around the world, central banks have been publishing research papers about issues 
raised by this phenomenon and trying to understand the implications of it (BIS, 1996,1997, 
1998 and 2000; EMI, 1994; ECB, 1998; Robson, 1996; Good 1997,1998a and 1998b; Issing 
1999 and Greenspan, 1997 and 1998). Further than that, the US House of Representatives had 
hearings on the future of money in 1995 and the US Treasury sponsored a conference on the 
role of government in an e-money environment in 1996. The US Department of the Treasury 
(1996) argued that e-money and electronic payment systems for retail transactions are on the 
top-ten list of issues for those with significant interest in financial services. Recently, BIS 
published a survey of 68 central banks around the world, including the ECB and the FED, on e- 
money developments in order to ensure that `central banks have adequate information to 
monitor the growth of e-money and to assess its possible consequences' (BIS 2000, Foreword). 
The World Bank also joined the discussion with a recent conference on the Future of Monetary 
Policy and Banking, which aimed to look ahead to the next twenty-five years and invited 
academicians and central bankers discussed the impact of e-money on the future of central 
banking. The International Monetary Fund (the IMF) was among the organisers. 
This attention from the academicians, practitioners, central bankers and other 
governmental and private institutions to e-money may be suggested as evidence for the 
importance of e-money developments for central banks and consequently for the whole 
economy. Additionally, e-money schemes have begun trials around the world in Swindon, a 
small UK town, in 1995 and it is not surprising to have new announcements for a new trial 
from time to time 
-like e-gold. Thießen (1999) looked at most of the proposals ranging from 
Millicent to Cybercash and tried to find out why most of them failed. But since then new 
versions have been developed such as Paypal. Digicash is an example of the failed versions but 
there are serious projects such as Geldkarte in Germany, which has distributed more than 50 
million smart cards capable of holding monetary value to be used for transactions. All of the 
trials, failed or still alive, have resulted in increased public interest, thanks to digital economy 
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discussions, which seems to be getting even more popular every year. As new projects and 
trials are announced, the myth surrounding e-money has substantially increased, creating a need 
for more analysis, which is the aim of this thesis. There also seems to be a need to define e- 
money in the first place as the confusion persists because some argue that e-money covers 
every electronic payment instrument from debit cards to cheques (Boeschoten and Hebbink, 
1996) whereas some make a clear distinction between electronic payment instruments and e- 
money (ECB, 1998). However, none of them differentiates between representative and 
independent issuance. The thesis intends to fill this gap as well. 
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The main questions to be addressed in this thesis may be grouped within five basic 
headings for exploring and explaining e-money. 
1. What is electronic money? A definition will be the starting point of the analysis. As e- 
money is an emerging phenomenon, recent definitions given seem to be confusing and 
contradictory, as they do not clearly indicate a full and complete definition because of the 
incomplete nature of different proposals for e-money. The intention is to single out the best 
definition that explains all the aspects of e-money. More than that, complexities on the current 
definitions will be discussed, as well. 
2. What are the current trends in the development of e-money? This question will be 
answered through case studies on two different types of e-money. One type is the card-based 
solutions, addressed by Mondex and the other type is network-based solutions addressed by 
Digicash. The analysis will keep in mind that differences are getting closer and closer after the 
discoveries on the multi-functionalities of smart cards that allow card-based solutions to 
address network payments and network-based solutions to address conventional payments. 
3. What are the opinions and perceptions of innovators (as technology discoverers and 
providers) and operators (as solution finders and applicators) on the issues surrounding e- 
money? Do they have parallel views on either side of the Atlantic? The first part of question 
will be answered by two surveys conducted in England during Smart99cards and 
Smartcard2000 Exhibitions. The second part of the question will be answered by the survey 
conducted in Miami, the US, by comparing the similarities and differences among European 
and American innovators and operators. 
4. What are the implications of e-money on monetary policy and policy instrument? The 
main weight in this section will be given to free banking possibilities of e-money, which might 
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force central banks to a contestable framework for their future existence. Assuming e-money is 
a reality, potential changes in the conduct of monetary policy will be investigated and any 
necessary adjustment for the conduct of monetary policy will be examined as well. The Bank of 
England and Bank of Finland are the sources of data used in this section as part of the analysis 
in order to provide real examples to the analysis. 
5. Should e-money be regulated? Although e-money is at the emerging stage, regulators 
(ECB, 1998 and EU, 1998) have already proposed different approaches to the regulation of e- 
money assuming that it needs to be regulated without waiting for a proven business case. 
Regulatory implications of e-money, due to its importance, will be discussed in order to 
investigate this question as the EU directive is finalised in the content and awaits publication in 
the Official Gazette. The official views of the UK's financial services authority will be 
investigated through a questionnaire supported by interviews in order to establish their 
approach to the regulation of e-money. 
1.3. THE AIMS OF THE RESEARCH: 
The main aims of the research are, first of all, to explain and define e-money and to 
evaluate critically the issues and problems raised by its emergence. The second aim is to seek 
out the current state of e-money trials with their success and failures including the technologies 
such as operating systems. The third aim is to find out innovators' and operators' opinions on 
the development of e-money and compare their views with central banks' approaches on both 
sides of the Atlantic in order to see whether they differ. The fourth aim is to investigate the 
implications of e-money especially for free banking alternatives to central banking and try to 
describe the impact of those implications on the current monetary policy framework 
arrangements. Finally, the last aim is to investigate whether financial authorities should 
intervene in e-money or not; extending the coverage to whether it can be regulated or not. 
1.4. MAIN FINDINGS 
The thesis, first of all, observed that the controversies with regard e-money starts with 
its definition. The hype surrounding the e-money phenomenon created contradictory proposals 
for a definition, and even the European Monetary Institute (the EMI) failed to give an 
acceptable or comprehensive definition as EMI (1994) ignored the network-based solutions and 
covered only card-based e-money schemes. 
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The second finding of the thesis is that e-money is still in an emerging stage and any 
decision made on the basis of the current pace of its development may be misleading. Almost 
every month, there seems to be a new announcement for a new solution to electronic 
representation of purchasing power. Private entrepreneurs have been investing a lot of money 
to come out with the most reliable business model ranging from simple Local Exchange 
Trading Systems (LETS) representing different items from time to bread, to complicated 
proposals such as distribution of gold as a medium of exchange in digital form. Not all the 
proposals manage to survive. Most of the earlier models designed three to five years ago have 
failed. But, the enthusiasm on the future of e-money seems still alive as more and more 
alternatives are developed, which has resulted in a situation where more e-money proposals 
appeared on the agenda than failed. The technology has had a strong impact on this fast moving 
agenda. In the beginning, e-money was almost all about smart cards but later Internet or 
networks gained increased priority. Recently, mobile phones, especially with wireless 
application protocols (WAP) gained popularity but the prospects for Personal Digital Assistants 
(PDAs) and digital TV (DTV) seems also very strong. If the current trend is extrapolated 
forward, it may be expected that the future may bring further alternative devices for e-money 
circulation such as game consoles, smart-card-powered electronic kitchen equipment such as 
refrigerators etc. 
These observations led the thesis to assume that the main drivers of e-money could most 
probably be the innovators as the real discoverers of necessary technologies to sustain lower 
fixed and operating cost of e-money business and operators as the service developers to enrich 
the technology to reach to the end user. After this assumption, three surveys have been 
conducted. 
In the first two 'surveys, the innovators and operators confirmed the potential of e- 
money to replace central bank money and they expected central banks and financial supervisors 
to regulate e-money in advance. The ECB's proposals have not been perceived as a negative 
influence on either innovation or competition for different schemes and the banks' monopoly 
on the e-money business was contested. Innovators and operators believed that e-money 
technology would diminish barriers to entry to the banking industry but went against the 
privatisation of money. They have almost unanimously agreed on a combined card and 
software base as the e-money `infrastructure' for the future. The main obstacles for e-money to 
replace central bank money were stated as technical infrastructure and interoperability and the 
dominant access medium of the future was believed to be personal computers (PCs) followed 
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by phones (mobile and home). Instead of a single and dominant one, the world of e-money 
would be shaped by two or even more operating systems according to them. Smart cards would 
be the most critical technology for the future success of e-money schemes and lack of co- 
operation with banks might be counted as the main reason for the failure of Digicash. Credit 
and debit card payments would be driven out by e-money applications as the future payment 
instruments. Impact of e-money on the financial industry was given as to decrease in the 
barriers to entry and increased efficiency and productivity for financial services as telcos were 
given a priority as the most competitive against banks. Innovators and operators almost equally 
favoured banks and other companies for the issuance of e-money and even the majority did not 
see banks as the main players in the financial service industry any more. They argued that 
central banks might loose their power at least to a certain extent to be the sole providers of 
monetary base and a re-emergence of free banking era with the flagship of e-money was 
supported by almost half of the innovators and operators. However, the creation of a world 
currency through the emergence of e-money was not supported and finally, innovators and 
operators went against central bank issuance of e-money. 
The third survey compared the results obtained to the earlier surveys' findings, as the 
main aim was to collect a comparative set of data. Major differences noticed were that 
innovators and operators on the other side of the Atlantic were somehow relatively more 
concerned than their European counterparts about the negative impact of central bank 
regulation of e-money on innovation and competition, and they were more involved in the 
discussion. The second difference was that participants in the European survey stated that 
technical infrastructure and interoperability are the main obstacles, whereas security and 
privacy are regarded as the leading problems for a successful e-money take-off in the US. In 
another separation the American innovators and operators gave more support to ATMs and 
hand-held devices while the Europeans paid more attention to DTV. Another distinction was 
that the US participants place less reliance on smart card-related common solutions, but they 
did feel that virtual and conventional financial transactions might require a combined solution. 
As another difference, the US participants gave more support to the expectation that instead of 
a single and dominant medium, e-money would be shaped by two or even more operating 
systems. Finally, the majority of European innovators and operators did not see banks as the 
main players in the financial service industry whereas the US perception was almost totally 
different on this issue. Other responses to the questions provided similar results. Whereas eight 
questions underlined different perceptions in different sides of the Atlantic, the rest of the 24 
7 
questions resulted in closer opinions. As a result, overall conclusion seems to be a clear 
consensus among innovators and operators in Europe and the US. They could not form a base 
for explaining all the differences between e-money perceptions of the FED and the ECB. 
Similar thoughts, perception and approaches to e-money among innovators and operators 
clearly surpassed the differences. 
With regard to implications of e-money, the major finding was that for two main 
reasons e-money befriends with free banking. First one is that innovation in payment 
technology is reducing the fixed costs of banking business. Secondly, as the computing power 
of new generation of computers increases, risk management and data processing with huge 
amounts of entries might become risk-free and less costly to process. It may then be possible 
that the information monopoly of banks relating to financial services may deteriorate, giving 
further opportunities for non-banks to supply financial services to customers. Such a 
development may decrease the special treatment of banks against other firms, so that the 
argument about the private positions of banks in an economy may become even harder to 
defend. E-money's impact for central banking in terms of the lender of last resort function, 
currency backing, and multiple currencies seems likely to be especially powerful. Technically, 
e-money may have different impacts for different functions of money. With regard to the unit 
of account function, it may be expected that e-money would decrease network externalities by 
both decreasing the fixed cost of networking (for example private clearing systems are already 
available) and by lowering the cost of switching from one local network to the other. With 
regard to the medium of exchange function, e-money would facilitate currency competition by 
allowing economic entities to provide technically efficient and effective alternative monies to 
reach end-users. With regard to the store of value function, e-money would increase the quality 
and quantity of information available and thus would greatly help to reduce imperfect 
information possibilities and to make easier portfolio selection procedures. 
With regard to findings on the regulation of e-money, it seems that every regulatory 
regime has its own influence on a given type of currency that the supervision covers. When e- 
money is issued as a representative currency, there would be no reason why regulation would 
be obsolete. But, when the issuance is independent with an alternative unit of account, then e- 
money might be extremely difficult to be kept under conventional regulation. 
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1.5. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
The research's first contribution is to clarify a framework for the theoretical analysis of 
e-money. The enormous amount of alternative definitions have been explored and a clear 
distinction between electronic payment instruments and e-money has been reached, including a 
separation of independent and representative issue of e-money. Secondly, case studies have 
been used in order to provide real-life examples for e-money schemes and in order to ease the 
understanding of the concept. Smart card operating systems have briefly been introduced, as 
they are the most and almost only (at least for now) suitable technical instruments to address 
both conventional and virtual life and behave as a bridge between the two. Thirdly, the thesis 
presents the perceptions of e-money innovators and operators with three extensive surveys. The 
first survey addresses basic problems surrounding e-money and main potential plus obstacles 
for successful implementation. The second survey extends the findings from the first survey 
and the final survey compares earlier findings in Europe to those innovators' and operators' 
perception in the US. The aim of this comparison has been to test whether the different 
perceptions between the ECB and the FED have any support among innovators and operators 
on both sides of the Atlantic. Finally, the thesis describes the monetary policy implications of 
e-money, especially with regards the synergy between free banking and central banking and 
potential transformation of central banking to a contestable framework. After looking at the 
relationship between money and payment system technologies and velocity implications of e- 
money, the thesis explores whether e-money should be regulated or not. 
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2. AN APPROACH TO ANALYSING E-MONEY 
In this research, e-money will be investigated as a phenomenon, as it is an evolving 
financial innovation. Consequently, an exploratory approach will be preferred in order to 
understand the recent phase of development, which will be followed by an explanatory 
approach to identify potential, obstacles and implications of e-money and to clarify 
speculations and controversies surrounding it. 
The thesis uses case studies to analyse two particular e-money products, one for card- 
based (Mondex) and the other for network-based (Digicash). The first case covers a field 
search for 10 days in August 1998 by a visit to Exeter University to explore a close circuit e- 
money trial by Mondex. During the field search, all the University outlets that accept Mondex 
value was visited and high street shops were interviewed about their interest in the project. The 
University library, computer room and photocopy outlet were all visited, in order to cover 
multi-applications of Mondex smart cards. National Westminster Bank (NatWest) officials 
contributed to the search by many means including information package for Mondex 
cardholders, potential system upgrades and questions were kindly answered in a half an hour 
interview. Another field search was conducted at the Helsinki University multi-functional smart 
card project so as to see the equipment. It was a short visit and the aim was limited just to have 
a visual image of the reflections of the trial in general. 
For the second case study, Digicash is chosen as a network-based e-money provider. 
Internet opportunities have often been used for communication purposes both with Digicash 
and with St. George Bank in Australia as the financial service provider for Digicash's e-cash, 
representing Australian Dollar. Both company officials have been very helpful in both 
providing insights about the project and answering questions. After the bankruptcy of the 
company, e-mails have been used to contact the Digicash staff about the future of the product. 
As soon as eCash Technologies announced the taking over the intellectual property of the 
company, additional questions have been sent through emails in order to keep the developments 
up to date. Obviously, the coverage of the thesis is not limited to these two examples of e- 
money. Whenever a new proposal went public, a special attention has been given to the product 
and as soon as anything found seriously advantageous compared to earlier proposals, more time 
given to analyse the product. E-gold is a good example of such a case as well as Beenz and 
some LETSs such as Ithaca Hours and Berkeley Bread. 
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Because e-money is a new phenomenon, the research method selected has mainly been 
survey techniques. The first survey was conducted between 23 and 25 February 1999 during 
Smard99card Exhibition in London with more than 120 exhibitors including the major 
innovators in smart card technologies such as Gemplus, Hitachi, Schlumberger and payment 
system innovators such as Mondex, Visacash, Europay and Proton. 105 questionnaire were 
distributed and response rate was about 49 % as 51 questionnaires have been collected back. 
After analysing the outcome of the first survey, the same avenue has been used for a 
second survey in order to extend coverage and deepen the understanding of innovators and 
operators perception on e-money trends in year 2000. The survey was conducted at the 13th 
International Advanced Card Exhibition and Conference (Smartcard2000), which was held in 
Olympia 2 in London on 8- 10 February 2000. The exhibition coverage included areas such as 
information technology, telecommunications, payments, identification and security, transport 
and access control, health, e-commerce, loyalty, gaming, multimedia, and personalisation card 
management. Almost all e-money scheme operators such as Mondex International Ltd, 
Europay International, Proton World International SA and Visa International participated at the 
exhibition. Maosco Ltd, the company behind Multos operating system, also joined. Innovators 
around the World behind the e-money technology including Ascom, Gemplus Ltd, Hitachi 
Europe Ltd, Oberthur Card Systems, Philips Semiconductors Gratkor, Keycorb Ltd, Racal 
Security and Payments, Fortress U&T Ltd and Schlumberger Systems have contributed to the 
exhibition, as many of them were in the first survey's sample last year as well. Total number of 
exhibitors was just above 90 and during the survey 107 questionnaires were distributed totally 
and 70 of them collected back with a return rate of 65 %. 
The final survey' was conducted at the Cardtech/Securtech2000 Conference and 
Exhibition, 1-4 May 2000 in Miami in the United States (the US), which was announced as the 
World's premier card and security technology conference and exhibition. The venue had 
everything from smart cards, biometrics, public key infrastructure, identity, e-commerce, 
mobile telephony, loyalty, mass transit, health care, to electronic banking. All the named 
sectors may be accepted as directly or indirectly related to the future of e-money. During the 
time of the survey, most of the named sectors exhibited mostly smart card-based solutions in 
their field of interest. The organisers expected more that 10,000 IT professionals and solution 
' The Bank of Finland has sponsored this survey in full during the Research Fellowship from April to September 2000. 
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providers, not only from the US but all around the world (65 nations) to join the exhibition. In 
all, 250 questionnaires were distributed during the survey, from which 97 responses were 
collected, giving a return rate of about 39%. The survey covered almost all of the relevant 
international operators including Proton World, Visa and Mondex International, almost all of 
the main e-money innovators around the world such as Atmel Corp, Bull Smart Cards, Digital 
Privacy, Inc., Hitachi Maxell Ltd., Infineon Technologies, Gemplus, Microsoft Corporation, 
Motorola, Overthur Card Systems and Sun Microsystems. All three of the major operating 
systems developers (Sun Microsystems for Java, Microsoft Corporation for Windows for Smart 
Cards (WSCs), and Maosco (Multi-Application Operating System Consortium) for Multos) has 
been represented at the venue as well. 
Relating especially to the regulation of e-money, individual interviews have been used 
in order to find insights from the regulators and e-money issuers. These individuals have 
mainly been officials from the Financial Services Authority (the FSA) as the prudential 
supervisory authority in the UK. The FSA interview was arranged after sending the questions 
in advance through. One Official responsible for the regulation of e-money has completed and 
returned it. During the interview, the surrounding problems with respect to the questions were 
discussed. Before the finalisation of the thesis, the interview notes has been updated in order to 
eliminate any outdated information. The BOE as the responsible institution for the overall 
stability of the financial sector preferred to answer the questions through emails and no 
interview was conducted. Later, the Official view of the Bank on the development of e-money 
was published at the BIS (2000). During the project at the Bank of Finland, discussions have 
been extended through individual interview, and through discussion sessions for the proposed 
publications. 
Other than the central bank and supervisory agencies, there have been extensive 
individual interviews with e-money innovators and operators, conducted at the surveys 
mentioned above. For all the surveys, a lot of time spent on the interviews in order to improve 
the understanding of e-money potential and get up-to-date information on the recent pace of 
projects. Interviews were extensive enough to follow the current state of e-money. Other than 
being survey samples, exhibitions played an additional role in the understanding of e-money. 
For instance, in the US survey, actual e-money has been spent on the vending machines around 
the venue. It was also possible to experience how e-money may be transferred on the 
conventional and mobile networks. Further than this, Hitachi Europe has actually donated an 
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electronic wallet, which enables person to person transfer of value from one smart card to 
another with dual card reading potential, for the dissertation as a visual contribution. 
There seems no difficulty in communication through Internet in relation to questions 
about both on e-money products and issues. Internet helped especially in the understanding of 
international issues regarding e-money. One example of this help is the membership to the e- 
gold discussion group for which the membership started almost a year ago. The membership 
did not only help to capture the developments with regards e-gold but also to be informed about 
the alternative e-money proposals as the group addresses the issues surrounding new 
applications and informed the members about interesting ideas. Main interviews with regards 
the follow-up of Digisash has been conducted through the Internet as well including eCash 
Technologies take-over and following projects. 
The rest of the thesis relied on the secondary analysis techniques especially to bring out 
monetary policy and payment system implications of e-money. Monetary and payment 
statistics have been evaluated in order to find guidance for the understanding of e-money. 
Additionally, Association for Payment Clearing Services (APACS) provided internal research 
results through the Internet, which shows payment instrument trends up to 2007. The BOE data 
including MO and M4 indexes have mostly been downloaded through the Internet but all 
records of profit and loss accounts has been collected from the annual reports at the Bank's 
library. The indicators with regards the Bank of Finland has been collected by the research 
department of the Bank during the project. 
Overall, the research design is based on a critical analysis of the recent literature 
including evaluation of recent developments and case studies are used to investigate potential, 
issues, and implications of e-money. Three surveys conducted collected three sets of data to 
deepen the understanding of e-money's innovators and operators perception. Two groups were 
given special importance as it was assumed that they play one of the most critical roles on the 
development of e-money. Innovators have the potential to carry the reach of advanced 
technology to new highs whereas operators are capable of solving obstacles for e-money by 
manipulating the technologies discovered by the innovators. Field searches conducted and 
exhibitions joined have helped to capture a visual image of current e-money trials and the thesis 
relied on secondary analysis to find out the implications of e-money. 
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3. DATA SOURCES 
The first set of qualitative data was collected by a survey of e-money innovators and 
operators, which was conducted on 23 and 25 February 1999 during Smard99card Exhibition in 
London. The participants were asked about the potential and development of e-money, 
obstacles surrounding e-money, regulatory issues relating to innovation and competition and 
non-bank issuance of e-money, whether e-money can replace central bank money, whether 
non-banks be allowed to issue e-money, potential future bases, potential access mediums for 
the future and whether money should be privatised or not. The sample were assumed to present 
basic technology developments behind e-money schemes as all the payment adaptations of 
related technologies were presented by major companies during the exhibition. 
The second set of data was collected at the 13th International Advanced Card 
Exhibition and Conference (Smartcard2000), which was held in Olympia 2 in London on 8- 
10 February 2000. The data set came out as complementary to the first survey with detailed 
questions on the issues closely related to the development of e-money. The last four questions 
of the survey addressed the future potential impact of e-money on free banking re-emergence, a 
potential world currency supported by e-money media, whether e-money can critically decrease 
the power of central banks on the conduct of monetary policy and whether central banks 
themselves should issue e-money or not. 
The final set of data came from the survey conducted at the Cardtech/Securtech2000 
Conference and Exhibition, 1-4 May 2000 in Miami, the US. First eleven questions were taken 
from the first survey and the rest from the second survey. The set provided an opportunity to 
make some comparisons between the European and the American perceptions with regards e- 
money and has been used to analyse whether the perception differs between the ECB (an in- 
advance approach to the regulation of e-money) and the FED (a wait-and-see policy towards e- 
money developments) have been supported by innovators and operators on either side of the 
Atlantic. 
The data for secondary analysis come from different sources. The Bank of England 
(BOE) and the Bank of Finland (BOF) are the main data providers for the research. Most of the 
BOE monetary statistics are from the web-site as downloadable Excel files, but time series data 
about annual profit transfer of the BOE to HM Treasury were collected from the annual reports 
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at the BOE library. Finally, the BOF research department has provided statistical data during 
the project research. 
In the analysis of the payment trends in the UK, APACS provided detailed information, 
available on the web pages. An internal research result within APACS about projections for 
payment trends was privately mailed by APACS as well. 
The future equipment for e-money infrastructure has been seen in both exhibitions and 
field searches. During the surveys at extra times available, as many different stands as possible 
were visited and detailed information collected on the design of the e-money equipment. This 
process helped the understanding of practical solutions that e-money may provide during and 
after the launches. 
For the literature review, Internet has been a useful source of information especially for 
the case study on network-based e-money. Many reports were printed on the Net before the 
publisher such as ECB (1998) made them available through the mail. The same happened for 
the BIS survey on e-money developments. (BIS, 2000). Additionally, some private companies 
such as Consult Hyperion created a publication page on the Net and shared some of the 
research papers with interested parties. The company also provided invitations to two 
successive conferences on Digital Money in two consecutive years with full documentation. 
During the conferences, the discussions have been actively followed and they are used as a 
source of enlightenment on the e-money issues. Many of the e-money operators provide 
information on the Net about their products and proposals as almost all e-money proposals 
recently have network-based solutions. The Internet became the main source for finding the 
new proposals and getting to know them as they emerge. Most of central banks including the 
FEDs, have their web pages providing useful reports about e-money. The BIS has also provided 
important documents on the emergence of e-money since 1996. 
Finally, macroeconomic indicators for the UK were taken from Office for National 
Statistics publications (Economic Trends) and Datastream. 
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4. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter of the thesis develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of e-money 
and reviews the related literature before using case studies to capture current stages of scheme 
proposals. The first section of the chapter provides basic information on money with its 
definition, functions, and features. Then, it briefly summarises the evolution of money and 
concludes describing the general problems surrounding money. 
The second part applies the same analysis to e-money including an in-depth search of 
definitions given by many authors and then covers its expected functions and features. It then 
follows the sources of demand for e-money and addresses its potential including the general 
problems around the concept. It concludes with a summary of e-money's impact for central 
banks. 
4.1. MONEY 
This section is devoted to the analysis of conventional money with its definition, 
functions and features. It starts with the definition in the following section and concludes with 
problems surrounding money. 
4.1.1. DEFINITION OF MONEY 
In general, money is defined as anything that is a generally and immediately acceptable 
medium for transactions even though this core definition may be extended. For example, 
Rutherford (1992) defined money as anything, which is generally and immediately acceptable 
for the discharge of a debt or in exchange for a good and service. The author gave a separate 
definition for fiat money (which is commonly used in modem economies) as anything, which is 
declared to be acceptable as money by a central bank or finance ministry in charge of the 
currency. Obviously, the need for money in a society is almost inevitable and may basically 
arise from the fact that without it, specialisation (division of labour) may turn out to be quite 
difficult. Money is expected to decrease transaction costs, which may be high under barter 
regimes and provide a unit of account as a societal measure. 
Money can appear in different forms as well. Goacher (1993) made a distinction 
between representative and token money, as the first one is banknotes that need a widespread 
confidence in its purchasing power, and the second one is financial claims such as bank 
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deposits that additionally need a confidence in the financial service provider and in the 
financial system. 
4.1.2. FUNCTIONS OF MONEY 
It is generally accepted that there are four main functions of money. The first one is that 
money is generally and immediately acceptable as a medium of exchange. This function 
sustains money as a payment instrument and maybe it is the first requirement that anything 
needs in order to be accepted as money. The second function of money is given as store of 
value so that wealth can be held and transferred for the future consumption in money form. The 
third function is a unit of account meaning to act as a common denominator for the valuation of 
goods, services and assets in order to make it possible to compare relative prices. This function 
refers to the integrity of money, which may be accepted as the most important societal function 
of money. Because anything from tobacco to gold may function as a medium of exchange but 
the same is not true for the unit of account. The last function, which sometimes cited in the 
literature, is that money is a standard for deferred payments. 
4.1.3. FEATURES OF MONEY 
Typically, money has in general the following features as outlined by Goacher (1993): 
The basic feature seems to be acceptability because without being generally and immediately 
acceptable, money may not function at all. Portability is another feature that follows. Heavy 
and physically inconvenient things may not be accepted as money because of the difficulties of 
moving around. Divisibility is required to guarantee that all transactions for different values can 
be undertaken. Denominations should be available in order to enable as small as possible and 
large value payments at the same time. Durability is needed to feel safe that money will keep 
its form under normal circumstances and will not be damaged easily as resistant against normal 
heat and cold. Homogeneity is a necessary feature to serve in a unique physical form in order to 
prevent possible confusions. The forms of money should not be confusing. Recognisability is 
preferable to ensure that there will be no need for a special expertise to identify money and 
`easy to capture nature' not by only average person but children and aged as well. Being 
unforgeable, at least easily unforgeable, is another feature because forgeable money may not 
survive, as the cost of production is so low compared to its purchasing power. Easily forgeable 
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money may lead to over-issue as well and may not defend the integrity at all. Schoter and 
Willmer (1997) named three additional features relating to the characteristics of transactions: 
a) Atomicity meaning that a transaction either occurs or not; 
b) Consistency meaning that conditions of the exchange need to be agreed by all 
participants; and 
c) Isolation meaning that there needs to be no interdependence on two different 
transactions. 
After listing these features, it may be argued that purchasing power of money may play 
the most critical role on the generally and immediately acceptance as it creates a history of 
reliability. 
4.1.4. EVOLUTION OF MONEY 
The history of money may go as back as the history where exchange of goods and 
services on non-barter base started among human beings. Williams (1997) stated that the story 
goes back to the third millennium BC in Mesopotamia and Egypt, broadly characterised by the 
monetary use of precious metals and added that silver as money takes back as far as the twenty- 
fourth century BC in Mesopotamia. In the seventh century BC, moneyhad a form by coinage. 
Paper money appeared in China in 1189. Evolution from precious metals to coinage and to 
paper money reached Europe in 1656 as the first banknote was issued in Sweden. In the 
thirteenth century, before paper money, banking emerged as a specialised profession in Italy. 
Banks were encouraging the use of bills of exchanges and written instructions as means of 
payments. 
It may be worth noting that paper money both in China and Sweden were printed by 
private companies. Nationalisation of money started in nineteenth century after many failures 
of private monies mainly due to over-issue and due to financial crises (because of systemic 
risks) arguably arising from overspending of governments in financing wars. Private monies 
were generally backed by bullion mainly gold or government bonds. Backing paper money 
with gold lasted until the 1970s despite the short or long-term disturbances from time to time. 
Governmental money became almost a fashion parallel to national pride motives, even the 
value has fluctuated greatly. 
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4.1.5. GENERAL PROBLEMS WITH MONEY 
It may be argued that money has always been one of the most controversial issues in the 
history of mankind. Chown (1994) examined the creation and transmission of money and 
questioned the general problems surrounding it in a historical perspective. Seigniorage, which 
may be defined as the charge for turning bullion into coins, was addressed as a problem. The 
author pointed out that seignorage may also be defined as the profit element from money 
business only. Recently, it is sometimes argued that seignorage is the amount of profit that has 
been gained by central banks from money business, especially interest earning from treasury 
bill and bond holdings as the counterparts of currency in circulation. 
Chown (1994) addressed debasement (which was defined as the practice of rulers to 
reduce gradually the precious metal content of the coins they issued under their so-called 
guarantee) as another problem. According to the author, Gresham's Law, which was quoted as 
`bad money drives out good' only applies if money means coins that are widely accepted and 
pointed out currency substitution in many developing countries. Hayek (1990) argued that 
Gresham's Law applies only when it is forced to fix rate of exchange between different forms 
of money. 
Changes in the value of metals used as money were addressed as another problem as 
these changes caused price movements. Chown, (1994) addressed bimetallism as it gave 
arbitrage opportunities. Hayek (1990) argued that acute inflation and deflation are the main 
problems surrounding money recently. After the First World War, almost every nation 
preferred to have their own currency. However, especially after the collapse of Bretton Woods 
system at the beginning of the 1970's, acute inflation became a serious phenomenon 
surrounding not only developed but developing countries as well. For example, in some Latin 
American countries such as Brazil and Argentina, hyperinflation caused money to be re-defined 
sometimes more than once and in some countries inflation reached around 20 % to 150 % as it 
has happened in Turkey since 1980. 
4.2. ELECTRONIC MONEY 
This section is devoted to the analysis of e-money with its definition, functions and 
features. The sources of demand for e-money will be evaluated and the rest of the section will 
cover general problems with e-money including the future potential and its implications for 
central banks. 
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4.2.1. DEFINITION OF E-MONEY 
To date, there is not a generally agreed definition and terminology for e-money in the 
literature. In recent discussions, it is defined in different ways and called under different names 
such as, smart money, digital money, electronic money, cyber-money, electronic currency, 
electronic purse, virtual money, internet money and electronic script. 
Money and cash are sometimes assumed to be the same in principle and some writers 
called e-money as smart cash, digital cash, virtual cash, cyber cash and electronic cash. 
Additionally, there seems to be a general confusion about the money and payment instruments 
such as debit and credit cards. In some analysis, anything from cheques to point of sales 
electronic fund transfers have been included in the definition of e-money, and in other cases it 
is strictly limited to the electronic representation of purchasing power. In the following parts, 
some of the definitions given to e-money will be overviewed critically. 
The EMI provided an earlier analysis of e-money potential. The aim was to improve the 
understanding of the functioning of multiple purpose prepaid cards also named as electronic 
purses which were accepted to have a potential to reduce the use of coins and banknotes 
significantly in retail transactions and excluded network-based e-money, which has not been 
developed yet at that time. The money received by the issuer of an electronic purse was, in 
economic terms, assumed by EMI (1994) to be the same as bank deposits. In the name of 
monetary policy implications, e-money was considered as a substitution of one form of money 
for another one and not a serious impact on monetary policy was expected at least in the short 
run. The definition covered only card-based e-money. 
Another early official definition was given by the US Department of the Treasury 
(1996) and e-cash was described as a claim on a party, most commonly, the issuer, stored in the 
form of computer code on a card about the size of a credit card or on the hard drive of a 
computer. The definition covered both card and network-based e-money opposed to EMI 
(1994). 
In another contribution to the literature, Ely (1996) defined e-money as the balance 
recorded electronically on a stored-value card and assumed that it is a credit for the balance on 
the card, which is a liability of its issuer. The author argued that specie (i. e., gold and silver 
coins) is the only form of money that is not a form of credit, but such coins no longer circulate 
in market economies and concluded that fundamentally, e-money is no different than all other 
forms of money in use today. 
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In one of the first publications on e-money in a book format, Lynch and Lundquist 
(1996) demonstrated that digital money is an electronic replacement for cash, which is storable, 
transferable and unforgeable. The authors argued that electronic commerce needs it's own type 
of payment instrument and with the help of advanced technology of smart cards and 
encryption, e-money is ready for use securely. The analysis gave an earlier picture of expected 
virtual life and e-money has been assumed as one of the most important complementary 
components in this new way of life. 
One of the earlier central bank discussion papers looked at the implications of e-money 
from a central bank point of view. Boeschoten and Hebbink (1996) considered e-money to 
include multi-purpose prepaid cards as well as other electronic transactions used in internet- 
payments (e-cash) and EFTPOS (electronic funds transfer system at the point of sale) payments 
and argued that such as prepaid card payments, electronic transfers replace cash turnover and 
consequently currency demand. They argued that any type of payment instrument operating 
electronically and reducing cash circulation might be treated as e-money. Their analysis 
extended the definition to any electronic payment instrument that has been used for executing 
transactions or can be used in the future as they have taken the main criteria as `decrease in 
demand for currency in circulation'. A similar line of argument was offered by Solomon (1997) 
as it was concluded that developments in the electronic delivery channels through electronic 
funds transfer (EFT) payment systems might lead to fast money flows and eventually virtual 
money. 
As the international organisation for national central banks, BIS started to follow e- 
money developments as early as 1995 and produced its first report on the security of e-money 
issuance. Instead of giving a particular definition, BIS (1996a) preferred to make a description 
as, stored value products that are generally prepaid payment instruments in which a record of 
funds is owned by or available to the consumer's possession. The technology that can support 
true electronic currency has been observed as ready. 
In the same year in another publication the BIS (1996b) defined e-money as the 
monetary value measured in currency units stored in an electronic form on an electronic device 
in the consumers' possession. It was demonstrated that the electronic value can be purchased 
by the consumer and held on the device and is reduced whenever the consumer uses the device 
to make purchases. That application was found contradicting with traditional electronic 
payment transactions such as those with debit or credit cards, which typically require online 
authorisation and involve the debiting of the consumer's bank account after the transaction. 
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Two different types of electronic devices were named: prepaid cards and prepaid software 
products. With prepaid cards, it was pointed out, the electronic value is stored on a computer 
chip (or integrated circuit) embedded in the card and value is typically transferred by inserting 
the card in a card reader. It was added that with software products the electronic value is stored 
on the hard disk of a computer and is transferred over communication networks such as the 
Internet when payments are made. 
In another BIS initiative, the Group of Ten (the GOT) admitted the confusion on a 
precise definition of e-money in its 1997 publication. Instead, the GOT (1997) preferred to 
exclude large value Interbank funds transfer systems, giro, automated clearing house and direct 
debit systems, new means to access credit card payments and home banking systems, from the 
definition. Then, the report underlined the fact that e-money devices typically represent a 
general or pooled liability of an issuer on a hardware device changing from plastic cards with 
chips to special software on personal computers. 
Rossell (1997) argued that despite the recent `hype', many people are not sure precisely 
what is meant by the term e-money and the `lingo' that has developed around it. He argued 
that, in a nutshell, e-money refers to balances stored on a computer chip embedded in a smart 
card that can be used for transaction purposes. 
In an individual contribution, Roberts (1997) argued that as in the case with smart cards, 
electronic cash resembles traditional, privately issued banknotes in the sense that it represents a 
liability of the issuer and not of the buyer using e-cash to make a purchase. 
Another contribution to the literature came from Schreft (1997), who assumed that 
stored-value cards are one form of electronic cash-electronic substitutes for paper currency and 
indicated that the newer stored-value cards are a type of smart card in that they have an 
embedded computer chip that can hold much more information than a magnetic stripe. The 
author noted that digital cash (also known as cyber-cash or e-cash) is the other form of 
electronic cash coming into use today and added that it consists of bits and bytes in cyberspace 
and substitutes for paper currency in transactions made over the Internet. 
In a descriptive analysis of the alternative e-money proposals, Wayner (1997) 
underlined the differences between account-based e-money that stores value in a ledger of a 
trusted third party and exchanged by subtracting the amount from one entry to another, and 
2 The publication was mainly about the consumer protection, law enforcement, supervisory and cross border implications of e-money and has been written by the working party on e-money for Group of Ten. 
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token-based e-money that revolves around unforgeable packets of bits that are traded such as 
pieces of paper and coins. This definition separates e-money from advanced payment solutions. 
But, Warwick (1998) gave a description for e-money, as being electronic circulation of the US 
dollar and everything that eases this circulation has been included within the definition. The 
author actually proposed a `federal electronic currency system' to eliminate the cost of 
banknotes and coins, which was estimated to be around $60 billion annually in the US. 
The European Commission Draft Directives (1998) argued that e-money can best be 
conceived as a digital form of cash as it has many of the characteristics of cash and gave the 
primary similarity as that to use e-money, authorisation is not required from a bank or other 
third party. The Draft defined e-money as monetary value, which is; 
1. Stored electronically on an electronic device like a chip card or a computer memory; 
2. Accepted as means of payment by undertakings other than the issuing institution; 
3. Generated in order to be put at the disposal of users to serve as an electronic surrogate for 
coins and banknotes; and 
4. Generated for the purpose of effecting electronic transfers of limited value payments. 
After two years of discussions on the European legislation procedures, this definition 
has been finalised with some changes. The final version is that e-money means monetary value 
as represented by a claim on the issuer which is (i) stored on an electronic device; (ii) issued on 
receipt of funds of an amount not less in value than the monetary value issued; (iii) accepted as 
means of payment by undertakings other than the issuer. This is one of the first legal definition 
given to e-money up to now. 
In this research, e-money will be defined as in the ECB (1998) which defined it broadly 
`as an electronic store of monetary value on a technical device that may be widely used for 
making payments to undertakings other than the issuer without necessarily involving bank 
accounts in the transaction, but acting as a prepaid bearer instrument'. 
This definition covers the following aspects of e-money: 
1. E-money is a prepaid bearer instrument excluding all kind of electronic payment 
instruments such as credit and debit cards and EFT payments. Obviously, the word 
`prepaid' should be taken with cautious as e-money may also be earned directly or be 
owned as a credit. 
2. It covers payments to undertakings other than the issuer which is a required aspect to 
differentiate e-money products from single purpose prepaid cards such as telephone cards. 
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3. Transactions do not necessarily require a bank account or any other financial service 
providers' authorisation. This potential excludes all kind of account-based (debit or credit) 
payment instruments. 
4. E-money stores monetary value on a technical device with a capacity to be used widely for 
making payments. The definition does not specify the type of technical device, which may 
be accepted as a better approach to the definition of e-money as it is in an emerging stage 
and technical potential of proposed devices are not fully clear yet. 
From this point, the ECB definition of e-money will be accepted as the most convenient 
definition, as it covers almost all of the accepted aspects of e-money. However, technological 
developments relating to e-money products should be watched carefully as these may still have 
an influence on the above definition with an unexpected innovation changing some basic 
features of e-money. On the other hand, the definition seems to cover just representative issue 
of e-money as it limits the definition to prepaid instruments, which means that e-money may be 
used only as a medium of exchange that has been covered by a current monetary system. In 
order to make a purchase, for example, first electronic value should be paid for so that it can be 
owned and transferred to complete the transaction. As a result, e-money for euro-zone becomes 
e-euro and e-money for the US becomes e-dollar. Unfortunately, this definition does not cover 
all type of e-money proposals that are available in the e-money market at the moment. Just to 
give an example, Beenz3 can only be earned on the Internet services and it can not be paid for 
by the end-users. Consequently, the definition does not cover the electronic issue of 
independent e-money, which is that the monetary value held by the electronic device does not 
represent any given national or international currency. In this case, anything from tobacco to 
time or bread that is used as money on an electronic environment may be included on the 
definition. These kinds of practices are already available in different parts of the world through 
LETS4 but not limited to locality only. At least one company at the moment has been trying to 
circulate gold digitally as a medium of exchange5. To conclude, it is better to be cautious not to 
limit the definition of e-money to prepaid instruments as it is not only limited just to represent a 
given national monetary frameworks' medium of exchange but it may be an independent part 
of a competitive monetary arrangement. 
3 www. beenz. com 
4 BREAD is local money that comes in denominations of 1Hour, 1/2 Hour, and 1/4 Hour. It is backed by labor and 
valued in Hours, but it can be thought of as $12 per Hour. Everyone is encouraged to participate and offer goods or 
skills for local money. (http: //www. breadhours. org/) 
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4.2.2. FUNCTIONS OF E-MONEY 
It may be argued that the expected functions of e-money would be the same as 
traditional functions of money, which were discussed in section 2.1.2. However, e-money is in 
its emerging stage and it may generally be accepted that it needs to prove itself as a medium of 
exchange in the first place. Without functioning as a medium of exchange, other functions may 
not follow. Obviously, it may be a mistake to limit e-money's whole function to medium of 
exchange, which was mostly captured by advanced electronic payment instruments such as 
credit and debit card schemes in many developed economies. 
4.2.3. FEATURES OF E-MONEY 
It may not be wrong to argue that e-money needs to have all the features of traditional 
money, 
-acceptability, portability, divisibility, atomicity, consistency, isolation, durability, 
homogeneity, recognisability, and unforgability- as analysed at section 2.1.3. On the other 
hand, because e-money can most probably and naturally be presented by a technical device, 
below mentioned features may help for the wider acceptance of e-money (Schoter and Willmer, 
1997): 
1. Economy: Transaction costs arising from the usage of e-money should be as low as possible 
and competitive against other payment instrument like cash and access products (credit and 
debit cards) in order to attract more customers. Basically, e-money has its real potential if it 
can decrease transaction costs below banknotes and coins. It may be wrong to assume that 
currency in circulation is cost-less to the society. The simplest cost is the interest that has 
been given up to keep the change in the pocket. Additionally, the real societal function of 
money in a society is to support division of labour by decreasing transaction cost as low as 
possible and if e-money can decrease this cost further, then its chance for being demanded 
might increase. 
2. Interoperability: It is defined as compatibility of different e-money devices to each other. 
This feature may be accepted as one of the most critically required feature of e-money 
because unless interoperability of e-money is sustained, the number of potential users may 
not reach a level to support the critical mass required to maintain the cost of investment. 
Without interoperability, e-money products may not be accepted widely, which is a 
necessary requirement to fulfil the medium of exchange function. This requires 
5 www. e-gold. com 
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compatibility of all electronic equipment so that one e-money holder can make spending 
anywhere, anytime and anyhow (with any instrument such as TV, mobile or conventional 
phones or PDAs). 
3. Conservation: This feature is required to guarantee that money hold its value over time 
securely without any technical disturbance. Unless used or destroyed, e-money should be 
fungible. As a result, the software to store value for the holder should always and for a very 
long time be reliable to keep the records safe and sound and revocable. Additionally, 
hardware that may get damaged as years pass by may cause loss of value and lower the 
potential demand for e-money. 
Security of e-money, which will be analysed in more detail in the following sections, 
may be compared to unforgability of traditional money. E-money needs to be user friendly 
requiring an ease of use further than recognisability. It should support disabled, aged and 
under-aged groups of the social life in order to sustain acceptability base. A very complicated 
software and hardware solution for e-money issuance may not create demand at all just because 
of the preference for simplicity. 
Anonymity of e-money may also be addressed as a privacy concern although even 
traditional money provides a limited anonymity. Off-line capacity to both transfer and receive 
e-money may extend the acceptability as well. 
4.2.4. DEMAND FOR E-MONEY 
Whatever the definition, or functions or features of e-money is, if there is no demand 
for it, any analysis may be in danger of being no more than an imaginary practice. However, 
the theme of this thesis is that there is already a real demand for a new payment alternative 
especially for international payments. An example can be given from personal experience with 
the difficulties of sending around £8 to the FED as a payment for a certain publication. At least 
two high street banks visited wanted to charge a transfer fee of not less than £5. The way 
money sent was to put £8 worth of the US dollars into an envelope and mail it to the address. It 
worked even though all the risks that had been taken. No other payment instrument offered by 
the banks seemed more convenient than this risky practice. It may seem quite primitive but it 
proved itself satisfactory at the end of the day. From this point, e-money may address similar 
problems that current monetary frameworks seems to be stuck and there seems to be a clear 
lack of solutions in international small value payments. 
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In this framework, Birch (1997) tried to find an answer to the question whether the 
existing and familiar payment technologies such as notes, coins, cheques, debit cards, credit 
cards, charge cards, wire transfers and so on extend their reach from the real to virtual worlds. 
The author argued that one particular sector named as micro-payments is of particular interest 
because banks' existing payment offerings stop being useful as the size of transactions falls 
below around £5. It was pointed out that potential of Internet payments innovation should fulfil 
these gap because it is not possible to use coins and notes on the Internet as a real life solution 
to the above problem. 
In a very useful analysis, the author broke down online payments sector into four 
subsections as: 
1. Macro payments, which are payments in access of £10.000 and can only be made 
convenient and cost-effective by using electronic funds transfer systems. 
2. Mini payments, which are payments from £10 to £10.000 and can be made using a variety 
of means ranging from credit cards to electronic cheques. 
3. Micro payments, which are payments from lp to £10 and cannot be made convenient and 
cost-effective using existing payment means. 
4. Nano payments which are payments that can not be made using any existing payment 
means whether cost-effective and convenient or not, such as a payment of 0.5p. 
The author excluded macro-payments from the analysis assuming that they will be 
conducted by wholesale payment systems and assumed that mini-payments are made by using 
credit and debit cards basically. Micro-payments were accepted as the main type of payments 
that attracts the most attention with two principal categories of implementations: software-only 
and smart card-based e-money schemes. 
In a similar analysis, Bauer (1995) described the cyberspace as the collection of 
computer communication networks that has evolved since the early 1970s and argued that there 
are three main reasons that attract vendors to cyberspace. The first one was given as millions of 
young, educated, and wealthier than average people throughout the world that have at least 
some access to Internet and the characteristics of these people are very attractive to marketers. 
The second one was given as that a business can offer its goods and services relatively cheaply, 
world-wide and 24 hours a day by just building a presence in cyberspace. The final reason was 
given as that the presence in cyberspace might boost sales by distributing detailed information 
to potential customers. The problems that should be overcome as the cyber-market evolves 
were named by the author as the difficulties in access by everyone, procedural and legal 
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challenges, controlling the content of material sold, copyright issues and as the most important 
problem of how to pay for cyber-goods and services. The author discussed why new payments 
instruments are needed for cyber-market. One reason was stated as the problems of trust, 
security and size for transactions arguing that a customer can mail the seller cash or cheque 
even if it is unlikely to be a satisfactory solution because of the lack of necessary trust between 
two strangers in cyberspace. Credit and debit cards may be accepted as a better alternative but 
as an open system, the potential for fraud was described as huge for credit and debit cards in 
cyberspace as someone with only a little technological expertise could get information about 
card numbers. Credit and debit cards were also said to have a problem in small value payments 
because the average cost for a credit card transaction was given as around 88 cents which 
makes them an uneconomical means of paying for small-value items. Lack of anonymity was 
stated as an additional problem. It was argued that once the security issue is resolved, new 
methods of payment would widen access to cyber-markets and stimulate the development of 
new products. The author concluded that e-money proposals have clear advantages as they may 
lower the transaction cost and spur the development of many new products parallel to e- 
commerce developments. 
On the same argument, Birch and Shaw (1995) tried to demonstrate the radical changes 
that e-money allows in Internet-based businesses such as computer programming, text 
marketing such as newspapers, video business as interactive TV or alike, music industry and 
new products composed of combinations of these services. They analysed recently available 
payment methods such as billing and subscription and realised that all available payment 
systems can technically not support Internet-based businesses. Consequently, the authors stated 
that what is required is a form of e-cash that allows consumers to pay the cost for their 
purchases at the time of sale and have that payment transmitted directly to the content-provider 
as the goods are being transmitted to the consumer. 
This potential for electronic payments have been analysed by others as well. For 
example, Fiske (1997) argued that all kind of mass-market payment schemes would benefit by 
using a technology that provides the following: 
" 
Transfer of e-money over digital networks in real time, which seems possible after several 
schemes supported by cryptography, (some on software and some on smart cards) have 
been developed in recent years. 
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" Widespread acceptance in the physical world as well as in cyberspace which requires that 
the value issuers should be as trusted as those in the real world who issue real notes and 
coins and the payment methods should be acceptable in everywhere. In the long term, it 
may be cheaper and more flexible to use digital cash. 
" The devices that connect the payments to the digital networks must be cheap and 
widespread. 
The author mentioned that e-money may begin to influence existing billing systems, because 
the payment processing components will need to be modified to take into account of the online 
nature of the new medium. It was believed that an exiting opportunity exists to leverage the real 
time cleared funds nature of e-cash to provide new online digital services, which would 
otherwise be commercially unfeasible. It was concluded that traditional billing is a barrier to 
profitable business and e-cash provide a major opportunity to service providers. 
After briefly summarising the source of demand for e-money from the virtualisation of 
life, the next section looks at the potential of this new instrument. Before that there may be one 
source of demand for e-money that needs to be addressed: Currency substitution in many 
countries seems to be a reality in recent years6. One of the basic reasons for this phenomenon is 
the unreliability of the national monetary framework that serves the society. But, the phase of 
substitution is generally limited to the store of value function of money and even foreign 
banknotes and coins are sometimes used for transaction purposes, the reach is most of the time 
limited to certain relatively developed regions in those countries. If it is assumed that e-money 
could provide an alternative as a medium of exchange in countries where there are conditions 
leading to currency substitution, the pace of it would be faster and wider. As a result the reach 
of `good money' increases and `funny money' may find less and less circulation basis unless 
the monetary policy regime has been transformed to a competitive base. In short, the demand 
for e-money may be extended further with the virtualisation of life and there may be increased 
demand for cyber payments that is not feasible with currently available instruments. There may 
be a demand even from conventional life for relatively more stable payment mediums in 
different parts of the world in a way of enriching the reach of `quality' monetary frameworks. 
6 The rate of currency substitution in Turkey, for example, has kept changing between 30% to 55% since 1980. 
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4.2.5. POTENTIAL OF E-MONEY: 
There seems to be quite a lot speculation about the potential of e-money but most of 
them are based on different assumptions. In this section, some of the relatively obvious 
potential will be discussed. 
Micro-payments seem to create a real demand beyond any speculation and this demand 
may be observed in many e-commerce practices, as there are still going on discussions about 
security of credit and debit card payments on the net. Other options may stop being useful for 
distant micro-payments. To give an example, if an entrepreneur wants to have a business to sell 
valuable information in the form of content trading for 5p per page, there seems no single 
payment instrument available for such a transaction to be completed instantly and 
independently without accumulating. If an author wants to publish a book on the internet for 
£1, it is again the same and there is no alternative to send a cheque, which even mailing cost 
becomes a serious portion of the cost of the good being bought. 
The cost of money transfers, especially international, seems to add another dimension of 
the demand for e-money, which may also be pointed out as a barrier to international small-scale 
trade. The example given at the beginning of the earlier section may fit well as an example. 
Maybe, systems such as SWIFT or national wholesales real time gross settlement payment 
systems managed to enrich payment options but the cost reflected to the end users came out to 
be unacceptably high. Any e-money scheme that can decrease the cost of international 
transactions and enrich alternative ways may create demand for the solution. To enrich the 
argument, one recent discussion in the UK may be given as an example of this point. For the 
ATM withdrawals, the banking industry want to charge a fee structure and consumer 
associations refused the proposals. Any new payment systems that can decrease current cost 
structure of payments seem to have a potential to guarantee a chance of survival against 
conventional solutions in this sense. 
Another interesting potential lies on the multi-purpose smart-card applications. It is 
getting to be generally accepted that technical developments on smart cards have been 
increasing the amount of data that smart-cards can hold and manipulate and security has been 
increasing as new applications on software are designed with cryptographic solutions. As 
smart-cards get more integrated to daily social life, e-money may play a wider role than 
recently observed potential. 
The US Treasury (1996) named two underlying developments that supports e- money: 
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1. Decline in the cost of computing power and increase in processing performance. 
2. Advances in communication technologies with continuing increase in the application of 
computer technologies to communication systems and sharply growing capacity of 
communication channels in addition to the reductions on the time needed to transmit text 
and graphics as a whole. 
Four basic benefits of e-money were stated as the lower transaction costs, reductions in 
alternative payment instruments (such as credit cards) fraud, reduced risk of theft and 
vandalism in retail outlets and increased convenience for consumers. The study explored forces 
for e-money growth and argued that expanding electronic-based government payments and 
collections may be a turning point in e-money products. If, for example, government 
unemployment benefits and the like are paid in e-money form, the essential critical mass for the 
development of e-money may be easier to reach (the US Treasury, 1996). Recently, the US 
government preferred to transfer all kind of benefits in electronic form, which is knows as 
electronic benefit transfer system. 
Birch (1996) made some suggestions as to the likely retail-banking environment in the 
coming world of e-money and the Infobahn. The author argued that there are two reasons why 
e-money is going to establish a presence more rapidly than many people imagine at present. 
The first reason stated as increasing cost of physical cash because of labour costs and 
counterfeiting and the second reason as decreasing cost of e-money due to advances in smart 
card technology. It was noted that the UK is an important player in card markets because there 
are more payment cards in circulation (around 86 million) than any other country and nearly 
four-fifths of the population have a credit, debit, ATM or charge card with 3 billion 
transactions annually. Birch (1996) predicted that if banks use smart cards and superhighways 
to respond to the threats to their business, then; the retail bank of the future would operate by 
serving customers with smart card-based e-money and an all-pervasive digital network for 
which the Internet is a precursor. The threats were named as banking competitors which use 
fully digital channels and achieve much lower cost overheads such as First Direct (telephone 
banking) and non-banking competitors using electronic channels to bypass retail banks 
completely such as supermarket chains and telephone companies issuing prepaid cards. E- 
money to the banking environment was expected to extend on-line banking. 
Another contribution in this area came from Brooks (1997), who argued that treating e. 
purse simply as a replacement for small change in the high street and analysing its impact on 
this basis may provide limited insights into the future. The cost of the cards and the 
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infrastructure may cause a proven business case hard to come and early experience has shown 
that increasing the functionality and utility of the smart cards is the only way to justify the 
necessary investment. Multi-function closed community cards was found to offer the best hope 
of justifying investment in the short term and the emergence of consumer electronic commerce, 
enabled not just by the PC but also by DTV and GSM or even PDAs, could become a 
significant driver in the medium term. Card-based loyalty schemes in the retail sector were 
addressed as starting to overlap with payments, and helping to provide a critical mass of smart 
card readers. The widespread deployment of smart card-based digital certificates to provide 
remote identification and authentication was demonstrated as a feed back into e-purse 
deployment. 
And final contribution to be cited here is from Birch and McEvoy (1997). They 
attempted to synthesise directions in payment cards, the Internet and physical cash to make 
some suggestions as to some of the ways in which e-cash will be the trigger for major changes 
in both business and society over the coming years. It was argued that emerging technologies, 
particularly the synthesis of cryptographic software and tamper-resistant smart card hardware 
into the electronic purse, will make the cost of entry into the currency issuing market quite 
small both as a means of supplying credit or raising finance with encouraging customer loyalty. 
The paper indicated that, the more revolutionary impact of e-cash might come from its ability 
to create new stores of value rather than its ability to act as a means of exchange. According to 
authors, the addition of e-cash to the banking environment will change bank's basic functions 
namely, the deposit and withdrawal of cash, by making remote banking the dominant channel. 
To conclude this section, it can be argued that e-money is not simply a dream for 
technology buffs. Just the opposite, there seem to be clear sources of demand for such an 
alternative not just in the future but for the present. 
4.2.6. GENERAL PROBLEMS WITH E-MONEY 
For the earlier version of e-money, there was a huge hope for very successful launches 
and soon-to-be-proven business cases at least in the medium term. But, the hype has not been 
realised. Most of the earlier versions have gone. BIS (2000) listed some of those unsuccessful 
schemes as Barclaycoin in the UK, Visacash and Mondex New York and CyberCoin for the 
US, Primeur Card in Netherlands and Digicash (the first version) in Germany and Australia. 
The list may be longer but even with its current form, it mentions some serious problems 
surrounding the future of e-money. This section addresses these issues briefly. 
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Basically, most of the current problems were noticed at an early stage. For example, 
Wennigner and Laster (1995) stated compatibility as a problem, especially for card-based e- 
money projects. They also proposed solutions. One option was to concentrate on contact cards, 
which touch a card reader when registering a transaction and the other was a contact-less card, 
which only need to come in proximity to a card reader. Another issue named was traceability, 
arising from the need to record of each transaction, which is burdensome and expensive and 
may represent an invasion of privacy. Clearing and settlement when more than one issuer share 
the same scheme, issuance by non-banks, consumer protection and money laundering were 
other problems addressed by the authors. 
In an earlier official publication, the US Treasury (1996) investigated obstacles to 
growth of e-money naming them as security especially Internet security, authentication, 
interoperability, and technological change. Technological change named as an obstacle by the 
report, because the march of technological innovation seems unending, offering opportunities 
for improving communications and computer capabilities but at the same time, it clouds, rather 
than clarifies, the future, creating incentives to wait for the next round of improvements. 
Currently, it seems still holding. To give an example, as soon as WAP technology have been 
discovered, conventional Internet seemed to loose its priority for payments and mobile phone 
handsets have been given more hope as to act as both holder and transmitter of e-money. 
In a FED working paper, the role of cash in payments was investigated by Good (1997) 
and three main reasons were given why economic units prefer cash as their main choice in 
payments as (i) cash is convenient for small, inexpensive purchases, (ii) force of habit and 
finally (iii) recipient prefers or only accepts cash. The author compared accountable and non- 
accountable schemes, as they are competitive to each other. It was assumed that in an 
accountable scheme, the smart card does not act as a universal cash replacement, but it acts as 
an added payments medium for low value cash transactions. Anonymity is not as strong as 
cash. On the other hand, it was stated, an unaccountable scheme has a fundamental difference 
that is manifested in the ability for transfers between smart cards of monetary value to occur 
with an unauditable transfer, which is not very different from an exchange of paper money. The 
author argued that this fundamental difference essentially creates a form of private money, 
which puts the creation of value into the realm of the private rather than public sector. It was 
mentioned that the location of money in an unaccountable scheme might never be fully known 
until the cards are redeemed for value. 
33 
Most of the problems sited in the literature obviously contributed to the failure of earlier 
versions of e-money proposals. But non-of them may have a serious impact as the one that will 
be analysed in the following section. It is the security of c-money and unless the end-user is 
fully convinced in one way or another, the demand might never get to a level of sustaining a 
critical mass for a potentially executable e-money system. 
Security of E-money: Security of e-money is not a technical issue only. It has a social 
dimension as well. Unless the holder of e-money feels fully defended against any fraudulent 
attack on the amount that is held in the electronic device, the willingness to replace 
conventional options with the new instruments may never be realised. That's why security of e- 
money is given a subsection here to fully cover all the aspects of it. The section will be a brief 
summary of an influential report produced by the BIS and since then it seems to be one of the 
most reliable analysis of the security of e-money. 
BIS (1996a) report focused on stored-value products. It found many major differences 
as regards design and implementation of e-money products as technical presentation of money 
differs7. Transferability was also mentioned as a difference, meaning whether participants can 
undertake transactions with one another without participation by the issuer or another central 
authority. It was argued that free transferability, in which consumers, merchants or banks may 
make unlimited direct transfers between one another, is a theoretical concept only and 
transferability is restricted in one way or another even the level of restrictions differ among 
different products. Issuer structure may be another area that e-money products may differ. If 
there is more than one issuer for a single type of product, then the scheme needs clearing and 
settlement and the card number or a cryptographic certificate is needed for the identification of 
the issuer. Additional areas that e-money products differ among each other are mentioned by 
the report as well8. 
BIS (1996a) discussed the security risk focusing primarily on those aspects of e-money 
products that are different from the conventional payment instruments such as credit and debit 
cards and electronic fund transfer systems and grouped them into two: fraud risks and 
' If the device stores and manipulates a numeric ledger, with transactions performed as debits and credits to a 
balance, it is called as a `balance-based' product. If the device stores electronic notes that are uniquely identified 
by a serial number and are associated with a fixed, unchangeable denomination, it is called `note-based' product. 
8 On-line authorisation: This requires an additional communication, which adds greatly to the cost, and time 
required for transactions. Information Collection: Some e-money products collect all the data and some collect just 
as little data as possible due to privacy concerns. Ability to Reload Devices, and Single or Multiple Applications 
were named as other areas that e-money products differ than each other. 
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malfunctions. Fraud risks were stated as duplication of devices, alteration or duplication of data 
or software, alteration of messages, theft and repudiation of transactions. 
Against these risks, security measures were categorised into three parts as prevention, 
detection and containment. The aim of these measures in general terms was said to safeguard 
the integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of critical data and process, as well as to protect 
against losses due to fraudulent duplication or repudiation of transactions. First Preventive 
measure was given as tamper-resistance of devices. The report indicated that the electronic 
devices used in e-money products provide the first line of defence against outside attacks. 
Active tamper-resistant features include sensors within the chip that detect unusual levels of 
heat, light and electrical current and render the chip inoperable under an attempted attack, as 
well as providing evidence that tampering has been attempted. This measure is valid for card- 
based products. For software-based products, the software itself has access control mechanisms 
to prevent the user from changing or duplicating data in an unauthorised manner. 
Second preventive measure was named as cryptography by the BIS (1996a). It was 
argued that cryptographic techniques provide the logical protection of e-money systems by 
ensuring the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of devices, data and communications 
used in transactions. Encryption was defined as a technique to protect the confidentiality of 
data during transmission or while stored on a device and may be particularly important for 
certain types of sensitive data used in security processes such as cryptographic keys. Other 
areas that cryptography is used were given as to authenticate the identity and privileges of 
devices in transactions, to certify the validity of electronic notes or other data created by an 
issuer or system operator and to verify the integrity of messages exchanged between devices to 
detect whether or not a message has been altered before reaching its intended recipient. It was 
argued that the use of active or dynamic asymmetric cryptography, in which chip cards 
generate digital signatures or perform other cryptographic calculations, can be applied to 
prevent attacks that may be attempted through replaying previous messages and observing the 
exchange of cryptographic information. Relating to key management and storage, the report 
indicated that all the e-money systems involve cryptographic keys that must be kept secret, or 
secure against unauthorised observation, in order to prevent unauthorised duplication or 
alteration of data. 
On-line authorisation was named as the third prevention method. As mentioned by the 
report, in card-based systems, on-line authorisation is only required at the time the device is 
loaded by a debit to a bank account but as a prevention method additional on-line authorisation 
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may be asked for increasing security. For software-based products, on-line authorisation was 
considered to be necessary for all transactions. Other prevention measures listed by BIS 
(1996a) as verifying expiration dates, number of transactions executed with the device, 
balances on the device against a possible maximum balance limit, maximum balance limit itself 
procedural and administrative controls during manufacturing and lastly cryptographic key 
management and card personalisation. 
The report discussed transaction traceability and monitoring as the first detection 
measure. It was observed that transferability and strong traceability might be chosen by e- 
money issuers as a detection measure in order to reduce security risk. Interaction with a central 
system was stated as the second detection measure which allows the central operator to check 
security parameters on the card for consistency, to update security measures on the device, such 
as cryptographic keys, and, in some cases, to gather additional transaction data from the device. 
Limits on transferability was the third detection measure stated by BIS (1996a). It was argued 
that such limits placed on the transferability of stored-value balances or notes may reduce the 
opportunities for fraudulent balances to be used without detection. Statistical analysis was the 
last detection measure and it was named as to check system-level data on payment flows in 
order to detect unusual volumes of payments that could be indicative of fraud. 
Containment measures were stated by the report (BIS, 199a) as: time and value limits 
on devices to reduce the potential financial gain from fraud, registration of devices to facilitate 
investigation of any attempted fraudulent activity, hot lists to check for suspect cards at each 
point of interaction with the system, disabling devices for multiple attempts to enter a PIN or 
multiple failed transactions, and system suspension when a wide-ranging fraud is detected or 
suspected. 
The security measures was evaluated and it was stated that potential measures were 
acknowledged as available to provide adequate security for e-money systems, in particular 
compared with other common forms of retail payment. According to BIS (1996a), a wide range 
of options which also presents trade-off in the areas of cost, functionality, speed and reliability 
are available to product developers in terms of specific chip card security measures, 
cryptographic algorithms, key lengths and transaction monitoring. It was indicated that 
international standards have been developed for particular aspects of e-money products, such as 
the basic functionality of chip cards, certain cryptographic techniques and communication 
protocols. These developments were not found enough for the security and it was argued that it 
is more important to focus on the overall security risk management approach for a particular 
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product, rather than on the use of individual measures. It was added that relatively low 
maximum balance limits on devices might represent one of the simplest yet most effective 
deterrents to fraudulent attacks. In a comparison to other forms of payment that are paper-based 
or rely on plastic cards with magnetic stripes, it was accepted that microchip cards are much 
more difficult for counterfeiter to fraudulently alter. The physical barriers against tampering 
with devices were supported to provide one of the most important security measures for e- 
money products. It was mentioned that tampering with microprocessor cards is beyond the 
means of the casual criminal, while even for experienced or professional computer thieves, 
tampering with chip cards would also be extremely difficult and costly. On the other hand, 
continual strengthening of the tamper-resistant features of card-based products were mentioned 
as necessary because as time passes by, attackers may have enough experience to misuse e- 
money products. 
For software-based systems, on-line, real-time authorisation was accepted by BIS 
(1996a) as a `must'. Cryptographic algorithms with especially longer key lengths were valued 
as a high level of security for e-money products. Relating to the feature of transferability 
between users, it was not believed that this would pose greater security threats due to 
permittance of full traceability of transactions so that shadow-balance accounting may be used 
to provide a very high degree of detection of possible fraud. Statistical analysis of payment 
patterns was advised on the belief that this might increase the cost of attempting fraud because 
of more care needed not to be caught. 
BIS (1996a) named three additional considerations for the use of e-money products as 
the criminal activities, reliability and privacy. For the use of criminal activities, it was 
concluded that the security features such as unique serial numbers that suppliers intend to 
implement in order to protect issuers from fraud risks might make these products less attractive 
for use in criminal activities than many existing payment instruments. Limits on transferability 
and expiration dates on devices or balances were also mentioned to constitute practical 
obstacles to the extensive use of e-money products for money laundering. In the discussion of 
reliability, it was concluded that clearing of transactions, storage of cryptographic keys or other 
critical functions, contingency arrangements for the systems would be important factors in 
ensuring reliability. With regard privacy, it was argued that advanced cryptographic techniques 
offer the potential for a greater degree of privacy in financial transactions that has been possible 
with other types of electronic payments. Especially blind signature technology may extend the 
reach of privacy to the virtualisation of money. 
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BIS (1996a) concluded that e-money systems especially with network-based schemes 
seems to satisfy an adequate level of security but no single measure or set of measures might be 
sufficient for a particular product unless a combination set of measures with the rigour with 
which they are implemented are used to serve to reduce the risk. It may be wrong to argue that 
secure e-money is not possible as it may also be wrong to argue that e-money is not risky at all. 
Money will obviously be the most valuable electronic product and all the scheme holders need 
to pay enough attention to the security as it is one of the most important requirement for the 
sake of the future of e-money. 
The next section will look at another import problem surrounding e-money 
developments. 
Legal Issues: Group of Ten report9 on e-money (GOT, 1997) investigated legal issues 
relating to e-money including consumer protection, law enforcement, supervisory and cross 
border issues and this section will rely on that analysis. 
Consumer risks posed by e-money were grouped into three. The first group covered 
financial loss risks including; theft of the consumer's card, manipulation or interception of the 
electronic messages sent over computer networks, accidental loss or damage of an e-money 
device, operational errors and malfunctions, insufficient transaction records to allow prompt 
resolution of errors and disputes, insolvency and bankruptcy of the issuer and any other reason 
that may dishonour e-money payments. Second group covered consumer risks that may cause 
incomplete payments in the amount or at the time and location that was desired because of 
malfunctions of terminals and lack of merchant acceptance or interoperability between different 
products. Third group covered consumer risks that consumers may face for the information 
generated through their use of e-money products, which may be disclosed without their consent 
or used for fraudulent purposes. 
Private measures to address consumer risks were analysed including measures such as 
potential PIN numbers, limiting the amount of funds held, carrying more than one type of 
instrument, analysing the terms and conditions of the contracts for privacy concerns, physical 
9 GOT (1997) named the underlying objective authorities may have in the banking and financial system report as: 
1. Limiting systemic and other risks that could threaten the stability of financial markets or undermine confidence 
in the payment systems. 2. Providing consumers with adequate protection from fraud and unfair practices, 
financial loss or unnecessary instructions on personal privacy. 3. Encouraging the development of effective, low- 
risk, low-cost and convenient payment and financial services for consumers and businesses. 4. Ensuring the central 
bank's ability to conduct monetary policy and 5. Not hindering the ability of law enforcement authorities to 
prevent and detect movements of funds associated with criminal activity. 
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and electronic security features of devices such as tamper-resistance and co-ordination between 
consumers and issuers for voluntary insurance and loss sharing arrangements. 
Relating to the potential policy approaches to consumer protection, GOT (1997) found 
that various risk control measures that could be taken by consumers, industry and governments 
may be complementary. It was advised that governments should further their policy objectives 
in the banking and payment sectors by ensuring that the relevant legal framework provides 
adequate incentives for fair practices and a strong foundation for reasonable private agreements 
and contracts. 
The policy of law enforcement, according to GOT (1997), should be to prevent, 
investigate and prosecute criminal activities affecting the payment systems. These activities 
was identified in two general types: First one was the exploitation of payment systems in 
connection with criminal activities such as money laundering, tax evasion or illegal gambling. 
Second one was the attack on e-money products themselves such as counterfeiting, fraud or 
disruption of the system. It was noted that e-money may have the potential to bring benefits to 
law enforcement efforts, like reduced usage and theft of cash and greater electronic record- 
keeping capabilities compared with some existing means of payment. Potential measures 
against criminal activities were named as the use of tamper-resistant smart cards or other 
devices, cryptographic protocols, on-line authorisation of some or all transactions, 
administrative controls on transactions and participants, record-keeping systems, expiration 
dates and value limits. GOT (1997) noted that in order to prevent illegal movements of funds; 
law enforcement and regulatory officials have historically relied on the intermediation of banks 
and other financial institutions where records of both transactions and customer identities are 
typically maintained. Continuing dialogue and co-operation with developers and providers of e- 
money products was found necessary to detect and address potential law enforcement problems 
at an early stage. 
GOT (1997) investigated supervisory issues as well. Potential risks to providers of e- 
money were named as operational and liquidity risks, credit and market risks depending on 
policies for investing the proceeds from issuance, risks arising from participation in loss- 
sharing or guarantee arrangements among issuers, clearing and settlement risks, foreign 
exchange risks, risks of fraud, operational failure or redeeming counterfeit e-money, strategic 
and reputation risks, compliance risks and risks associated with outsourcing of operations. 
Private sector measures to address those risks were given as maintaining sufficient liquid assets 
on hand to meet demands for redemption, investing the proceeds from issuance in high-quality, 
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short-term, liquid securities, establishing strong internal controls to prevent employee fraud, 
instituting risk management procedures for new products, designing robust security measures 
and procedures to defend against external fraud and counterfeiting attacks. It was argued that a 
combination of security measures for an e-money product, rather than any single measure of 
standard should be most effective against all kinds of above-mentioned risks. Due to immature 
nature of e-money products, no clear potential supervisory approaches in G-10 countries were 
determined. 
The cross-border issues were addressed by GOT (1997) considering whether the 
potential international operation of e-money schemes raises additional concerns for the 
effective implementation of monetary policy, consumer protection, law enforcement or 
supervisory objectives of individual countries including the potential effects of differences in 
laws or policy approaches in these areas. The report named two potential cross-border 
concerns. Firstly, consumers could use prepaid cards issued by domestic institutions to make 
payments to foreign-based merchants while travelling or in making purchases over a computer 
network such as Internet. Secondly, an issuer in one country could issue e-money to consumers 
in another country, potentially in the consumer's home currency, for use at either domestic or 
foreign purchases. It was found appropriate for supervisors to share information on e-money 
schemes with international ownership and operation to understand fully any cross-border issues 
that affect institutions in any particular countries in order to find out the best approaches to 
addressing cross-border concerns. Four key considerations to which consumers, e-money 
providers and authorities may wish to give attention in the implementation and use of e-money 
products as well as in the development of national policies were stated as transparency, 
financial integrity, technical security and vulnerability to criminal activity. 
Other than the security and legal issues, maybe retail characteristics of e-money has 
been underestimated during the earlier versions as a serious problem surrounding e-money. In a 
typical advanced economy, it is a general observation that most of the wholesale payments has 
been electronised already in case of the value so that they represents more than 70 % of all 
transactions. However the comparison of the volume is just the opposite and banknotes and 
coins represents more than 70 %. As a result, any e-money scheme seems to be at the middle of 
a jungle to address extensive problems for small value payments. Obviously, once a proposal 
proves the capacity to find a solution to address the demand for e-money, then; it might be in a 
`once and for all' base. It may be quite a long way ahead but once e-money manages to address 
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all the complications of micro-payments, then there might be no way back to banknotes and 
coins again. 
4.2.7. IMPLICATIONS OF E-MONEY FOR CENTRAL BANKS 
This topic seems to be on the agenda since the beginning of the 1990's but the official 
reports came through the middle of the decade. BIS (1996b) became one of the leading 
contributors to the literature grouping them into four as safety and soundness of payment 
systems arising from the central bank's oversight function, seignorage, the operation of 
monetary policy, and possible financial risks borne by issuers of e-money to the supervisory 
responsibility extent. 
According to report, e-money could lead to shifts in the velocity of money, which might 
temporarily reduce the usefulness of the monetary aggregates, especially narrower ones, for 
countries that rely on them as targets or indicators. It was believed that if e-money replaces 
only cash, there may be no need for an adjustment in monetary policy operating techniques but 
if e-money has also a potential to replace deposits, then; this may complicate the ways by 
which central banks influence money market interest rates. Replacement of cash causes also 
shrinkage of central bank balance sheet and this may result in problems in large scale reserve- 
absorbing operations when necessary. This concern seems to decrease lately as more and more 
central banks managed to follow direct inflation targeting monetary policy frameworks. 
It was indicated that since banknotes in circulation represent non-interest bearing 
central bank liabilities, a substitution of e-money for cash would lead to a corresponding 
decline in central bank asset holdings and the interest earned on these assets that constitutes 
central bank seignorage revenue which generally exceeds the operating cost of central banks. 
The loss of seignorage revenues may force central banks to become more dependent on other 
revenue sources. It may be, on the other hand, wrong to argue that central banks have some 
difficulties in finding alternative independent source of revenues like earnings from clearing 
services or flows from the partnerships on the wholesale payment systems. It may be worth 
mentioning that operating cost of central banking might decrease seriously with the efficiencies 
brought by e-money and related technologies. Additionally, the role of reserves may actively 
contribute to e-money discussions. The proportional increase in foreign assets on central bank 
balance sheets may decrease the reliance on banknotes and coins in circulation as well. The 
BOF balance sheet may be a good example for this trend, which is exhibited in the following 
chart. 
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CHART: 4.2.1. BANK OF FINLAND RESERVE ASSETS AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL ASSETS 
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Possible policy responses to the development of e-money were also addressed by BIS 
(1996b). In regulatory framework, it was found unclear whether e-money will be judged under 
traditional financial products and treated according to recent financial regulations or there is a 
need for a totally new legal framework. The response to loss of seignorage revenues may not be 
needed until a serious shrinkage in central bank balance sheet as long as the balance sheet gives 
a particular central bank enough options to conduct monetary policy effectively. The report 
concluded that two options, namely central bank issuance of e-money and expanding (non- 
interest-bearing) reserve requirements, would not only increase the size of central bank balance 
sheets but would also help to offset any loss in seignorage. As an alternative way to offset 
seignorage loss, central banks could consider charging banks for various services they provide. 
In another contribution to the subject, Boeschoten, and Hebbink (1996) estimated the 
impact of the use of e-money on currency demand and its possible consequences for seignorage 
loss in the G10 countries The authors defined e-money as multipurpose prepaid cards and other 
electronic transactions used in Internet and debit (EFTPOS) payments. They intended to use all 
kind of payment instruments that replace cash turnover and thus decrease currency demand. 
The implications of e-money on currency demand were estimated under different assumptions 
for G10 countries. 10 
10 Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. 
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First, the decrease in currency circulation was estimated by different methods. The first 
method assumed all the citizens in the national economy have a prepaid card and cards hold an 
average amount of USD 100. For the UK, 1994 population was taken as 58.3 million which 
means that the total amount that prepaid cards hold equals to USD 5.8 billion. This amount was 
16 % of total currency circulation and 3.5 % of GDP in 1994. 
Secondly, it was assumed that all denominations with a face value of up to USD 25 will 
be replaced by prepaid cards, meaning that everybody will use a prepaid card in transactions 
that needs money denominations which are equal or smaller than USD 25. According to this 
method, total currency outstanding for 1994 in the UK was USD 36.1 billion of which USD 
18.4 billion was of up to USD 25 denominations. This was equal to 51 % of total currency 
circulation, meaning that prepaid cards may decrease currency demand by 51 %. 
Thirdly, the decrease in currency circulation was calculated by assuming that all the 
cash payments in transactions below USD 25 will be carried out by means of prepaid cards. 
According to the results, percentage decrease in need for notes in the UK may be 40 % and for 
coins 87 % which was equal to a 23 % decrease in banknotes circulation and 87 % decrease in 
coins circulation for 1994. Total percentage decrease in circulation equals to 36 %. In 
calculating these ratios, it was assumed that a payment would be performed by using a 
minimum number of notes and coins given a country's available denominations. This method 
was stated by authors as more advanced. 
Boeschoten, and Hebbink (1996) also calculated the consequences of e-money for 
seignorage. Relating to the methodology to calculate seignorage, they used a definition based 
on opportunity costs, 
S=iA 
with S being the amount of seignorage received by the central bank per year, i the 
nominal interest rate and A central bank assets. They argued that, if central bank assets equal 
the monetary base (H) and if reserves (R) remain unchanged, then; 
AS = i0H = i(OCu 
- 
OCo) 
with Cu and Co being the amount of currency and coin in circulation, respectively. 
According to the authors, the above method for calculating seignorage may be extended by 
subtracting interest payments by the central bank on bank reserves and cost of managing 
seignorage and differentiating between interest rates. The calculated opportunity cost measure 
of seignorage foregone due to a widespread use of e-money for the UK (using long term 
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interest rates) calculated as USD 2.96 billion and it was equal to 0.28 % of GDP. This amount 
was implied to be the potential revenue of e-money issuers but it was reminded that with 
increasing international competition in the banking sector, the issuers might pay interest on 
accounts, which will cause erosions on this potential amount. 
Boeschoten, and Hebbink (1996) concluded that seignorage loss due to the use of 
prepaid cards per se is expected to be limited, as long as these cards are used only for small 
value payments. The eventual effect, it was argued, depends on the degree of acceptance of 
these cards, on the amount up to which they are used for payments and on the maximum value 
stored on these cards. Seignorage may be affected, however, by the combined use of e-money 
for small value payments by means of prepaid cards and large value payments by means of 
other types of e-money. Such an overall use of e-money would eventually result in a complete 
or almost complete elimination of transactions cash balances. This would imply a seignorage 
loss of between 0.2 % of GDP and 0.4 % of GDP (for G10 countries). An even larger 
seignorage loss of between 0.3 % of GDP and 0.7 % of GDP (for G10 countries) would result if 
currency hoards would disappear as well. The authors added that this analysis is basically static 
and all the mentioned developments depend on many factors such as technology, risk of loss 
and frauds, possible credit facilities and, especially costs and tariffs. 
In this discussion, the authors preference to include all kind of electronic payment 
instruments on the effect of e-money may be a proof of inevitability of total electronification of 
payments. E-money in this argument seems to be the final frontier for currency in circulation. It 
also underlines the fact that e-money may not be a concern with regards the decrease in 
currency circulation as this has been an historical phenomenon that has been supported by 
electronic payment instruments. In the next part, the thesis will look at two examples of e- 
money solutions that are currently available. 
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5. CASE STUDIES ON THE USE OF E-MONEY 
This chapter of the thesis analyses two real life examples of e-money proposals. The 
selection of the cases has actually been shaped by the characteristics of the schemes. First of 
all, academicians, practitioners and central bankers around the world have acknowledged both 
schemes as among the best examples of e-money projects. Both allowed person-to-person 
transactions, for example and it may be argued that both fit to this thesis, as they are 
representatives of e-money schemes and they are more than just another payment solution. 
Secondly, both schemes have their own independent clearing system and both targets to replace 
coins and banknotes circulation by fulfilling the demand for them. Thirdly, there has been a 
clear distinction between card and network-based e-money for a few years and Mondex was 
coded as a good example of card-based schemes and Digicash as network-based schemes. This 
distinction need some caution recently because smart cards became more and more network 
adaptable and any card-based scheme might function as a network-based solution. The opposite 
is also true. Arising from this development, operating systems for smart cards will be analysed 
at the end of this chapter after first investigating Mondex in the first section and Digicash in the 
second section. 
l 5.1. CASE STUDY 1: MONDEX AND EXETER UNIVERSITY TRIAL" 
The aim of this section is two folds. First one is to give a clear description of Mondex 
scheme and the second one is to express the findings of a field search at Exeter to see the 
university trial. 
5.1.1. MONDEX IN GENERAL 
Mondex is an electronic cash product that was invented by then deputy director of 
payment services Tim Jones and then Manager of Card Strategy Group Graham Higgins of the 
National Westminster Bank (NatWest) in 1990. The idea was to store money in electronic form 
11 This section often visited the web-sites listed: http: //www. mondex. com; http: //www. mondexinternational. com; 
http: //www. mondex. co. uk; http: //www. exeter. ac. uk/mondex; http: //www. mondexusa. com; http: //www. mondex. ca 
http: //www. multos. com. Mondex Magazine, has been followed as well including issues: Summer 1996, December 
1996, July 1997, November 1997, April 1998 and September 1998 and all the issues then on. Mondex Publications 
that have been used as source of data are: 1. Vision & the Internet: the Structure of the Mondex System. 2. 
Security, Risk Management and Organisation. 3. Mondex around the World. 4. Mondex on the Campus. 5. 
Mondex: The Worldwide Alternative to Cash. 6. Technology and the Future of Money. 7. The Future is Built in 
Multos Chip 8. The Future of Money. 9. The Mondex Opportunity: A Guide to Merchant Acceptance. 10. Cash in 
on: The Future Mondex and 11. "Smart Cards: A Revolution in Plastic Cards" Mondex UK Limited, 1997. 
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on a smart card. The first type of money in electronic form was called as "Byte" by the 
innovators and the first trial was conducted as an in house project at NatWest in London in 
1992. During the same year, the Mondex team established relations with leading electronic 
companies around the world and detailed market research were undertaken including 47 
consumer focus groups and over 5,500 consumers. Just from the beginning, as a result, Mondex 
turn out to be an international project in character. 
In 1992, the BOE was informed about Mondex and further intentions to establish a 
global e-cash payment scheme. In 1993, Midland Bank joined as an equal partner to NatWest. 
During 1994, over 400 manufacturers from 30 countries had expressed interest in developing 
Mondex devices after the first set of product development specifications was announced to 
enable manufacturers and Mondex was awarded as the "Most Innovative Smart Card 
Accomplishment of the Year" by the European Smart Card Applications & Technology. The 
first franchise rights were sold to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited 
in the Far East during the same year. 
In 1995, Bank of Scotland announced intentions to join the other two banks to support 
Mondex in the UK. More Franchise rights were sold in Canada but the main event of the year 
was the first trial of Mondex in Swindon and journalists and TV crews from 15 countries 
observed the first electronic cash transaction. British Telecom tried Mondex compatible 200 
payphones and 2000 private phones. All of them acted as Mondex cash points. Another trial 
was conducted in the US by Well Fargo Bank at their San Francisco headquarters and close 
retail outlets. 
During 1996, Mondex was introduced in Canada by a consortium and franchise rights 
were sold in Australia and the US. One important development was the establishment of 
Mondex as an independent payment organisation under the name Mondex International 
Limited by a group of 17 major organisations. Projects on compatible payment products for 
vending machines, payments on the Internet and supply of smart cards for Mondex's global 
implementations were developed during this year with different companies around the world. 
In 1997, MasterCard International acquired 51 % of Mondex International. A solution, 
which was first to bring the benefits of Mondex chip-to-chip technology to Internet commerce, 
for making payments over the Internet commercially viable was announced by AT&T and 
Mondex International. In May, a consortium lead by Mondex International introduced Multos, 
which is an international operating system for smart cards. A consortium named Maosco was 
formed to support Multos as an industry standard. Bank of Scotland with the University of 
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Edinburgh and Aston University announced new trials in the UK. During 1997, more banks and 
companies from different countries around the world joined Mondex in order to stimulate the 
concept throughout the world and to further develop the Mondex devices. A program to 
transfer e-cash via digital mobile phones was started jointly with Cellnet Company. Mondex 
was launched in New York, Hong Kong, New Zealand and Australia. Cardholders became able 
to use personal computers and the Internet to access bank accounts to download cash from 
home. 
In 1998, the first international e-cash transaction was completed to prove that 
international capabilities of Mondex card allow users to carry a single card for transactions 
around the world and international multi-currency potential of the scheme was being tested 
positive. Mondex was declared as a Millennium product in the UK. Maosco, in partnership 
with leading smart card manufactures, announced the creation of a global supplier network in 
readiness for the mass-market deployment of Multos, This was a further step to secure the 
multiapplication platform of Mondex to be promoted all around the world. 
In 1999, the first multi-currency smart card capable of carrying an electronic version of 
the European currency unit, the Euro, was demonstrated. E-cash franchise for Japan was sold to 
a Japanese company. The UK's first demonstration of a set-top box, which would allow 
consumers to pay for programs and data of all kinds on DTV using Mondex electronic cash, 
was presented to promote DTV applicability of the scheme. First interactive loyalty capability 
was tested to stimulate the ability to reward a consumer's purchases, update their records and 
allow the merchant direct access to that updated record 
-all in real time as the consumer is in- 
store. SmartAxis has been launched this year to promote cross border payments as a critical 
enabler for e-commerce. Credit Mutuel 
-a bank in France- was the first bank to commercially 
introduce electronic Euro using Mondex. The University of Exeter in the UK launch new 
software to facilitate the Mondex e-cash payments over the Internet for 'pay-as-you-go' distance 
learning study courses. Mondex was awarded a rating of ITSEC Level E6, 
- 
the highest 
possible rating achievable in ITSEC (Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria), 
which has boosted the security confidence of the product. Other than selling the product in 
more countries such as Korea and Taiwan, `www. beenz. com', creator of the web's currency 
Beenz and Mondex announced a technical marketing agreement to develop a smart card 
capable of carrying Mondex e-cash, beenz and complementary e-commerce services. This 
agreement proved the closer gap between network and card-based e-money schemes. 
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In 2000, the Norwegian State Lottery became the world's first lottery organisation to 
provide players the option of paying for games and receiving winnings with Mondex cash. 
Through the middle of the year, Cable & Wireless (Hong Kong Telecom) and The Hong Kong 
and Shanghai Corporation Limited (HSBC) launched i. Life card, a high capacity smart card 
bringing enhanced security and convenience to online shopping which was powered by a 
Multos chip. It is a multi-functional smart card that has been developed to meet the need for 
sophisticated e-commerce applications and includes Mondex e-cash, credit and debit card 
functions, international calling service, and chip-based e-commerce applications 
-all on a single 
card. This year more franchise has been sold as well. 
5.1.2. THE MONDEX STRUCTURE 
Mondex International is based in London and holds the intellectual property rights of 
Mondex e-cash and franchises it around the world. In general, in every country or region, a 
consortium of banks and related companies such as telecoms and payment system related 
companies was established in order to promote Mondex devices in that particular country or 
region. Recently, Mondex International, which has registered trademarks in over 80 countries, 
is responsible for global marketing and management of Mondex and defines standard operating 
regulations to ensure that all Mondex cards around the world are interoperable. 
As the owner of the intellectual property rights of Mondex, Mondex International signs 
agreements with Shareholder Franchisees (those that have a share in Mondex International), 
and Ordinary Franchisees (those that have no share in Mondex International) in order to let 
them have the right and obligation to manage, promote and exploit Mondex in their specified 
territory. Franchisees are responsible to ensure that a regulated Originator will be formed in 
their territory to issue and manage Mondex value for banks and their customers. Mondex 
International will license such Originator. Obviously, the originator is where the electronic 
value is created. For the time being, the main target is to represent major national currencies but 
the concept may reach to private money incentives in case there comes a demand. 
Members are the financial service providers such as banks and telecomm companies to 
provide Mondex instruments to final users. Mondex International licenses manufacturers to 
produce Mondex equipment ensuring that compatibility with Mondex specifications is 
guaranteed. Final members of Mondex scheme are consumers holding cards and merchants to 
accept Mondex value as payment for goods and services. Mondex International's primary role 
was explained by the Company as to establish, manage and exploit the Mondei scheme with 
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the responsibilities to encompass franchisee recruitment and support, marketing, operations, 
regulatory and scheme governance, procurement, brand development, security and 
administration functions. It was argued by Mondex International that the roles of the central 
bank in supplying cash and investing the proceeds of cash sales will be assumed by a bank or a 
regulated consortium of banks known as the Originator which will issue Mondex value to 
members under the Mondex scheme. 
In the UK, Mondex UK Limited owns the franchise and its current Members and 
owners are HSBC (ex-Midland Bank), NatWest, Bank of Scotland and National Australia Bank 
(NAB). HSBC and NatWest are also the Originators. Membership is not exclusive in the UK 
and other banks and non-banks may join the scheme. 
How Mondex works was explained by Mondei International on the Web pages12 as 
follows: The Mondex electronic cash system operates on a smart card 
-a plastic card that looks 
such as an ordinary debit or credit card which stores information on a microchip. The 
microchip contains a `purse' in which Mondex value is held electronically. The purse is divided 
into five separate pockets, allowing up to five different currencies to be held on the card at any 
one time. The microchip also contains the Mondex security programs to protect transactions 
between one Mondex card and another. 
According to Mondex International; being electronic, Mondex provides significant 
advantages: it can be transferred over a telephone line or the Internet; the microchip maintains a 
record of the last ten transactions and the e-cash can be locked into the Mondex card using a 
code chosen by the user. The Company believes that Mondex has the following unique 
features 13: 
1. Multi-currency as being the only electronic cash smart card to allow 5 different currencies 
to be carried on the card at the same time. 
2. Telephonic transfer as allowing to download money from bank accounts to Mondex cards 
by using telephones (conventional and mobile) and thus by making all the telephones to 
function as ATMs. 
3. Large & Small Payments as Mondex cards can be coded to store any amount of money to 
be used conveniently. 
12 http: //www. mondex. com/intro/index. html 
13 http: //www. mondex. com/intro/index. html 
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4. Immediate Transfer of Value as the cash is on the card itself and no connection to an 
account is needed. 
5. Globally Interoperable as being the only electronic cash smart card to carry 5 different 
currencies, and with Multos operating system, a Mondex card can be used in any country. 
6. Person-to-Person as being the only smart card with the security and sophistication to 
permit person-to-person movement of electronic cash without a need to report cash 
movements to a central computer system. 
7. Payment over the Internet as being able to enable customers to buy goods and services on 
the Internet. 
Mondex UK Limited argued/4 that Mondex has many benefits to customers and retailers. The 
first consumer benefit is given as ease of use because of withdrawing or depositing value by 
telephone, paying the exact amount (no fiddling for change), no authorisation or signature 
during the transaction, immediate payment, and finally mobile telephones, allowing Mondex e- 
cash being available anytime, everywhere. Second group of consumer benefit was named as 
flexibility arising from transferring value by telephone, capabilities of person to person (P2P) 
payment, allowing both low or high values transfers and finally its multi-currency capability 
with no age limit so that it is suitable for all the family. The third group of consumer benefits 
was listed as accessibility and convenience because of Mondex e-cash machines and telephones 
giving more access points to funds in personal accounts for 24 hours/365 days. It was 
underlined that e-cash machines and telephones will never run out of value. The final consumer 
benefit was mentioned as safety and control because of spending only what the card holds, 
lockable card or wallet, readable balance, loading value at home, keeping track of the amount 
spent (including where), and traceability when a lost card is found. 
Retailers benefits were given as more efficiency, less cost, better financial management 
and lowers risks. More efficiency was expected because there is no need for customer 
identification, authorisation or signatures and no clearing period 
- 
unlike cheques and credit 
cards 
- 
and the value is immediately received, and is guaranteed. Additionally, correct value is 
tendered every time, no counting is needed to check how much is on a retailer terminal, 
Mondex payments are said to be fast and accurate and the scheme is suitable for all types of 
retail environment. Less cost was planned because of less need to handle, store and transport 
banknotes and coins, improved security for currency handling and reduced pilferage from cash 
14 http: //www. mondex. co. uk 
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tills when the retailer's card is locked. Better financial management opportunity was supported 
by quick and easy totalling, analysing and reconciling of the takings. E-cash can be converted 
into a designated interest earning account at any time, and money paid into an account is 
instantly available for further investing or transferring. Finally Mondex e-cash is less risky 
compared to hard currency because of reduced likelihood of raids and attacks on staff. There 
seems no need to store large amounts of cash on site overnight and Mondex is more impervious 
than cash to fraud, forgery and theft. Retailer terminals might have both physical and electronic 
locks as well. 
It was further explained15 that if used with the Mondex wallet, the card enables 
payments to be made between individuals. The only difference seems that cash value is 
transferred from one chip to another chip rather than hand-to-hand. As Mondex e-cash is 
digital, transactions can also be carried out remotely across national and international 
telephones lines including mobiles, making Mondex ideal for home shopping and Internet 
transactions. 
Mondex International named four benefits16 to issuers. The first benefit is the enhanced 
services arising from the potential that Mondex can help to improve and differentiate customer 
services such as on-line banking, telephone banking and home shopping. Issuers take full 
advantage of the expansion of the Internet and electronic trading. The second benefit for issuers 
is the corporate and brand image that will be supported by Mondex by allowing issuers to 
price their services as they wish and to package their services according to their customers 
needs. The third benefit is the new customers arising from the new markets that will inevitably 
be opened by Mondex. The last benefit is cost cutting for the issuers because Mondex will 
decrease the cost of handling cash. 
5.1.3. LAUNCHES17 
Maybe the first launch of Mondex was the one tried at NatWest Tower in London. 
`Byte' smart cards were distributed to the staff of the Bank in 1991 enabling them to pay for 
goods and services. It was an in-house trial. 
The second launch was in Swindon in July 1995 and ended in July 1998. The number 
of cards distributed reached to 14.000 and the average transaction during the trial was 
" http: //www. mondex. co. uk 
16 http: //www. mondexintemational. com 
17 http: //www. mondex. co. uk 
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determined as £6.70. Around 600 retailers joined the trial. It was observed that Mondex 
replaced % 91 of cash and only %9 of other payment methods. Mondex UK announced the 
reasons to close Swindon trial after the closure: 
" It has proved that the technology works in a demanding high street environment. 
" It has proved an immense amount of data from which the company can build its strategy for 
wider commercial development of Mondex in the UK. 
" The trail acted as a `world showcase' and helped in the sale of Mondex franchises in over 
70 countries around the world. 
The company decided to refocus the resources that were involved in running the trial on 
building up to commercial implementation. The NatWest and Midland Bank conducted the 
Swindon trial and The Bank of Scotland launched the third trial in Edinburgh in its offices as 
an internal staff trial in October 1995. 
Other trials were conducted at universities in the UK. The first examples of university 
trials included the Exeter University, which will be discussed later in detail, and the York 
University both started at October 1996. In October 1997,3 more university trials began 
namely the Aston University, which has plans to develop further applications for the cards to 
run on the Multos platform, the Nottingham University and the Sheffield University. Either the 
NatWest or Midland Bank conducted university trials. Bank of Scotland and the University of 
Edinburgh launched another trial in 1998. 
Other than that, the Mondex scheme has more trials all around the world. In Canada, for 
example, the first trial has been conducted in Guelph. According to the company, the 
implementation has been recognised as one of the most advanced electronic cash programs 
world-wide and has grown to include more than 560 merchants, 12,000 cardholders and $2 
million of e-cash issued. Sherbrooke region of Quebec was the second trial region in Canada. 
Among the most advanced implementations of Mondex in North America, the launch 
represented the next major stage in the development of this new technology in Canada. The 
Sherbrooke Mondex program is defined by the company as offering consumers the first 
combination of Mondex e-cash and debit on a single card and the first test of new e-cash 
Internet loading technology. Additional trial sites were quoted as Bishop's University and 
Champlain College. 
The trials are not limited to above list. Mondex has been conducting more almost all 
around the world; including Hong Kong, South Korea, Australia, France, Japan and the US. 
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With the help of the organisational structure, the lessons learned from the trials have been 
pooled at Mondex International and shared by the partners to develop the product further. The 
mission of the company has been announced as to ensure Mondex is the world's leading e-cash 
product and all the trials and investment has been directed to complete the mission. 
5.1.4. THE UNIVERSITY OF EXETER LAUNCHI8 
This trial was officially announced on March 28,1996 and launched on October 1996 
with the start of new term at the University. The project financed and conducted by the 
NatWest with the backing of both the University and the National Union of Students (NUS). 
The NatWest University Card that was distributed to over 10.000 students and staff had the 
following features'9: (i) Mondex electronic purse for cash-less purchases to be used at outlets 
on campus, vending machines, photocopiers, launderettes and payphones. (ii) Student 
Identification Card with printed student details and a photograph. (both Guild and the NUS 
card). (iii) Library card. (iv) Access control card (only in the Computer Science Suite and a 
student hall). (v) Voting cards for student elections. (vi) Discount card for a range of goods and 
services. 
Additional projects for electronic lunch tickets and computer access was planned as 
extra features. The benefits of a card to anyone at the University were named as20: 
 A single but multifunction card is more convenient for all students and easier for the 
University to handle and manage. 
  
The smart cards offer secure means of building access controls. 
  
Electronic purse function creates convenient access to money at the Bank accounts through 
ATMs and with extra facilities like special payphones and Mondex Loading Points. 
Payment with the card is guaranteed, quick and easy with the exact amount. The Mondex 
card requires no signature, form of identification or authorisation. 
  
Mondex will reduce the cost and effort of managing cash for the University. 
  
Easy to use. 
'8 http: //www. exeter. ac. uk/mondex. Other than that; University Card User Guide, NatWest, August 1996, 
University of Exeter Smart Card User Guide, NatWest, August 1997, University Smart Card User Guide, 
NatWest, August 1998, University Cardholder Terms and Conditions, NatWest, April 1998 and "Mondex Survey 
Final Report" Department of Mathematical Statistics & Operational Research, 1997 provided data and information 
about the Exeter University trial. 
19 http: //www. exeter. ac. uk/mondex/ 
20 http: //www. exeter. ac. uk/mondex/ 
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There is no need to have a NatWest account because it is possible to download money from 
other bank accounts, too. 
All cardholders received a balance reader during the registration. When the Mondex 
card is inserted to the Balance Reader, it shows the amount of monetary value under five 
different currencies that the smart card holds. As a security measure, cardholders were given a 
4 digit Personal Code to lock and unlock their cards. NatWest account holders were allowed to 
link their cards to their bank accounts. Then, monetary value could be downloaded to Mondex 
card by using either Mondex adopted cash machines or 30 British Telecom Mondex compatible 
payphones around the University or Mondex Loading Points. Each Mondex card had a 
maximum value limit for £100 Mondex Cash and holders were allowed to deposit Mondex cash 
back to their account. Cardholders banking with other banks were asked to buy Mondex cash 
by using their Switch or Delta debit cards. Each card holds the details of the last 10 transactions 
that can be viewed through ATMs and payphones. 
Person to person transactions was only allowed via payphones and Mondex Wallet was 
not distributed around the University. Some of the services provided by Mondex card were21: 
(i) Loading Mondex cash from the NatWest bank account. (ii) Depositing unspent Mondex 
value to NatWest account. (iii) Reading the balance of linked NatWest account. (iv) Check the 
Balance on the card. (v) Changing and selecting a Personal Code. (vi) Show the last 10 
transactions. 
The lost or stolen cards have no graphical security other than the photograph since their 
use remains protected by the purse's Value Transfer Protocol and other smart card security 
features, so that they cannot be used by any other person. Students and staff were not charged 
for renewing the stolen or lost cards for the first year but from the second year, they were asked 
to pay £10 for lost cards only. If a card is not locked when it is lost, someone else can use it but 
even if it is locked, the holder of the card loses the monetary value that the card holds unless 
the one who found it returns it. Computer registration of students started in 1997 and 84.99 % 
of students were registered via their Mondex cards. Central computing facilities like e-mail, 
Internet access and secure on-line file space became usable via Mondex cards in the second 
year of the trial. 
21 http: //www. exeter. ac. uk/mondex/ 
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It was announced in 199822 that the project moved from pilot to rollout technology. All 
the cards renewed with a new technology and all the students need the card for their 
registration. There will be 5 food and drink vending machines for the new cards, around 20 BT 
payphones and 11 Mondex Service Points will replace Value Loading Points, which were 
placed on September 1998. ATMs will not be used for Mondex features. From October 1998, 
the number of buildings that accepts only Mondex card for access increased to 6. Three high 
street stores joined the scheme in November 1996 and as it is the rollout phase, the number of 
stores joining is expected to increase in the following years. 
5.1.5. UNIVERSITY CARDHOLDER TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
According to Terms and Conditions, which were set on April 1998, without a Personal 
Code Number (PCN) and a link that will be set by the Bank due to cardholder's demand 
between Mondex card and NatWest Account; the cardholder can only use the Mondex card for 
the University functions such as identification, library, voting and building access. PCN will be 
used to lock and unlock the card. Mondex e-cash can not be transferred from the card when it is 
locked but it is possible to transfer e-cash to the card in either position. 
A withdrawal of funds from one account in the form of Mondex e-cash was accepted to 
have the same effect between the cardholder and the bank as a withdrawal in the form of notes 
and coins. The cardholder bears the risk of loss, theft or misuse of e-cash on the card. The Bank 
regulates overdraft facilities through the bank accounts and Mondex card does not entitle 
cardholders to overdraw. 
The Bank reserves the right to limit the amount of Mondex e-cash that the cardholder 
may withdraw from the account or which he or she may hold on the card at any one time. 
Relating to privacy issues, it was declared that the Bank may hold and disclose information 
about the cardholder, the linked bank account, and use of the card to the police and other 
authorities. However, in relation to other cardholders, this will be done only where it is 
considered necessary for resolution of fraud and dispute. If a lost, stolen or misused card is 
returned to the Bank, the Bank will reimburse the rightful owner with the amount of any cash 
on the card at that time but the Bank will have no further obligation. 
Relating to security and consumer protection, it was announced that if Mondex value is 
obtained by an unauthorised withdrawal from the account before the Bank is informed that the 
22 http: //www. exeter. ac. uk/mondex/ 
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Mondex Card has been lost, stolen or been liable to misuse, the cardholders liability to the bank 
is limited to a maximum of £50 unless the cardholder acted fraudulently or with gross 
negligence. 
The Bank rely on the data in the card and any other equipment as conclusive evidence 
of the amount of cash on the card except in the case of manifest error. The Bank may also rely 
on the Transaction Record and the Exception Log on the card as conclusive evidence of the 
matters recorded in them and that the transactions described by them actually occurred. The 
Mondex scheme may be terminated or suspended by the Bank at any time without any prior 
notice and a date may be specified after which Mondex value will not be accepted for refund. 
Changes will be made in accordance with the current Code of Banking Practice. 
The information above has outlined the relationship between the e-cash issuer and the 
cardholder and may be the evidence of effectiveness of private contracting for financial 
services. As e-money is not officially regulated in the UK, the Bank, the University and the 
cardholders including the students and staff had mutually agreed on the terms and conditions. 
5.1.6. CRITICS OF THE EXETER UNIVERSITY LAUNCH 
On August 17,1998; Exeter University was visited in order to see the trial and observe 
the process as a field search. The aim of the field search was to have a personal experience for 
Mondex scheme visually and to talk to related parties in order to get an idea about the trial. 
During the search, two interviews with the NatWest staffs that are responsible for customer 
relations were held. The library, all the outlets were visited, vending and photocopy machines 
were being checked. A Mondex card and a Card Reader have been obtained. The field search 
continued in Exeter until the 29`x' of August. 
The Mondex Survey Final Report that was dated 1997 and written by the Department of 
Mathematical Statistics and Operational Research of the University proved the progress that 
was made for three years. The number of students that used Mondex cards to make phone calls 
and photocopying increased continuously. The report concluded that Mondex has been well 
received and more students and staff have tried Mondex facilities finding it convenient to use. 
Popularity of Mondex has increased and vast majority wishes its use to continue beyond 1997. 
Basically, the trial at Exeter University may be accepted as proven successful due to the 
University's decision to carry the trial to rollout phase. 
Exeter University trial field search provided useful information in understanding e- 
money. The observations may be summarised as follows: 
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1. Micro-payments may be the main target of e-money schemes as it is in Exeter 
University. For example, the insurance company located at the campus did not join the trial and 
the explanation for that was given as the nature of payments, which is generally made by credit 
or debit cards. 
2. Universities and similar closed environments may be the frontiers of e-money 
schemes as they provide enough opportunities both to test and analyse pros and cons of the 
schemes and limit the risks. 
3. Human perception of technology may be more critical to the future of e-money than 
already expected by researchers as many cardholders interviewed raised their unwillingness to 
learn how to use the multipurpose Mondei cards and prefer to enjoy University facilities only. 
Familiarity of consumers and retailers to banknotes may influence negatively the desire to use a 
new payment instrument. Many cashiers working for University outlets expressed their 
preferences to banknotes and coins due to their ability to solve banknote related problems. It 
seemed that most of them did not want to accept Mondei e-cash just because they did not 
exactly understand what it is. This observation is also supported by many cardholders that did 
not spend the bonus Mondex e-cash values already downloaded as the cards were distributed. 
4. The main support to e-money may come from multi-functioning smart cards. As 
expected by many observers, it may be possible for integrated circuit technology to develop 
even further to store and manipulate even more data. This may give more multi-application 
potential for cards such as Mondex and increase the potential demand for e-money. The 
University of Exeter seems to decide to use Mondex equipment in the premises not because of 
Mondei e-cash but because of the convenience of this equipment as student identity card, as 
library card, as access card and other potential such as providing lunch coupons for students. 
The University openly decided to take advantage of technological development in the area of 
smart cards. 
5. Trials such as Exeter collects actuarial data to analyse consumer behaviour and 
market reactions to e-money and this type of data may help to design potentially successful 
future schemes. Mondex may be accepted as very successful in this area because all the data 
provided by not only Exeter University trial but all the others around the UK, Hong Kong, 
Canada, USA and other parts of the world is collected and analysed overall by Mondex 
International. Data from Exeter University is collected by NatWest and is passed to Mondex 
UK, which passes it to Mondex International. Due to the company structure, it is easy to 
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compare results from trials to each other. Obviously, this will contribute to the future design of 
e-money products for success. 
6. Mondex strategy may be to take time for regulatory and infrastructural developments 
and concentrate on creating international standards for international interoperability of all 
Mondex cards and equipment around the world. In Exeter, Mondex preferred to concentrate on 
the campus only and it was not insisted on finding more retailers on high street to join the 
scheme. Most of the retailers that were interviewed were even not informed about the trial by 
Mondex and those that know has mostly learned from students asking whether they accept 
Mondex cash or not. 
7. Up to now, NatWest did not loose any money due to fraud arising from the trial. £100 
limit for maximum value to be held on a card as Mondex cash seems to contribute to the 
security of e-money. 
8. There were some incentives to increase the number of students and staff that use 
Mondex cash. One obvious incentive was the discount of photocopying cost when it is paid by 
Mondex card. If paid in coins, it costs 5p per A4 page but when it is paid by Mondex card, it 
costs only 4p. 
5.1.7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Mondex may be accepted as a close challenge to cash on a card-based e-money system. 
Because it is an international project, it needs to be understood by central bankers fully in order 
to be well informed before any action is taken to regulate e-money or to adjust monetary policy 
or monetary policy operating procedures. Mondex seems to be one of the rare projects to allow 
person-to-person transactions. Even if it is not totally anonymous as cash due to the registration 
of transactions through chips, Mondex e-cash seems to have a serious potential to replace 
central bank banknotes and coins. Mondex has also many projects to progress in the field of e- 
money technology including adaptation of Mondex cards to networks such as Internet, 
integration of mobile telephone technology for telephonic transfer of Mondex e-cash, 
increasing the malfunctions of Mondex equipment to all the fields that smart card technology 
can reach. 
One important development is the creation of a consortium called Maosco to promote 
an internationally accepted operating system called Multos, which will be analysed in depth in 
later sections. Multos gives further international support to the concept of e-money by creating 
an internationally compatibly operating system. 
58 
Another development is the replacement of magnetic stripe payment cards including 
debit and credit cards by smart cards because it was proved by the case of France that smart 
cards decrease the level of fraud compared to magnetic stripe cards. Mondex has already started 
to negotiate with similar projects to include Multos as operating system, in order to allow such 
e-purse schemes to be featured for multi-application, that other schemes do not provide. Such a 
development may suddenly open a new usage and distribution infrastructures to launch 
Mondex e-cash nationally sooner than expected. The necessary critical mass problem may be 
solved by similar national projects around the world. On the other hand, due to fast developing 
technology, Mondex may loose comparative advantage to small but dynamic smart card 
projects in closed environments such as underground systems, mass city transportation and 
supermarket cards. 
To conclude, Mondex is one of the most influential e-money project with its own 
operating system and with its international character that has already expended to more than 80 
countries. Multi-currency application and the Originator concept increases its challenge to 
central banking as it intends to create an infrastructure to issue any conventional or newly 
designed or developed currency that may intent to challenge current monetary systems. The 
company never planned to challenge any central banks around the world. Just the opposite, it 
prefers to co-operate with them. (BOE has been informed quite early about the project and flow 
of information is still said to continue). However, Mondex scheme has its own clearing and 
settlement mechanism to create alternatives to central bank controlled wholesale payment 
systems. Once the circulation of Mondex e-cash is fully supported by conventional channels 
such as card readers and retailer machines and the virtual channels such as the Internet, DTV, 
PDAs and mobile phones; anonymous circulation may be ensured with disposable cards that 
will carry e-cash to address privacy concerns from the general public. Even the main target is 
given as to replace conventional banknotes and coins in order to provide a better alternative to 
the medium of exchange function, once the technology is ready and another monetary policy 
framework is demanded, then; Mondex e-cash seems to have the design to supply. Finally, 
currency substitution in countries with `funny monies' may further be supported by the 
Mondex e-cash scheme as the nature of the project allows the end-user to have more than one 
choice of currency downloaded on the smart cards. 
59 
5.2. CASE STUDY 2: NETWORK-BASED E-MONEY AND DIGICASH23 
This sections overviews the second case study of the thesis. Digicash has been chosen 
because of its acknowledgement not by central banks only but also by almost all Internet 
enthusiasts, almost all e-money practitioners and many academicians. The popularity of the 
company did not seem to pass even the difficulties surrounding the network-based e-money 
schemes around the world. 
5.2.1. COMPANY PROFILE 
Digicash was founded in 1990 and its products are based on patented developments in 
public key cryptography devised by Dr. David Chaum who was also the innovator of the 
product and founder of the company. Network-based e-money was not the only product that the 
company has been involved. It also had different projects such as roll-tolls, which used a 
system of radio beacons to debit the prepaid cards displayed by a vehicle, and such as CAFE 
(Conditional Access for Europe), which was a project developed as a secure electronic payment 
system (European Commission Project numbered 7203). 
5.2.2. PRODUCT 
Digicash named its network-based e-money product as e-cash and defined it as 
follows24: `Digicash's e-cash is a software-based payments system that sends electronic 
payments from any personal computer to any other workstation, using any computer network 
including the Internet. Actually e-cash is designed to convert money into a digital form, a string 
of numbers which can be represented in different forms and transmitted over any medium from 
telephones and fax machines to television cables'. 
The company used cryptographic patents registered by Dr. David Chaum to develop e- 
cash as a software-only payment system that provides tamper proof, anonymous transfer of 
23 Web-sites visited often for this section: http. www. digicash. com; http: //www. stgeorge. com. au; and Digicash 
publications downloaded from those sites: `Digital Signatures and Smart Cards', Digicash Publication, 
Information Package, 1998; 'Digicash Profile and Press Releases', Digicash Publication, Information Package, 
1998; ` An Introduction to how ecash Works' and `The Ease of Ecash', Digicash Publication, Information Package, 
1998. `David Chaum on Electronic Commerce: How Much do you Trust Big Brother'. (http: //computer. org/internet/vln6/w6chaum. htm); 'Ecash Purse User Manual for Windows', Digicash 
Publication. (http: //www. DIGICASH. COM/index_e. html); Law, L., Sabett, S., Solinas, J.; `How to Make a Mint: The Cryptography of Anonymous Electronic Cash', National Security Agency, Cryptography Division, 1996. (http: //jya. com/nsamint. htm); Schoenmakers, B., `Basic Security of the Ecash Payment Systems', Digicash 
Publication. (http: //www. DIGICASH. COM/index_e. html) 
24 http: //www. DIGICASH. COM/ecash/intro/index. html 
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money over networks such as Internet. E-cash was developed technically in late 1994 and over 
25.000 testers joined the ` Cyberbucks Trail' in 1995 during test phase on the Internet. 
The company provided more information about e-cash via web pages25: The e-cash 
coins are actually very long strings of characters sent from a bank to its account-holders over a 
network connection (i. e. the Internet) in such a way that the serial numbers are not known to 
the bank. The e-cash coins, each of which has a specified value, are stored on the user's hard 
disk and can be transferred in e-mail or as data files exchanged online between payer and 
payee. To receive the value, the payee confirms the validity of the coins by depositing them 
online into an e-cash account. This transaction will not reveal the name or address of the payer 
unless the payer has added this information'. 
Digicash argued that e-cash ensured both privacy and security and technology provided 
speed, accessibility and ease of use. Compared to other options, e-cash eased micro-payments 
on the Internet by guaranteeing cheap transaction cost by using network lines instead of relying 
on expensive telecommunication bands. 
The company mentioned that26; `like banknotes or coins, e-cash can be withdrawn from 
and deposited to transaction demand deposit accounts. And like banknotes, one person can 
transfer possession of a given amount of e-cash to another person. But unlike cash, when a 
customer pays another customer, an electronic bank will play an unobtrusive but essential role'. 
5.2.3. HOW E-CASH WORKS 
Founder of Digicash, Dr. David Chaum, explained in an on-line interview with The 
Computer Society how e-cash works as27: `E-cash is the first digital bearer instrument, and so 
an e-cash coin is simply a number that's worth a certain amount of money. You get e-cash coins 
the same way you get paper money, except that instead of going to, say, an ATM machine in 
person, you connect to your bank's digital branch over the Web. Just like at the ATM, you 
identify yourself and request, say $100 from your current account. Instead of issuing you 
electronic coins e-bank chooses, which it could later recognise and trace to you, the banknotes 
with electronic signatures for you in a way that lets you protect your own privacy. Your PC 
first creates "blank" coins that are actually just random numbers. It then hides or "blinds" these 
by placing them in envelopes, actually just a layer of special encryption using secret keys 
25 http: //www. DIGICASH. COM/ecash/intro/index. html 
" 
26 http: //www. digicash. com/index_e. html 27 http: //computer. org/intemet/v I n6/w6chaum. htm 
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formed by and known only to your PC. The bank then deducts the amount from your account 
and signs the blinded blank coins, using an RSA digital signature. Then the PC removes the 
envelopes, using its secret keys, and stores the signed un-blinded coins on its hard disc. 
Because the blinding commutes with the signature, your PC can remove the blinding while 
leaving the signature on the coin number. When you pay a merchant with some of the coins, it 
forwards them to the bank and waits to hear back before accepting the payment. To ensure they 
haven't been spent before, the bank cheques its list of already spent coins. And since they have 
the bank's signature on them, the bank knows that it must honour the payment to the merchant. 
But the bank has no idea from which account the coins were withdrawn, and thus has no 
knowledge of who the payer was--since all the coins were blinded during withdrawal'. 
Dr. Chaum invented blind signature, which was used to guarantee privacy in network- 
based e-money schemes. The technology is like a digital envelop that hides information kept 
inside secret to all the users, including the financial service provider, of the network other than 
the owner. 
5.2.4. E-CASH CUSTOMERS, RETAILERS AND ISSUERS 
The way to be an e-cash user was to have a transaction account at an electronic bank 
that issue e-money. There were many issuer banks including Deutsche Bank in Germany, Den 
Norske Bank in Norway and St. George Bank in Australia. The issuer banks provided e-cash 
purse software to customers and this software package included an account identity plus set-up 
password. The end user followed the purse's user manual in order to open an e-cash account 
and connect it to the transaction account at the bank. E-cash was a software-based product and 
without understanding how to use the software, no transaction is possible. The software was 
either downloaded on-line or sent by the issuer bank. 
On the analysis of the software, even if it seemed to be a very ease one for average PC 
user, it might have been perceived difficult by average person. In this sense, the software may 
be blamed as part of the problem for lack of wide acceptance of the scheme that leaded to the 
failure of the first version. In this respect, simplicity requirement of e-money schemes has been 
underlined one more time. 
As users, retailers were asked to have an e-cash software either directly downloadable 
from the network or provided by the issuer bank. This package included an account ID and set- 
up password. They also needed a bank account to be connected to their purse account, which 
was named above as safe for users. Retailers were advised to contact issuers in order to get 
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domestic requirements to open a merchant e-cash account in order to accept e-cash for the 
goods and services that they sell. 
Digicash worked directly with issuers and helped banks (and only to banks) to develop 
national e-cash markets, integrate e-cash scheme into the banking system and localise the user 
and retailer software. The company developed partnership with banks around the world to issue 
e-cash in local currency. Digicash invited any banks issue e-cash and published a message to 
potential issuers on the Internet web-site in order to attract them. 
5.2.5. E-CASH PROCESSING 
St. George Bank of Australia explained how e-cash operated on its Web pages28 for the 
Australian scheme: `There are two components to e-cash: The first one is an e-cash Safe 
- 
this 
is analogous to a safe deposit room in a bank. Every user of e-cash has their own Safe in the 
Safe deposit room (resides on the e-cash server). The second one is an e-cash Purse that resides 
on the hard disk of account holder's PC. The Purse contains electronic coins. No actual money 
is involved in the system. Each coin consists of a long string of digits and each has a 
denomination or value. The Purse of coins is managed automatically by the e-cash software 
- 
it 
decides which coins to spend and keeps track of small change'. 
28 http: //www. stgeorge. com. au/eCash/intro/work/default. htm 
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FIGURE 5.2.1: ECASH PROCESSING: 
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The figure above exhibits the flow of money in the Digicash's e-cash scheme operated 
by St. George Bank in Australia: 
1. Users buy e-cash by using funds in their conventional bank accounts through 
telephone banking, Internet banking or any other means. Issuer bank sends e-cash to the users 
e-cash safe account. The e-cash is stored in user's safe. From the point of view of central 
banking, as soon as money gets in the safe account for the user, it is out of the financial system 
and is not included in any monetary aggregates within recent definitions unless e-purse 
balances is added to the preferred aggregates. 
2. Users keep their e-cash as long as they want in their safe account. They can also 
transfer e-cash from their Safe to their Purse. This process is conducted by e-cash software, 
which is provided by the bank. During the transfer, e-cash is converted into electronic coins 
that reside on the hard disk of user's PC as an encrypted data. The St. George bank plays an 
unobtrusive role in authenticating this money at the time of transaction in order to check 
whether e-cash is the one and only and issued by itself. This process guarantees the security of 
e-money scheme but needs too much computer-power for a widespread circulation to store so 
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much data for many users. On the other hand, it makes duplication of e-cash coins technically 
impossible within the system. Once e-cash is stored in user's PC, it is ready to be spent for the 
transactions on the Internet. 
3. Users need to find a web-site displaying the e-cash logo selling goods and services 
before using e-cash. They use "buy me now" link on their purse software. Just after this 
command, merchant's software sends a payment request to user's Purse. Upon the confirmation 
of the payment request, e-cash is transferred from user's purse and is authenticated and 
deposited in the merchant's safe. 
4. During the transaction, the merchant receives confirmation from the safe that the e- 
cash has been transferred into the merchant safe. This is an on-line real time confirmation and 
is needed for the security reasons. As soon as merchant's software confirmes the payment, it 
sends e-cash directly to the Safe in order to get an authentication that this e-cash was the one 
and only and was not spent before. 
5. Merchants and personal users can redeem e-cash at any time and deposit the funds in 
their bank accounts. During this process, e-cash goes back to the financial system as 
conventional money. 
6. Merchants can refund the consumer at any time. Refund might be needed for any 
possible cancellations of transactions. An important point here is that, refund is not through the 
same e-cash that was used for the transaction. Because once the transaction is completed, Safe 
destroys e-cash that was used in the transaction and in a case of refund, new e-cash that is 
issued by the banks with new string number for the merchant will be used. 
7. Users can, at any time, transfer e-cash from their purse back to their safe. This option 
let users to control the amount of e-cash in their purse accounts. If they think that they do not 
need that amount of e-cash in their PC purse account, they transfer the surplus to their e-cash 
safe. 
According to above explanation, e-cash has a direct link to a bank account but this 
connection arises from the nature of the e-cash scheme. Because it is a network-based product, 
it is expected to have all kind of network connections including a bank account. What makes e- 
cash a good example of e-money is that as soon as money left bank account for safe (1. BUY in 
Figure: 5.2.1), it was out of the banking system and was not included in any monetary 
aggregate. 
E-cash software lets users keep e-cash from problems such as network collapse or PC 
breakdown. By using a secret random seed number chosen when the software downloaded, it 
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was possible to re-create the coins in PC and obtain back coins that were lost. Issuers could 
limit the amount of e-cash both at e-cash Safe and e-cash Purse. 
E-cash Safe plays a critical role in above-mentioned scheme. First of all, e-cash Safe 
converts money into a digital form and creates a string of numbers to be used as medium of 
exchange. It also checks whether an e-cash created in advance was spent before or not. This 
guarantees that there is no e-cash in the system that is the same as another one. Consequently, 
Digicash scheme could be accepted as an electronic central bank distributing medium of 
exchange only on a network such as Internet. 
5.2.6. FEATURES 
Digicash used cryptographic encoding to protect the security of e-cash. It is the 
technology that typical Interbank payment systems such as APACS or SWIFT rely on for 
authenticating requests to move huge sums of money between banks. The company believed 
that e-cash technology incorporated a range of significant and unique features29: 
`1. Micro payments and More: Most other Internet payment systems do not 
accommodate micro-payments due to their high transaction costs, but e-cash overheads are so 
low that even payments for a couple of cents can be economically transacted, and in a matter of 
seconds. At the same time, e-cash can handle higher-value payments with equal ease. 
2. Protection of Customer Privacy: Using e-cash, customers can shop on the Internet 
without compromising their security or privacy. Neither merchants nor issuers are in a position 
to know who has been shopping or what was purchased, ensuring that confidential information 
is never abused. Customers who require proof-of-payment are able to uniquely identify the 
recipient of their e-cash coins. 
3. Impossible to Lose: The design of e-cash ensures that, even if a PC crashes, hard disk 
fails, or a power surge interrupts a transaction, e-cash balance is protected. A simple, intuitive 
procedure reissues remaining coins automatically and instantly. 
4. Security through Encryption: The e-cash software uses public key cryptography with 
a key-length of at least 768 bits. 
5. Fully Functioning Cash: Just like cash, e-cash can be freely transferred between 
individuals or merchants. This feature allows all e-cash users to act as merchants, with the 
ability to buy and sell their goods on the Internet'. 
29 http: //www. digicash. com/ecash/new-issuers/ 
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There were there banks fully dedicated to the e-cash, one in Germany, one in Norway 
and the last one in Australia accepting e-cash as a potential product to attract more customers. 
Digicash expected that more banks around the world to issue e-cash in the near future. Digicash 
had no policy for international issuance of e-cash. The company preferred to assist banks to 
localise the purse program and left it to the bank's individual policies for their service. As a 
result, the issuer bank may or may not let e-cash to be used for international transactions. 
Digicash's e-cash may be accepted as a good example of network-based e-money 
because of two reasons: 
1. It was not an access product. Although it was needed to have a conventional bank account 
in order to get a safe; there was no connection to the conventional bank account at the time 
of transaction. As a result, e-cash was an `offline' e-money product in an online 
environment. 
2. As soon as money was downloaded from the conventional bank account to the safe account, 
it left the financial system and it was not included in any monetary aggregates. Safes 
presented a purchasing power to be used in any network transaction. 
The company used advanced cryptography in e-money scheme. As a network-based e- 
money product, Digicash had a dependence on the developments on the Internet 
implementations such as e-commerce. 
5.2.7. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND CONCLUSION 
Digicash announced bankruptcy in November 1998. On December 1998, when the 
company was under `Chapter 11', Interim CEO Scott Loftesness answered questions about 
developments on through e-mail and here are questions and answers: 
Question: What does being under Chapter 11 really mean? Does it mean that there will 
be no more e-cash issued by partners around the world like St. George in Australia and Credit 
Suisse in Switzerland after the end of recent contracts? 
Answer: Chapter 11 is an opportunity for a company to obtain protection from creditors 
while it pursues a re-organisation plan. In the case of Digicash, we expect to either sell the 
assets of the company to another company or to take in new financing which could enable the 
company to "re-start" its efforts. If either of these alternatives happen, I would expect that e- 
cash will continue to be marketed to banks around the world and, by them, to their consumer 
and merchant customers. 
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Question: Does it mean Digicash really decided not to invest more money to e-cash 
schemes so that there will be no more network-based e-money schemes after so many reports 
about it from central banks around the world like BIS and ECB in Europe and FED in 
America? 
Answer: The reasons behind Digicash filing Chapter 11 are complex. Basically, the 
company failed to raise sufficient equity capital financing to continue operations. When the 
company ran out of money, Chapter 11 was filed. The failure was in no way associated with 
any reports from central banks around the world. In fact, central banks are quite comfortable 
with the Digicash's e-cash implementation as it enables seller/purchaser anonymity while still 
enabling banking authorities to monitor the flows of e-cash to/from consumer and merchant 
accounts. 
Question. Does it mean Digicash accepted that there is no potential business case for 
network-based e-money? 
Answer: No, it doesn't mean anything of the kind. 
Question: Is it possible that another company will develop e-cash further by buying all 
the property rights from the Digicash? 
Answer: As described above, yes 
-this is definitely a possibility.. 
In less than a year, major intellectual property that was belonging to Digicash has been 
sold to another company and e-cash came back to the market. In October 2000, the new 
company has been contacted through the Internet30. It was Ruloff Capital, that has purchased 
some of the assets of Digicash and the new owners incorporated eCash Technologies Inc in 
May 1999. eCash Technologies seems to be a new organisation, completely separate from 
Digicash and with a much broader focus. The new company argued that, Digicash was focused 
primarily on micro-payments. Digicash was the company that originally developed the e-cash 
software. When Digicash ran into financial problems, eCash purchased this special software 
and technology and now markets the software and derived products like person to person 
(P2P), debit, prepaid, business to business (B2B) and wireless payments, as well as gift 
certificates and customer loyalty programs. Germany's Deutsche Bank (which was one of the 
main supporters of Digicash) joined back into the program and now a full-fledged customer for 
new solutions. The new company has also signed a contract with Metavante, a transaction 
30 Rhonda Fels from the eCash Technologies has kindly answered the questions through the mail on October 9`h 
2000 and info desk provided extra information again through the mails. 
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processor. Metavante will offer eCash Technologies' products to 700 client banks in the U. S. 
They plan to announce soon a deal to open up the Asia market, as well as supplying the gift 
certificate product to a major online site. According to the current plans, several well-known 
retail sites will accept the gift certificate product. 
In a recent questionnaire conducted by email31, Rhonda Fels of eCash Technologies 
explained the current position of the product as follows: 
Question. How eCash can enrich a solution for the Internet payments where banknotes 
and coins can not function as medium of exchange? 
Answer: eCash is supportive of the government and bank regulated monetary systems. 
Rather than allowing individuals to create their own currency outside of a central monetary 
system (such as money used only for the web and gift systems), eCash is derived from bank 
controlled funds, and is guaranteed, controlled and redeemed by regulated financial institutions. 
Therefore eCash is an electronic/Internet extension of banknotes and coins, and not a 
replacement of them. eCash funds are generally exchanged between 2 parties, buyer and seller, 
before being returned to the financial system. Therefore governments and central banks can 
maintain closer control of Internet commerce through eCash then through other systems, where 
value can exchange hands several times before being accounted for by regulated institutions. 
Question. How eCash can increase payment system efficiencies? 
Answer: eCash is completely electronic, so has automated efficiencies of non-paper- 
based systems. eCash is also a streamlined payment and accounting system, with efficient 
sized payment messages. Many existing bank payments processing systems use older 
transaction processing technologies, which do not lend themselves to Internet-worked 
distributed real time payment systems. eCash easily interfaces with the legacy bank payment 
systems, but is an efficient user front end that allows payment flexibility with connection to 
bank back-end processes, funds and control. 
Question. Can eCash create a full alternative to currency circulation with a capacity to 
cover all money demand for transaction purposes not only virtually but with the help of smart 
cards conventionally as well. 
Answer: eCash technologies believes that the banking industry can use eCash products 
to completely address all payment transaction demands, because it is flexible and customisable. 
It provides a very simple basis for an electronic payment infrastructure, upon which financial 
31 The questionnaire has been sent on the 91h October 2000 and the answers has been received 3 days later. 
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service providers can add unique products and services to enhance basic monetary transactions, 
such as advice, insurance, and risk management. eCash can be used with smart cards for stored 
value systems and it can be used with smart cards or other biometrics authentication systems 
for enhanced security. 
Question. To what extend, such a potential may even be developed with the co- 
operations with financial industry including central banks and financial supervisory authorities? 
Answer: Having a supervisory authority, central bank, or financial industry to co- 
operatively decide to set up eCash as the basic electronic payments infrastructure for one 
institution or for an entire countries' electronic currency could be realise huge efficiency, 
organisational and modernisation benefits for any individual institution or country that elects to 
use eCash as the basis for its' electronic payments infrastructure. 
Question. What is the major difference between Digicash's and e-Cash's approach to 
network based e-money? Is there radical differences on the 'purse' application. 
Answer: eCash Technologies has enhanced the basic software system, by incorporating 
recent advances in computing technologies for increased efficiency and scalability. eCash 
Technologies has also incorporated other recent advances for increased flexibility in the user 
interface and in administrative reporting. Finally there are some differences in the 'purse' 
application, which is now referred to differently according to the eCash product in question. 
Because of increased flexibility and unique branding enabled by the user interface, eCash can 
be used to extend various core banking products, which may behave differently from the 
consumer or user point of view. For example a debit product may behave differently than a 
credit or ATM cash machine or a stored value card. So the interface may appear differently 
and the method for withdrawing and depositing funds can be controlled by the financial 
institution that offers the product or service. eCash payment messages can also be more varied, 
(can be in denominations or a total amount) but still represent bank redeemable funds. 
Basically more flexibility has been added to the system to replicate more bank products. 
Question. What happened to the other banks like St George in Australia? Is Deutsche 
Bank the only customer at the moment? 
Answer: St. George Bank in Australia is still conducting its eCash pilot, and is in 
discussions with eCash Technologies to determine next steps. Metavante has also signed up to 
offer eCash products and services to many of its banking customers. eCash is in discussions 
with many other banks around the world. Since we are keeping the staff small at this point, we 
must prioritise our business dealings. Deutsche Bank and Metavante in the U. S., as well as 
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some other banks, financial service companies and online merchants that will be announced 
soon take top priority right now, but we are/will be talking to the banks that were in the original 
Digicash pilot. Interestingly, a former executive at Mark Twain bank, which participated in the 
earlier pilot with DC, has moved to EverBank, and we've been in serious discussions with him 
about Everbank using our software. One thing at a time; that's our motto right now. 
Question. In your opinion, what was the major mistake on the original Digicash 
proposal? Why did the company fail? Can it be the lack of demand for a network-based e- 
money? or was it because of very complicated software? 
Answer: We have great respect for the innovative approach pioneered by Digicash. 
Obviously, since eCash purchased some the assets (including patents) from the company after it 
failed, we see it as having great validity. Still, our business model is markedly different from 
Digicash's. Ours is not focused solely on micro-payments, a market that Digicash focused on. 
Our product line includes Debit, P2P, B2P, mobile, prepaid, gift certificates and loyalty 
programs. We feel this broader vision is a more valid business model. A large part of the reason 
for the Digicash failure was a matter of unfortunate timing. Sometimes, being ahead of the 
market (as Digicash was) is not a benefit. The Internet was not widely used, nor was the need 
for electronic payment solutions widely recognised earlier in the decade. We believe that the 
major problem Digicash faced. The business model they followed did not help that situation. 
eCash enriched the payment solutions within the product portfolio. Digicash' s original 
e-cash has been kept in as with the changed name: P2P for person to person. Other than that the 
new product Monneta32 also offers debit services with unique ability to transform traditional 
funds into electronic payments that can be offered globally with PCs and PDAs or mobile 
phones. A Monneta virtual card for prepaid services was described as a cash equivalent 
electronic payment method with a stored value. By adding gift certificate, loyalty and mobile 
options to the portfolio, the intention of the company seems to be to address any kind of virtual 
payment demand that may emerge in the future. Other companies such as www. flooz. com have 
tried gift certificates as well. 
32 http: //www. digicash. com/Solutions/ 
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5.3. OPERATING SYSTEMS AND WINDOWS FOR SMART CARDS 
The reality of e-money may totally be dependent on an effective and efficient 
technology. The current discussions seem to get over questions about the capabilities of the 
technology that makes e-money a reality but the conflict arises from the different approaches 
from different system operators for the future of different e-money schemes. As money needs 
to be generally acceptable, so does e-money and for e-money to be generally acceptable, it has 
to be supplied in such a way that there should be no technical obstacle for the general and 
immediate acceptability. In other words, all e-money schemes in a certain economic area had 
better to be interoperable and compatibly to each other. No matter which operator provides the 
e-value, the retailers and consumers should be capable of accepting any e-money that has been 
offered to them. The borders of such an economic area may be defined as a group of economic 
entities dealing and transacting with each other like a country, like Euro Zone and like border 
towns using more than one currency in daily life. For example, any e-money scheme within 
European Union countries needs to be interoperable in all countries because e-money will be 
issued as Euro which will be acceptable in all member countries. As a result, interoperability 
becomes one of the most critical issues surrounding e-money. 
On the other hand, as the technology seems to be in an emerging stage, there are 
different approaches to e-money proposals. A discussion of these systems seems to be 
necessary both to understand the current issues relating to e-money and to evaluate future 
developments. 
Consequently, in this part, first of all, there will be a general overview of Microsoft, 
Java and Maosco proposals for alternative operating systems. An operating system for an e- 
money scheme may be explained as a software that will enable the electronic purse application 
in a smart card to support the card to function as money, including storing the monetary value, 
making payments from the card and taking payments to the card by transferring monetary value 
from one card to another or from card to a financial service account. Whereas, the operating 
system for the smart card microprocessor must handle such tasks as33 data transmission over 
the bi-directional, serial terminal interface, loading, operating, and management of applications, 
execution control and instruction processing, protected access to data, memory management, 
file management and management and execution of cryptographic algorithms. 
33 http: //www. litronic. com/whitepaper/scoper. html 
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Unlike the personal computer operating systems such as Unix, DOS, and Windows, 
smart card operating systems do not feature user interfaces or the ability to access external 
peripherals or storage media. The capabilities of hardware may not be comparable to personal 
computers as the size of a smart card is typically between 3 and 24 Kbytes recently but future 
developments are expected. The lower limit weak cards are used by specialised applications 
and the upper limit strong cards are used by multi-application operating systems. 
The importance of operating system for different proposals is that all the machinery 
including the cards, retail terminals, value-loading mechanisms such as PCs and/or ATMs 
and/or telephones and/or PDAs and/or game consoles need to be compatible with particular 
software or with all the software which enable the circulation of e-money. Like Windows 
operating system for PCs, a standard for smart card operating systems may contribute to widen 
the acceptance of e-money as it creates a standard and interoperable environment for all e- 
money schemes. 
Windows for Smart Cards (WSCs) operating system will be searched in dept. There are 
two reasons to choose this particular system. The first one is that Microsoft is not a bank at 
least for now. The company's specialisation is computer software. As it is argued that e-money 
technology may decrease barriers to entry to financial service industry, Microsoft's plans to get 
involved into e-money business would be a test for this projection. Second reason is that, as 
Microsoft is a leading company in computer software with a comparative advantage to banks in 
this particular field, it may also have a comparative advantage to be the leading operating 
system among current proposals such as Java and Multos at least for multi-application smart 
cards. Whereas banks has a comparative advantage in payment technologies and know-how 
compared to Microsoft, the project may also contribute to the changes in traditional banking as 
the concentration and weight of traditional payment services from banks may loose its 
importance and force the banks to re-structure. 
The last part of this section will include recommendations and implications of different 
operating systems for the future of e-money. 
5.3.1. OPERATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL AND JAVA CARD 
There are three major current proposals for smart card operating systems with a 
capacity of universal acceptability. With the limit of current potential of smart cards, it may not 
technically be possible to place more than one operating system to a smart card. As a result, 
software system interoperability seems technically difficult for especially card-to-card 
73 
transactions at least for now. It may be argued that smart cards will follow a similar pattern to 
PCs so that in every one-to-two years the technical capabilities will double itself without any 
production cost (Moore's Law). This can create an opportunity for software interoperability but 
within current limits, smart cards are not able to support more than one operating system even 
card readers may operate with two or more operating languages. 
The first operating system to be analysed is Java programming language-based. This 
system has the backing of Sun Microsystems and Visa International. Visa dedicated itself to 
Java and believes that it will be the future operating system for smart cards. Java technology is 
explained34 as to run on a smart card or other small memory-constrained device. The Java 
wallet is defined as a Java application, which provides an open development framework, user 
interface, and secure services for Internet commerce transactions. The Java Wallet was said to 
run on Java Runtime Environment (JRE) available on a personal computer, workstation, or 
network computer. The underlying framework for Java Wallet includes an interface that can 
communicate with smart cards, including Java Card-enabled smart cards. 
As the other two operating systems, Java's aim is to support smart cards, retailer 
machines to be used for these cards and all of their applications relating to smart card potential 
such as vending machines and point-of-sale terminals. The main components of Java software 
are explained by Java sources in depth as35: The Java Card Virtual Machine is built on top of a 
specific integrated circuit and native operating system implementation as main part of the 
operating language. The Java Virtual Machine layer hides the manufacturer's proprietary 
technology with a common language and system interface. The Java Card framework defines a 
set of Application Programming Interface (API) classes for developing Java Card applications 
and for providing system services to those applications. A specific industry or business can 
supply add-on libraries to provide a service or to refine the security and system model. Java 
Card applications are called applets. Multiple applets can reside on one card. Each applet is 
identified uniquely by its application identifier. 
A Java Card is defined as a smart card that is capable of running Java programs and said 
to contain detailed information for building the Java Card Virtual Machine and application 
programming interface in smart cards. The minimum system requirement is 16 kilobytes of 
read-only memory (ROM), 8 kilobytes of EEPROM, and 256 bytes of random access memory 
34 http: //java. sun. com/products/javacard/faq. html 
35 http: //www. javaworld. com/javaworld/jw-03-1998/jw-03 javadev. html 
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(RAM). These requirements makes Java as the most complicated operating system because 
current smart technology still relies on 8 kilobytes of read-only-memory. On the other hand, 
Java applications those were named as applets contributes to the security of Java cards as it 
separates every single application from other applications creating auto-exist firewalls. As a 
result, it may be argued that Java operating system may play a critical role as an operating 
system in the future especially after the technical capacity of smart cards reach to a certain 
point which is not expected to take more than a couple of years. 
For the purpose of e-money analysis, technical details may not seem to be so relevant 
but software improvements of the past relating to computer industry may be accepted as a proof 
for fast and sudden developments in this area. As a result, e-money may need at least a partial 
understanding of smart card operating systems but any further details will not be searched as it 
is very technical and in general may not be needed for e-money dynamics. 
In the following parts, Multos will be analysed. This particular operating system has a 
special place in this particular area as it is especially developed for e-money applications when 
Mondex initiated the beginning of the project and additionally it may be accepted as the most 
banking industry influenced operating system in the market. 
5.3.2. MULTOS OPERATING SYSTEM 
Maosco (Multi-Application Operating System Consortium) was formed as an industry 
wide consortium in May 1997 to drive the adoption of Multos as an industry standard operating 
system and to manage its on-going development. Up to that time, the smart card market has 
been developed on a proprietary basis. Systems typically enabled only one application per card 
which lead to consumers having to carry a number of different cards in their wallets for a 
number of different purposes, such as telephone cards, debit and credit cards, loyalty cards and 
access cards to buildings. Interoperability was not possible to form as all the cards to have an 
individual operating system. It was not only inconvenient for the consumer but, because each 
card had to be developed as a unique product, it was also extremely expensive for card issuers 
and application developers. Consequently, despite the obvious advantages of smart cards, their 
emergence has been restricted to a certain extent. During the development of Mondex scheme, 
it has become apparent that without a purse-oriented operating system, the critical mass for 
different applications including e-purse may not be sustained. As Java Card and WSCs was not 
available for that time, developers of Mondex decided to create a unique and c-money-oriented 
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operating system to support e-money schemes and other applications to enlarge the reach of 
smart card technology. 
Maosco's mission was given as36 to exploit the Multos specification to create an open 
industry standard, high security smart card multi-application operating system. Its role is 
threefold; to drive the adoption of Multos as an industry standard, to manage the ongoing 
development and maintenance of the specifications and to provide licensing and certification 
services. 
Further companies are being invited to give the consortium interests in all major areas 
of the smart card business and the industries it serves, which makes the consortium an open 
platform. But, as different companies has different projections, there are more than one 
consortiums in the market and membership seems very volatile currently as there has been a 
consolidation going on. Maosco Ltd is said to be a `not for-profits company'. The control of the 
Multos specification is shaped with the consortium members and it is the consortium members, 
as a group, who are responsible for the ongoing maintenance and development of the Multos 
specification. The membership to the consortium is not restricted but three criteria's were 
named to achieve maximum industry presentation 37: The first one as global representation 
- 
Multos is to be a global not a regional standard. The second one as cross industry 
representation 
-with representatives of both supply and demand sides of the smart card industry 
and the final one as multiple industry representation 
-i. e. telecommunication companies, 
financial service providers, DTV companies, Internet and e-commerce companies, public sector 
and so on. 
Multos may be defined 38 as `an enabler for a number of different applications or 
products to be held on the smart card at the same time, separately and securely, and makes the 
applications platform independent, which means that for applications such as credit and debit 
cards, cardholders need a single card'. This may prove a huge convenience for the consumer, 
while allowing card issuers the opportunity to share the space on the chip and hence the cost of 
the cards with other service providers. With Multos, consumers, in conjunction with the card 
provider, will be able to construct a smart card, which is able to hold a number of different 
applications to suit their individual requirements or lifestyle. For example, an underground pass 
36 http: //www. multos. com/200/240. html 
37 http: //www. multos. com/500. html 
38 http: //www. multos. com/ 100/ 110. html 
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card may include e-money to pay for parking or for a newspaper, to function as a telephone 
card and as an emergency health application. 
Multos runs on the micro controller on a smart card. The technical procedure has been 
explained39 in depth. ` The Multos smart card checks the validity of the application it has been 
sent, allocates the program a protected and 
-through the use of special `firewall' programs- an 
isolated area in its memory, and locks the new program into place. Every application on a 
Multos smart card has a firewall protected area to prevent it from interfering with any other 
application and operating system and to protect it from any other application's interference. 
Multos is compliant with the key industry standards and EMV and allows credit/debit, 
electronic cash and other applications to co-reside on the same chip card. (EMV is Europay, 
Mastercard and Visa specifications for credit and debit cards to be used on e-commerce in an 
internationally standard and interoperable manner). The security system allows multiple 
applications from many different industries, not just financial applications, to be carried 
together securely and independently on the same smart card. 
Multos is now available on a non-proprietary `open system' basis to enable it to be used 
as a standard across the various industries interested in using smart cards including travel, 
retail, medical, government, access control, telecommunications, entertainment and finance 
applications. They may be named as EMV compatible credit and debit cards, electronic purses, 
airline ticketing, bus or rail season tickets, electronic traveller's cheques, loyalty programs, 
medical, Government/Citizens cards, driving licences, emergency health information, social 
security access control, telecommunications, calling cards with a programmable list of contacts 
and telephone numbers, entertainment applications such as electronic ticketing and electronic 
purse for theme parks, GSM standard for digital telecommunications, Internet both for access 
or payment. 
Maosco Ltd. argued three key unique features for Multos operating system40: Firstly, 
rather than keeping Multos as a proprietary specification, Mondex International as the inventor 
of the operating system has chosen to donate the Multos specifications to the industry with the 
objective of creating an open, de facto industry standard. Secondly, security is a fundamental 
business requirement and should be designed into the product from the start 
- 
not added as a 
39 http: //www. multos. com/100/120. html 
40 http: //www. multos. com/500. html 
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layer at the end. Finally, the ability to load and delete applications securely, whilst cards remain 
in the field is a feature which is completely unique to Multos. 
- 
These arguments do not hold for only Multos at the moment because all the operating 
systems argue that they have the same unique features. Consequently, above-mentioned 
features may be interpreted as the basic requirements that any operating system should sustain 
in general terms. Maosco Ltd. is clearly aware of the fact that41 `any card issuer who is going to 
invest seriously in smart cards as part of their delivery infrastructure is going to require and 
demand multiple sources of interoperable supply. The products are going to have to be 
interoperable 
- 
that is guaranteed to provide the same functionality, security and compatibility'. 
Multos mentioned all the benefits of this particular operating systems for all the parties 
including both the financial industry and to many others 
-telecommunications, Internet, public 
services, satellite/cable and pay-per-view TV, transit, ticketing and retail industry and to benefit 
consumers in these industries world wide. Some of the benefits may be listed to demonstrate 
the efficiency and ease of use of an operating system42: 
Card Issuers can choose among silicon providers and migrate their products from one 
generation of chip to the next without having to re-write applications. The security features 
enable applications to be downloaded over `insecure' networks such as the Internet or public 
telephone systems by using firewalls. Upgrades would be faster, cheaper and less disruptive to 
the customer relationship arising from the standardisation. Multos operating system plans to 
allow issuers to share the cost of silicon with non-competitive application suppliers 
- 
for banks 
with travel companies, medical agencies with government issuers or transit authorities with 
telecommunication companies 
-enabling new areas of co-operation and co-branding to be 
developed. These additional offerings would also help to create a critical mass for smart card 
applications and increase the awareness of the smart card potential in public and private sector. 
Application developers who have previously been restricted to the development of one- 
off bespoke applications could have the capability to offer their developments as standard 
products after the reality of an interoperable operating system. Like PCs, smart cards would 
have a common platform to operate without being hardware dependent. 
41 http: //www. multos. com/500. html 
42 http: //www. multos. com/300/330. html 
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Silicon and card manufacturers may benefit from the greatly increased size of the 
smart card market arising from Multos technology that allows manufacturers to offer any one 
of their products to the complete range of application developers and smart card users. 
Retailers may have more choices for offering cards to their customers and reducing 
costs. The operating system enables retailers to offer new services beyond loyalty programs 
such as electronic shopping lists or coupons with the new option of co-branding, sharing costs 
and offering customers more services on the retailer's own card. The standard operating system 
will allow all the economic units to adjust to a common platform for trade and exchanges with 
a potential to increase the acceptability of e-money and increase its role as a medium of 
exchange. 
Customers (end-users) benefit from fewer cards to carry and to bring preferred products 
and services onto a single or small number of smart cards. Multos offers the important benefit 
of immediate on-line programming, allowing the consumer to choose which applications to 
hold on the card and enabling deletion of non-relevant applications. Multos will create an 
environment that cardholders need not to wait for a customised card to be physically delivered 
as they can create their own card on-line using a bank ATM, a public phone or a PC on the 
Internet to program the services they want on to the card. This may take a little over one minute 
with the cardholder putting the card into a bank ATM, into one of the new card-based 
telephones or a smart card reader attached to a PC linked to the Internet. Once the card is 
connected with the computer system of the bank or service provider, the cardholder is given a 
menu of options, which will start the programming process. This flexibility would allow the 
emergence of lifestyle cards, such as university cards carrying all the applications required for 
life on campus as the University of Exeter 
- 
building access, electronic purse, library card, 
student voting card, identity card etc. With a standard operating system, smart cards would 
have all their multi-application potential available to the customers. 
Benefits to telecommunications companies include a secure and cost efficient way to 
move away from the 12 billion phone cards that have to be thrown away every year. 
Although Multos exhibited these benefits arising from its own product, obviously, same 
benefits may be sustained by other operating systems as well. These benefits should better to be 
analysed as general benefits of a standard and interoperable operating system for smart card 
applications including e-money. 
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After analysing two operating systems namely Java Card and Multos, in the next 
section, WSCs from Microsoft will be searched in detail as it may play a critical role for e- 
money perspectives and future structure of financial service providers. 
5.3.3. WINDOWS FOR SMART CARDS 
WSCs will challenge Java Card from Sun Microsystems and Visa International, and 
Multos from Maosco, a consortium that includes MasterCard, American Express, Fujitsu, and 
other major corporations. All three Operating systems make it possible to put several 
application packages on an integrated circuit inside a smart card and to change those programs 
without any impact on other programs stored in the card. What makes WSCs so special is 
because Microsoft has a great influence on computer software with a well-established 
marketing structure throughout the world and has a comparative advantage against its 
competitors. Multos has a banking background and more dedicated to e-money arising from its 
Mondex connection but without analysing all the operating systems, it may not be possible to 
cover operating system developments around e-money including WSCs. The multifunction 
capability of smart cards lets these cards be used for site and network access, identification, and 
records storage and for cash transactions as e-money. Some of the potential functions of smart 
cards that were mentioned43 by Microsoft include: 
 A smart card can remember multiple passwords for a user, all protected by a single PIN. 
This results in a direct solution for users to remember many different passwords for many 
different network accesses. 
  
Users need not know the secret or password stored on the card, so that they can't write it 
down or share it with others. This potential solves the problem of password vulnerability. 
  
When the smart card is capable, symmetric cryptographic algorithms can be performed on 
cards so that the secret does not need to appear in the desktop computer, where it could be 
sniffed by a malicious program. This guarantees the security of card passwords in network 
environments. 
  
The smart card can hold the private key for a user PIN protected, so that it's portable. 
Additionally, these cards are temper-resistant creating storage for protecting private keys, 
account numbers, passwords and other forms of personal information. Smart cards may be 
used for authentication under a high level of security. 
43 http: //www. microsoft. com/windowsce/smartcard/resources/wp2. asp 
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If the smart card is capable, it can perform the asymmetric algorithm on card, so that the 
private key never appears in the PC, where it could be sniffed by a malicious program. 
  
If the smart card is capable, it can generate the private key on the card so that it never has 
existed anywhere other than on the smart card in secured storage. This allows digital 
signatures to replace hand-written signatures. 
  
When on a smart card, the certificate and private key are portable from machine to machine 
creating convenience and allowing place-independent transactions to be performed. 
  
When on a smart card, the private key need never exist in the computer memory, where it 
could be vulnerable to sniffing by malicious programs. 
  
When on a smart card with an auto-disabling PIN, access to the private key is resistant to a 
`guessing' attack. 
  
When on a smart card, the intended user has more control over when and where the private 
key is being used because they can carry the smart card with them. 
  
Smart cards can be initialised with a very strong password, which would be difficult for a 
human to remember. This increases the effective key space. 
These potential are not directly related to particular operating systems. The reason they 
were investigated here is that with all these potential, smart cards may have a widespread 
acceptance as they create a combination of conventional and virtual way of life. Thus, 
software-based and card-based e-money potential may be integrated to a single platform by 
using smart cards to allow individuals to perform financial transactions on conventional 
methods and fast-developing virtual methods such as e-commerce. For this purpose, three 
multifunction operating systems are expected to battle to gain a foothold in market namely 
WSCs, Java Card and Multos. 
Historically, WSCs is the youngest operating system project. It was announced in 
October 1998 with a potential launch as early as January 1999 but because of non-stop 
technical progress and fast-changing requirements of the market, it has been delayed quite a 
few times. The project was announced44 as a standards-based platform that will provide secure 
storage for security, loyalty and e-purse solutions in the Microsoft Windows operating system. 
Obviously, Microsoft seems to be willing to play a full-scale role with all the infrastructure of 
its products already available in almost every PC around the world and relies strongly on the 
44 http: //www. microsoft. com/PressPass/press/1998/0ct98/smrtedpr. htm 
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comparative advantage of Windows product that are widely used and became familiar to PC 
users and experts. 
Typical solutions enabled via smart cards were named as secure network authentication; 
secure corporate transactions such as online banking, and debit and credit, e-cash and customer 
loyalty programs; and mentioned to take many advantages45 
WSCs has no direct aim to be a pure alternative to central bank money because it is not 
an e-money scheme. Consequently, it may be misleading to investigate this product as to be a 
direct threat to the central banking. The importance of the product is, as mentioned earlier, is 
that: 
1. Microsoft is not a financial service provider and the development of its operating system is 
not directly and only financial service oriented. However, as a non-financial institution, the 
company's plan may create an alternative payment system infrastructure, which may also 
be used for financial services. This potential comes from the continuous progress in smart 
card technology and continuous innovation on smart card applications. Even a smart card 
infrastructure with a purely standard or interoperable operating system may not have a 
direct aim to create an e-money scheme, once the critical mass is reached, it may be very 
easy to add an e-purse application for all smart cards to lead direct issuance of e-money. 
2. Microsoft's comparative advantage in PC software and international expertise on marketing 
and on sustaining a non-stop progress in computer software may be an additional cost- 
cutting alternative to banking-based payment alternatives. As surveyed in chapter 6, the 
future access for money is expected to be PCs by the innovators and operators and PCs may 
not be understood better by banks and similar financial service providers than Microsoft, 
which may not have a comparative advantage in financial service products but could get an 
advantage to create a payment infrastructure by using its power in PC software and by 
using smart cards in payment services including other multi-application potential. 
3. For a few decades now, computing cost has been diminishing and it is generally expected 
that the cost of communication may follow a similar trend. With almost zero cost of 
as http: //www. microsoft. com[PressPass/press/1998/0ct98/smrtcdpr. htm: Multi-partition file system to physically 
separate data files so that multiple applications can safely run on a single card. Java manages this by using applets 
and Multos by using firewalls. Access Control Rules to tightly control who has access to all the files on the card, 
as well as files off the card. Security seems to be one of the most critical issue for all operating systems. Pluggable 
cyptographic algorithms to allow developers and customers to specify and design their own levels of 
cryptographic support. This option seems to address especially public key infrastructure potential by using public 
key cryptography and security. Support for existing smart card standards to sustain currently agreed standards 
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computing and communication, it may not be easy to charge financial service customers for 
simple transactions relating to payments such as account-to-account transfers. If Microsoft 
supports WSCs as an alternative payment infrastructure which may be open to different e- 
money scheme operators, then, the role of banks may deteriorate as new financial service 
provider start-ups find a ready-to-use payment infrastructure that they can use by just 
integrating to PC-based and Windows compatible smart cards. Because of their multi- 
application potential, such a system may provide e-money with a ready-to-use PC network 
hugely supported by recent trends in Internet and WAP potential with an enormously 
increasing number and ability to add other payment alternatives such as credit ' and debit 
cards for macro-payments. 
4. Even central bankers started to question the future of central banks after the current 
technological developments. Deputy Governor of the BOE Mervyn King argued in a recent 
latter published in Financial Times that46 `There would be no unique role for base money, 
and hence the central bank monopoly of its issue would have no value. Central banks would 
lose their ability to implement monetary policy. The successors to Bill Gates would have 
put the successors to Alan Greenspan out of business'. Without being even a bank, 
Microsoft, representing the technological improvements of the last two decades, seems to 
convince even central bankers that money, most probably in an electronic form, may be 
managed without central banks. This approach may confirm a requirement for a close 
attention to WSCs. 
5. Regulators may find it difficult to understand how to react to a potentially new framework 
for the financial service supply by using internationally compatible and borderless service 
coverage as conventionally banking regulation relies on banking industry and financial 
service providers mainly dominated by banks. It may be a new concept to supervise a 
computer software company as a financial service provider or an electronic network to be 
shared by many financial service start-ups to enjoy the potential of smart cards creating a 
combined software and card-based environment for e-money issuance. 
In the light of these considerations, it may be useful to investigate the WSCs operating 
system in further depth. 
for smart cards by the industry in order not the create a competition which may result in the disruption of given 
standards. 
46 http: //www. ft. com/hippocampus/g147c2e. htm. Financial Times, `Personal View', August 31,1999. 
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Microsoft assumes that smart cards will have a similar development pattern to personal 
computers: Once a common operating system, similar to IBM compatibility in the PC market, 
is created there will be a boom in demand for especially multi-application smart cards including 
e-purse to store money. As a result, Microsoft's WSCs has been designed47 to provide a 
standard-based platform that enables secure storage for smart cards used for a variety of 
purposes, such as secure network authentication, secure corporate transactions, e-cash and 
customer loyalty programs. This approach would create a natural environment for e-money 
potential because as smart cards have a wide customer base, it may be easier to convince them 
to add e-purse applications to their existing cards than convincing them to carry an e-purse card 
only. WSCs is defined as an 8-bit multi-application operating system for smart cards for now. It 
is designed to be a low-cost, easy to program platform that runs many existing Microsoft 
technologies. It has been designed to meet four key criteria: 
1. To enable smart cards to be a secure extension to the PC environment, in terms of 
development tools and connectivity. This criterion may create the broadest base for money 
distribution channel that is available in the current market conditions. All the computers 
carrying a PC/SC logo will be interoperable for smart card applications. 
2. To work with software development tools that has a broad base of developer familiarity and 
support. This is the comparative advantage of Microsoft in the software industry and e- 
money scheme operators may customise the operating system to add and subtract different 
functions in addition to e-purse limited only to the memory of the embedded chip. 
3. To offer card issuers the ability to choose the components they want from a variety of 
suppliers. It is this opportunity that new entrance to financial service industry may be easier 
and cheaper compared to a current fixed investment level for conventional financial 
services. 
4. To deliver smart cards at a more attractive price, therefore encouraging new applications 
and uses. Cards are expected to cost between $2 and $4 each for simple cards and $6 and $8 
for cards with more advanced security features, compared to the $15 or so it costs for 
existing cards. The cost mentioned here may drop dramatically in the future or advanced 
cards may be offered for the same level of cost creating an opportunity not to increase cost 
for increased security with advanced cards. There may be a correlation between the cost and 
security level and financial applications may require highest level of security. But, as cost 
47 http: //www. microsoft. com/PressPass/features/1998/10-27smartcard. htm 
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of card decreases, the reach of applications increase as well to help sustain economies of 
scale. 
Above four criteria were regarded as necessary for any smart card platform or initiative 
to succeed in accelerating the acceptance of smart cards to support a critical mass to sustain the 
economies of scale. 
Microsoft expects WSCs to become the popular smart card choice for three reasons48: 
1. Because it is based on the Personal Computer /Smart Card (PC/SC) interface standard. 
Other operating systems are available for both card and network-based solutions as well. 
2. It is ISO 7816-compatible. Other operating systems maintain the same requirement as well, 
as this is a standard for smart card industry. 
3. It is very tightly integrated with the Microsoft Windows NT, Windows CE and Windows 
2000 operating systems and Microsoft Internet Explorer browser software. This is the major 
difference of WSCs from other operating systems, as Microsoft seems to be committed to 
its operating system by using all its software expertise for smart cards infrastructure. 
As it is mentioned earlier, Microsoft has no immediate intention to operate an e-money scheme. 
On the contrary, Microsoft's initial focus is on three broad market categories 49 
1. Corporate information technology (secure logon). 
2. Medical applications to improve the quality of service and decrease the time spent for 
admitting and processing patients. 
3. Travel and Entertainment including Loyalty Applications. As credit cards emerged from 
this particular sector, it may be one of the major parts of early smart card applications. 
On the other hand, WSCs promises to create operating systems resulting in benefits 
known as the four P's50: enhanced protection, improved productivity, increased profit and 
facilitated promotions for all related parties to smart card applications. Microsoft argues that 
applications are the driving force behind the new smart card market and the choice of 
applications will be the strategic decision for implementers and adopters including e-money 
scheme operators. According to the company, the most promising applications include": (i) 
Prepayment for services like prepaid phone cards. (ii) Credit, debit and e-purse cards. (iii) 
Loyalty cards for discounts. (iv) Access control to buildings, computers or other secure areas. 
as http: //www. microsoft. com/PressPass/press/1999/May99/AtmelPR. htm 
49 http: //www. microsoft. com/PressPass/press/1999/May99/PilotPR. htm 
so http: //www. microsoft. com/windowsce/smartcard/start/intro. asp 51 http: //www. microsoft. com/windowsce/smartcard/startbackground. asp 
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All these applications broadens the reach of smart cards for widespread issuance of e- 
money by just adding e-purse applications to the cards that are already in the circulation. Any 
application that increases the number of smart card capable for e-purse application would 
increase potential customer base resulting in a critical mass for economies of scale. 
Consequently, WSCs may help not only to create a common platform for different e-money 
schemes but also widens the number of potential customers to a level, which is attractive 
enough for local, national and international rollouts for e-money schemes. 
5.3.4. EVALUATION OF OPERATING SYSTEMS 
Three different operating systems that were analysed above have been trying to 
dominate smart card operating systems for the future by creating a common platform for 
different applications including e-purse. They all aim to be the best both now and in the future. 
The competition among them may either exploit aggressive e-money rollouts or may delay it 
because of unclear future perspectives. Here is a comparison: 
TABLE 5.3.1. MULTI-APPLICATION OPERATING SYSTEMS 
WINDOWS FOR SMART CARDS MULTOS JAVA CARD 
Last to start First to start Second to start 
Most flexible Formal Security Most Functions 
Cross Industry Financial Industry 3-4 key Industries 
Single Company Consortium Company + Consortium 
Windows Development Environment Mondex tie-in Java-based technology. 
source: iuropean tiara Keview, May-June 1999, Page 4. 
The table gives a summary of each operating system including their characteristics. 
WSCs seems to be the most flexible one as it gives issuers a wide range of options to customise 
applications on their own priorities compared to Multos, that gives security a top-priority as it 
targets financial industry whereas WSCs targets cross industries such as authentication and 
secure access. On the other hand, Java Card seems to enjoy Java language's advantages with 
most functions creating a demand for even more advanced cards targeting certain industries 
such as banking and leisure and entertainment. 
The structure of organisations changes among the operating systems as well. Microsoft 
seems to prefer to act alone on the design of WSCs by just consulting its potential customer 
base. 
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The last distinction arises from operating platforms as WSCs operate in a Windows 
development environment totally integrated to Microsoft's software expertise whereas Java 
Card operates under a Java language-based technology. Mondex, on the other hand, was 
designed as an independent operating system mainly prioritising financial application 
requirements for Mondex e-money scheme. 
A current survey question on the Internet by Faulkner & Gray's Card Technology asked 
the participants this question52: Below chart exhibits these results: 
('HART 5.3.1: 711F. FLITI IRE OF OPERATING SYSTEMS 
NONE: 
WIN DO\% 
.P AVA('ARI) 
I 1% 
The results seem to favour Multos but it may be very difficult to conclude that the 
competition is over. As of October 12,1999, there were 598 responses and 424 of them 
favoured Multos whereas 77 of them argued that in `several years' there would not he a 
dominant operating system. 68 of the participants voted in favour of Java Card whereas only 29 
participant voted for WSCs. Because of the consolidation process, it may be possible to observe 
2 http: //www. cardtech. faulknergray. com/survey2. htm- Which softwurc-n/krratim plat/orm will become the 
standard for multi-up/)lication curds: ' Select One: 
A) Multos: It's available today, highly secure, and it was developed with smart cards in mind. 
B) Java Card: The Java programming language has many supporters among software developers, and Java Card 
has established a foothold in the GSM phone market. 
C) Windows for Smart Cards: Microsoft knows software, has virtually unlimited resources and, well, it's 
Microsoft. 
D) No single operating platform will dominate the smart card market for the next several years. 
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hard fluctuations arising from continuous technological process. A possible crackdown, for 
example, may change above picture suddenly in disfavour of cracked systems. 
5.3.5. ADDITIONAL REMARKS ON OPERATING SYSTEMS 
The relationship between e-money and multi-application operating systems may be 
constructed by the definition of money, which is generally and immediately accepted medium 
of exchange. The current stage of e-money may be summarised as a discovery process to find 
the best way to create an efficient infrastructure in order to create first of all a critical mass and 
then, support it to profit from economies of scale. The aim of this section was to find out how 
smart cards may create a natural infrastructure by enjoying multi-application potential to reach 
every economic entity including households and provide transactions using e-money, which is 
accepted in `every' intention and `everywhere' just like money. Operating system's importance 
is to support this infrastructure by creating a common platform for all e-money schemes to 
operate under any circumstances. As a result, it may be expected that the future of operating 
systems will be shaped by many different developments. 
For example, technological progress may determine the reach of smart card solutions to 
financial service demands. Even smart cards seem to be the best available gateway between 
virtual and conventional financial services, because of the lack of consensus on interoperability 
solutions, the acceptance of e-money may be delayed. The reason for such a delay may be 
found on different proposals regarding electronic purse standardisation. For example, European 
Committee for Banking Standards have been publishing so many guidance relating to 
electronic purse and finally, The Interoperable Financial Sector Electronic Purse Standard for 
European Banking was announced in June 1999. Standardised transactions included balance 
inquiry, currency exchange, log inquiry, load of purchasing power, incremental purchase and 
purchase cancellation. 
It is not only European Committee for Banking Standards that is trying to create a 
common platform for e-money operations, payment card operators want to impose their own 
solutions as well. For example, Visa International published the details of Open Platform as a 
solution to create a common platform for its own e-purse: Visa Cash. But it only supports Java- 
based solutions even it is promised to adapt other operating systems when they are finalised 
including WSCs. Visa defines The Open Platform53 as a comprehensive system architecture 
53 http: //www. visa. com/av/news/PRmisc042999. vhtml 
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that enables the development of globally interoperable smart card systems. Visa argues that 
Open Platform enables smart card issuers to choose between operating systems and application 
developers while providing a core security and card management technology. 
Proton World, on the other hand, supports a variety of technologies and specifications 
to deliver open, interoperable and global smart card solutions with an aim to support and 
implement the Common Electronic Purse Specifications (CEPS). The CEPS is designed to 
permit convenient interoperability between electronic purse schemes world-wide. The CEPS 
were published at the end of March 99 after reviewed by independent laboratories and is 
supported by Europay International, Visa International, Proton World and German and Spanish 
Banks associations. Unfortunately, Mondex is not CEPS compatible at least for the moment 
resulting in an interoperability problem for two different approaches to e-money. 
All the above-analysed alliances may have a different influence on the future of 
operating systems because all those different `common platforms' need a different technology 
resulting in different software. Either operating systems or e-purse operators may need to adapt 
to the other as a result of interoperability requirement. 
Other than technological problems relating to operating systems, the operating systems 
should be interoperable among themselves as well, which may only be supported by more 
advanced smart cards in the future. It may be expected that there may not be so many operating 
systems at the same time, as mobile phone technology seems to prove the advantage of having 
an international standard for a new product. Some of the operating systems may be eliminated 
in the future through competition. This risk may slow decision-makings of operators in order 
not to choose the operating system, which is not reliable. 
One other point is that recently, operating systems seems to be planned through card- 
based e-money schemes. It may be expected that, software-based e-money schemes may also 
find smart card solutions to issue e-money. National or international currencies may not be the 
only form of purchasing power that are downloaded to smart cards but it may also be e-gold 
and/or Beenz (the Internet value earnable on the Internet only as a currency) for example. Once 
there is a reliable infrastructure to circulate purchasing power on smart cards with 
interoperability, it may be possible to circulate any kind of purchasing power. 
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5.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS FOR CASE STUDIES AND OPERATING SYSTEMS 
This chapter considered Mondex as an example of card-based e-money proposals, 
Digicash as a network-based e-money scheme and operating systems for smart cards as to play 
a critical role for the future of e-money. The numbers of e-money projects are not limited to 
these two examples. From Avant in Finland, which was originally the one and only central 
bank e-money scheme, to e-gold; there have been many others that have been developed and 
even so often another new project comes on to the market. They may change from Ithaca Hours 
as a local exchange trading system to an electronic gift certificate such as Flooz, or an 
electronic mail of value such as Paypal. Some projects try to fill the gap of alternative payment 
systems as credit cards look for an age limit of 18 and offer virtual wallets on the Internet to 
enable underage to be able to spend. 
It may be argued that all the exaggeration of the past few years for national rollouts for 
testing projects or increased international co-operation were not realised. It may also be argued 
that e-money may not be realised in the couple of years. Both arguments may have supportive 
and discouraging aspects. But, e-money is still under increased interest among central bankers, 
academicians and practitioners and the discussions probably accelerate year by year to the 
implications. The above two case studies were believed to cover almost all the potential e- 
money proposals in a way. Especially the analysis on operating system completed the picture 
because it may be expected for the future that all the e-money forms will in one way or another 
be similar to the cases that were investigated here as they almost cover all the potential aspects 
of e-money. 
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6. SURVEYS ON ELECTRONIC MONEY54 
In this chapter, three sets of data will be analysed. The first data set was collected in 
1999 and will be analysed in the next section and the second data set was collected in 2000 and 
will be analysed in the following section. Both surveys have an aim to collect empirical data 
about the current stage of e-money schemes and investigate future trends that may help central 
bankers, regulators and practitioners shaping their approach to e-money and its implications for 
financial service industry including monetary policy and financial regulation. The final data set 
from the third survey was collected in Miami in 2000 with an aim to compare the results to 
earlier findings from the European surveys. The comparison will target whether there is a 
difference on the perception of e-money among European and the American innovators and 
operators to create a base for the alternative reactions of the ECB and the FED to the 
emergence of e-money. 
E-money has captured the attention of central banks, financial regulators, law 
enforcement agencies, financial practitioners and academics alike. All the three surveys have a 
clear assumption: The future stage of e-money might most probably be shaped by the 
discoveries that have been and would be made by the innovators and the operators, who will 
further manipulate and exploit the technical potential of those innovations with financial 
applications. As a result, any e-money analysis might be incomplete unless covering the 
opinions and perception of innovators and operators. This assumption also covers the two basic 
motives behind e-money reality, namely endlessly decreasing cost of telecommunication and 
ever increasing computing power including smart cards. It is clear that innovators and operators 
are at the forefront of e-money development, conceiving and offering new ideas and products 
to investors and the market at large. Therefore, their views on the potential of e-money and its 
impact are uniquely interesting for policy makers. Of course, innovators and operators cannot 
exactly predict how the future of e-money will turn out, but they do have a lot of special 
54 Partial analysis of these surveys have been presented in conferences and published as discussion papers. The 
analysis of the first survey was presented as "Capie, F. H. 
- 
Gormez, Y. 
- 
Stojanovic, A.: Electronic Money: The 
Perception of Operators and Innovators" at the 8th Symposium on Finance, Banking, and Insurance, Universität 
Karlsruhe (TH), Germany, December 15-17,1999" and the analysis of the second survey was presented as 
"Capie, F. H. 
- 
Gormez, Y.: A Survey on Electronic Money Trends in 2000" at the Third Berlin Internet 
Economics Workshop, Berlecon Research, Berlin, Germany, May 26-27,2000. A collected version of both 
surveys has been combined and published as "Gormez Y.; Capie F. H.; `Surveys on Electronic Money', Bank of Finland Discussion Papers, 07\2000, Helsinki, June 2000". The final survey has totally been sponsored by the Bank of Finland during a research scholarship and the analysis is accepted for the future publication list as 
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knowledge on the possibilities of their products and ideas make available for the society as a 
whole. 
E-money has been treated as a phenomenon through the chapter. Consequently, it was 
assumed that the survey approach would be the best way to collect data in order to gain insights 
into the future of this presumed phenomenon, as meaningful time series data being almost 
totally unavailable because of the infancy of e-money. As a result, the chapter is mainly 
exploratory. 
It is hardly surprising anymore to hear about new trials in new countries or cities 
(involving the same or different e-money schemes). Although there is no generally-agreed 
business case for any particular e-money scheme, operators and innovators have been trying to 
establish national and international standards for e-money products, using a wide variety of 
approaches (from account-based payment solutions to totally anonymous token-based 
payments). They have invested large sums of money, time and effort. A survey of current or 
planned e-money products in 68 countries/territories has recently been made available to the 
public by the BIS, (2000). 
As an emerging technology, e-money seems to have been moving very fast. A few years 
ago, expectations as to network-based e-money tended to be exaggerated. The early proposals 
were impressive, in line with popular expectations regarding Internet and network-based virtual 
life. In the following years, smart card-based solutions to e-money applications became very 
popular, and nearly all credit companies began to invest in electronic purse technology, parallel 
to independent start-ups. There were even forecasts of person-to-person transactions via 
electronic wallets that would be distributed to all cardholders. Recently, mobile applications 
have favoured network and card-based e-money schemes in connection with WAP applications, 
which is another type of card-based solution, since WAP is written on smart cards. In this 
rapidly and continuously changing environment, the survey approach seems to provide the best 
means of collecting data on the implications and possibilities of e-money. 
6.1. E-MONEY: THE PERCEPTION OF INNOVATORS AND OPERATORS 
The first data set will be analysed in this section. The data was collected in 1999 during 
12`h International Advanced Card Exhibition and Conference (Smart99cards), which was held 
"Gormez Y.; Capie F. H.; `Prospects for Electronic Money: A US 
- 
European Comparative Survey', Bank of Finland Discussion Papers". 
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in Olympia 2 in London on 23 
- 
25 March 1999. The exhibitions brought the innovators and 
operators together in a presentation of their products and visions of e-money applications. 
Consequently, the scope of the survey is limited to the perceptions of innovators and operators 
regarding e-money; the views of other interest groups are excluded from the study. 
The purpose of the survey was to collect empirical data on the current status of e-money 
schemes and to investigate future trends, interesting to central bankers, regulators and 
practitioners who are shaping their approach to e-money and its implications for the financial 
services industry, including the monetary policy and financial regulation aspects. The study is 
not intended to provide detailed information on any particular e-money scheme nor on the 
advantages or disadvantages of particular proposals. Nor is this an analysis of a particular 
country's vision of the e-money phenomenon. The aim was to collect data that may help to 
understand the possibilities and limitations of e-money in general, so as to assist policy makers 
to decide on policies that may have direct or indirect consequences for the development of e- 
money. The questionnaire for the survey is presented in the appendix 6.1.6. 
6.1.1. INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF THE SURVEY 
It is generally assumed that e-money, as a developing technology, has many 
implications for the overall structure of financial industry and on the conduct of monetary 
policy and monetary policy instruments in particular. In order to investigate the assumption 
further and collect empirical information about the impacts of this developing technology, 
innovators and operators, who develop it for daily use in financial transactions, have been 
questioned. 
One aim of the first survey was to provide empirical insights into what e-money 
innovators and e-money scheme operators driving the innovation and technological 
developments think about the issues surrounding e-money. 
The second aim was to scrutinise some of the issues of concern to the parties that take 
part in e-money implementation, analysis and discussions. The broader aim was to gather 
information from industry experts and use it to gain insights that will help decision-makers and 
other discussants from both academia and the practical world to understand e-money and its 
potential and limitations. 
Consequently, detailed analyses of particular products or schemes are beyond the scope 
of the study. The data collection was not designed for this purpose, which would be better 
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served by a case study. Moreover, it is not the aim here to compare different e-money schemes 
or to clarify differences in various concepts of e-money. 
Consequently, the. scope of the survey was limited to collecting empirical data on e- 
money developments from the innovators and scheme operators point of view only, excluding 
academics, bankers, central bankers, financial industry experts, consultants and the like. 
Individual analysis of a particular product or scheme was also out of the scope of the survey. 
The procedure to collect data was not designed to do so, as this would be done better by case 
studies. There is also no intention to compare different e-money schemes or to clarify 
differences to the concept of e-money from different sides. 
6.1.2. THE SURVEY SAMPLE 
With the above mentioned aims and limits, a questionnaire was prepared and a survey 
was conducted at the Smart99cards Exhibition and Conference. Open systems and multi- 
applications were key concepts at the exhibition, not only for card manufacturers but also for 
system operators and users. Almost all e-money scheme operators 
- 
some with similar and 
some with widely differing approaches to e-money applications 
- 
including Mondex 
International Ltd, Europay International, Proton World International SA and Visa International 
participated in the exhibition. Projects involving person-to-person applications were presented 
along with projects with account-based solutions. There were companies that were attempting 
to unite several e-money applications in a single and compatible platform and companies with 
operating system proposals for potential e-money software. Most of the major innovators in the 
world behind e-money technology including Ascom, Bull Smart Cards and Terminals, 
Gemplus Ltd, Keycorb Ltd, Lucent Technologies, Philips Semiconductors, Schlumberger 
Cards and Siemens Semiconductors contributed to the exhibition. The topics ranged from 
biometrics solutions to advanced cryptography. The majority of represented companies were 
interested in certain aspects of smart card technology, but the main players were also concerned 
with defining their approaches to current problems and sharing their visions with interested 
parties. The total number of exhibitors was just over 120. 
As a result, it can be argued that the survey sample, which included almost all relevant 
exhibitors, was representative and had good-to-excellent coverage on emerging e-money 
technologies, since all the main players were there long enough to provide the appropriate 
environment for a survey. 
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6.1.3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
The questionnaire was distributed to the individual exhibit stands on the second and 
third days of the exhibition. The distribution process included an interview of the exhibitor 
concerning its products and services. Those exhibitors with products and services unrelated to 
e-money (eg companies involved in the manufacturing process but not in financial applications) 
were not given a questionnaire. Potential respondents were informed of the aims of the survey, 
including general information about the research project. In all, 105 questionnaires were 
distributed and 51 were later collected, so that the return rate was 49 %. (Due to the hectic 
circumstances, many exhibitors lost their questionnaires and were given second copies. In 
calculating the rate of return, lost questionnaires were excluded from the total count so as to 
avoid double counting). There were some exhibitors who refused to complete questionnaires 
while other non-responses were mostly due to a lack of available staff or requisite expertise (as 
most of them explained it). 
Collection of the questionnaires took place on the second and third days of the 
exhibition. Longer interviews were conducted with e-money operators and influential 
innovators (eg the major smart card providers) on an individual basis in order to gain additional 
insights into current and future projects. The exhibition also enabled visitors to view the latest 
developments such as mobile phones that can read smart cards and execute financial 
transactions on a real-time basis. (These mobile phones are like card readers with dual bands 
and are capable of executing financial transactions). Another exhibit was on the integration of 
smart card readers and PCs, which enables interoperability of conventional and virtual payment 
systems. When mature, all PCs may be able to execute financial transactions with guaranteed 
security. 
6.1.4. SURVEY RESULTS 
The questionnaire comprised eleven questions, each with a section for comments. 
Central to the questionnaire were central banking-related issues, like the outlook for regulation. 
The implications of regulatory proposals on innovation and competition were also investigated. 
The technological limits and obstacles as well as the possibilities for e-money innovation 
- 
like 
the future base for e-money access 
- 
were also included in the questionnaire. Finally, queries 
were also made on future trends in light of these obstacles and possibilities, as e. g. the 
implications of e-money products for the banking industry. 
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The first question on the questionnaire was "Do you think that electronic cash has a 
potential to replace central bank money? ". The aim of the question was to ascertain whether e- 
money technology is perceived as sufficiently mature to replace currency (banknotes and coins) 
in circulation produced and managed by central banks and treasuries, since this would have 
implications for both the privatisation of seigniorage revenues and for the conduct of monetary 
policy. Further, the views expressed on e-money can be defended only if the technology has the 
potential to provide a permanent replacement for banknotes and coins. Otherwise, e-money 
may warrant analysis merely as another complementary innovation in advanced payment 
systems, which have been developing rapidly, especially since 1980, due to advances in credit 
and debit card applications. The responses are summarised in the chart 6.1.1. 
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lt seems quite clear that the majority of the respondents believed in the possibility of e- 
money replacing currency in circulation. Only I8 % felt that e-money could not replace central 
bank money, whereas 82 % felt that it could do so, albeit 47 % to only a certain extent. l; ven 
excluding the "To a certain extent" option, believers in the potential of e-money technology to 
eliminate banknotes and coins surpassed non-believers by 17 °/0. There were no , I)on't know" 
responses. It seems that the sample selection for the questionnaire was appropriate for 
collecting data on c-money, as all the respondents confirmed that they were sufficiently 
familiar with e-money to give reasoned responses to the questions. There were comments on 
issues of concern to elderly people and children and on issues such as marketing e-money 
concept in order to create a critical mass of users. These are serious matters among those 
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concerned with e-money. Some argue that even with the appropriate technology for replacing 
central bank money, there could be social barriers to a complete changeover. 
In connection with the first question, it was asked "If yes, when? ". 35 % of those who 
said "Yes" to the first question gave their responses. The aim here was to ascertain the expected 
time needed for c-money technologies to replace banknotes and coins and to determine whether 
central banks and regulators should take time to analyse e-money products or should try to 
decide now on their roles and functions. The responses should provide insight on the time- 
frame for policy action. The results are shown in chart 6.1.2. 
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Note that more than half of the respondents who felt that e-money has the potential to 
replace central hank (CB) money also felt that this will take place before 2010. The chart also 
shows that those respondents who anticipated the total replacement of currency in circulation 
by e-money believed this would happen sooner rather than later. Only 17 % indicated that 
replacement of CB money would be realised after 2020. 
According to the results, policy makers concerned with c-money, including central 
banks and regulatory bodies, should decide soon on appropriate policies in order not to lag 
behind the curve of technological progress. Time may be a critical factor for the eli ctiveness 
of a policy measure. One important aspect of the elimination of banknotes and coins is that this 
is a once-and-for-all matter since, once the technology is capable of circulating money 
electronically, the circulation could continue to be electronically based even in the event that 
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the denomination of the currency is changed. Moreover, central banks' control over money 
increased in the early 19th century, and over a period of many years financial markets became 
accustomed to this notion. Keeping this in mind, even a 20-year period for the elimination of 
currency may not be regarded as a "long time". 
The next question regarding central banking issues concerned the desired reaction of 
central banks to e-money developments. The aim was to determine innovators' and operators' 
demands on the regulatory authorities in general and on central banks in particular as regards 
the regulation of c-money. Chart 6.1.3 illustrates the results. 
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Interestingly, a majority of respondents called for in-advance regulation of c-money by 
central banks, whereas a "wait-and-see" policy was mentioned only as often as "other" 
proposals, i. e. "getting involved in the discussions" and "analysis of c-money products". The 
clear preference for regulation of e-money may he explained by uncertainty about the future of 
e-money products and the fact that innovators and operators may he expecting central hank 
regulation as an alternative to common standards, which would be necessary For world-wide 
success of a particular scheme. Because so many different proposals for e-money schemes have 
been developed and because there are already more than three different operating systems for 
using smart cards in a launch of e-money, the questionnaire result may also he taken as a call 
for centralised regulation that would guide future e-money developments. As there seems to he 
a lot of different proposals for different e-money schemes and as there already are three 
different operating systems (Multos, Java and WSCs) for future e-money launches, the result 
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may also be taken as a demand for centralised regulation to guide the future of' e-money 
developments. Any kind of incentive (incl. central bank regulation) that sets standards for 
launches would eliminate the risk of investing in a non-dominant technology. 
There were two other questions concerning regulatory issues. The aim was to ascertain 
the reaction of innovators and regulators to the ECB regulatory proposals (ECB, 1998) on 
innovation and competition. As it is generally believed that there is a negative correlation 
between regulation and innovation, the intention was to determine whether innovators and 
operators regarded regulation as a barrier to further innovation and whether it was regarded as 
anti-competitive. Chart 6.1.4 summarises the implications for innovation. 
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As the chart displays, almost half of innovators and operators favour regulation, as they 
do not regard it as a barrier for innovation incentives. At the same time, 29 `Yo expressed a 
neutral affect of ECB proposals for innovation and only 7% believed that proposals discourage 
innovation. Those who were not familiar with the ECB proposals marked 'Others' option 
among the answers, which equal to 10 %. 
The results of EC'B's regulatory proposals for competition implications are shown on 
Chart 6.1.5 below. 
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Here, 38 % believed that the competition implications of the ECB proposals would be 
neutral, 32 % thought that proposals would encourage competition, and 19 % indicated no 
opinion on the proposals. Only 11 % anticipated that regulation would discourage competition. 
Responses to these last two questions seemed consistent with the ECB view that in-advance 
regulation may contribute both to innovation and to competition in connection with e-money 
products, since it would remove uncertainties about the future potential of e-money products 
(ECB 1998). The results also appear to be consistent with chart 6.1.3, as it indicated that the 
majority of participants clearly preferred in-advance regulation of e-money. 
The next question dealt with the problem of whether non-financial institutions should he 
allowed to issue e-money. The aim of this particular question was to find out whether c-money 
may also be issued by, for example, telecom companies, and if yes, whether they should be 
allowed by central banks and regulatory bodies. The results are exhibited in the next chart: 
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As the chart shows, the majority was in favour of allowing non-financial institutions to 
issue e-money; only 36 % opposed the idea. Although the FC'B proposals on regulation of e- 
money were favoured in respect of innovation and competition, the tendency to eliminate non- 
banks seems not to he supported by innovators and operators. They apparently prefer regulation 
as guidance rather than as a set of restrictive rules. 
The next question was about obstacles to wide acceptance of e-cash as a replacement 
for central bank money. The aim ofthe question was to determine the kinds of problems that 
have so far limited, and would in the future limit, potential technical solutions from turning into 
practical total solutions. Chart 6.1.7 shows the results. 
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The required technical infrastructure, including retailer readers, customer cards and 
software, was mentioned as the leading obstacle for e-money to replace CB money by almost 
half of the respondents. Interoperability of different e-money schemes was the second most 
frequently mentioned obstacle, and most of respondents mentioned the success of GSM 
technology in mobile phones in that it enabled a common world-wide platform for mobile 
systems. Interoperability is also a big issue for alternative operating systems. Issuers' costs and 
profitability was the third obstacle, and it may be argued that because there is as yet no proven 
business case for e-money, the innovators and operators still see profitability as an obstacle. 
Interestingly, not many of the respondents mentioned security and privacy as major obstacles 
(25 % and 22 % respectively). Whereas it is not unreasonable that security would not be rated 
high in importance because of confidence in secure solutions, privacy seems to he somewhat 
undervalued. The legal framework was also given low priority, which may he another 
indication in favour of the regulatory approach to e-money issues. It may he argued that 
innovators and operators look for some kind of guidance in resolving their conflicts and rely on 
regulation as a common ground. Because, on one hand, they favour in-advance regulation 
(chart 6.1.3) and do not think ECB regulations impose a negative impact on innovation and 
competition (charts 6.1.4 and 6.1.5) while, on the other hand, they do not think that a legal 
framework is a serious obstacle to e-money schemes. 
Another question concerning future prospects for e-money was about the future base for 
e-money schemes. There are three essentially different proposals for the base for c-money that 
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can he supported by an operating system: card-based like Mondex. software-based like 
Digicash and/or a combination of the two like Beenz. The results are shown in chart 6.1.8. 
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According to the results, 61 % felt that the future base for e-money schemes would be a 
combination of card- and software-based products that can be used both in conventional 
transactions and in e-commerce. This result seems consistent with current market trends since, 
in all card-based solutions, network connections have been adapted to c-money schemes and 
network-based proposals seem to entail commercial problems, at least as regards the earliest 
versions of c-money schemes. The card-based option was supported by 27 % and only 2 '%, 
favoured software-based products. One of the important aspects of the multi-application 
potential of chip cards is that they are suitable to develop the critical mass necessary to solve 
the chicken-egg problem for e-money schemes. As every card application could increase the 
number of cards in circulation, the purse application may be supported by the existence of an 
appropriate infrastructure. However, according to the survey results, the respondents expect 
that there will be a common solution for transaction requirements in conventional and virtual 
lives, ie for both traditional and electronic commerce. This result underlines the significance of 
smart cards, as they seem to he the only technical product that can support a card- and 
software-based solution due to their individual features and network adaptability. Of all 
respondents, 10 % thought that three different solutions might continue to exist side by side, 
which indeed seems a possibility since this would address the needs of different segments 
within the interactive groups via international, national and local electronic trading systems. 
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The next question is about another critical problem concerning e-money schemes, i. e. 
the future access medium. The aim of the question was to find potential distribution channels 
for e-money in financial transactions, including activities such as downloading purchasing 
power from a financial service provider's account into a chip card, etc. The results should 
provide guidance to decision-makers as to which technology they should concentrate on in their 
policy reactions. The result is displayed in chart 6.1.9. 
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The PC was the favoured access medium for the future, and mobile phones ranked 
second. The third was the home phone, followed by TV, public ATM and public phone. The 
preference for the PC seemed consistent with the anticipated future base for e-money schemes, 
as it can be used for both card and software-based e-money schemes. TV is probably ranked 
high because it is anticipated that DTV technology will bring new opportunities in connection 
with e-commerce. These responses are important to central banks because the top four choices 
are not among the common cash access media in current banking practice. This may he an 
indication that the financial service industry could change profoundly from the traditional 
distribution of currency via bank branches, A"l'Ms and retailer cash-backs to electronic 
circulation of monetary value via PCs, phones and DTVs, which would obviate the need for 
physical cash. Once money can be circulated electronically via the latter media, 
electronification of financial services as a whole may be accelerated, which would have broad 
implications, ranging across the monetary transmission mechanism to scignioragc and across 
free banking to competing currencies. 
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The purpose of the next question was to determine whether e-money technology could 
reduce barriers to entry to the financial service industry. These harriers affect provision of new 
financial services by financial institutions as well as provision of financial services by non- 
financial firms. The question is intended to cover both, with emphasis on the latter 
development, especially as regards payment services. 
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As chart 6.1.10 shows, a majority believed that e-money technology will reduce harriers 
to entry. Only 21 % thought it will not do so, while 15 % anticipated a neutral effect.. If the 
results are accurate. they may have implications not only for regulation of e-money but also for 
regulation of the whole financial system, as they raise questions about special treatment of 
banks vs other firms in the economy. The results confirm that e-money technology \0l 
increase competition in the financial services industry. The general feeling is that competition 
increases market efficiency. It may be necessary to evaluate financial services as to exactly who 
should be licensed to provide these services so as to ensure productivity, efficiency and 
stability. 
The last question was about the privatisation of money. It may be argued that it is 
generally expected that the introduction of e-money will reduce handling costs of money as a 
medium of exchange, and if security can be ensured, then there may be a case for privatisation 
of money. It may also be argued that c-money developments have stimulated increased 
analysis of unregulated banking experiences around the world from a historical perspective, 
since it apparently enables a technical and informative infrastructure for issuing private money. 
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Privatisation of money in this context, in its simplest form, is defined as the process of 
eliminating the central bank monopoly on money and transferring the issuance, circulation and 
quality management of money to private hands, preferably on a competitive basis. The aim of 
the question was to investigate the exact stance of innovators and operators on the question of 
private money. Responses to the question are shown in chart 6.1.1 1. 
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With a majority, the innovators and operators opposed the privatisation of money. Note 
that "don't know" responses amounted to 31 %, i. e. almost a third of the respondents preferred 
to stay out of the discussion. But 8% favoured the privatisation of money. This seemingly 
small percentage could be quite significant, in light of the fact that privatisation of money 
would constitute a big change from a status quo situation going back many years. It may he 
argued that the primacy of central bank money is no longer a truism and that central hank 
money is not unchallenged anymore. 
6.1.5. CONCLUSIONS 
The survey confirms that central banks and regulatory bodies have been on the right 
track in exploring the potential of e-money to replace their own monies. First two charts 
suggest that innovators and operators are of this opinion. Moreover, central banks are expected 
by innovators and operators to regulate e-money business in advance, probably in order to 
establish a well-defined regulatory environment for continuously changing business structures 
and proposals. 
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The pronounced demand for regulation may be explained by the fact that GSM seems to 
have been successful in providing a standard for mobile phones, as it has enabled the 
development of a critical mass and has solved the chicken-egg problem already during the 
initial launches. Innovators and operators did not regard the ECB proposals on e-money as an 
impediment to innovation in e-money technology nor to competition among different operators. 
Concerning the privatisation of money, it may seem that the majority rejected the idea. 
However, the monopoly of central banks in issuing money as a medium of exchange did not go 
unchallenged. 
Responses to questions about the implications of e-money for the banking industry 
indicated that innovators and operators contest the banks' right to monopolise the e-money 
business and feel that e-money technology will reduce barriers to entry to the banking industry. 
Innovators and operators nearly agreed on a combined card and software base as the e- 
money infrastructure for the future. This is in line with the anticipated wider acceptance and 
use of e-money and the need for a payment medium that will be a part of the new, developing 
lifestyle, whereby e-commerce and PC banking are interconnected with conventional 
commerce and personal finance. The need for integration of a payment medium (eg e-money) 
with the new commercial and financial landscape is further emphasised by the favoured access 
media for e-money. It is not impossible to envisage a "network" of interoperable PCs, mobile 
and fixed-line phones, DTVs and ATMs that serve as a platform for retail payments, at 
customers' convenience. Provision of payment and settlement services is where financial 
institutions have the advantage over the new challengers but, at the same time, commoditisation 
of these services may lead to the demise of banks as the service providers. 
The main obstacles to e-money replacing central bank money were seen as problems in 
technical infrastructure, interoperability, and costs and profitability for issuers. It is obvious 
that the innovators and operators gave priority to "technological and operational" issues, 
believing that the broader economic and social considerations will eventually fall into place. 
This may reflect a professional bias, but it may also indicate the confidence of innovators and 
operators in the realisation of secure and "privacy-protected" e-money. 
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6.1.6. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 1999 
A QUESTIONNAIRE ON ELECTRONIC MONEY DEVELOPMENTS 
City University Business School; Department of Banking and Finance 
Research Student: Yuksel Gormez (Y. Gormez@city. ac. uk) 
Topic: ELECTRONIC MONEY, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND MONETARY POLICY 
QUESTIONS: 
1. Do you think that electronic cash has a potential to replace central bank money? 
A) Yes 
B) No 
C) To a certain extent 
D) Don't know 
Comment: 
la. If yes, when? 
A) Before 2005 
B) Before 2010 
C) Before 2015 
D) Before 2020 
E) After 2020 
2. What are the main obstacles for e-cash to replace the central bank's money (or to be 
widely accepted)? (Tick all relevant answers) 
A) Costs for the customers 
B) Costs/profitability for the issuers 
C) Security 
D) Privacy 
E) Interoperability 
F) Legal framework 
G) Technical infrastructure 
H) Cross-border issues 
I) Critical mass of customers 
J) Others 
Comment: 
3. What should be the reaction of central banks to e-cash? 
A) In advance regulation for guidance 
B) Wait and See 
C) Leave it to the Market 
D) Other: 
4. What do you think about the European Central Bank proposals on the regulation of c- 
money? 
A) Encourage Innovations 
B) Discourage Innovations 
C) Neutral effect on Innovations 
D) Other 
Comment: 
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5. What do you think about the European Central Bank proposals on the regulation of e- 
money? 
A) Encourage Competition 
B) Discourage Competition 
C) Neutral effect on competition 
D) Other 
Comment: 
6. What is the base for e-money schemes of the future? 
A) Card based 
B) Software based 
C) Combined card and software based 
D) All of the Above 
E) Other 
Comment: 
7. What `access' medium for e-money will be used the most in the future by the 
customers? (Tick all relevant answers) 
A) Public telephone 
B) Home telephone 
C) Mobile telephone 
D) Television 
E) PC 
F) Public `ATM' 
G) Other 
Comment: 
8. Should institutions other than banks be allowed to issue e-money? 
A) Yes 
B) No 
C) Don't Know 
D) Other 
Comment: 
9. Do you think e-money schemes can decrease barriers to entry to the banking industry? 
A) Yes 
B) No 
C) Neutral 
D) Don't Know 
Comment: 
10. Should money be privatised? 
A) Yes 
B) No 
C) Don't know 
Comment: 
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6.2. ELECTRONIC MONEY TRENDS IN 2000 
In this section, the second survey, which was conducted about a year later in 2000, at 
the 13th International Advanced Card Exhibition and Conference (Smartcard2000), which was 
held in Olympia 2 in London on 8-10 February 2000, the same venue where the first survey 
was conducted, will be analysed. As the previous year's survey provided a very useful set of 
data, the same venue was used a year later in order to extend the understanding of current 
trends in e-money developments with additional questions. It was not intended to collect up to 
date data in order to see what might have changed in the interim since it was considered more 
useful to extend the coverage of the surveys as extensively as possible using a different set of 
questions. The relationships between the results of the two surveys will be discussed in the last 
section of this division. 
6.2.1. INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF THE SURVEY 
The aims of this survey were first to deepen empirical insights into what e-money 
innovators and scheme operators driving the innovation and technological development think 
about the issues concerning e-money (e. g. the preferred operating system for card-based 
solutions) and technical issues surrounding the current stage of e-money technology. 
The second aim was to discover the current expectations of innovators and operators 
concerning the possibilities and impacts of e-money for the future of the financial service 
industry and financial service providers. Questions in this section are intended to show how e- 
money may influence e. g. the dominance of banks in the provision of financial services. 
The third aim of the survey was to investigate future capabilities of e-money technology 
regarding the future of central banking as well as innovators' and operators' expectations about 
the possibilities for e-money and the implications of those possibilities for the future of central 
banking. 
The overall aim was the same as that of the first survey, i. e. to gather information from 
industry experts and use this information to gain insights that will aid decision-makers and 
discussants (both academics and practitioners) in understanding e-money and its potential and 
limits. An important limitation of both surveys is that they are concept- rather than product- 
oriented. They do not analyse any particular proposals or schemes or compare them in terms of 
advantages and disadvantages. E-money is taken here as an emerging phenomenon, and it is 
assumed that anyone with an interest in the financial industry will need to understand its pros 
and cons. Instead of relying on case studies of different proposals and making comparisons, it 
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was felt that a collection of broader data would most effectively provide advance insights for 
shaping policies to address the overall implications of alternative proposals. 
Consequently, the scope of the survey was again limited to collecting empirical data on 
e-money developments from the innovators and scheme operators point of view only, 
excluding academics, bankers, central bankers, financial industry experts, consultants and the 
like. Individual analysis of a particular product or scheme was also out of the scope of the 
survey. The procedure to collect data was not designed to do so, as this would be done better by 
case studies. There is also no intention to compare different e-money schemes or to clarify 
differences to the concept of e-money from different sides. The survey has been concept 
oriented instead of being product oriented. 
6.2.2. THE SURVEY SAMPLE 
With the above-mentioned aims and limits, a questionnaire was prepared and a survey 
was conducted at the Smartcard2000 Exhibition and Conference. The exhibition was defined 
as55 "the catalyst of high level debate where bold ideas will be both discussed and unveiled". 
The coverage included areas such as information technology, telecommunications, payments, 
identification and security, transport and access control, health, e-commerce, loyalty, gaming, 
multimedia and personalisation card management. As in the previous year, almost all 
international e-money scheme operators representing either account-based or other scheme 
proposals participated in the exhibition including Mondex International Ltd, Europay 
International, Proton World International SA and Visa International. Operating systems were 
also represented at the exhibition, although by only one of more than three specialist firms 
namely Multos. Innovators from around the world involved in e-money technology, including 
smart card producers, semiconductor providers, security and payment system experts and card 
system designers, participated in the exhibition, many of whom had participated in the first 
survey. Ascom, Gemplus Ltd, Hitachi Europe Ltd, Oberthur Card Systems, Philips 
Semiconductors Gratkor, Keycorb Ltd, Racal Security and Payments, Fortress U&T Ltd and 
Schlumberger Systems were the major participant innovators. The total number of exhibitors 
was just over 90, which meant that the coverage of the second survey was not as wide as that of 
the first survey. 
55 Smartcard2000 Show Guide 
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Because the survey results from the previous year proved encouraging, it seemed 
natural to extend the data collection and analysis of e-money into year 2000. The exhibitions 
again included many products relating to e-money applications, including electronic wallets, 
personal computers designed to function like point-of-sale terminals and e-money transfer 
terminals, secure mobile phones that use bio-metric technology to guarantee the security of 
potential mobile e-money applications, reloadable smart cards that can extend the reach of e- 
money in retail applications and smart card keys that can expand the scope of applications in 
payments. Innovators and operators exhibited their latest products, which may reshape the 
future of e-money technologies, and the exhibition was useful in presenting the current level of 
technology and suggesting current and future applications that will exploit the vast potential of 
e-money technology. 
As the survey results from the last year proved the sample as reliable, there has been no 
hesitation to extend data collection and expend potential of e-money analysis to year 2000. The 
venue had many products relating to e-money applications including electronic wallets, 
personal computers designed to function like point-of-sale terminals and e-money transferring 
terminals, secure mobile phones that use bio-metric technology to guarantee the security of 
potential mobile e-money applications, re-loadable smart cards that may extent the reach of e- 
money on retails applications and smart card keys that may enrich the alternative applications 
in payments. A visual image of the current level of technology has been quite helpful in 
understanding the future of e-money. One particular example was to execute a person-to-person 
transaction using an electronic wallet, which was the basic technology that eliminates the 
requirement of a financial service provider during a transaction and thus differentiates e-money 
from other electronic payment instruments. 
6.2.3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
The methodology and data collection for the second survey were quite similar to those 
for the first survey. The questionnaire was distributed on the first and second day of the 
exhibition on a stand-by-stand basis, but this time the interviews required more time to discuss 
particular products and their relevance to e-money. In particular, e-money that is compatible 
with mobile phones was given extra time and attention because of its vast potential to create an 
alternative mobile, and hence flexible, distribution channel for e-money schemes. Moreover, 
almost all the participants were informed of the aims of the data collection, including basic 
information about the research project. For this survey, 107 questionnaires were distributed, 
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which was slightly more than for the first survey (105), and 70 were returned. The return rate 
(65 %), was considerably higher than that for the first survey (49%). This may be a result of 
expertise gained a year earlier on the conduct of surveys and measures taken to increase the rate 
of return. Lost questionnaires and refusals to respond (mostly due to a lack of available staff 
and/or expertise, as most of them put it) were not included in the distribution count and the rate 
of return was calculated so as to avoid double counting. This time, collection of the 
questionnaires took place during the first, second and third days of the exhibition. 
Extra time was given to some participants in order to help them to understand the 
questionnaire, especially when they asked questions about the research project in general. One 
observation may be worth mentioning. It seems that it is not only the operators that try to 
manipulate and exploit the potential of e-money and e-money applications. Innovators as well 
seem to be quite confident to extend their product ranges to enrich e-money applications, both 
conventional applications, such as transportation applications of card-based e-money schemes, 
and PC-based solutions for the management of network-based e-money. Innovators seem to 
work together with different e-money scheme operators in order to provide different application 
tools required for different applications by different e-money scheme operators. Some of the 
innovators argued that sometimes it is the innovators that guide operators on the full potential 
of the technology in order to help operators to extend their coverage on e-money schemes, 
especially relating to multi-applications. This may help to create a synergy that will speed up of 
the adjustment of the financial industry to potential of e-money technology. 
6.2.4. SURVEY RESULTS 
The questionnaire for this survey included thirteen questions compared to eleven in the 
first survey, most of which included a comment section. One theme of the questionnaire was 
the technical issues concerning e-money technology such as critical access media, the operating 
system that is most likely to dominate future applications, the most favoured technology for 
successful e-money implementation, and possible reasons for the failure of some e-money 
trials. Another theme was financial services industry-related problems such as the future 
medium of exchange for e-commerce, the potential impact of e-money on the industry, non- 
bank firms that may gain competitive advantage vs banks, potential issuers of e-money, and the 
banks' position in the industry. The final theme was the future of central banks and central 
bank money in light of the potential of e-money technology and the implications for central 
banking and national currencies. 
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Fhe first question on the questionnaire was "Which medium of access technology is 
most likely to dominate the future e-money developments? ". The aim of the question was to try 
to find leading indicators about the future trends in technology especially those supportive to e- 
money. The result of'the responses is illustrated in chart 62.1. 
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It seems clear that the majority of the respondents believe personal computers will be 
the dominant access medium for c-money, as almost half of the respondents chose it as the 
potential dominant technology. This result accords with the results from the first survey, as 
shown in chart 6.1.9. The mobile phone maintained its place as second choice. It may thus he 
argued that the PC is expected to play a dominant role in the future of c-money. DTV and 
hand-held devices tüllowed the P(' and mobile phone on the list. Alternative proposals from 
respondents included "any tool that guarantees security", "mobile phone combined with palm" 
and "point-of-sale terminals". The emerging picture is that the PC and the mobile phone are 
well positioned to dominate the future, whereas DTV, palm and ATMs are likely to play a 
supportive role. 
The second question addressed a technical issue relating to operating systems for 
network-based e-money solutions: "Which operating system may dominate the future of e- 
money technologies'? " The aim of the question was to investigate whether a particular operating 
system will play the critical role in shaping the future of e-money or there will he more than 
one operating system. Because, with more than one operating system, interoperability is a 
primary concern of end-users and hence is critical to the immediate acceptance of c-money for 
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final settlement of transactions. Whereas chart 5.3.1 provided an external opinion limited to the 
Internet users, the aim here is to get innovators and operators opinion on the subject matter. 
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The result is exhibited in the chart 6.2.2, which demonstrates that more than one-third 
of the participants believes that there will be more than one operating system in the future. The 
result underlines the importance of interoperability among different e-money schemes for the 
acceptability of e-money, whenever it becomes available. It may be useful to note that, once 
there is more than one operating system, all potential e-money access media 
- 
such as I'Cs, 
DTVs, palms, ATMs, PDAs etc 
- 
will need to be adaptable to different operating systems, 
which will require open and pre-agreed distribution for adjustment requirements. Otherwise, it 
would be difficult to maintain the reliability of circulation of e-money schemes, as households, 
firms and other economic entities will have to be induced to change their habits of using, notes 
and coins. The finding here is contradictory to Chart 5.3.1 which exhibits an Internet survey on 
operating system and names Multos as the most favoured operating system. Obviously, it was 
an `Internet-only' survey and the samples are quite different. 
The next question relating to technical issues surrounding c-money was about the most 
critical technology for the future success of e-money applications. The 11111 was to get 
innovators' and operators' views on the technology that will play the critical role in shaping a 
successful e-money rollout. This was expected to enable decision-makers and other c-money 
discussants to focus on the proper technology in order to judge alternative proposals in terms of 
impacts and potential for the future. The next chart illustrates the result: 
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One sees that smart card technology was chosen as the most critical technology for the 
future success of e-money proposals. Internet applications ranked second and some 16 % of 
respondents did not rank the technologies, arguing that all the listed technologies are equally 
important. "Security", "service" "user acceptance", "speed of the applications", "consumer 
take-up" and "standardisation"" were other important matters listed separately by respondents. 
Overall, innovators and operators confirmed the latest idea, which is to treat smart cards as the 
connector between virtual and conventional lives that will open the gate to common solutions 
to similar problems in two different dimensions of modern life. 
The last question on technical issues concerning e-money schemes was "What may he 
the reasons for the failure of alternative e-money proposals like Digicash? ". The intent was to 
collect empirical evidence on the reasons that some c-money schemes (at least their first 
versions) failed and thus aid financial authorities in evaluating the chances of success of future 
trials. Digicash, which was a very popular concept earlier in the history of Internet, played a 
critical role in spreading the understanding of c-money and related technologies. As analysed in 
section 5.2, Digicash played a critical role on the understanding of e-money technology and 
became a great success during the initial launch for a trial but the company was not able to 
promote e-rnoney idea above a certain limit and sold all project to another company, including 
the "blind signature". which is a critical technology for creating anonymous network-based e- 
cash. The results were exhibited in the next following chart. 
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Note that nearly half of the respondents blamed the lack of cooperation between banks 
and e-money innovators. This result may reflect the current influence of banks in payment 
systems and the belief that banks still have a sustainable comparative advantage in payment 
solutions, at least in the near future. The second-ranked reason for failure was lack of demand 
for e-money, at least during the trials of the first versions. This may reflect the immature stage 
of the Internet and e-commerce in previous years. Internet penetration was relatively low and 
the volume of e-commerce was insignificant compared to conventional commerce. The third- 
ranked reason was lack of a business case for e-money. Again, the result underlines the 
importance of carefully designed e-money proposals and good timing. The next reason given 
was exaggerated expectations, which may suggest that future proposals should not create 
unsustainable and unrealisable expectations for e-money schemes. Other reasons given were 
"lack of time to market", "lack of government regulation", and "unfriendly consumer interface" 
combined with "not the right acceptance" and "poor marketing of the product". 
After the four questions related to technical issues, the second part of the questionnaire 
examined the future of the financial industry and the impact and implications of e-nmoney 
technology on the industry in general and on hanks in particular. The first question in this part, 
"Which payment instrument is best suited for "retail" e-commerce transactions'? ", was aimed at 
determining whether current payment alternatives can eliminate the demand for c-money 
arising from e-commerce, especially retail e-commerce as opposed to business-to-business e- 
commerce. The results are illustrated in the following chart. 
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According to the results, e-money will be a "demanded or required" medium of 
exchange in one way or another and expectations regarding the demand for c-money resulting 
from e-commerce transactions are characterised as non-illusionary but real. More than 40 `% of 
the respondents believed that e-money is the best instrument for retail c-commerce. Even credit 
and debit cards, with their historical advantage in consumer awareness and understanding, were 
outranked by e-money. They ranked second and third as payment instruments for retail e- 
commerce. This result may indicate a potential pickup in the maturation of e-nmoney schemes in 
the near future due to rapid growth in value and volume of e-commerce. It may also reduce the 
reliance on credit and debit cards as c-commerce payment instruments, since even operators 
and innovators seem not to be relying on them. It may be worth emphasising that c-money 
products can support credit and debit payments whereas the opposite does not hold. For 
example, with multi-application smart cards, it is possible to integrate purse, debit and credit 
functions. 
For the next question, "What may be the impact of e-money on the future of' financial 
services industry'? ". the aim was to clarify the impact of c-money on financial institutions. 
There are opposing expectations regarding this issue, ranging from no serious impact at all (IC 
just another innovation related to payment media) to a serious development similar to the initial 
use of money in primitive societies. The results are exhibited in the next chart: 
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As the chart shows, more than 30 % of the respondents felt that c-money will reduce 
barriers to entry to the financial service industry by reducing operating and managerial costs 
and increasing competition. This result was consistent with the first survey, as seen in chart 
6.1.10. Respondents also believed that e-money will increase the efficiency and productivity of 
financial service providers. About 20 % believed that telecommunication companies would 
gain comparative advantage in financial service provision. On the other hand, some 15 % of 
respondents were neutral as to the impacts, reporting them as equally possible. Almost 5% also 
believed that e-money will allow financial institutions to issue their own private money. Other 
views expressed included "reduction of freight and operating cost", "decline in user loyalty", 
and "increased income with com companies". 
The next question, "Which institutions are best placed to compete with banks in 
providing e-money schemes'? ", was aimed at discovering which institutions are expected to 
compete best with banks for e-money. The importance of this issue is that traditionally central 
banks have relied mainly on banks to both collect data and provide liquidity to the financial 
system. If e-money can change the structure of financial sector, then central banks may need to 
include non-hank institutions in their price stability operations. The monetary transmission 
mechanism may he influenced or even changed because of non-bank involvement in financial 
services. The results follow in the next chart. 
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The results point to telecommunication companies, as the majority of respondents cited 
them as the banks' main competitors. This result may lead to future mergers and acquisitions 
between banks and telecom companies or banks may try to take over telecom companies or 
vice versa. The result also underlines the expertise of telecom companies in communication 
channels, which is expected to dominate retail payment systems in the future, both with wires 
and recently wireless. Internet service providers, software houses, supermarkets and retail 
chains followed telecom companies with almost equal percentages. Interestingly, most of these 
companies have already started to co-operate with banks in one way or another. Internet brands 
that have gained a certain amount of consumer awareness and confidence and high-tech 
companies that also support financial service providers with solutions to financial applications 
were also preferred by some of the respondents. One respondent mentioned "insurance 
companies and pension funds" while another argued that "banks will not promote c-money". 
Another question related to the future impact of e-money on the financial service 
industry concerned potential issuers of e-money: "Who should be allowed to issue e-money'? " 
The aim was to determine whether banks are still favoured as payment system experts or 
whether other institutions are also becoming acceptable as e-money issuers. This may have 
implications for the integrity of financial systems and fier monetary stability, which is generally 
viewed to have primacy in modern financial systems. The results are shown chart 6.2.9. 
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The respondents seemed neutral as to issuers of e-money, as they equally favoured the 
options "only banks" and "any firms capable of handling c-money technology". Who is the 
issuer does not seem to be a major concern to innovators and operators, as banks are not clear 
favourites over other companies. Moreover, the third choice clearly indicated that respondents 
want all types of firms, including, banks, telecom companies, Internet service providers and 
software houses, to be able to issue e-money. 
The last direct question concerning financial service-related issues was on whether 
banks would remain as the main players in the financial services industry. Banks are the main 
players in almost all well-developed and stable financial systems, and they play a key role in 
the monetary transmission mechanism. As a result, it is important for central hankers and others 
concerned with financial stability (which is necessary for a well-functioning, market economy) 
to understand all the technologies that may influence banks' prospects. The aim of the question, 
as a result of this importance was to obtain information that will guide central banks in how 
they should react to the emergence of e-money technologies in light of their impact on the 
future of banks within the financial industry. The results are shown in chart 6.2.9. 
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Note that less than a majority of respondents believe that banks will be able to sustain 
their main role in the financial industry whereas more than 40 % believe that banks may not be 
the main players in the future. The result can be interpreted as being supportive of functional 
rather than institutional regulation of financial services. 
I'he last group of questions addressed implications of e-money for central banks and 
conventional money. The first question was on the impact of c-money on the power of central 
banks as sole providers of monetary base. The results are illustrated in the next chart. 
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As the chart shows, the majority of respondents believed that c-money technology will 
eliminate the power of central banks (by offering alternative monies issued by other 
institutions) as sole providers of monetary base, though 34 % qualified this to a certain extent. 
If one accepts that operators and innovators will shape the future of e-money technology, then 
this result could have implications for central banks as sole providers of monetary base. It 
might raise issues like that of a monetary policy regime without monetary base or an interest 
rate transmission mechanism in a competitive currency area. 
The next question was on whether e-money would lead to a new free banking era. It 
also contained the main aspects of free banking, i. e. the absence ofcentral hank involvement in 
the financial system and competing currencies issued by different institutions. The aim of the 
question was to obtain empirical evidence on expectations as to the re-emergence of a free 
banking era based on the fruits of technological improvements in computation. The results are 
exhibited in the following chart. 
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The results indicate that almost half of the respondents expected that e-money 
technology would lead to a new free banking era, although 20 % qualified this only to an 
extent. Those who did not believe that e-money would lead to a new free banking era amounted 
to about 33 % and those that choose the "don't know" option amounted to some 19 `%,, which 
was the highest for any question in the second survey. 
The next question was part of the third group of questions, which investigated central 
banking and money implications of e-money. The question addressed whether there is a 
potential for a world currency with the advent of the technology. Some academicians and 
practitioners expect that computers and mobile networks will create a global economy without 
borders that will require a world currency or at least a world medium of exchange för this 
network. The results are shown in the following chart. 
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A slight majority rejected the idea of a world currency and about 13 `%0 chose the "don't 
know" option. One respondent argued that he did not anticipate a world currency because "the 
world industry is not only around computers". On the other hand, more than a third of the 
respondents accepted the concept of a world currency, a proportion that may have implications 
for future e-money proposals and regulation. If 35 % of the innovators and operators are 
convinced of the efficacy of a world currency that could he supported by c-money technology, 
national currencies, especially those with unstable values, may be under threat. Further, 
national approaches (including national regulation) of e-money with a global potential may not 
adequately address all issues concerning e-money. 
The last question of the survey investigated the issuance of c-money by asking 
respondents whether central banks should issue e-money Im their own account and hence 
compete with private banks and/or other institutions. The aim here was to gain insight into 
expectations regarding the best way to issue e-money in the future and to help central banks 
prepare for c-money-based monetary and financial systems. The results are shown in chart 
6.2.13. 
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As the chart shows, only 26 % believed that e-money should be issued exclusively by 
central banks. On the other hand, more than a third of the respondents clearly expressed their 
concerns about central bank involvement in the issuance of' e-money, as they believed that 
"central banks should not compete with financial services providers". Moreover, almost a 
quarter of the respondents favoured competitive issuance of e-money, i. e. that central banks 
should compete with private issuers in e-money schemes. As a general conclusion, it seems that 
innovators and operators do not favour direct involvement of central banks in c-money 
issuance. In other words, central banks seem not to be welcomed in direct involvement for e- 
money issuance. 
6.2.5. CONCLUSIONS ANI) RECOMMENDATIONS 
The second survey shed some light on current problems with e-money technology. It is 
evident that c-money innovators and operators feel that future access products for c-money 
applications will be dominated by PC's, followed by mobile telephones and digital television. 
Regarding the choice of operating system, the respondents believed that, rather than a 
single operating system, the e-money environment will he shaped by two or even more 
operating systems (most likely interoperable, as common sense would dictate). Smart cards will 
be the most critical technology for the future success of proposed e-nmoney schemes, which is 
not at odds with current trends, as smart cards seem to serve as a bridge between the virtual and 
conventional life styles, including financial applications. Internet applications followed smart 
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cards as the second most important technology, ahead of WAP, operating systems and digital 
television. The final conclusion regarding technical issues concerns the general reasons for 
failure of some of the current e-money trials. It was confirmed that lack of co-operation with 
banks might be the main reason for failure, probably because of banks' comparative advantage, 
especially in payment systems. Lack of demand for e-money and lack of a business case, at 
least during trial periods were given as secondary reasons for failure. 
Second group of findings relates to potential impacts and implications of e-money for 
the financial industry. It was confirmed that despite a strong position, historically proven 
success and adaptation to Internet payments, credit and debit cards could be driven out by e- 
money. Respondents chose e-money as the future payment instrument for retail e-commerce 
transactions. The potential impact of e-money on the financial services industry was expected 
to be a reduction in barriers to entry to the financial service industry, which may already be 
confirmed, as Egg, an insurance company's Internet bank, proved to be a potential success 
within less than two years in the UK. Increased efficiency and productivity for financial 
services and a weakening of bank's comparative advantage, especially vs telecommunication 
companies, were underlined as secondary impacts of e-money on the financial services 
industry. Telecommunication companies were rated as the most competitive vs banks, but 
Internet service providers, software houses and supermarkets were also mentioned as potential 
competitors of banks in providing e-money schemes. Regarding the issuance of e-money, banks 
and other companies were almost equally favoured, i. e. banks were not ascribed top-favourite 
status. It seems that banks have begun to loose their favoured status among innovators and 
operators as regards the provision of financial services, at least for the issuance of e-money in 
the future. Moreover, less than a majority saw banks as the main players in the financial service 
industry. Of the respondents, 41 % clearly stated that banks would not be the main players in 
the future. 
The final set of conclusions is based on responses to questions on the impact and 
implications of e-money on conventional money and the current position of central banks. The 
first result confirmed that central banks might lose their power, at least to an extent, as sole 
providers of monetary base. The re-emergence of a free banking era triggered by e-money was 
expected by 48 % of the respondents, although 20 % qualified this somewhat. Regarding the 
creation of a world currency, 35 % of respondents felt this was likely, which can be regarded as 
a strongly supportive result. A total of 52 % clearly rejected the idea. The final finding from the 
survey was that respondents expressed opposition to central banks' monopoly of e-money 
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issuance, as only 26 % supported the idea while 34 % rejected it. Some 24 % of respondents 
supported competitive (incl. central banks) issuance of e-money. 
There are some general observations regarding the survey results that might be worth 
mentioning: Innovators and operators argued that the technology and expertise for the launch of 
a successful e-money scheme could already be considered to be in place. However, they also 
mentioned the importance of perceptions of the general public concerning technology, which 
they cited as one of the main causes of delays in full implementation of e-money technology. 
The innovators in particular expressed a real concern about unsuccessful launches. They argued 
that each unsuccessful trial postpones a full-scale launch of national roll-outs by many years, 
even an international roll-out, especially in Europe that is enjoying the benefits of the Euro. 
6.2.6. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEYS 
In preparing the second questionnaire, it was not intended to compare the results of the 
two surveys. However, certain complementary conclusions seemed to flow out of the two 
surveys, mostly because of overlapping questions. Caution is called for in such a comparison 
because of the year-long interim period at a time when the e-money phenomenon was changing 
rapidly. In the course of a year, there may be solid reasons for changes in basic attitudes to e- 
money. Even a single technological innovation may be capable of changing some of the basic 
presumptions. But because the questions in the two surveys were closely related, the venue was 
the same, and the respondents were largely the same, a comparison might be useful, given an 
appropriate degree of caution. To be sure, many of the questions were not related, as the second 
survey was designed to be complementary. 
The first useful relationship to be cited is between chart 6.1.1, which indicates that e- 
money has the potential to replace central bank money and chart 6.2.10, which indicates that e- 
money technologies eliminate the power of the central bank as sole provider of monetary base. 
Both results underline the need for central banks to find and identify new means and 
instruments, especially so as to minimise their dependence on monetary aggregates in general 
and on narrow money in particular if they are to preserve their influence on financial markets 
and their ability to maintain price stability in the event that central bank money is replaced by 
e-money. 
There seems to be a close relationship between charts 6.1.6 and 6.2.8. In the former, 50 
% indicated that non-banks should be allowed to issue e-money and, in the latter, the 
respondents were about equally divided as between "only banks" vs "any company". Both of 
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these results suggest that if non-banks gain the right to issue e-money, central banks 
- 
which 
have traditionally relied on banks to maintain a stable relationship between the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism and the price level 
- 
may be forced to pay more attention to non-bank 
firms or to focus on monetary functions instead of monetary institutions in their efforts to 
maintain price stability. 
Another noteworthy relationship holds between charts 6.1.9 and 6.2.1. In both charts, 
personal computers and mobile phones were given top priority as access media to e-money, 
followed by DTV. It can be argued that operators and innovators did not change their minds 
during the year as to the future of access products and e-money access. This finding is not at 
odds with the widespread expectation that network-based "virtual life" will be shaped by 
developments in three different technologies, ie personal computers, mobile phones and digital 
television. There are alternatives like refrigerators or electric cable appliances, but PC, DTV 
and the mobile phone seem to have a clear lead, at least for the time being. 
Two different questions provided very similar results, as shown in charts 6.1.10 and 
6.2.6. Both indicated that e-money will reduce barriers to entry to the financial industry. Even 
current trends may be seen to confirm these results, as many banks have begun to prefer either 
a merger with another bank or cooperation with different companies as means of maintaining a 
competitive edge. A current study on the implications of innovation in financial technology, 
especially in respect of money, argued that "it costs USD 1 million to set up a fully functioning 
Internet bank" (Gosling, 1999). Even though actual set-up costs may not constitute the only 
barrier to entry, they are clearly important, and they could well generate innovative financial 
applications that will open the door to the financial services industry. 
Finally, charts 6.1.11,6.2.11 and 6.2.13 seem to tell a story. The first chart indicates 
that money should not be privatised, albeit 8% challenged the idea. In the second chart, 48 % 
of respondents indicated that e-money may lead to a free banking era and, in the third, 24 % 
defended co-issuance of e-money by central banks and private institutions while 34 % opposed 
central bank issuance of e-money. One might interpret this as an indication that during the year 
between surveys there was a trend toward a more liberal approach to currency issuance, 
including private money. The real challenge for e-money arises when it represents freely 
circulating intrinsic monetary value that is not the same as any national unit of account 
controlled by a known monetary authority with the intent to defend its value. The results of the 
surveys suggest that this challenge is seen to exist even at this stage of technology. 
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6.2.7: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 2000 
A QUESTIONNAIRE ON ELECTRONIC MONEY DEVELOPMENTS 
By: Yuksel Gormez (Y. Gormez@city. ac. uk) 
City University Business School; Department of Banking and Finance 
Topic: ELECTRONIC MONEY, FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MONETARY POLICY 
SURVEY QUESTIONS: 
1. Which medium of access technology is most likely to dominate the future e-money 
developments? 
A. Personal computer (PC) 
B. Mobile telephone 
C. Palm 
D. Digital TV 
E. Automated Teller Machine (ATM) 
F. Other: 
2. Which operating system may dominate the future of e-money technologies? 
A. Multos. 
B. Java. 
C. Windows for Smartcards. 
D. None of the above but 
E. There will be two or more operating systems. 
3. What is the most critical technology for the future (success) of c-money? 
A. Smart Cards. 
B. Internet Applications. 
C. Wireless Application Protocols for mobile phones. 
D. Digital TV. 
E. Palm. 
F. Operating Systems like Java, Multos, Windows for Smartcards 
G. All of the above. 
H. None of the above but 
4. What may be the reasons for the failure of alternative e-money proposals like Digicash? 
(Please tick all the relevant answers) 
A. Lack of demand for e-money. 
B. Lack of business case for e-money. 
C. Lack of coordination with banks and operators. 
D. Lack of investment and advertisement. 
E. Lack of expertise and management skills. 
F. Exaggerated expectations. 
G. Unsustainable cost of infrastructure to get critical mass. 
H. Other: 
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5. Which payment instrument is best suited for `retail' e-commerce transactions? 
A. E-money. 
B. Credit cards. 
C. Debit cards 
D. Checks. 
E. E-gold. 
F. Other: 
6. What may be the impact of e-money on the future of financial services industry? 
A. E-money will allow financial institutions to issue their own money. 
B. It will only increase the efficiency and productivity of financial service 
providers. 
C. It will decrease barriers to entry to the financial service industry by reducing 
operating and managerial cost and increase competition. 
D. Technology companies will gain comparative advantage for financial services. 
E. All of the above 
F. It will have no impact 
G. None of the above but other: 
7. Which institutions are best placed to compete with banks in providing e-money 
schemes? (Please tick all the relevant answers) 
A. Telecommunication companies like BT and Vodafone 
B. High-tech companies like IBM. 
C. Internet service providers like AOL. 
D. E-commerce brand names like Amazon. com. 
E. Software companies like Microsoft. 
F. Supermarkets and retailer chains like Wal-Mart and M&S. 
G. Other: 
S. Who should be allowed to issue e-money? 
A. Only Banks. 
B. Only Telecommunication companies 
C. Only Internet Service Providers 
D. Only Software companies. 
E. All of the above. 
F. Any firms capable of handling e-money technologies. 
G. Other 
9. Will banks remain as the main players in the financial services industry? 
A. Yes, they can supply financial services more efficiently than other firms. 
B. No, other firms have been gaining comparative advantages especially in digital 
economy. 
C. Don't know. 
D. Comments 
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10. Can e-money technologies eliminate the power of central banks as the sole providers 
of monetary base in the future (by offering alternative monies issued by other 
institutions)? 
A. Yes. 
B. No. 
C. To a certain extent. 
D. Don't know Comment: 
11. Can e-money technologies lead to a "free banking' era (A system of competing 
currencies issued by various institutions and without a Central Bank) 
A. Yes. 
B. No. 
C. To a certain extent. 
D. Don't know 
E. Comment: 
12. Can e-money create a `world currency' by eliminating most of the currently available 
national currencies all around the world? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. Don't know 
D. Comment: 
13. Should central banks issue e-money for their own account, thus competing with 
private banks and/or other institutions? 
A. Yes, money should only be governed by central banks 
B. Yes, all firms including central banks should compete with each other in e- 
money schemes. 
C. No, central banks should not compete with financial services providers 
D. Don't know 
E. Other 
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6.3. PROSPECTS FOR E-MONEY: A US 
- 
EU COMPARATIVE SURVEY 
This section extends an investigation of views on e-money operators and innovators on 
approaches to current issues surrounding e-money. This has been achieved through a survey of 
major e-money innovators and almost all international operators, who came together in Miami, 
the US, at the Cardtech\Securtech2000 Conference and Exhibition on e-money and related 
technologies. The aims of the section are to update forefront findings from European surveys 
on e-money related issues and to deepen the understanding of innovators' and operators' views, 
in order to stimulate further discussion, especially among central bankers, and to eliminate 
some of the existing ambiguities regarding the possibilities and implications of e-money. 
6.3.1. INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF THE SURVEY 
There are two different perceptions (analysed in depth in the following part), which are 
essentially those of central banks as represented by the ECB and the FED. However, two basic 
motives behind e-money, i. e. decreasing cost of telecommunications and ever increasing 
calculation power, are almost irrelevant (or at least not directly relevant) to the main functions 
of central banking. As a result, it can be argued that the future of e-money is more dependent 
on the possibilities of innovation and implementation of the new products to real life payment 
problems as practical solutions through operators. This argument provides an opportunity to 
compare the e-money perceptions of innovators and operators in Europe (the EU area) and the 
United States. Two earlier European surveys provided a set of data that reflects e-money 
perception in the EU, and here the aim is mainly to collect a set of data reflecting the US 
perception to add to the combination of European questionnaires. 
Aims of this survey include all those of the European surveys, including the provision 
of empirical insights into what innovators and operators driving e-money developments think 
about the issues of e-money regulation and implications of the advent of e-money for the 
banking industry and the investigation of the potential of e-money technology as regards the 
future of central banking and banknote and coin circulation. The overall aim is also and 
particularly to gather data from industry experts and use it to gain helpful insights in order to 
increase the understanding of differences in perceptions on e-money in Europe and in the US. 
The analysis compares earlier findings from two earlier surveys conducted in London. There 
were no major changes in the last survey compared to the two earlier ones, other than to 
combine the questions into a single questionnaire. By keeping the questions almost the same, 
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the aim was to develop a data set that could be compared to the European survey findings. It 
was expected that this will increase the understanding of the potential and the limitations 
associated with e-money among decision-makers and discussants, both academics and 
practitioners, and will help central bankers, regulators and practitioners formulate their 
approach to e-money and to understand its implications for the financial services industry, 
including monetary policy and financial regulation. It is important to underline that the aim was 
not to provide detailed information about a given e-money scheme nor the advantages and 
disadvantages of a particular proposal or the state of current e-money trials around the world. 
Current trials have arguably not been able to provide a business case for e-money. Year 
1998 figures for outstanding value in e-money schemes for the EU countries were made 
available by the ECB56 (2000). The number of e-money cards increased from 46,077,000 to 
77,282,000 between 1997 and 1998 while the number of e-money loading machines increased 
from 50,347 to 71,080 in the Eurozone. 
Hove (2000) looked at the major electronic purse project in Europe and reached the 
conclusion that 'the initial expectations concerning EP adoption were unrealistic'. The 
Economist (February 19th 
- 
25th 2000) earlier made a similar argument regarding the first 
versions of e-money trials as 'the reality has proved much less exciting: for electronic cash has 
flopped badly. Its' issuers either went bankrupt, dropped the product or moved into another 
business' but concluded that the second version or 'new generation of e-cash firms appears to be 
getting more things right than its predecessor did'. However, interest in e-money does not seem 
to be diminishing because of failures of the first generation e-money trials. 
Although there is still no generally accepted and proven business case for a single e- 
money scheme, operators and innovators, in trying to create national and international 
standards for e-money products, have been investing significant amounts of money, time and 
effort. Their effort ranges from radical proposals such as commodity representative circulation 
of monetary value, which assumes digital and transferable circulation of precious metals like 
gold, silver, platinum etc (according to www. e-gold. com; there are 72,720 e-gold accounts 
world-wide as of September 2000) as medium of exchange, to `gift certificates' that can be 
56 BEF 1.35 billion for Belgium (compared to BEF 438.8 billion in notes and coin in circulation), DKK 18.5 
million (DKK 34.5 billion) for Denmark; DEM 0.1 billion (DEM 242.6 billion) for Germany, ESP 1.71 billion 
(ESP 4.436 billion) for Spain, ITL 1309 billion (ITL 115,200 billion), for Italy, NLG 0.1 billion (NLG 38 billion) 
for the Netherlands, ATS 0.04 billion (ATS 145.5 billion) for Austria, PTE 04 billion (914.8 billion) for Portugal, 
and FIM 3 million (FIM 14.8 billion) for Finland. 
134 
addressed to a particular mail account only. Failures of different trials around the world did not 
seem to seriously dampen the interest on e-money proposals. 
6.3.2. DIFFERENT E-MONEY PERCEPTIONS 
Central banks around the world began to monitor the e-money phenomenon almost as 
soon as the first launches appeared in the financial industry, without waiting for a proven 
business case. However, there seems to be a clear distinction between the European (EU) and 
the US financial authority's perception on the proper approach to e-money. The first sign of 
this difference appeared in EMI (1994) which provided five scenarios for central bank action 
on e-money and evaluated them as follows: 
1. No central bank intervention at all. This scenario was ignored in the light of central 
banks' responsibility for maintaining the integrity, stability and efficiency of payment systems 
and for conducting monetary policy. 
2. No restriction on the issuing institution but with central banks exercising oversight. 
This scenario is rejected because the funds representing the value of the purchasing power 
contained in electronic purses needs to be considered as bank deposit money, which can only 
be held by credit institutions. 
3. Central banks issue electronic purses themselves in competition with similar private 
sector schemes, using the existing banking infrastructure for the distribution of their electronic 
purses. This scenario was found to be inconsistent with the long term trends that led central 
banks to withdraw from competition with the banking sector and to concentrate on the 
oversight of payment systems and provision of Interbank services. 
4. Central banks decide that the issue of electronic purses is exclusively a central bank 
activity and create a distribution infrastructure of their own. Under this scenario electronic 
purses could be given the status of legal tender. This scenario was not accepted as the best 
option by the report, which indicates that no EU central banks have a plan to issue purses 
because of the belief that the consequences of electronic purses may not be different than other 
cashless instruments. However, it was stated that central banks could at some point be obliged 
to issue prepaid cards themselves. It was stated that the Finnish central bank had decided to 
issue prepaid cards itself as a way of preventing the proliferation of non-compatible systems. 
5. The issuance of electronic purses to be limited to credit institutions and not-fully- 
fledged credit institutions provided that (i) they provide only domestic payment systems, (ii) 
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they are subject to appropriate regulation, in particular with respect to liquidity requirements, 
and (iii) they are supervised by the institution that supervises credit institutions. 
The last scenario was found by EMI (1994) to be the most appropriate one. A wait-and- 
see approach was heavily criticised due to the heavy investment in electronic purses and to the 
fact that after heavy investment, it would be very difficult in the future to modify developments 
later found to be inappropriate. EMI (1994) is a proposal that has had important implications 
for the regulation of e-money in particular and of innovative financial instruments in general. 
Because it did not cover software-based e-money, which did not exist when the report was 
written, indicating that regulation might better be cautious regarding innovative services and 
that it might be better to wait for at least a partially proven business case before totally shaping 
the coverage of regulation. Recently, a similar development seems to be recurring, as WAP for 
mobile networks have suddenly opened up a new avenue for e-money applications in addition 
to personal computers and DTV. The same problem may still exist in a similar way because 
when the technology behind e-money is not clearly agreed via the market mechanism, imposing 
regulation may be irrelevant and hence ineffective. For example, perhaps no one will be sure 
whether tomorrow's payment industry experts will come up with a voice-recognition-based 
payment solution. 
Another expression of the European perception of e-money came three years later with 
the publication of the Opinion of the EMI Council on the issuance of e-money in the EMI 
Annual Report for 1997, but these opinions are mostly covered by the ECB (1998). Clearly, not 
all the European countries agreed with the report. It was mentioned in the ECB (1998) that `a 
majority (excluding Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg) adopted the 
opinions mentioned'. The report on e-money proposed further regulations relating to e-money, 
including software-based products. It defended a regulatory approach to e-money arising 
basically from concerns relating first to the need to preserve price stability and also to the need 
to preserve the unit of account function of currency. Setting out six different and mostly related 
arguments on the reasons behind the regulation of e-money, ECB regarded it as essential that e- 
money issuers should fulfil the following minimum requirements: 
1. Prudential supervision of the issuers of e-money. 
2. Solid and transparent legal arrangements enforceable under all relevant jurisdictions 
relating to the rights and obligations of customers, merchants, issuers and operators in an e- 
money scheme. 
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3. Technical security requiring adequate technical, organisational and procedural 
safeguards to prevent, contain and detect threats of counterfeit in particular. 
4. Protection against criminal abuse such as money laundering required to be taken into 
account during the designing and implementing stage. 
5. Monetary Statistics Reporting for the purposes of monetary policy to be supplied to 
the relevant central bank. 
6. Redeemability as issuers proposed to be legally obliged to redeem e-money against 
central bank money at par at the request of the e-money holder. (Details were said to be 
specified). 
7. Reserve requirements as a possibility for central banks to impose on all issuers of e- 
money. 
Finally, the BIS (2000) gave another source of European perception on e-money, as the 
ECB stated that `it is crucial that the development of the e-money should take place within a 
regulatory framework, which takes into account the public interests pursued by central banks'. 
The Eurosystem's view is that `a clear and prudent regulatory framework for e-money will 
actually promote its acceptance by the general public and its development'. 
Another dimension of the European perception for e-money comes from an EC 
directive, which is to be published in the Official Gazette. The directive allows non-banks to 
issue e-money under certain conditions. First of all, the total amount of financial liabilities 
related to outstanding e-money should normally not exceed EUR 5 million and should never 
exceed EUR 6 million. Additionally, the maximum reloadable amount is specified as EUR 150 
per technical device. This normally implies a maximum of 33,333 cards, but it seems that the 
operator is to be allowed to choose a maximum reload limit of EUR 100, and the card number 
may be increased to 50,000 (or more by further reducing the reload amount). Secondly, the 
bearers of e-money are allowed to ask for redemption and that `redeemability should always be 
understood to be at par value'. 
Contrary to the above-mentioned European perception, the US perception on e-money 
seems quite different. The US Department of the Treasury (1996) mentioned the European 
perception and argued that `limiting the issuance of electronic cash to banks could stifle 
competition and innovation'. The paper advised the US government to `combine patience with 
aggressive fact-finding, study and co-ordination among government units both nationally and 
internationally' to meet its responsibilities. 
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Further, Greenspan (1997) clearly came out against early regulation of e-money, stating 
that in order to foster financial innovation, care should be taken not to impose rules that inhibit 
it. The Governor is especially concerned that there should be no attempt to impede unduly this 
newest innovation, e-money, or generally, increasingly broad electronic payments systems'. 
Investigating the legal and regulatory framework across the world for e-money, Good 
(1997) proposed an international body to address the issue of dispute resolution in connection 
with e-money. The author argued that product standards and regulation are needed for e-money 
technology to be a serious alternative to central bank currency circulation and suggested that 
payment systems would be a challenge for policymakers, who must find a fine line between 
providing safety and stifling innovation. In a later paper, Good (1998) reached six conclusions 
on e-money issues for the future prospects for e-money systems in the US: 
1. E-money systems will slowly be adopted by the US consumers as an additional 
payment method. 
2. Those e-money systems that are most `cash-like' will more likely be accepted for 
non-Internet purchases. 
3. Technology acceptance is accelerating and this will speed the adoption. 
4. Stored-value products that offer multiple applications, including incentives, are more 
likely to be accepted by the consumers. 
5. Acceptance by European and Asian countries, as well as the developing countries, 
will push acceptance in the United States. 
6. The market for e-money systems should be allowed to develop on its own without 
government intervention. 
The last finding underlines the difference in the US approach to e-money issues relative 
to the European perception, and there are further indications of differences. Gramlich (1999), 
for example, valued `obvious efficiency advantages in terms of ease of handling and record 
keeping for consumers, merchants, the banking system and the FED' arising from the advent of 
e-money. The author named the `network problem' as the major hurdle for e-money product 
and concluded that because of the chicken-egg problem faced by innovative proposals like e- 
money with network problems, the government could possibly intervene to effect a solution but 
`alternatives to stored-value products are cheap and safe enough that such intervention is both 
economically unwise and politically unlikely'. 
This year; Greenspan (2000), again came out against a pivotal role for the public sector 
in setting the shape of payment systems for merchants and households. He advises that these be 
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left to the private sector and would limit the government's regulatory role to a focus on `risk 
management systems', arguing that with complex financial systems, `detailed rules and 
standards have become both more burdensome and less effective'. Greenspan mentioned one 
important role for the government in respect of payment system regulation, i. e. `to help identify 
and, where appropriate, help remove barriers to innovation'. 
Finally, the FED publicly declared recently (BIS, 2000) that, `the introduction of e- 
money is not expected to have any effect on monetary policy implementation 
- 
neither reserve 
demand nor reserve supply is expected to be significantly affected. The situation will need to be 
monitored if and as e-money balances expand'. 
The above comparison can be summarised as the in-advance regulatory approach to e- 
money in Europe versus wait-and-see approach advocated in the US. 
6.3.3. THE SURVEY SAMPLE, METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
The choice of venue for this survey was based on the assumption that the future of e- 
money would most likely be shaped by the technology and the applications flowing from 
related technologies. This assumption was valid for the European surveys as well and as a 
result, all survey analysis in this section reflects only the views of innovators and operators and 
excludes academicians, central bankers, private bankers, investors etc. The exhibition in Miami 
attracted nearly all known innovators and operators of e-money, and it may be argued that it 
had nearly the widest coverage of all such commercial exhibitions around the world. 
This survey questionnaire comprised 24 questions, most of them with a comments 
section. The questions entail four basic themes. The first involves questions on the financial 
regulation of e-money, including the implications of central bank regulatory proposals on 
innovation and competition. The second theme was the problems and obstacles for e-money 
arising from technological development, innovation and applications such as a future base for 
e-money access, as well as future trends influenced by these obstacles. The third theme 
addressed the direct and indirect influences of e-money on financial market structures such as 
the future medium of exchange for e-commerce, the potential impact of e-money on the 
industry, non-bank firms that may gain competitive advantages over banks, potential issuers of 
e-money, and banks' position in the industry. The last theme involved policy issues arising from 
the development of e-money, especially for the long run, including its implications for central 
banking and national currencies. 
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The first eleven questions in this survey are from the first survey and the rest are from 
the second. The reasons for combining the two surveys that were conducted earlier were, first, 
e-money technology (both hardware and software) is changing very fast. Secondly, the 
particular aim of this survey was to make a comparison of the results, which needed a 
combination of two European surveys. This survey was conducted at the 
Cardtech/Securtech2000 Conference and Exhibition, 1-4 May 2000 in Miami Beach, Florida, 
which was announced as `the World's premier card and security technology conference and 
exhibition'57 at its tenth anniversary. The venue described itself as `sizzling solutions for a 
digital world'58 and promised `everything you need to know about smart cards, biometrics, 
public key infrastructure, identity, e-commerce, mobile telephony, loyalty, mass transit, health 
care, banking... and more'. All the named sectors may be accepted as directly or indirectly 
related to the future of e-money. The reason for this is that every smart card with multi- 
application potential helps to create critical mass for rollouts with their available memory for 
electronic purse applications in addition to the original function. During the time of the survey, 
most of the named sectors exhibited mostly smart card-based solutions in their field of interest. 
The organisers expected more than 10,000 IT professionals and solution providers, not only 
from the US but all around the world (65 nations) to join the exhibition. 
The exhibition promised opportunities to learn, network and conduct businesses in a 
total immersion in the latest technologies and real-world demonstrations, and more than 300 
`hot' technology companies (card and equipment manufacturers, vendors, developers, 
integrators and producers of related technologies) were being hosted. They offered their 
solutions in `identification and authentication, public key infrastructure, cryptography, anti- 
counterfeiting technology, electronic payments and more'59. As the organisers had `promoted 
advanced card, identification and security technologies through educational and networking 
programs for professionals at every level of expertise' over the previous nine years, their 
intention for this year was to `present a superior line-up of workshops and seminars and a 
comprehensive array of industry exhibits to further this vision'. The workshop and seminars' 
57 Show Guide. 
58 Leaflet: Supplement to IDWorld. 
59 Show Guide and Leaflet: Supplement to IDWorld. 
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coverage highlighted the profile of survey sample, as almost all of them were directly or 
indirectly related to e-money60 
The coverage of the survey was impressive: Compared to surveys conducted before, the 
number of participants was almost tripled. Operating system developers joined the exhibition 
without exception, (Maosco, Sun and Microsoft) three of them being represented individually. 
All of the major international scheme operators were there as well. The major smart card 
innovators seemed to play an active role not only in the marketing of multi-application 
potential but also in presenting current solutions to problems that could slow the speed at which 
applications reach their full e-money potential. At the same time, dynamic small and medium 
size innovators showed their enthusiasm for providing alternative and practical protocols and 
made proposals regarding niche problems surrounding the development of advanced payment 
systems, both for closed circuit trials as on university campuses and open circuits as in Internet 
environments. 
As a result, it may be argued that the survey sample, which included almost all of the 
relevant international operators, almost all of the main national scheme holders and almost all 
of the e-money innovators around the world, was representative for data collection on e-money 
perception in the US. 
The survey venue was visited one day before the exhibition started. Because of the 
extremely large size of the exhibition venue, it was decided to distribute the questionnaire on a 
selective basis. It was almost impossible to visit all of the 300-plus stands on the first day and 
to expect questionnaire responses from all of the participants. The exhibitors are divided into 
two groups according to business line. Those directly connected with e-money, such as scheme 
operators, operating system innovators, advanced smart card developers, secure payment 
solution providers etc, were given top priority for the distribution process. Almost all of these 
innovators and operators were given a questionnaire on the first day of the exhibition, and in 
the afternoon they were visited in order to gather the responses that were already available. 
The second day was used for conference attendance, additional distribution of 
questionnaires and data collection. In addition to the survey, the event provided an opportunity 
to follow current discussions by attending presentations directly related to e-money. The final 
60 Some of the topics were `Advances in Card Technology', `Enhanced Private Key Protection', `Cryptography 
Technology', `Smart Cards and the Internet', `Multi-Application cards: Managing Business Relationships and Security', 'Changing the Face of Money' and `Financial Applications'. The last two were being followed during 
the survey in order to shed light on the current stage of discussions and proposals surrounding e-money. 
141 
day was used mostly for collecting responses and filling replacement requests for lost 
questionnaires. 
In all, 250 questionnaires were distributed during the survey, from which 97 responses 
were collected, giving a return rate of about 39%. This was lower than the rates of return for the 
European surveys (49% for the first survey and 70% for the second). On the other hand, the 
number of questionnaires distributed was higher than for the European surveys (107 and 105). 
The reason for this difference is the size differences in the survey samples. The very busy and 
hectic environment may explain the difference on the rate of return, as many exhibitors lost the 
questionnaires and had given their priorities to `commercial' activities, which should be 
respected. The rate of return was calculated so as to avoid double counting. Replacements for 
lost questionnaires given were excluded from the total distribution figure. 
Private interview sessions were conducted with major institutions that were believed to 
play critical roles for the development of e-money. They were questioned on their visions for 
the future and on their current proposals with expected adjustments. Most of these interviews 
provided useful information to update perceptions on the present level of e-money 
developments and to increase the understanding of future possibilities. There were some 
exhibitors who refused to fill out questionnaires arising from `legal' concerns that led them to 
avoid expressing views on anything in order not to be `judged' by industry regulators later, 
despite the guarantees on the anonymity of the survey. 
The reliability of the survey sample finds support from an exhibition practice: The 
exhibition identity cards for entrance were multi-application smart cards with electronic purse 
capability. Every card contained the monetary value equivalent of USD 3, which was to be 
spent on the exhibition premises, i. e. generally on vending machines located throughout the 
conference area. The cards owned during the time of the exhibition were being tested as to 
functionality, and the application proved successful. The same card was given capabilities such 
as food allowances as well. 
There has been some limitations regarding comparative aims in this survey. The first 
limitation is that the surveys were conducted at different times, the time lag between the first 
and last surveys being 14 months, which may be considered a `long' time in this rapidly 
changing phase of innovation relating to e-money. The time lag between the second and final 
surveys was three months, which may be assumed to be quite reasonable. Time lags, rather than 
perceptual differences, may have caused most of the similarities and differences in the findings. 
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Secondly, the rates of return were different for all the surveys, as sample sizes are 
different, especially for the last survey, compared to the first two. 
Finally, this thesis assumes that surveys conducted in Europe reflect the European 
perception whereas the last survey reflects the American perception, as it was conducted in the 
US. Because most of the innovators and almost all of the operators are structurally 
`international', this assumption requires some caution. As an observation, there were many 
companies represented in all of the three surveys. On the other hand, it may not be wrong to 
argue that the settings of the surveys would reflect local views, as even international companies 
adapt to local approaches for their businesses, which is e-money in this case. Moreover, it was 
found significantly different associations on 7 of the 23 questions, which suggested that the 
samples are not overlapping (see appendix provided in section 6.3.7) 
6.3.4. SURVEY ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This section has focused on differences in survey results, as the earlier analysis 
provided the innovators and operators perceptions in depth and it seems unnecessary to go 
through a similar set of opinions here. The survey analysis includes a `comparison' between 
survey findings categorised as a reflection of the American perception and the European 
surveys, which are categorised as a reflection of the European perception. 
The first part of the analysis looks at the basic differences in the findings of this survey 
as compared to the European surveys. This section comprises four divisions: regulation-related 
results, technical issues, financial market structure and policy issues. A comparative table is 
presented in the appendix (section 6.3.6), which summarises the results. The comparison is 
based on the table instead of the charts for the data with similar results. The reason for choosing 
this approach is that the preference has been put on the differences in order not to repeat 
findings that are similar to those already analysed in connection with the European surveys. 
The determination of questions with different opinions among European and American 
innovators and operators decision was taken with the aid of a statistical test, i. e. the Chi-square 
test with a significance level of 5%. The Chi-square test compares observed frequencies to 
expected frequencies in the samples. In this case, the EU survey results are compared to the US 
survey. As `quantities' were not numerical in these surveys, the Chi-square test was chosen 
over correlation analysis to measure association between quantities. (Neave and Worthington, 
1988). The second appendix (6.3.7) gives the overall p-value results. In summary, seven 
questions out of 23 provided totally different opinions between Europe and the US whereas 
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four questions came out with close opinions and the remaining twelve questions gave similar, if 
not the same, results. Next, those responses to the questions that provided major differences 
compared to the Furopean surveys will he analysed individually in depth, using both bar and 
pie charts. Bar charts will include a line giving the findings from the European surveys in order 
to make the comparison easier. 
The question "Do you think that electronic cash has a potential to replace central bank 
money? " aimed to find out whether e-money technology is perceived as mature enough to 
replace currency in circulation produced by central banks' and treasuries' banknotes and coins. 
Due to the importance of the issue, it was reasonable to delete the to a certain extent' option 
from the possible answers. This was done to clarify further whether the presumed potential of 
e-money would be confirmed by innovators and operators with a clear choice so that one of the 
most critical issues connected with the emergence of e-money could be analysed with a clearer 
result. Consequently, this was the only question that was changed compared to the Furopean 
surveys. Because of this adjustment, the p-value is not applicable in this question. 
('IIART 6.3.1: CAN E-11ONE1' REPLACE CENTRAL BANK NIONE '? 
I)ON' I' KNOW 
vES 
r, si, 
32%, 
The US innovators and operators confirmed the potential of' e-money to displace central 
hank money in circulation with all its implications for Payment system stability, e. g. the 
correlation between efficiency of the payment system and efficiency of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. The majority of respondents believed in that potential without 
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limiting their expectation to any extent, surpassing non-believers (31 %), as only 32% did not 
see a potential for e-money to replace central bank money. In the European survey, even with 
the exclusion of the `to a certain extent' option, believers in e-money technology's potential to 
eliminate banknotes and coins surpassed non-believers by 17%. 
This result may be a confirmation of the maturing stage of e-money technology. The 
increase in the number of believers confirms this result, but as 32% did not agree to this 
potential i. e. 15% higher than in the first survey, it appears that there is no full consensus yet on 
the elimination of central bank money. The ever-changing pace of e-money related 
technologies might be a reason for the lack of full consensus. 
The complementary question to the first one was "If yes, When? " This was answered by 
63% of participants, those who said `Yes' to the first question. The aim of the question was to 
find out the expected lead time for e-money technologies to replace banknotes and coins and to 
quantify whether central banks and regulators would just take their time to analyse e-money 
products or should immediately develop policies arising from their responsibilities for 
monetary stability. It was expected that such a finding might give central banks and regulatory 
bodies an idea of the timeframe for their decision-making. 
The result indicates that 56% argued that it will take e-money 10 years to replace 
central bank money, which was slightly more than for the European survey (55%) but the 
difference may be accepted as minor. This may imply that both European and American 
innovators and operators almost agree on the speed at which central bank money would 
disappear from circulation, and all 61 participants who believed in the total replacement of 
currency in circulation by e-money believe that it will happen sooner rather than later. This 
agreement was confirmed by the statistical analysis as well, as the p-value for this question was 
0.999, i. e. the highest among the 23 questions. 
Two questions addressed regulatory issues with the aim of finding out how innovators 
and regulators will react to central bank proposals on the regulation of innovation and 
competition. It was of interest to investigate the general belief that there is a negative 
correlation between regulation and innovation, especially in the US. The intention was to find 
out whether innovators and operators regarded regulation as a barrier to further innovation and 
whether it was regarded as anti-competitive. In the EU questionnaire participants were asked 
how they felt about `ECB regulatory proposals', whereas the US participants were asked about 
`potential central bank regulation', as the FED had not yet made any regulatory proposal. 
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CHART 6.3.2: INNOVATION IMPLICATIONS OF CENTRAL BANK REGULATION OF E-MONEY 
50% 
45% 
40% 
35% 
30% 
LINE-CHART: EUROPEAN PERCEPTION 
BAR-CHART: AMERICAN PERCEPTION 
25% 
20% 
15i. 
10% 
5% 
0i. 
ENCOURAGE NEUTRAL OTHER DISCOURAGE 
In the European survey, almost half of the innovators and operators apparently favoured 
regulation, as they did not regard it as a barrier to innovation incentives and less than a third 
saw a neutral effect for ECB proposals on innovation. In this survey, support for the 
encouraging impact of regulation dropped below 50%, but the main difference was the 14% 
increase for the `discourage' option. American innovators and operators seem to have a concern 
for the impact of central bank regulation on e-money innovation, at least to a much greater 
extent than their European counterparts, but there are no radical differences. The real difference 
seems to lie in the fact that the typical EU participant preferred to stay out of the discussion if 
he was not familiar with the ECB proposals and so choose the `other' option, whereas the 
typical US participant actively joined in the discussion, so that the preference for `other' option 
decreased by 14 % compared to the EU. Consequently, the p-value for this question was 0.005. 
As regards the impact of central bank regulatory proposals for competition among 
different e-money schemes, the chart below shows the results. The question had a p-value of 
0.001. 
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CHART 6.3.3: COMPETITION IMPLICATIONS OF CENTRAL BANK REGULATION OF E-MONEY 
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As the chart shows, support for neutral effects in the American survey was not much 
different, being just 2% less than in the European survey. The real difference was with respect 
to the belief that central bank regulation would encourage competition in e-money business, 
which got 13% more support in the US where it exceeded the 50% level. American innovators 
and operators in a sense argued that even though regulation may stifle innovation it might 
support competition among different e-money proposals. There seems to be no clear indication 
that central banks should be concerned about their regulatory attempts with regard to direct or 
indirect discouragement of innovation and competition. In either case, supporters of the 
`encourage' option outnumbered supporters of the `discourage' option. Interestingly, European 
innovators and operators were concerned more with competition whereas Americans seemed to 
be more concerned with innovation. The strong intervention by American law enforcement 
agencies in recent days with regard to monopolistic practices could have affected this 
difference, as innovators and operators on the other side of the Atlantic might rely on regulators 
for the defence of competition in corporate America. 
The question that has provided another very different outcome for this survey with a p- 
value of 0.002 was about obstacles to wide acceptance of e-cash as a replacement for central 
bank money. The questionnaire listed some of the problems thought of as the main obstacles to 
the successful emergence and strong maturation of e-money, and the respondents were asked to 
give their priorities. The aim of the question was to find out what kinds of barriers now and in 
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the future would limit the practical realisation of the technical potential of e-money. The chart 
below shows the results. 
CHART 6.3.4: MAIN OBSTACLES FOR E-CASH TO REPLACE CENTRAL BANK MONEY 
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Participants in the European survey, felt that the required technical infrastructure, 
including retailer readers, customer cards and software, was the leading obstacle for e-money to 
replace CB money, as almost half of the participants indicated this. Interoperability of different 
e-money schemes ranked second, and cost and profitability for issuers ranked third. Few of the 
participants mentioned security and privacy as main obstacles. The picture in the US is totally 
different. As the above chart shows, the US innovators and operators gave top priority to the 
security level of e-money schemes and privacy of e-money holders was ranked second. The 
differences were not limited to this at all: Interoperability, which was the second biggest issue 
for Europeans, came out almost last for the US. 
The agendas of innovators and operators on opposite sides of the Atlantic seem to be 
quite different in terms of presumed obstacles. They seem to put quite different weights on 
quite different issues. One explanation for the difference as regards the security issue may be 
that Europeans had already experienced the convenience of smart cards, especially in France, 
whereas America seems only now to be catching up, but differences still remain unresolved for 
privacy perception. 
In another question, three different proposals on the future base for e-money, namely 
card-based, software-based or a combination of the two technologies, that could be supported 
by an operating system were analysed to determine which one seems to be most favoured by 
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innovators and operators. It still seems unclear whether there will be a demand for both card- 
based and software-based e-money or for some other combination. The p-value for the question 
was 0.039. 
CHART 6.3.5: FUTURE BASE FOR E-MONEY SCHEMES 
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According to the results, the future base for e-money schemes would be a combination 
of card and software-based products. In this survey, the preference given to the combined 
version again seems clear even though it was 7% less than in the European survey. The real 
difference was the decline of 13% for card-based solutions. This result may be related to the 
relatively mature smart card penetration, especially in France, whereas the US could be 
considered more advanced in Internet-based services. The biggest jump was at the `all kind' 
option, a reflection of Americans attaching more importance to the coexistence of different 
types of e-money bases, compared to Europeans. The result still points to smart cards, as they 
seem to be the only technical product that can support a card and software-based solution with 
their individual capabilities and network adaptability. Central banks and other policy-makers 
may be influenced in their views on e-money by the need for a common solution for payment 
media, both for conventional and virtual transactions. The convenience of such a choice seems 
to be confirmed by innovators and operators on both sides of the Atlantic. Other options here 
included `ID card based solutions'; `authentication based biometrics' and `biometrics', which 
are the original responses given by the participants. 
One question intended to find a leading indicator for decision-makers as to what 
technology that should concentrate on in their policy reactions addressed another critical 
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problem surrounding e-money schemes, namely the potential access medium for e-money in 
the future. The aim of the question was to find out potential distribution channels of e-money 
for future financial transactions, including activities such as downloading purchasing power 
from a financial service provider's account into a chip card, sending money via DTV networks, 
etc. The result, which got a p-value of 0.058, is displayed in the following chart. 
CHART 6.3.6: ACCESS MEDIUM FOR E-MONEY FOR THE FUTURE 
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In the European survey; the majority named personal computers as the best access 
medium for the future and mobile phones came in second. The third best medium was the home 
phone. TV, Public ATM and the public phone followed the first three options. As the above 
chart shows, the preferences among American innovators and operators did not indicate a major 
difference, as the PC and mobile phone took the first two places. However, the major difference 
as compared to the European perception was ATMs, which ranked as the third most favoured 
future access medium for e-money, compared to fifth in the European survey, with the 
difference being 28%. DTV, on the other hand, seems less favoured by American innovators 
and operators. Some participants named alternative devices such as `parking meters, wireless 
devices, medical cards and transportation tickets, smart cards and readers, and special readers'. 
These results may underline the importance of ATM networks in the US compared to 
DTV technology in Europe, which is reflected in new terms such as `t-commerce' to represent 
DTV commerce. The overall result from the two surveys seems to present a three-fold future: 
The first, e-commerce, as represented by the PC, seems to be relatively well-developed already. 
The second, m-commerce (mobile phones) seems to be very popular in current discussions. 
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Lastly t-commerce is growing rapidly in some European countries such as the UK, as DTV 
penetration increases fast on the heels of the first two. The operators and innovators seem to 
imply that e-money will be circulating with all these network-based business solutions in 
digital form and will provide payment solutions for financial transaction settlements in e- 
commerce, m-commerce and t-commerce. 
The question `Which operating system may dominate the future of e-money 
technologies? ' was designed to investigate whether a particular operating system will play the 
critical role in shaping the future of e-money. There may also be more than one operating 
system, which would require interoperability for end-users for acceptance of e-money as final 
settlement at transactions. The p-value for this question turned out to be 0.015. 
CHART 6.3.7: WHICH OPERATING SYSTEM MAY DOMINATE FUTURE OF E"MONEY 
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The European survey demonstrated that more than one-third of the participants believed 
in more than one operating system in the future. The rest supported particular systems. Here, 
the picture seems quite different, as the supporters of `two or more' operating systems 
increased 21%. There was also much less support for individual operating systems to dominate 
the future of e-money. As interoperability supports the `general and immediate acceptance' of 
e-money, it is expected to play one of the most critical roles in exploiting e-money potential. 
Scheme operators, as a result, may look for common platforms for PCs, mobile phones, DTVs, 
ATMs, hand-held devices etc to support alternative operating systems for each device. Other 
potential operating systems named by participants were `Unix' and `Linux'. The result 
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underlines the importance of interoperability among different e-money schemes in order to 
sustain acceptability of e-money whenever it is offered. 
The question whether banks will remain as the main players in the financial services 
industry was intended to gather information that will help central bankers to react to the 
emergence of e-money technologies with regard to its impact on the future of banks within the 
financial industry. The results are shown below (p-value 0.046). 
CHART 6.3.8: WILL BANKS REMAIN AS THE MAIN PLAYERS IN TILE FINANCIAL SERVICES 
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The European survey indicated that less than the majority of participants believed banks 
would be able to sustain their central role in the financial industry. In contrast, the second 
survey clearly suggested that banks would maintain their key position in financial service 
provision, as almost two-thirds of the innovators and operators in the US pointed to their 
comparative advantage in financial services, especially as payment system experts. As a result, 
the US may not experience a real challenge to the dominance of banks in the financial service 
industry whereas European innovators and operators see better possibilities for non-banks to 
enter into banking services, especially payment services. 
This may also imply a comparative advantage for non-banks to extend their 
involvement in financial services in Europe. For example, almost all the major supermarket 
chains in the UK have already started to provide banking services on site, and some European 
telcos provide a billing service added to telephone bills, allowing telephone account-based 
crediting. With the advent of mobile and DTV-based technologies, it may not be surprising to 
see alternative models for the provision of basic banking services. Many distribution channels 
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that now seem highly hypothetical could be realised in the medium or long run. As far as 
central banks and financial supervisory authorities are concerned, there is a definite need to 
spend more time and effort investigating possible future financial trends in Europe whereas the 
US innovators and operators are more convinced that banks will maintain their competitive 
edge over non-banks. 
FINANCIAL REGULATION: So far, the analysis of the comparative survey has dealt 
with the major differences between the EU and the US innovators' and operators' perceptions 
with respect to e-money. The questions analysed have had p-values of less than 0.06, except for 
the second question, which was related to the first one. P-values for the rest of the analysis are 
higher than 0.06, and there seem to be no major differences between European and American 
perceptions. Consequently, charts will not be employed in the following analysis; comparisons 
will generally rely on the table in the first appendix. However, the answers will be briefly 
summarised in the text. 
The question about the expected reaction of central banks to e-money developments 
addresses the differences between the American and European current reactions. Question 6 in 
the appendix at section 6.3.6 gives the results (p-value 0.179). The majority of the participants 
expected central banks to regulate e-money in advance on both sides of the Atlantic. This may 
imply that differences between regulatory agencies were not quantified by innovators and 
operators with regard to their first choice, which clearly shows that in advance regulation is 
expected, but with regard to second best choice there seems to be more support on the 
American side for a `wait-and-see' policy. 
Central banks and regulatory agencies may have some difficulty in justifying this clear 
expectation in favour of in advance regulation for two reasons: First, regulation may be 
demanded not because of a clear welfare effect but just to clarify the unclear and unsettled 
standardisation among different e-money schemes and difficulties in the search for common 
platforms for different e-money proposals. Secondly, the e-money industry may prefer that 
central banks act as a kind of `common denominator' for solving the conflicts and arguments 
with regard to the emergence of e-money so that they can manage the risk of investment loss 
due to the backing of loosing proposals during the discovery process. 
TECHNICAL ISSUES: The question "Which medium of access technology is most 
likely to dominate the future e-money developments? " was asked in order to evoke a single 
choice among alternatives. Question 12 in the first appendix at section 6.3.6. gives the results 
(p-value 0.082). In the European survey, the majority of the respondents felt that personal 
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computers would dominate the future access media for e-money. The US survey gave a similar 
picture, with PC and mobile phone taking the first two places. However, hand-held devices 
seem to be more popular, and consumer acceptance of such devices appears to be stronger in 
the US. The same argument may hold for ATM networks, but DTV does not seem to be as 
popular as the other alternatives. It can be concluded that the primary access channels for e- 
money are likely to be PC and mobile phones, supported by hand-held devices in the US and 
possibly DTV in the EU area. The overall picture seems to be that the PC (e-commerce) and the 
mobile phone (m-commerce, including hand-held devices) stand a good chance of dominating 
in the future, whereas ATMs and DTV (t-commerce) will likely play a supportive role. Of 
course these channels may be combined in solutions such as PDAs in the future as the 
technology comes on stream. 
Another question addressed the most critical technology for the future success of e- 
money applications. The aim was to get the views of innovators and operators on the most 
critical technology for shaping successful e-money rollouts. The p-value for the question was 
0.571, so that little difference is indicated vs the earlier surveys. 
The European results indicated that smart card technology is perceived as the most 
critical technology for the future success of e-money proposals. In this survey, smart card 
technology gained additional support from the American innovators and operators as being the 
most critical technology, but Internet applications instead of ranking second as for Europe were 
considered to be just one of the equally important technologies. Participants listed alternative 
critical technologies as `biometrics', `security, encryption, authentication', `customer's 
acceptance', `retail and POS infrastructure', `back office plus card and terminal management 
systems' and `security'. The preference for smart cards by innovators may not be surprising 
due to the fact that smart cards can be considered to be the only technology that can 
communicate with all the e-money related platforms, including PCs, mobile phones, DTVs, 
ATMs and hand-held devices. (Appendix at section 6.3.6, question 14) 
FINANCIAL MARKET STRUCTURE: The problem of whether non-financial 
institutions should be allowed to issue e-money was investigated to address the clear European 
choice for limiting the issuance of e-money to financial institutions and whether innovators and 
operators approve European policy choice in the US. The majority in Europe favoured allowing 
non-financial institutions to issue e-money. Only around a third were against non-financial 
institutions being in the e-money business. American innovators turned out to be less 
supportive of non-bank issuance of e-money. The results (p-value 0.588) may seem a bit 
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paradoxical in light of the general impression that Americans are less restrictive than 
Europeans in respect of financial services provision. This may be explained by the stronger 
support for banks over non-banks in the competition for financial services provision in the US. 
The ` other' option reflected a question asked by a participant: `Why not? What is Barter? '. This 
response may reflect the richness of discussions among innovators and operators. (Appendix at 
section 6.3.6, question 9). 
The question whether e-money technology could reduce barriers to entry to the financial 
services sector was intended to cover both horizontal entries to new services by financial 
institutions and vertical entries by non-financial institutions to the banking industry. The 
question got a p-value of 0.876. In the European survey, a majority believed that e-money 
technology would reduce barriers to entry. In this survey, the support of this view was 5% less 
and 25% higher than the `no' responses. The implications not only for the regulation of e- 
money but also for the regulation of the whole financial system may be that it might accelerate 
current trends toward `functional regulation'. Obviously, a reduction in barriers to entry could 
also enrich customer choice and stimulate competition and so increase in the overall efficiency 
of financial services. (appendix at section 6.3.6. question 10). 
There was a question about the privatisation of money. It may be argued that private 
money and free banking experiences began to attract more academicians involved in the 
discussions after the advent of e-money. The aim of the question was to investigate the stance 
of innovators and operators on private money. Question 11 in the appendix at section 6.3.6 
shows the results (p-value 0.134). The European survey supported, by a majority, the resistance 
to the privatisation of money. Almost one third of the participants stayed out of the discussion 
but less than a tenth favoured the privatisation of money. Here in the second survey, the 
participation of innovators and operators increased in the discussion. Moreover, 14% clearly 
gave direct support to the privatisation of money. 
This result may indicate two policy conclusions. First, it may indicate more support for 
private monies in the US compared to Europe. This result may not be surprising, as Europe 
currently has an agenda for monetary union. Secondly, it may show that in two years time the 
supporters of e-money have increased from 8% to 14%. Either result could concern central 
banks and other financial authorities as sovereigns of national currencies, and there may be a 
case for the long run (if not short run) denationalisation of money, as dreamed of by 
intellectuals for some time now. These relatively small percentages may carry a large weight 
since privatisation of money would be a great challenge to the status quo, established over 
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many years. This survey made it even much clearer that central bank money is no longer an 
unchallenged truism. One participant responded to the question on privatisation of money with 
the question `It already is. Do you really think that the FED is controlled by the government? ', 
with the likely meaning that money is already private in the US as the government has no direct 
control over the US dollar. 
The question `What may be the reasons for the failure of alternative e-money proposals 
like Digicash? ' was aimed at collecting empirical evidence on the reasons why some e-money 
schemes (at least their first versions) failed. The p-value was 0.424. In the European survey, 
nearly half of the participants blamed the lack of co-operation between banks and e-money 
innovators. The picture did not change much here, as more than 45% of American e-money 
innovators and operators blamed the lack of co-operation with banks for the failure of early e- 
money business proposals. Participants mentioned the following reasons as well: `Difficult to 
use or program', `social and cultural inertia', `lack of secure transactions', `the consumer', 
`privacy and security concerns', `lack of merchant acceptance' and `comparison to other e-cash 
schemes: the best will only succeed'. (Appendix at section 6.3.6 question 15). 
The question `Which payment instrument is best suited for `retail' e-commerce 
transactions? ' was aimed to determining whether current payment alternatives can eliminate the 
demand for e-money arising from retail e-commerce (p-value 0.505). The European survey 
results suggest that e-money will be a `demanded or required' medium of exchange, in one way 
or another, for e-commerce transactions. In this survey, e-money seems to get stronger support 
(by a 7% margin) as the main alternative for retail e-commerce transactions. Credit and debit 
cards, which enjoy strong consumer awareness and understanding, once again failed to surpass 
e-money as the future payment solution. On the other hand, the latest survey did not name 
cheques and e-gold as alternatives to e-money, and credit and debit cards share the pie 
(Appendix at section 6.3.6 question 16). 
One of the questions was `What may be the impact of e-money on the future of 
financial services industry? '. It aimed to clarify the impact of e-money on financial institutions 
with regard to different suggestions ranging from `no serious impact at all', to `a serious 
development similar to the first use of money in very primitive societies' (p-value 0.540). 
Around a third of the participants believed that e-money will mainly reduce barriers to entry to 
the financial services industry in the European survey; for the US the figure was 29%. The 
difference between the American and the European perceptions on this question showed up in 
the weights given to the `all' response in the questionnaire, which ranked second in the US 
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compared to fourth in the first survey. On the other hand, as one participant also argued that `it 
(e-money) will give banks a new channel for customer relations'. (appendix at section 6.3.6 
question 17). 
- 
The question `Which institutions are best placed to compete with banks in providing e- 
money schemes? ' was intended to find out which institutions are expected to effectively 
compete with banks in e-money applications. Question 18 in the appendix at section 6.3.6 
shows the results (p-value 0.185). 
In the European results, telecommunication companies were given a clear priority, as 
the majority of participants favoured them as the banks' main competitors. Internet service 
providers, software houses, and supermarkets and retail chains followed telcos with equal 
weights. In the second survey, the big picture did change, as less than the majority favoured 
telcos as the biggest challengers to banks in the provision of e-money and 20% less than in the 
European survey. The secondary order seems quite changed as 7% more participants in the US 
favoured Internet service providers, and supermarkets and e-commerce brands also got more 
support. This implies more diversification as compared to the views of European innovators 
and operators. Participants also named `third sector companies', i. e. `EDS' and `voucher 
companies', as alternative potential e-money scheme operators. 
The conclusion as regards policy, specifically in terms of the medium of exchange 
function of e-money and money in general, may be left to the market, including telcos, as the 
technology comes in stream. To the extent that central banks ensure that payment system 
stability is not threatened by market practices, particularly in terms of contagion effects on the 
store of value and unit of account functions, who provides these services may not be crucial for 
monetary stability. As a result, telcos and other firms with similar capabilities may be allowed 
to compete against banks if they can create a customer base with increased service quality 
under fair competition principles, which will benefit all on the final analysis. This trend finds 
more support in Europe (by favouring telcos), whereas the US case is diversified among 
additional alternatives. 
As the technology comes on stream, payment systems might become less dependent on 
the expertise of the financial system. One example of this trend may be the telcos providing 
alternative payment methodologies, e. g. Sonera (Finnish Telecom), which allows vending 
machine operators to vend through telephone numbers, so that the customer is charged via his 
phone bill. That is why another question addressed the potential issuers of e-money: `Who 
should be allowed to issue e-money? '. The aim was to determine whether banks are still 
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favoured as `payment system experts'. The comparative table is provided in the first appendix 
at section 6.3.6 question 19. (p value 0.435). 
In the European survey, the participants seemed neutral on the issuers of e-money, as 
they equally (34%) favoured the `only banks' and `any firms capable of handling e-money 
technology' options. In the US survey, there was strong support for banks as the sole issuer of 
e-money, as a clear majority of innovators and operators gave them top ranking of the 
alternative options. The support for banks was 17% more in the US than in the EU. This result 
may give a clear advantage to American banks to compete against potential e-money issuers, as 
they get strong support from innovators and operators. It might additionally imply that 
American banks enjoy a better reputation in the US among innovators and operators, especially 
with respect to being potential e-money issuers, compared to European innovators and 
operators with regard to other companies, as e. g. telcos. One response, which illustrates the 
social concerns behind technologic developments, might be worth mentioning here: `No one, 
because technology should not control human finance'. 
POLICY ISSUES: The question about the impact of e-money on the ability of central 
banks to continue to be the sole provider of the monetary base addressed the issue arising from 
the potential of e-money technologies to allow alternative e-money issuance in different forms, 
e. g. digital circulation of gold, both as a payment medium and store of value. According to the 
survey results provided in the appendix at section 6.3.6 question 21, in the US more 
participants seemed to believe that banks could use the benefits of e-money to their own 
advantage. They did not openly give the same support to central banks. Their view would likely 
be realised if e-money extends the potential of issuance of currencies in digital form so that it is 
`generally and immediately' suitable for PC, mobile phone and DTV networks globally and 
that smart card-aided local transactions also be enabled (so that good money can go anywhere 
in the world, without any limitation on its ability to drive out bad money). Obviously, there was 
no clear distinction between the EU and the US perceptions on this question because the p- 
value was 0.800. 
Another policy issues related question examined whether e-money may lead to a new 
free banking era. The question also dealt with the main aspects of free banking. The aim of the 
question was to try to get empirical evidence on the emerging expectations about the re- 
appearance of a free banking era, mainly via increased computing power and reduced cost of 
communication. 
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The European survey results showed that almost half of the participants expect that e- 
money technology will lead to a new free banking era, even though 20% limit this expectation 
to a certain extent. In this survey, the participants seemed more concerned about the argument 
in the first place, as only 11% chose the `don't know' option. Secondly, the supporters of a free 
banking era reshaped by the help of e-money technologies was 2% higher and 24% limited this 
to a certain extent. Those who saw no turning back to free banking amounted to more than a 
third. The innovators and operators both in the US and Europe expressed a clear expectation of 
free banking practices in the future and there was no clear difference of opinion here as 
summarised in appendix at section 6.3.6 question 22. (p-value 0.750). 
The question concerning central banking and money implications of e-money was about 
the potential for a `world currency'. Some academicians and practitioners have argued that 
computers, mobile networks and DTV networks will create a global economy with no borders 
that will require a `world currency' or at least a `world medium of exchange'. The aim here was 
to get the opinions of the innovators and operators in the US with regard to these expectations 
(p-value 0.528). 
In the European survey, a slight majority rejected the idea of a `world currency'. In this 
survey, the rejection rate for American innovators and operators was 8% lower, and those who 
believed in the potential emergence of a `world currency' through the elimination of national 
currencies amounted to 3% more. One participant argued that his would only be possible with 
'IMF's participation'. These minor differences among European and American innovators and 
operators might have arisen from local circumstances, as Europe has an agenda for a currency 
union (Euro) whereas the US agenda is a kind of `dollarisation', especially among Latin 
American countries. In either case, the confidence among innovators and operators may have 
serious implications for discussions such as `international lender of last resort', `sustainability 
of local currencies after currency unions among major economies' and `national regulatory 
policies under international currency era'. Obviously, developing countries may be one of the 
main sides in these discussions, as their money would be threatened by the availability of 
superior money. 
The last question of the survey investigated the issuance of e-money. It asked 
participants whether central banks should issue e-money for their own account, thus competing 
with private banks and/or other institutions. The European results indicated that only a quarter 
of the participants believed that `money should only be governed by central banks'. On the 
other hand, more than a third of respondents clearly expressed their concerns about central 
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bank involvement in the issuance of e-money. Additionally, almost a quarter of the participants 
believed in competitive issuance of e-money, arguing that central banks should compete with 
private issuers in e-money schemes. The results were not radically different from the US 
results, in which 27% supported only central bank issuance of e-money, whereas 29% were 
concerned about central bank involvement in e-money issuance. Less than a quarter supported 
competitive issuance and the percentage of participants who preferred to stay out of the 
discussion reached 22%, which is the highest for this survey. These results may imply the total 
rejection of central bank involvement, as innovators and operators who rejected the central 
bank involvement in e-money issuance exceeded supporters in both surveys on both sides of 
the Atlantic as summarised in the appendix at section 6.3.6, question 24. (p-value 0.522) 
6.3.5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The first conclusion that might be drawn is that the potential for e-money to replace 
central bank money was confirmed by the American innovators and operators as it was by their 
European counterparts. The same result was reached more than a year ago with the first survey. 
This result may put more pressure on central banks and financial service authorities to increase 
co-ordination for their policy action with regard to the advent of e-money because of its 
borderless characteristics, a tendency that is already confirmed e. g. by published BIS survey 
results (BIS, 2000). Additionally, e-money innovators and operators argued that replacement of 
currency by digital bits and bites representing monetary value would be realised sooner rather 
that later. Keeping in mind the very long existence of banknotes and coins in the history of 
economic development, even 20 to 30 years for full e-money take-off may not be regarded as a 
`long time'. 
Innovators and operators in Europe did not regard central bank regulation of e-money as 
a negative influence on either innovation perspectives for further developments in e-money 
technology or competition among different operators and innovators. The innovators and 
operators on the other side of the Atlantic share the same belief but are somehow relatively 
more concerned than their European counterparts about the negative impact of innovation vs 
competition, and they are more involved in the discussion. 
The main obstacles for e-money to replace central bank money were regarded quite 
differently in the US and EU. Participants in the European survey stated that technical 
infrastructure, interoperability, and costs and profitability for issuers are the main problems, 
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whereas security and privacy are regarded as the leading problems for a successful e-money 
take-off in the US. 
It is likely that the future key access media for e-money will be personal computers in e- 
commerce and mobile phones in m-commerce, as both of the surveys seem to confirm. 
However, the differences as between the two surveys is in the priorities. The American side 
gave more support to ATMs and hand-held devices while the Europeans paid more attention to 
DTV technology. 
In the European survey, the innovators and operators almost agreed on a combined card 
and software base as the e-money `infrastructure' for the future, an opinion which is shared by 
their US counterparts. There seems to be some differences as to secondary priorities. The US 
participants place less reliance on smart card-related common solutions, but they did feel that 
virtual and conventional financial transactions might require a combined solution. 
The European operators and innovators felt that, instead of a single and dominant 
medium, the e-money would be shaped by two or even more operating systems. The US 
participants gave this view even stronger support, by a margin of 21%. These results might 
increase the concern of policy-makers around the world for an interoperability requirement for 
alternative e-money proposals before the differences in implementation become too 
complicated to be changed. 
The majority of European innovators and operators did not even see banks as the main 
players in the financial service industry. Once again, the US perception was almost totally 
different on this issue, as 17% more of the participants gave clear support for banks to defend 
their positions in the future as the main players in the financial service industry. 
Other issues addressed in this questionnaire disclosed closer perceptions among the EU 
and American innovators and operators. Other than the above-mentioned differences, their 
opinions did not differ widely. Whereas seven questions underlined different perceptions, the 
rest of the 24 questions resulted in closer opinions. As an overall conclusion, there seems not to 
be a clear consensus among innovators and operators in Europe and the US that could form a 
base for explaining all the differences between the e-money perceptions of the FED and the 
ECB. Similar thoughts, perception and approaches to e-money among innovators and operators 
clearly surpassed the differences. The differences were mainly limited to the position of banks 
within the financial industry, access media for e-money, operating systems, innovation and 
competition-related issues, the potential e-money issuers and the main obstacles to an e-money 
take-off. This result may mean that e-money innovators and operators would like to have closer 
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co-operation and co-ordination among European and American central banks in particular and 
among central banks around the world, in general, in order to develop similar responses to the 
emergence of e-money. It may be true that when the business practices are somewhat similar 
and market structures are not radically different, the perceptions as to industry regulation may 
be expected to be similar or at least not radically different. 
The BIS seems to have found a common ground for increasing the level of 
understanding for the advent of e-money. In the future, it may play a bigger role in sustaining a 
discussion platform to eliminate (or close the gap between) perceptual differences in order to 
bring some kind of policy consensus. Moreover, there may be an inclination to ask more from 
central banks around the world (with the increase in the globalisation in financial services 
provision) in supplying global solutions for global financial services, and it may be that no 
single policy response will successfully address a particular issue on an independent 
prescription base. This request may emerge especially from the borderless characteristics of e- 
money circulating itself in PC, mobile phone, DTV and hand-held device networks and having 
the advantage of addressing also conventional payment solutions to conventional transactions 
by utilising the possibilities of smart cards. 
Such a demand may force central banks to work hard to find shared grounds on a 
sustainable policy reaction to e-money and related issues. This survey has found a clear 
demand for a closer policy action on e-money from central banks, as innovators and operators 
did not express widely differing perceptions regarding e-money in the surveys discussed here, 
the differences being largely limited to secondary choices. 
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6.3.6. APPENDIX 1: COMPARATIVE TABLE FOR SURVEY RESULTS 
QUEST: Major Differences ANSWERS EU US EU-US 
1. Do you think that electronic A) Yes 35,00 63,00 
-28,00 
cash has a potential to replace B) No 18,00 32,00 
-14,00 
central bank money? B) To a certain extent 47,00 
D) Don't know 00,00 05,00 
-05,00 
2. If yes, when? A) Before 2005 22,00 21,00 01,00 
B) Before 2010 33,00 35,00 
-02,00 (Connected to Question 1) C) Before 2015 17,00 16,00 01,00 
D) Before 2020 11,00 10,00 01,00 
E) After 2020 17,00 18,00 
-01,00 
3. What may be the impact of A) Encourage Innovations 48,00 44,00 04,00 
central bank regulation on B) Discourage Innovations 07,00 21,00 
-14,00 innovation regarding e-money C) Neutral effect on Innovations 29,00 33,00 
-04,00 
technologies? D) Other 16,00 02,00 14,00 
4. What may be the impact of A) Encourage competition 38,00 51,00 
-13,00 
central bank regulation on B) Discourage competition 11,00 14,00 
-03,00 
competition among e-money C) Neutral effect on competition 32,00 34,00 
-02,00 issuers? D) Other 19,00 01,00 18,00 
5. What are the main obstacles A) Costs for the customers 17,64 27,84 
-10,20 for e-cash to replace the central B) Costs/profitability for the issuers 31,37 26,80 04,57 
bank's money (or to be widely C) Security 25,49 55,67 
-30,18 
accepted)? (Please tick all D) Privacy 21,57 44,33 
-22,76 
relevant answers) E) Interoperability 41,18 24,74 16,44 
F) Legal framework 19,61 25,77 
-06,16 G) Technical infrastructure 47,06 34,05 13,01 
H) Cross-border issues 23,53 34,02 
-10,49 
I) Critical mass of customers 25,49 27,84 
-02,35 J) Others 17,65 04,12 13,53 
7. What is the base for e-money A) Card based 27,00 14,00 13,00 
schemes of the future? B) Software based 02,00 02,00 00,00 
C) Combined card&software based 61,00 54,00 07,00 
D) All of the Above 10,00 27,00 
-17,00 E) Other 
MMMMMMM 
00,00 03,00 
-03,00 
8. What `access' medium for e- ý A) Public telephone 33,33 31,96 01,37 
mone will be used the most in B) Home telephone 52,94 32,99 19,95 
the future by the customers? C) Mobile telephone 56,86 63,92 07,06 (Tick all relevant answers) D) Television 39,22 31,96 07,26 
E) PC 66,67 73,20 
-06,53 F) Public `ATM' 35,29 62,86 
-27,57 G) Other 13,73 05,15 08,58 
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QUEST: Major Differences ANSWERS EU US EU-US 
13. Which operating system A. Multos 19,00 07,00 12,00 
may dominate the future of e- B. Java 24,00 20,00 04,00 
money technologies? C. Windows for Smartcards 18,00 10,00 08,00 
D. None of the above but 00,00 03,00 
-03,00 
E. There will be two or more 
operating systems 
39,00 60,00 
-21,00 
20. Will banks remain as the 
main players in the financial 
services industry? 
A. Yes, they can supply financial 
services more efficiently than 
other firms 
48,00 65,00 
-17,00 
B. No, other firms have been 
gaining comparative advantages 
especially in digital economy 
41,00 24,00 17,00 
C. Don't know 11,00 11,00 00,00 
QUESTIONS: Regulation ANSWERS EU US EU-US 
6. What should be the reaction 
of central banks to e-cash? 
A) In advance regulation for 
guidance 
56,25 57,45 
-01,20 
B) Wait and See 04,17 13,83 
-09,66 C) Leave it to the Market 35,42 27,66 07,76 
D) Other 4,17 01,06 03,11 
QUESTIONS: Tech. Issues ANSWERS EU US EU 
- 
US 
12. Which medium of access A. Personal computer (PC) 42,86 38,95 03,91 
technology is most likely to B. Mobile telephone 32,86 28,42 04,44 
dominate the future e-money C. Palm 04,29 11,58 
-07,29 developments? D. Digital TV 18,57 08,42 10,15 
E. Automated Teller Machine 
(ATM) 
02,86 10,53 
-07,67 
F. Other 04,29 02,11 02,18 
14. What is the most critical A. Smart Cards 30,00 34,07 
-04,11 
technology for the future B. Internet Applications 25,71 14,29 11,42 (success) of e-money? C. Wireless Application Protocols 
for mobile phones 
10,00 10,99 
-00,99 
D. Digital TV 04,29 01,10 03,19 
E. Palm 00,00 01,10 
-01,10 F. Operating Systems like Java, 
Multos, Windows for Smartcards 
05,71 08,79 
-03,08 
G. All of the above 17,14 21,98 
-04,84 H. None of the above but 11,43 07,69 03,74 
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QUESTIONS: Financial 
Markets Structure ANSWERS EU US EU 
- 
US 
9. Should institutions other than A) Yes 50,00 39,00 11,00 
banks be allowed to issue e- B) No 36,00 43,00 
-07,00 
money? C) Don't Know 14,00 17,00 
-03,00 
D) Other 00,00 01,00 
-01,00 
10. Do you think e-money A) Yes 51,00 46,00 05,00 
schemes can decrease barriers B) No 21,00 21,00 00,00 
to ent to the banking industry? C) Neutral 15,00 19,00 
-04,00 
D) Don't Know 13,00 14,00 
-01,00 
11. Should money be A) Yes 08,00 14,00 
-06,00 
privatised? B) No 61,00 69,00 
-08,00 
C) Don't know 31,00 14,00 17,00 
15. What may be the reasons for A. Lack of demand for e-money 20,00 15,12 04,88 
the failure of alternative e- 
money proposals like Digicash? 
B. Lack of business case for e- 
money 
17,14 09,30 07,84 
(Please tick all the relevant 
answers) 
C. Lack of coordination with banks 
and operators 
51,43 46,51 04,92 
D. Lack of investment and 
advertisement 
08,57 03,49 05,08 
E. Lack of expertise and 
management skills 
10,00 01,16 08,84 
F. Exaggerated expectations 14,29 06,98 07,31 
G. Unsustainable cost of 
infrastructure to get critical mass 
10,00 10,47 
-00,47 
H. Other 08,57 06,98 01,59 
16. Which payment instrument A. E-money 42,00 49,00 
-07,00 
is best suited for `retail' e- B. Credit cards 36,00 31,00 05,00 
commerce transactions? C. Debit cards 20,00 20,00 00,00 
D. Checks 01,00 00,00 01,00 
E. E-gold 00,00 00,00 00,00 
F. Other 01,00 00,00 01,00 
17. What may be the impact of 
e-money on the future of 
financial services industry? 
A. E-money will allow financial 
institutions to issue their own 
money 
04,29 05,81 
-01,52 
B. It will only increase the 
efficiency and productivity of 
financial service providers 
28,57 20,93 07,64 
C. It will decrease barriers to entry 
to the financial service industry by 
reducing operating and managerial 
cost and increase competition 
31,43 29,07 02,36 
D. Technology companies will gain 
comparative advantage for financial 
services 
20,00 12,79 07,21 
E. All of the above 15,71 24,42 
-08,71 F. It will have no impact 02,86 05,81 
-02,95 G. None of the above but other 02,86 01,16 01,70 
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QUESTIONS: Financial 
Markets Structure ANSWERS EU US EU-US 
18. Which institutions are best A. Telecommunication companies 62,86 43,30 19,36 
placed to compete with banks in like BT and Vodafone 
providing e-money schemes? B. High-tech companies like IBM 10,00 18,56 
-08,56 (Please tick all the relevant C. Internet service providers like 28,57 35,05 
-06,48 
answers) AOL 
D. E-commerce brand names like 15,71 20,62 
-04,91 Amazon. com 
E. Software companies like 28,57 18,56 10,01 
Microsoft 
F. Supermarkets and retailer chains 28,57 23,71 04,86 
like Wal-Mart and M&S 
G. Other 01,43 04,12 
-02,69 
19. Who should be allowed to A. Only Banks 34,29 51,09 
-16,80 issue e-money? B. Only Telecommunication 05,71 03,26 02,45 
companies 
C. Only Internet Service Providers 01,43 01,09 00,34 
D. Only Software companies 01,43 00,00 01,43 
E. All of the above 20,00 13,04 06,96 
F. Any firms capable of handling 34,29 30,43 03,86 
e-money technologies 
G. Other 01,43 01,09 00,34 
QUESTIONS: Policy Issues ANSWERS 
EU US EU-US 
21. Can e-money technologies A. Yes 23,00 24,00 
-01,00 
eliminate the power of central B. No 37,00 39 00 
-02 00 ks as the sole providers of b C. To a certain extent 34,00 
, 
29,00 , 05,00 
ase in the future (by D. Don't know 06,00 09,00 
-03,00 ernative monies issued 
titutions)? 
F 
-money technologies 22Can A. Yes 28,00 26,00 02,00 
free bankin g' era (A B. No 33,00 39,00 
-06,00 competing currencies C. To a certain extent 2000 24,00 
-04,00 arious institutions and D. Don't know 19,00 11,00 08,00 
without a Central Bank) 
23. Can e-money create a `world A. Yes 35,00 38,00 
-03,00 
currency' by eliminating most of B. No 52,00 44,00 08,00 
the currently available national C. Don't know 33,00 18,00 
-05 00 currencies all around the world? , 
24. Should central banks issue e- A. Yes, money should only be 26,00 27,00 
-01,00 money for their own account, thus governed by central banks 
competing with private banks B. Yes, all firms including central 24,00 22,00 02 00 
and/or other institutions? banks should compete with each , 
other in e-money schemes 
C. No, central banks should not 34,00 29,00 05,00 
compete with financial services 
providers 
D. Don't know 16,00 22,00 
-06,00 
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6.3.7. APPENDIX 2: TABLE OF ASSOCIATION (CHI-TEST) 
QUESTIONS (Numbered as the questionnaire) P-VALUE01 
4. What may be the impact of central bank regulation on competition among e- 
money issuers? 0,001 
5. What are the main obstacles for e-cash to replace the central bank's money 
(or to be widely accepted)? (Please tick all relevant answers) 0,002 
3. What may be the impact of central bank regulation on innovation regarding 
e-money technologies? 0,005 
- 13. Which operating system may dominate the future of e-money technologies? 0,015 
7. What is the base for e-money schemes of the future? 0,039 
20. Will banks remain as the main players in the financial services industry? 0,046 
8. What `access' medium for e-money will be used the most in the future by the 
customers? (Tick all relevant answers) 0,058 
12. Which medium of access technology is most likely to dominate the future e- 0,082 
money developments? 
11. Should money be privatised? 0,134 
6. What should be the reaction of central banks to e-cash? 0,179 
18. Which institutions are best placed to compete with banks in providing e- 
money schemes? (Please tick all the relevant answers) 0,185 
15. What may be the reasons for the failure of alternative e-money proposals 
like Digicash? (Please tick all the relevant answers) 0,424 
19. Who should be allowed to issue e-money? 0,435 
16. Which payment instrument is best suited for `retail' e-commerce 
transactions? 0,505 
24. Should central banks issue e-money for their own account, thus competing 
with private banks and/or other institutions? 0,522 
23. Can e-money create a `world currency' by eliminating most of the currently 
available national currencies all around the world? 0,528 
17. What may be the impact of e-money on the future of financial services 
industry? 0,540 
14. What is the most critical technology for the future (success) of e-money? 0,571 
9. Should institutions other than banks be allowed to issue e-money? 0,588 
22. Can e-money technologies lead to a `free banking' era (A system of 
competing currencies issued by various institutions and without a Central Bank) 0,750 
21. Can e-money technologies eliminate the power of central banks as the sole 
providers of monetary base in the future (by offering alternative monies issued 
by other institutions)? 0,800 
10. Do you think e-money schemes can decrease barriers to entry to the banking 
industry? 0,876 
2. If yes, when? 0,999 
61 P-Value implies a close association as it gets closer to 1 and opposite when it is close to 0. 
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7. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ELECTRONIC MONEY 
This chapter discusses e-money, its relation to free banking and some implications for 
central banking including monetary policy and policy instruments. It first looks at the free 
banking implications including the synergy between two concepts. Then, it considers monetary 
policy adjustment mechanism from the `electronification of payment systems' point of views. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with the potential influence of e-money velocity of circulation, 
money multiplier and monetary policy. 
7.1. FREE BANKING IMPLICATIONS OF E-MONEY62: 
This section investigates e-money, its relation to free banking and some implications for 
central banking. It begins by introducing its conceptual framework for modern central banking, 
in terms of which it then rehearses the free banking argument. It then reviews the development 
of e-money in terms of both electronic payment methods and electronic issue, with special 
attention paid to the latter. The discussion includes both mainstream developments, such as 
Mondex, and `alternative' schemes such as LETS. From here it proceeds by way of a 
consideration of the synergy between electronic issue of money and free banking precepts, to a 
consideration of some implications for the future of central banking generally. It offers a 
`contestable' model of central banking, which endeavours to show the effects that e-money 
may be expected to have (and, indeed, may already be having) as regards monetary policy, 
financial supervision and seignorage 
7.1.1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim in this section is to discuss the possible impact of e-money on central banking. 
The frame of reference is the free banking debate, which revolves around the issue whether or 
not central banks are in fact necessary and useful. The free banking controversy has highlighted 
several conditions, which are critical for monetary systems to function well in the absence of a 
traditional central bank. However, the way in which these conditions come into play seems 
being transformed by information technology. 
The analysis firstly introduces a conceptual framework summarising the role of central 
banking in a modern monetary economy. This framework is based on distinguishing the 
62 An earlier version of this section is under review as "Gormez Y. and Houghton H. B.; `Electronic Money, Free 
Banking and some Implications for Central Banking', Bank of Finland Discussion Papers". 
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different functions and tasks of central banking as regards the management of the monetary 
system, in order to find out how the development of e-money might affect the "public-good" 
nature of these functions. 
The following section overviews the case for free banking as an alternative to the 
current monetary policy framework and pinpoints the parts of the argument relevant to the 
emergence of e-money. 
After that, it reviews the development of e-money in terms of both electronic payment 
methods (representative e-money) and electronic issuance of currency (independent or 
competitive e-money). The analysis focused on the latter because were it to be shown that e- 
money qua unit of account was not an alternative to conventional money circulation, then its 
ultimate effect is unlikely to go beyond the displacement of currency in circulation by advanced 
payment systems including credit and debit cards or advanced clearing systems 
- 
something 
that has been going on for some time now. After defining e-money, the paper investigates its 
implications with regard to finance, banking and the functions of money. 
The following section considers the relationship between e-money and free banking 
precepts. The discussion details how e-money helps to address three main aspects of the free 
banking debate 
- 
the lender of last resort function, currency backing, and multiplicity of 
currencies. The focus of this section is on possible implications for the future of central banking 
generally, rather than predicting radical change to the current monetary policy framework. 
Followingly, the analysis offers a `contestable' model of central banking, which 
endeavours to take into account effects that e-money may be expected to have on monetary 
policy and seignorage. That section stresses the importance of the market mechanism on central 
banking and argues that this may enable (or force) central banks to offer some of the benefits 
associated with "free banking" even under the present institutional arrangements, while 
defending the integrity of money for the whole society. 
The last section presents the conclusions and recommendations. 
7.1.2. AIMS OF THE ANALYSIS 
There may be a need to clarify the view of central banking that provides the background 
to this paper, and the conceptual framework in terms of which the discussion is formulated. The 
focus is on the central monetary authority in its most basic functions, shorn of its role as banker 
to or agent of government and no longer handling debt management or other services that can 
as easily be provided by private firms. 
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In this context, the central monetary agency is assigned three main functions 
- 
facilitating price stability, promoting financial stability, and ensuring the integrity of money, 
with the third of these arguably subsisting in the other two (Figure 7.1.1). Money is a public 
good which has certain systemic network externalities at its core. In a word, the integrity of 
money refers to money's ability to remain a reliable and stable cover for purchasing power over 
time (short, medium and long-term). It refers to the soundness of money, implying the absence 
of `bad' (over-issued) money, while the concept of a stable measure connects it to the unit of 
account function of money and related topics, such as network externalities and the 
enforcement of legal tender provisions. Integrity of money, in other words, entails anything that 
increases or sustains the reliability of the unit of account by convincing economic entities to 
trust to the future quality of money. It covers the avoidance of inflationary effects but goes 
beyond that to include anything that may have an influence on the reliability of the unit of 
account. 
FIGURE 7.1.1: THREE MAIN FUNCTIONS OF CENTRAL BANKING 
INTEGRITY OF MONEY 
PRICE STABILITY FINANCIAL STABILITY 
It is in this sense argued here that the integrity of money subsists in price stability and 
financial stability, since its ability to act as a stable measure will be maintained if price stability 
is maintained and if price stability in turn is not undermined by financial instability. Price 
stability can be understood as a short-hand reference to the wider concept of central bank 
independence (whether instrument or goal, partial or complete) with its concern to provide a 
constitutional context appropriate to price stability and its need to meet the challenge posed by 
competition in the quality of money 
-the possibility of enabling good money to reaching the 
end user. With its focus directly on the avoidance of inflation, price stability is clearly related to 
the means of exchange function of money, also referring to currency competition with a 
mechanism of direct danger of substitution in case of an unreliable monetary policy. Financial 
stability, on the other hand, addresses such issues as free entry to financial service provision 
and the perfection of information by promoting financial awareness of individual economic 
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entities. It also deals with problems of regulation and supervision of the financial sector and is 
thus related to the store of value function of money, although that there is continuing debate 
over whether financial supervision should or can be divorced from the conduct of monetary 
policy. 
For exploratory purposes, a further image (Figure 7.1.2. ) can be derived from Figure 
7.1.1, an image that is not an arbitrary invention. It has its genesis in Keynes's (1923) 
discussion on monetary reform and seems to be born out in current experience by the case of 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), for example, which describes its strategy as one 
that, wherever possible, leaves it to the markets to do the central bank's work. As regards 
monetary policy, this means the pursuit of price stability by way of single objective monetary 
policy. In terms of supervision, the RBNZ calls on banks (99% of which in New Zealand are 
foreign-owned) to account directly to the public in terms of meaningful reporting and 
transparency. The third function, the integrity of money, the Bank reserves to itself in its 
capacity as sole issuer of the NZ dollar 
-a fact, the Bank believes, that gives it a force over 
against otherwise autonomous global markets. While one may wonder at the certainty of this 
last claim, the interesting point in terms of the preferred framework is that the RBNZ may not 
be just a one-off or special case. It may indicate a generic along the lines of the Goodhartian 
(1988) definition of a central bank as an "outside agency to regulate and control the banking 
system 
... 
in the otherwise free working of a free market. " 
FIGURE 7.1.2: A POSSIBLE GENERIC FORM OF CENTRAL BANKING 
INTEGRITY OF MONEY 
Societal 
Market 
PRICE STABILITY FINANCIAL STABILITY 
This image also reflects Issing's (1999) criticism of Hayek's (1990) claim that it is free 
competitive issue of money that guarantees a stable and efficient monetary system. For Issing, 
money is accepted as a public good, because money acts as a basic convention in society, like 
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language and standards of physical measure. Issing points to the network externalities involved 
in the use of money in transactions and criticises Hayek's assumption that complete, symmetric 
and free information would obtain in a monetary system based on competitive currency. He 
also questions the transition period and argues that the change to competitive issue would be 
inflationary itself and generate uncertainty for future prices. For these reasons, Issing envisages 
money as a public convention standing above the fray. 
Finally, such a generic image may serve to indicate, in responding to modem 
developments, central banking is undergoing a transformation away from unitary forms 
towards an articulated expression. The interest is, therefore, in developing a relevant, 
appropriate, and viable tool of analysis for understanding the possible effects of e-money's 
seeming affinity with free banking on central banking generally, giving evidence where 
available of such effects 
7.1.3. FREE BANKING: DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISATION 
The location of monetary policy in central banks is a recent development in the history 
of finance. Central banks became monetary policy makers only as the gold standard was 
replaced by fiat money, which was controlled by governments. There are alternatives to central 
banking as practised today, such as currency boards, full convertibility (under a commodity 
standard) and free banking. 
The assumption of this section is that central banks are facing fundamental changes, 
which may in the end lead to their demise or, as argued here, a transformation of their 
behaviour in a way that approximates the free banking concept at least in some key respects. 
This possibility is not an invention, of course; as the existence of central banks is already under 
discussion. For example, King (1999) believed that central banks might be at the peak of their 
power. The author argued that there may be fewer central banks in the future, and their 
extinction cannot be ruled out as societies have managed without central banks in the past and 
they may do so again in the future. This was also the focus of a recent World Bank Conference 
on the future of monetary policy. Although these discussions do not directly consider the idea 
of free banking as an alternative to the current monetary policy framework, it may be that, once 
the continued existence of central banking is brought into question, free banking may yet 
emerge as an alternative, or provide an important benchmark in whatever transformation comes 
about. 
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White (1995) defines free banking as a monetary system without a central bank, under 
which the issuing of currency and deposit money is left to legally unrestricted private banks. 
This definition represents a general consensus in the free banking literature - see, for example, 
Dowd (1993). White points out that, as a monetary regime, free banking consists of two main 
elements 
- 
unregulated issue of transferable bank liabilities and unmanipulated supply of base 
money or basic cash. There is no government role with regard to the quantity of money 
produced inside or outside the banking industry, and outside money free of central bank control 
is desirable. Money issue is not seen as a device of governments to achieve their goals, but 
operates as the means for individuals to pursue their own purposes. That said, White (1995) 
does not reject the idea of a clearinghouse (considered later in this section) at the centre of the 
financial system when without a central bank; his view is that this should be a market 
mechanism designed to eliminate imperfections within the financial system. The author 
underlined the lessons from free banking theory and Scottish free banking experience under 
free conditions as follows: (i) Bad money does not drive out good. (ii) Counterfeiting does not 
pose a major problem. (iii) Banks are not inherently phone to over-issue and suspension. (iv) 
Banks will not hold chronically insufficient or excessive reserves. (v) Bank runs are not an 
endemic problem. (vi) There is no clear need for a lender of last resort. (vii) No pyramiding of 
reserves, making credit inherently unstable, takes place (viii) No natural monopoly exists in the 
production of paper currency. (ix) Proliferation of bank-note brands is not a problem. 
As envisaged by Dowd63 and others, free banking is regarded as the multiple issue of 
currencies by competing banks, whose notes, however, are interchangeable and redeemable 
against a "community-recognised commodity", while option clauses protect against "sudden 
excessive demands for liquidity". This last is an arrangement that obviates the need for a lender 
of last resort, since free banking is a system in which monetary and financial stability are 
guaranteed by market determination of the preferred currencies and interest rates. Dowd (1996) 
has underlined the basic requirements for successful free banking based on private money. One 
of them was the emergence of a clearing system. Another was the use of option-clauses 
- 
auto- 
63 Dowd (1992) gave three basic arguments about the misperceptions on free banking: The first one is that 
historical experiences of free banking were not prone to inflation as the price level was tied to an anchor 
commodity where inflation and deflation occurred as a result of changes in market conditions to the anchor 
commodity. The second is that free banking did not create an unstable financial system but lead to the emergency 
of clearing settlements to return over-supplied notes and deposits to the issuers to sustain stability. The third is that 
historical free banking experience contradicts with the argument that currency issuance is a natural monopoly 
because even the economies of scale did not create a dominant bank to influence the banking system as a whole 
and competition did not threaten other bank's share to create a monopoly. 
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control mechanisms used in cases of `fire-sales' (selling assets under their value to get the 
liquidity in a crises) to defend against bank-runs. The final one was the development of a 
private lender of last resort within the financial sector to help individual institutions that were 
solvent but facing a liquidity crisis. In an earlier study, Dowd defined the distinctive features of 
a free banking system as (i) multiple note issuers who would guarantee to redeem their notes in 
a commodity recognised as valuable (ii) a regular note exchange between note issuers, and (iii) 
the insertion of option clauses into the convertibility contracts to protect the note issuers against 
sudden excessive demands for liquidity (Dowd, 1993). 
An important contribution to the literature came from Hayek (1990). While not 
restricting free banking to a commodity standard only, Hayek defended that the past instability 
of the market is the consequence of the exclusion of the most important regulator of the market 
mechanism, money, from itself being regulated by the market process. He thereby invoked the 
idea of the invisible hand as the basic requirement for a successful monetary policy regime. 
Hayek also argued that central banks should be abolished, since the free issue of competitive 
currencies would solve the lender of last resort and elasticity of circulation problems in a 
financial system. He proposed that the demand for a lender of last resort arises from liquidity 
crises created by nationalised currencies, whereas under competitive issue there is no risk of 
excess liquidity as the competing currencies are fully backed by purchasing power. It is in this 
sense that central banking can be seen to be not the only choice for a monetary policy 
framework, especially if it is not able to guarantee the integrity of money as a reliable medium 
of exchange and store of value. 
Free banking as an alternative to central banking was also discussed by Capie, 
Goodhart, Fischer, and Schnadt (1994). Although they described today's free banking 
proposals as a `somewhat fringe academic exercise without much support from financial 
practitioners'; they emphasised that free banking ought not to be discounted as an alternative to 
central banks and currency boards for the operation of monetary systems. They pointed out that 
the preference of governments for central banking stems from national pride and seigniorage 
interests, while the financial community in general and commercial banks in particular support 
the central banking option for two reasons of their own. First, commercial banks economise 
systemic non-interest bearing reserves by offering a safety net. As a result they are able to 
reduce individual bank capital requirements when providing leadership in joint exercises such 
as establishing payments and settlement systems. Second, commercial banks enjoy an influence 
on central bank decisions through the dynamics of the relationships between controllers and 
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controlled, supervisors and supervised. (This influence may not, however, extend to the full 
theory of capture, which argues that commercial banks capture central banks and thus approve 
their operations. ) 
Capie and his colleagues identified four problems associated with free banking theory: 
(i) It may lead to extra transaction costs. (ii) Some additional bank reserves of real assets may 
be needed. (iii) There may be possible minor inefficiencies connected with multiple note issue. 
(iv) It seems indeterminate how the system as a whole behaves since free banking theory relies 
on the law of flux64. They also noted that an insufficiently capitalised bank would adopt a 
riskier portfolio due to the incentive to allow any resulting loss to fall on the depositors or an 
insurance fund. 
They then summarised four responses of free banking advocates to the argument that 
free banking may lead to bank runs and contagious panics. The first is the denial of the 
likelihood of such events in a free, competitive system. The second is the argument that an 
implicit central bank safety net or a deposit insurance scheme invites moral hazard (absent in 
free banking), while intrusive regulation to minimise moral hazard leads to further distortion 
and misallocation of resources. The third is that free banking decreases susceptibility to 
instability through its adoption of self-regulatory mechanisms such as option clauses, clearing 
houses, and narrow banking. The fourth is the denial of any sizeable externalities and social 
losses in excess of internalised private losses in the case of banking failures. Such possible 
externalities were not found to be potentially greater in banking than in other industries. 
Clearing House and 'Central': Central to the free banking concept is the 
clearinghouse under which the financial system not only currencies clear, but over issue is pre- 
empted. If a participant issues more than it can clear, the clearing house immediately will 
realise it and put sanctions on the member so that the problem will never get out of hand. It is 
important to note, that, although against central banking, free banking recognises, both 
theoretically and in practical instances, the need for a centralised clearing function 
- 
not on 
political grounds, to be sure, but out of the practicalities of enabling the interchangeability of 
currencies yet providing for the return of over-supplied or `bad' money. It is also said that this 
clearing function is in the self-interest of the issuers of currency. Moreover, Horowitz (1992) 
" The theory of reflux is explained as a situation where a note issuing bank will lose/gain reserves at the clearing if it expands faster/slower than other competing note issuing banks. 
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regards clearing as neutral to the players so that it can be said to be without (or contextual to) 
rather than within the market. 
In the light of the free banking debate, if one considers central banking in its economic, 
as distinct from its political meaning, the adjective `central' can be read as referring not to 
governments' use of central banks as instruments of centralised financial control, but to the fact 
that the financial system ineluctably has nodal points or centres, places at which the system as a 
whole comes to a focus. Since this also underlies the free banking concept of a clearinghouse, it 
is not, therefore, a question of whether or not such a central agency can be avoided, but of the 
form it takes, whether it is forced by a `central bank', which is given a monopoly by fiat or 
whether it is shaped by market forces: national or international financial markets for example. 
Insofar as free banking is based on competitive issue of money, end-user preference is a 
function of the soundness or backing of money, not just its name. It is important to note in this 
regard that, although sound money usually means `real' backing, real can have various 
meanings, ranging from `solid gold' to non-inflationary behaviour. In this sense, if a national 
currency (even if state-issued) fulfils the requirements of price stability in a way specified by 
the users of money, it should be able to compete with other currencies. In this sense, the recent 
advent of central bank independence and stability-oriented central banking arrangements may 
act as a transition arrangement or conversion device. Monetary arrangements working much 
like the free banking system may not, therefore, be as distant a prospect as one might think, 
hence the importance of avoiding too fixed usage of terms, giving rise to a false contrast 
between the free banking doctrine and the underlying nature of modern financial developments. 
In sum, free banking envisages an environment without central banks and is put forward 
as an alternative to central banking, meaning central banks when subject to political 
manipulation and thus made into distorting agencies. Whatever the final outcome of the 
debate61, these arguments and counter-arguments reflect the fact that central banking is not the 
65 One example may be given for this debate. Capie and Wood (1991) discussed the reasons for concerns with 
banks more than other firms in the economy. The basic reason was given as that the failure of one bank can lead to 
the failure of another with a risk of the total collapse of the whole banking system, which may also cause a 
collapse in the stock of money via the working of the money multiplier. They, however, questioned the need for 
central banks to go further from being lender of last resort for such crises and their function for supervision and 
regulation of the banking system. However, Goodhart (1991) gave three main reasons for a need for a central 
bank. These are information asymmetries in financial markets, depositor protection in the financial industry and 
systemic problems surrounding the banking system. Wood (1991) commented on those arguments that deposit 
insurance gives rise to a moral hazard by letting banks to take risks at the taxpayer's expense. lie added that 
managed money since early 1900s has been a major inflation and recession era, as the cost of having a lender of last resort. 
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only monetary policy framework available. It is Hayek's contention that other approaches 
should be explored, competitive money issue in particular. His point is that in a free 
environment with concurrent currencies, it will be people with better ideas who determine 
development through their imitation of what works best, as opposed to a national currency 
system where only those with power can shape evolution. 
7.1.4. RELEVANCE OF E-MONEY TO FREE BANKING 
E-money may have different shapes. Up till very recently, electronisation of the 
payment systems has been based on improvements in account-based systems, their reach 
(domain) and their speed. Account-based systems record all the transactions and authorise them 
centrally, whereas non-account-based systems circulate e-tokens through telecommunication 
networks or on smart cards and may allow transactions without central authorisation. Account- 
based e-money systems are really very little different from the debit card of credit card 
networks of EFT systems currently in use. Token-based e-money, on the other hand, is 
radically different in the sense that it introduces an electronic form of currency. 
Ultimately, the impact of the perfection of account-based systems of electronic transfer 
and the expansion of token-based e-money is the same because both compete with (or create an 
alternative to) the use of conventional currencies in payments. Paper currency has hitherto been 
able to compete against account-based payment systems because of its anonymity and the 
absence of verification costs, which have been prohibitively high for micro-payments. Now, the 
challenge to paper money comes from both sides - the reduction in verification costs on the one 
hand and the development of electronic tokens, which avoid verification altogether. The major 
difference between these two systems is actually just the cost of authorisation as e-cash targets 
micro-payments. The other is security. If the authorisation cost can be lowered to a certain level 
so that even micro-payments are executed by accountable systems, it may be expected that 
even the non-account-based systems may prefer to authorise all the transactions due to security 
concerns. In that case, the distinction between token-based systems and account-based systems 
would become rather blurred. 
Regardless of the form of e-money, the main technological developments behind e- 
money are firstly the decreasing cost of communication, and secondly the increasing computing 
power in ever smaller units. The first one favours all kind of networking models including the 
conventional and mobile Internet and also local, national and international networks based on 
PDAs, DTV, ATMs and any other networking model that will be designed and developed in 
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the future. Cheapening communication not only allows to lower the operating cost of existing 
networks but also provides an opportunity to create alternative or competing local, national or 
international networks as well. 
The increasing power of computing allows the operation of networks with improved 
data and risk management techniques, including artificial intelligence and cryptography. It may 
be argued that e-money will be the most sensitive data on the networks and unless managed 
perfectly with almost risk-free technology (or at least less risky than currency), the e-money 
will never succeed. This development is thus very critical. Increasing computing power will 
also reduce the cost of secure hardware including smart cards, as more advanced processors are 
being developed. 
The formal definition of e-money offered by the ECB, which has been discussed in 
section 4.1.1. The definition is unsatisfactory, however, in two respects: Firstly, it may 
overemphasise the technical distinction between account-based and token-based systems, 
which have ultimately similar effects. Secondly, it does not distinguish clearly enough two 
quite distinct kinds of e-money issuance strategies: the conventional strategy of a new 
electronic payments medium and the more radical one of electronic issue of alternative, 
competing currencies (not based on conventional, government-organised monies). 
The two different kinds of e-money may be called as "representative" and 
"independent" respectively. As long as it is representative of legal tender under a given 
monetary policy framework, 'e-cash' is a form and extension of cash generally, an addition to 
coinage, notes, cheques and debit and credit cards, etc. In this respect, e-money is clearly 
nominal in its effects - such as increasing velocity 
- 
and may be regarded as neutral in terms of 
systemic change. It has important implications for the current monetary framework, in that it 
makes payments easier and hassle free, revolutionises monetary base management and enriches 
currency choice through making it easier to use several currencies and/or to switch between 
them. It would reduce the demand for conventional central bank money. But, e-money as a 
mere representation of a given currency may have no different effect on monetary policy 
frameworks than what has already been caused by advanced payment systems, which have 
decreased the proportion of currency in circulation to total money stock especially in the last 
couple of decades. 
However, the impact of e-money would seem to be most significant when it comes to 
the electronic issue of non-bank money, that is, money issued without reference to banking 
reserves. If e-money is introduced as independent money, not a representation of any 
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conventional currency, it may have the potential to revolutionise the competition among 
monetary policy frameworks. This impact may well be different for developed and developing 
countries: For developed countries, it may provoke 'currency competition' among core 
currencies such as Dollar and Euro, or perhaps between these traditional currencies and new, 
privately issued monies (if the performance of the incumbent central banks is seen as 
unsatisfactory by money users). For developing countries, it may facilitate and speed up 
currency substitution to dollarisation and/or Euroisation. Other that that, three distinctive effect 
may be more direct in finance, banking and money: 
Implications for Finance: E-money and related technologies would seem to have 
powerful consequences and serious impact on the future of finance for at least two main 
reasons. Firstly, with increased on-line connection between the service provider and the end 
user, information quality is not only increased but it individualises it as well. Mutual flow of 
information allows both the service provider and the customer to develop a better relationship 
base, which will allow lowering the potential of panic during financial crises. This new model 
of relation may allow individual valuation of particular financial service providers so as to 
decrease systemicity (contagious) between financial institutions. Because once the end-user has 
all the information about the service provider including the potential risks that may arise from 
any change in the financial market conditions, any potential danger for a systemic run may be 
expected to decrease compared to conventional financial market conditions. 
Secondly, all the financial assets may get digitised even further, a trend that is already 
clear. Recently, bonds, bills and securities are all electronically represented as electronic assets 
with a technology similar to EFT, allowing smaller and flexibly denominations for example. As 
a result, clearing, trading and custody services are getting to be cheaper, easier and more 
importantly, open to any customer all around the world, which eliminates local independence. 
E-money, in this respect, favours all these electronisation of finance by providing a medium for 
sustainable micro-transactions and speed up the reach of individualised services. To give an 
example from current financial markets, an alternative to SWIFT or credit and debit card 
networks may be both cheaper to design and easier to operate so as to open the market for 
competition, which will increase efficiency and effectiveness of the service quality 
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One interesting impact of e-money phenomenon is very apparent in the emergence of 
`closed circuit currencies', ranging from the marginal and `low tech' but numerous LETS66, 
through corporate barter arrangements in the conventional business world67, to experiments in 
bank-created e-money such as Mondex, and Internet-based currencies such as Beenz. As a 
consequence, payment systems become simplified and easier to handle, inviting new entrants 
into the industry, challenging credit and debit card infrastructures as well. Mondex and Beenz 
have been mentioned intentionally in particular because, first of all, of more than fifty e-money 
proposals with very different approaches to micro-payment solutions on the Internet, Mondex 
is one of the few to allow person-to-person transfers without the involvement of financial 
service providers. Thießen (1999) surveyed most of these proposals ranging from Digicash to 
Mondex. The second reason is that, although the company that operates Beenz began the 
scheme as a purely Internet-based approach, it recently co-operated with Mondex to benefit 
from smart card technology in order to issue and redeem Beenz on conventional transactions as 
well, so that Mondex cards will be used to earn and spend Beenz. In this connection, it is worth 
noting that almost all the major banks now operate Internet-based services, but there are also 
non-bank initiatives, such as Prudential Insurance's "Egg"68, which has received deposits of 
more than £6 billion in less than two years. 
Implications for Banking: Whatever other functions banks provide, whether these be 
credit creation, intermediation or settlement, they all rely on the precision and objectivity of 
their record keeping. They also are all required to maintain a clear distinction between their 
own funds, which they seek to increase, and the funds they manage for others, which they, are 
required to match and hold at net zero. On the other hand, as the case of LETS makes very 
clear, the essential banking function is that of a shared or centralised accountant and has a 
societal nature. Insofar as banks carry out other functions, however, none of them is as core as 
its bookkeeping service and none of them can as reliably be assumed to belong to banking on a 
permanent basis. Goodhart (2000) addressed this advantage of banks as well when he 
mentioned the need for portfolio selections consultancy that may sustain bank's future in the 
financial markets. More importantly, the more money can be created outside the banking 
66 Good (1998) mentions 470 such systems in the world, mainly in the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
Britain, as well as around 30 low-technology local currencies. There are also many LETS schemes in France, 
Belgium and Italy. They typically have less than 300 members, often people from `alternative life-style' 
movements. 
67 The oldest established is the WIR system in Switzerland. Founded in 1934, it now has over 60,000 members and 
an annual turnover in excess of 2,500 million CHF. 
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system 
- 
in the financial markets, for example, or in the folksier LETS schemes 
- 
the less does 
it rely on bank deposits. 
E-money creates an opportunity to decrease the cost of banking in one way and makes 
easy to handle portfolio management procedures by allowing to increase the size of the number 
of customer and the service regions by allowing network-based solutions, with the power to 
ignore location dependence. This, at the end, enriches end-users' right to choose among 
financial service providers and increase competitive pressures on service providers though very 
flexible opportunities to change the service providers to which proving the best service with the 
most reliable data. These developments can only be reinforced by the fact that the fixed 
investment necessary for an Internet bank has fallen to around $1 million (Gosling, 1999). This 
may suggest a `structural change' in the establishment of banks so as to reduce the barriers to 
entry to banking arising from the high amount of fixed and operating cost and limiting barriers 
to the expertise that banks has been accumulating for many years. Competition, as well, will be 
powered with ease of entry so that any new establishment with expertise based solutions for 
banking services with increased quality will get a better chance for success. 
There is also the fact that, as a seemingly inevitable process in history, the monetary 
base as a proportion of total money stock has been diminishing for quite a long time. Indeed, it 
may be that one of the important effects of e-money is its potential to change totally the 
traditional management of the monetary base. 
69 www. egg. com 
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The Chart shows the UK trends since 1970 for the velocity (defined as total GNP 
divided by total monetary base (GNP/MO)) and money multiplier (defined as monetary base 
divided by total money stock (MO/M4)). In the period prior to 1990, the proportion of monetary 
base in the total money stock decreased to as low as 4%, while velocity more than doubled to 
nearly 30. 
Again, this decrease is not caused by e-money as such, but by improvements in 
electronic payment instruments such as debit and credit cards and the development of same- 
time financial applications such as direct credit and debit. Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine 
that, in a perfectly digitalised or electronic payment infrastructure, in which all manner of 
transactions including micro payments are effected through digital transfer of value from payer 
to payee, the record keeping nature of money will enable the identification of any potential lack 
of demand (within the registered economy at least) for banknotes and coin as a medium of 
exchange. Combined with such developments, which serve only to further individualise the 
bookkeeping function of money, e-money can be expected to promote the growing trend 
towards what one can term 'self-administered banking' and `narrow banking'. Together with 
telephone banking, online banking, mobile-phone banking, computer-based accounting, and all 
other aspects of electronic finance, e-money enables and promotes the individual person or 
organisation, household or firm, as the locus of financial awareness and responsibility. Banks 
and the banking system generally are thereby rendered more and more a resource or tool and 
less and less the determinant of their clients' financial actions. 
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The Functions of Money: One of the implications of the improvements in the 
electronic communications and computing technology is that they alter the traditional 
complementarity between the functions of money. In monetary systems based on paper 
currency and slow and expensive access to information, the three functions of money (unit of 
account, means of payment, and store of value) were almost always connected: the same 
instruments 
- 
money 
- 
served as means of payment, were nominated in the unit of account 
(actually, defined the unit of account), and were also an important form of wealth. Exceptions 
to this occurred only in exceptional circumstances (under hyperinflation, rationing of goods, 
financial crisis and so on) when the integrity of money is no longer obvious. The reason for the 
almost universal connection of the three functions is in the associated savings in transaction 
costs under the traditional payment technology. 
Electronisation of payments and transaction situations in general has the power to 
change. This is the result of improved communications and information. When up-to-the 
minute price information (such as exchange rates and asset prices) are available in any 
transaction, and when wealth can instantly be transferred from one asset to another, the reasons 
why the functions of money should be connected become weaker and weaker. Transactions 
may be paid for with assets which are not denominated in the same units in which the prices are 
quoted; and the amount of wealth actually kept in the form of the means of payment may be 
minimal. The three functions of money in a "unified" system can be thought of as exhibited 
below. 
FIGURE 7.1.3: UNIFIED MONEY 
UNIT OF ACCOUNT 
MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE STORE OF VALUE 
If represented thus, the idea arises that the three functions of money may be the 
monetary version of earlier depiction of the three main functions of a central monetary agency 
(see Figure 7.1.1) If that were the case, it would be reasonable to expect that, just as central 
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banking seems to be undergoing a transformation from a unitary to a devolved or articulated 
form, so money may also be subject to the same process. In other words, one may need to pass 
from the idea of money as consisting of three functions somehow linked and held together as if 
from a central point, to the notion of money as the combination or combined effect of three 
distinct processes (Figure 7.1.4). 
FIGURE 7.1.4: ARTICULATED MONEY 
UNIT OF ACCOUNT 
MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE STORE OF VALUE 
This development, if it occurs, makes it increasingly difficult for central banks to rely 
on their legal tender powers as suppliers of the mandatory means of payment to entail a unified 
unit of account in their respective economies, or a large demand for central bank money 
(reserves or currency). This is not necessarily a new idea. Issing (1999) mentions the prospect 
for separating the functions of money, as do Browne and Cronin (1995). E-money just extends 
this possibility and changes the dynamics of money as a result. 
7.1.5. THE SYNERGY BETWEEN OF E-MONEY AND FREE BANKING 
The direct or indirect relationship between e-money and free banking has been 
addressed quite often recently. For example, White (1995) argued that the technology gives an 
opportunity to issue private bank notes as smart card balances, which are transferable without 
bank involvement. He added that digital payment technology has begun to foreshadow a world 
in which central bank currency is obsolete 
- 
replaced, perhaps, by privately issued currency in 
the form of balances written to smart cards or downloaded to personal computers and 
transferred by means of electronic wallets or over the internet. He also investigated the 
potential of e-money to make small denomination currencies interest-bearing for the first time 
in the history, and concludes that, when combined with anonymity e-money would facilitate the 
public's turning away from government-based notes and coins. Selgin (1996) proposed that the 
more financial innovation succeeded the less reliance the public would place on central banks 
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as direct sources of exchange media. Therefore, he argued, the public could afford to deny the 
central bank and its discretionary powers. More than that, Browne and Cronin (1996) pointed 
out that laissez-faire banking could emerge endogenously over time in response to 
technological improvements in information and financial products. 
The literature on the issue seems quite rich. To cite some of them, for example, Smith 
and Weber (1998) mentioned the current legislative developments in US and noted that it 
removed the legal impediments to private banknote issue. They found it quite likely to see a re- 
emergence of privately issued substitutes for national currency in developed economies. Dywer 
(1996) is another advocate to cite the potential of e-money to create a new era for free banking. 
These authors published their papers on the FED sources, an action to confirm that it is not only 
academicians to analyse free banking but even central bankers seem to investigate the 
implications for the current financial system. 
In another contribution, Birch and McEvoy (1997) discussed private currency issue and 
noted that the discussion of e-purses solely as a new medium of exchange may be a short-term 
view. Craig (1996), for example, argued that a competing foreign currency may provide a 
discipline to keep a domestic fiat currency sound with the help of greater freedom of 
international trade. In a parallel analysis, Greenspan (1998) explained the dramatic expansion 
in cross-border financial flows with very rapid increases in telecommunications and computer- 
based technologies and products and added that even a reluctant government has little 
alternative other than deregulating and freeing up internal credit and financial markets. 
Bordo and Schwartz (1995) have taken granted that outside-money arrangements will 
remain in the hands of governments for, at least, near future. They found restoration of either 
gold or bimetallic-based monetary standard highly unlikely and doubted that central banks 
would cease to function as monetary authorities in the foreseeable future. England (1996) 
argued that the improved inflation performance among developed countries in recent decade is 
a result of the growth of effective competition among national currencies. As competition 
increases among nationally provided currencies, the author stated, economic stability in both 
developing and developed countries increases as well. 
The effects of electronisation are not limited to the retail use of currency but they 
extend also to the role of the central bank as the supplier of reserves to banks. According to 
Friedman (1999), three factors bring into question the future of the central bank's role as a 
monopolist over the supply of bank reserves: the erosion of the demand for bank money, the 
proliferation of non-bank credit, and the development of private bank clearing mechanisms. 
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The conclusion, he warned, would be that central banks' ability to conduct monetary policy 
might deteriorate as they could not affect the price level of goods and services in the non- 
financial economy unless they had direct control on interest rate setting. 
Goodhart (2000) did not agree with Friedman, arguing that only incompetence (in 
monetary policy) rather than the information technology revolution or e-money may bring 
about the demise of central banks and give a comparative advantage to free banking. He did not 
see the possible anonymity with disposable e-purses as important. Goodhart argued that e- 
money cannot replace central bank base money because only the latter can, in his view, enjoy 
full anonymity, full security and legal tender status. However, even if currency demand 
decreases to zero, the central bank is expected to be able set the interest rates though direct 
quotation to the financial markets. 
Obviously, central banks can defend the money that they produce as long as they have 
the power to make unlimited losses with the full support of the nation. But, the risk of currency 
substitution may force central banks to leave rates to be determined by market forces. As long 
as the support behind the central bank is both safe and sound, the market price may be affected 
by central bank interventions, but once the market questions the cover of money, the risk of 
financial crises may follow, as it happened in Turkey in 1994. In practice, it may be that central 
bank intervention is rendered unnecessary by the realisation of the efficiencies to be brought by 
information technology in general and e-money in particular. 
Freedman (2000) reached a similar conclusion while making a case for the continuation 
of central banking. He named two instruments necessary to its survival: the potential to refuse 
the settlement on payment systems other than its own, and 
-when necessary- making or taking 
deposits on financial markets to force the market rates under its control. But, again, the issue 
was not that free banking would require such things, but that they offered a way for central 
banks to continue their role in monetary policy management. Woodford (2000) defended a 
similar line of argument. Obviously, the power to impose tax gives the power to defend the 
central bank as well, but the concern here is whether central banking is the most efficient way 
to maintain the integrity of money with its full cost or whether e-money can increase 
alternatives to the `right to choose' with regards money. 
All these discussions support the relevance of e-money to free banking. In free banking 
terms, the basic requirement for an e-money proposal would be the promise of convertibility 
with any other currency demanded by the holder. Provided the regulatory environment were set 
to allow private competing currencies, this requirement would now be met more easily than, 
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say, 20 years ago. While it may not be appropriate to expect a revolutionary transformation of 
current financial systems, further deregulation of domestic and international financial 
institutions may lead of itself to an evolutionary transformation towards free banking. 
The relation between e-money and free banking, as a result, seems that e-money has 
very significant, even synergetic, effects. Not only does e-money foster a clearer understanding 
of the nature and workings of money, and thus of its `proper' management with its influence on 
banking and finance that has been analysed in the earlier section, but its electronic issue may 
provide a technical means to bring free banking into play. Provided the electronic issue of 
money does not become subject to excessive regulation or outlawing, it may enrich currency 
choice through a process of substitution that has been supported by the e-money-based 
financial service provision. Chief influences of electronisation which suggest such a scenario 
are the following: 
1. Because bits and bytes are more easily re-defined than banknotes and coins, it may be 
easier to revise or change currency representation, leading, in the case of countries, to easier 
entry and exit to monetary unions, and facilitating inter-currency switching by end-users and, 
therefore, private money issue. This view may be supported by the long planned currency 
conversion in the Euro area with conventional banknotes and coins. In a future with e-money, 
any serious financial problem that threatens the Euro may allow individual members to express 
their reaction with the possibility of designing a new monetary framework. On the contrary, e- 
money also eases to join in a short time as well for those potential members who has been 
attracted by well-managed Euro. This mechanism, at the end, puts purely economic pressure to 
the ECB to respect the integrity of Euro so as to exclude any kind of political pressure. As a 
non-national (denationalised) currency, it allows non-Euro economies to think of leaving the 
defence of the integrity of money to ECB as well. 
2. Thanks to the opportunities for transparency afforded by Internet applications, money 
can be backed as easily by commodities as by indices, or both. It does not mean to turn back to 
commodity backed currencies but the monetary institutions may not take the risk of inflating 
their currencies because of these opportunities that has been available with the advent of e- 
money technologies. Integrity of money may be defended with the cover of money, which is 
explained in the following sections but if the society prefers to see a commodity backing, e- 
money can only help to realise such a demand. 
3. The increasing use of distribution channels such as the Internet, DTV, PDAs and 
mobile phones, may enable `good money' to reach end-users more easily. Conversely, end- 
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users in need of a reliable medium of exchange may find it easier to reach better alternatives. 
For the same reasons, mismanaged money, what Rudi Dornbusch calls `funny money'69, may 
become limited. E-money in these mechanisms extends the reach of currency substitution to 
micro transactions other than medium or large transactions. In a sense, currency substitution 
includes not only store of value but medium of exchange function of money as well. This puts 
extra pressure to the sustainable inflationary currencies around the world. 
4. Ease of access to e-money may speed up the formation of a critical mass, the moment 
when people generally become willing to accept the new proposed unit of account because they 
become convinced that it now enjoys widespread recognition and appropriate world-wide 
liquidity and systemic support. This potential of e-money allows institutions to challenge 
mismanaged currencies with stronger proposals. The face of alternative proposals may be 
limited only to imagination. Instead of a non-governmental institution such as ECB, a gold 
mine company in Australia, for example, may get into the money business to offer an 
alternative to inflationary currencies with the help fast speed enrichment of distribution 
channels to ease access to the offer. This option may be open to any company who can create 
and sustain a customer base for their offer. To complete the picture, these many attributes of 
electronic banking clearly reflect key features of Hayek's (1990)70 conception of denationalised 
money - such as basketisation, autonomous agreement regarding the unit of account, and 
indexation. 
The defence of central banking per se does not explain currency unions, the 
dollarisation trends spreading in Latin America, or the currency substitution in developing 
countries' unstable monies. To discuss the relation between e-money and free banking are not, 
therefore, to address directly the threats to central banking, but to consider the opportunities it 
69 "When funny money is no joke", Financial Times, 3.1.2000. Monetary reformists also use this term, but they 
mean time dollars and the like. 
70 Hayek, (1990) interestingly mentioned the potential of electronic money to solve technical problems like the 
demand for small coins to create a uniformity in order to make life easier for end-users. He wrote in the footnote 
(page 51) that: `replacement of the present coins by plastic or similar tokens with electronic markings which every 
cash register and slot machine would be able to sort out, and the `signature' (asterisk on the original text) of which 
would be legally protected against forgery as any other document of value'. Issing (1999) evaluated Ilayek's 
proposal under e-money 
developments as digitalisation revolution is supported by accelerating progress in 
computer and communication technologies. The Author mentioned the difference between the elimination of 
central bank money through innovative and cost efficient e-money products and Hayek's proposal to remove 
central banks at once 
for all. The first difference, he argued, is that in the first case, the elimination of central bank 
money will be a gradual evolution through innovation and improvements in payment technologies rather than a 
sudden legislative elimination. He named second difference as the preservation of unit of account function of 
national currency in the first case and as a result preventing adventurous characteristics of Hayek's proposal 
during the transition. 
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presents to create a better monetary regime. This is a crucial point. There may well be 
continued use of interventionist settlement of interest rates through forced clearing procedures 
and depository instruments, but it is worth mentioning that foreign exchange interventions have 
failed many times since 1980 and in different parts of the world. 
Insofar as free banking considers that sound money not only delivers price stability but 
also financial stability, it may now be only a matter of time before free banking challenges 
central banking in practical fact with the advent of e-money. Such a development would be 
influenced by the manner in which free banking addresses three key questions which e-money 
serves to emphasise: (i) the role of lender of last resort (ii) the backing of currencies (iii) the 
multiplicity of currencies 
Lender of Last Resort: Under present monetary policy framework, the misbehaviour 
of one financial institution can have disastrous consequences for the financial system as a 
whole with regards the risk for a total collapse of the money stock. In order to prevent 
contagious risk, central banks are given the sole right to issue money without limit and for as 
long as it takes, provided the situation is in extremes and the danger is systemic. The lender of 
last resort is a costly arrangement and there is always a risk for socialisation of private losses. 
., 
On the other hand, free banking leaves it to the market to `discipline' bad money and it 
does not entertain the need for a lender of last resort. It is believed that the system will never 
fall into a systemic risk because the invisible hand of market mechanism forces every 
individual financial institution to be ready against bank-runs. It is also believed that weakened 
and unfeasible institutions will be replaced by the competitors before they create any systemic 
risk. If the danger still persist, Dowd and others envisage `option clauses', whereby in extreme 
circumstances banks can exercise compensatory delays to withdrawals. This is a concept of 
prudence - appealing to the depositor to avoid rash investment and precipitate action. 
E-money serves to reinforce free banking by providing it with a powerful instrument for 
its realisation and it may decrease the need for a lender of last resort for at least two reasons. 
The first one is because option clauses becomes very easy to arrange, manage and realise, 
thanks not only to the electronification of money but also electronic finance, electronic 
distribution channels and electronic relationship management. E-money serves to decrease the 
costs of making and performing on option clauses and all manners of contracts between issuers 
and users. Secondly, it creates new frameworks to analyse individual defenders of the integrity 
of money so as to take individual decisions, which in the end, eliminates systemic structuring 
within the financial service provision. It allows individual institutions to develop personalised 
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relations with the end users so as to be ready to convince them on the quality of their service in 
case of a fall of a financial institution. Lender of last resort function is not to save individual 
institutions and unless one failure does not effect other members of the financial system, there 
will be no need for it in the first place. With increased end-user awareness supported by e- 
money, no economic entity will question the overall stability of the system when they can 
easily reach to the data that can convince them about the integrity of money that they rely on. 
It may be worth to mention at this stage the possibility and consequences of a seamless 
emergence of free banking since even present events seem to be taking their cue from free 
banking precepts. In the case of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in the autumn of 
1998, for example, the New York FED orchestrated, but did not participate in, a bail out by 
other Wall Street banks, who, presumably, mustered enough reserves to meet the situation. 
Losses were not socialised. Similar can be said of Barings in 1996. In the case of the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand, even though it has regulatory responsibilities, its requirement on banks 
to account direct to the public appeals to, or at least induces, their common interest as financial 
service providers to co-operate against systemic risk. E-money confirms this direction and even 
enhances realisation of it. The pre-emptive techniques of free banking can readily be introduced 
as pre-stated conditions requiring e-money users to click on "acceptance" before proceeding. 
These developments already give signs of free banking practices even under current monetary 
policy framework and e-money can only extend the reach of these practices. 
Currency Backing: If it is clear that a lender of last resort is not envisaged by free 
banking because it is not necessary, attention may be turned to two related topics 
- 
the cover of 
money (backing of currency) and a multiplicity of currencies (currency competition). The unit 
of account function of money generally has two aspects. On the one hand, for money to enjoy 
general acceptance, the unit of account needs to be widely recognised, otherwise circulation 
will be impeded and people will not wish to use it. Thus, for example, the US dollar enjoys far 
greater global acceptance than the Russian rouble. In crisis moments, however, the unit of 
account in itself is not enough. Money's ability to act as a medium of exchange becomes a 
matter of its backing or its cover. Until 1973, gold provided the anchor for all currencies, even 
though technically it was held at a remove. Since then, foreign currency reserves (that is to say, 
other units of account) have played an increasing role. To give an example, the backing for the 
US dollar is the power of the US economy to keep the value of dollar against other currencies 
strong enough to eliminate any loss of the value for end-users. Liquid money and capital 
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markets and strong fiscal structure with budget surpluses further sustain the cover of the US 
dollar. 
It is important to consider the question of cover in the context of the overall approach 
(Figure 7.1.5). It may be no accident that much of 20th century monetary history centres on a 
debate about cover and the quest for a replacement to the gold standard of equivalent effect but 
without the disadvantages of gold. It was during the beginning of the 20th century that central 
banks (in the negative sense) came to the fore, printing bad money seemingly without 
constraint. The ultimate cover of such money is future tax revenue, which is an indirect 
reference to future profitability. Tax cover and fiat finance may disguise but cannot change the 
basic economic fact that the cover of money entails a spectrum between potential values and 
created values, future profitability and existing assets, or a mixture of the two. Where the 
spectrum lies depends largely on economic conditions. 
FIGURE 7.1.5: SPECTRUM OF COVER 
CONSUMABLES (TAXATION) FUTURE PROFITS 
This image is neither new nor radical. In terms of analytical framework, the spectrum of 
cover suggests that `cash', or money as a medium of exchange, is related to the finite things 
that one can buy. Insofar as money is not backed by consumable goods, it cannot but be a 
potential (and in crisis moments, actual) call on future profits. This is the true match for money 
as store of value. This image is important because it is ordering, on the one hand, yet admits to 
a wide variety of backings, on the other. One cannot say, for example, that gold is good and 
assignats7l are bad. Indeed, free banking experience embraces both. The point is that the 
backing has to be appropriate and adequate. 
71 Even though all of around 60, (Schuler (1992) gave this number arguing that they lasted from a few years to 
over a century) free banking experiences around the world were in one way or another backed by gold or a similar 
commodity (metallic standard), French experience provides an actual example for fiat money based free banking 
including coins backed by bank-notes. White E. N. (1991) explained two periods in French Revolution that free 
banking played a role. One was 1790-92, where private notes were redeemable into government supplied fiat 
money. The other was 1797-1803, where coin was exchanged upon demand. The first period was a reaction to the 
scarcity of smaller denominations not provided by the monetary authority and private banks emerged as 100 
percent reserve banks to issue `bills of confidence' in small denominations fully backed by fiat money. The 
government was supplying the outside money as assignats in large denominations and free banks supplying the 
inside money under a competitive basis. Bills of confidence were widely accepted as a medium of exchange even 
they were not legal tender and banks discovered soon that they could operate with fractional reserves. The second 
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In the world of so-called alternative currencies, often the same software package is 
used, but the currencies are denominated by reference to local artefacts or symbols. For 
example, tales in Canterbury (after the famous book by Chaucer), but yawls in nearby 
Whitstable (a type of fishing boat used there). Similarly, these currencies have a variety of 
economic underpinnings. Some are related at 1: 1 or other parities to the national currency and 
to each other. Others define themselves in terms of a set wage. The yawl, for example, being 
equal to £5 per hour, regardless of what one does - jobbing gardening or legal services. 
Likewise, in New York State an Ithaca Hour is equivalent to one hour of work valued at $10. 
The same trend holds for virtual (i. e. Internet-based) experiments as well. Digicash, for 
example, was intended to create a pure Internet-based representation of national currencies, 
whereas e-gold represents a digitalised allocation of gold, enabling it to be used as a medium of 
exchange for virtual life with the potential to reach conventional life in the same way as 
achieved through the co-operation between Mondex and Beenz, namely, smart cards. 
Provided e-monies remain uncontrolled and unregulated other than the free workings of 
markets, therefore, their emergence implies a furtherance of free banking precepts. This 
possibility is especially real because e-monies support independent clearing systems with 
decreased demand for central bank money and allow non-bank credit expansion through an 
easing of distribution channels. A further feature - anonymity - reinforces this trend and may 
prove possible with the development of `blind signature' technology or, more simply, by the 
use of disposable tokens issued on the networks of PCs, DTVs, PDAs palms and mobile 
telephony. E-money, as a result, puts extra pressure to keep the cover of money strong enough 
to keep the integrity of money to sustain the trust. As a result independent issuers of e-money 
may decide to back (or cover) the issued amount with alternative choices. For example, the 
issued amount of money may be fully backed with money market funds. Another backing may 
be stock exchange indexes or any kind of real estate funds. Actually there is no limit on the 
period was between 1797 and 1803 after the closure of free banks did not solve financial system problems and 
assignat inflation created financial turmoil including the closure of all banks. From 1797, private banks started to 
emerge serving basically commercial community, smaller banks but not the general public. There were few 
dominant banks in Paris whose notes accounted the main stock of exchange media. Private bank's notes were 
accepted by government tax collectors. The second period ended by forcing these free banks with armed forces in 
order to create a national bank. The author named lessons from the French experience with free banking as the 
absence of any apparent interest 
in the insurance of bank notes or deposits. He also mentioned that it was not 
abandoned because of systemic 
defects but to create a national bank. Nataf (1992) described the French experience 
as to: function as freely satisfying public in a smooth way despite the difficult times of war, theft and 
embezzlement. According to the author, French free banking had strong prosperity, solvency and stability but still 
eliminated to create a national bank. 
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alternatives for backing because anything that can sustain end-user's trust on the integrity of 
money may be used as backing. There seems nothing wrong with the current backings of major 
world currencies as well. As long as the US dollar and Euro are competitive and end-users in 
the US and Europe are allowed to choose between these two currencies, they may compete with 
their backings as well. In this case, the backing of the currencies is just the future potential on 
either side of the Atlantic to sustain the strengths of these economies. As far as financial 
stability is sustained on both areas with competent central banks, the end-users will have no 
reason to ask for an alternative backing but once there is a demand for another backing, then e- 
money can only help to design a new arrangement and help to sustain the compatibility against 
weakened currencies. 
Multiplicity of Currencies: The prospect of unregulated currencies implies multiple 
currencies or currency competition, giving rise to the question of how these would work. The 
case of LTCM, for example, illustrates the ability of financial institutions to create excess 
credit, a characteristic made more problematical where the money involved is e-money and one 
that may warrant a review of the relation between the monetary base and credit creation. It 
follows that the nature of the respective covers may be defined differently, and yet 100% cover 
is maintained in both cases (Figure 7.1.5). 
The fungibility of cover is supported by the clearinghouse system, which does not 
arbitrate over what the `right' cover should be, but leaves this to the market. After free banking 
theory, multiple currencies do not proliferate, but are subject to rationalisation. In their ultimate 
expression of self-administered banking (home banking, etc. ), one can envisage one currency 
per person. This is wholly impracticable, however, since trade and division of labour even 
between two people requires a common element, a universal language enabling 
communication. It is said that multiple currencies imply a worldwide bank, but surely this, too, 
requires a common language. However many names given to separate currencies, they need to 
be linked. To be sure, these linkages do not need to be determined, as under the gold standard, 
from gold (or some other backing) via a primary currency or numeraire, thence to all others. 
Rather, the independently determined currencies will coalesce in an implied reciprocator ('best 
basket'), a shared unit of account one level up, so to speak. Parities may not all be 1: 1, but 
parities will be needed and they will need to be based on floating, so that market forces can be 
allowed to work to discover the best denominator. Put another way, the actual parties to any 
transaction are free to determine the parity that suits them. 
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Insofar as this scenario goes beyond national economic considerations and the world 
economy at large becomes the primary frame of reference, here again free banking's 
recognition of the need, at least as advocated by Hayek, to denationalise money. This, as is 
readily conceded, leads to a shrinking number of currencies 
- 
the logic of which may be the 
universalisation of finance. Global financial markets and electronic finance in particular do not 
respect national monetary jurisdictions, so that their impact must be to promote homogeneity in 
the fields of monetary policy and supervision, and the denationalisation of money. Indeed, for 
this purpose, there could hardly be a more effective means than e-money. 
- 
The denationalisation of currencies gives rise to a further consideration, however. To 
denominate money in a national motif is to mask the fact that what really matters is (a) its 
interchangeability with other currencies and (b) their mutual convertibility into real rather than 
fiat or, perhaps better put, sound rather than unsound, cover. In this respect, e-money easily 
extends the reach of good money with the best cover to the end holder, functioning successfully 
both as a medium of exchange and as a store of value. Every holder of money also gets to 
choose from among currencies that are independent of local availability constraints. The 
multiplicity of currencies in this regard makes more than one unit of account available as the 
common denominator in trade at both local and international levels with the right to choose the 
currency that is most preferred. This practice is limited at the moment on the level of currency 
substitution but e-money extends the reach of good money and increases the level of 
competition among national and international, which helps to save individually strong money 
with sustainable integrity. 
As a result, privately issued independent e-money may not find a place to challenge the 
influence of the US dollar or Euro but this may not lower the impact of e-money to ease free 
banking practices. A competition between Euro and the US dollar itself may extend the reach 
of free banking to possibly a better financial order and legally supporting this potential by 
allowing legal tender status on both sides for both currencies may further enrich free banking 
practices. 
7.1.6. CONTESTABLE CENTRAL BANKING 
The fact that e-money not only supports free banking, but provides a medium for its 
implementation, gives rise to a question concerning the interface of this development with 
modem central banking. It seems that there is a need to envisage a transitional arrangement that 
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enables central banking to move towards free banking. This is what it refers to the concept of 
contestable central banking. 
Definition: Because of the controversies associated with central banking, the term may 
require some introduction. It does not refer to the central bank as the agent to or banker of 
government in the traditional sense. Even though central banks have acquired many functions 
that they fulfil on behalf of governments, the focus is on their role in what one might call 
systemic management of the economy. While for many people this may be a proper and 
appropriate role for government, this analysis does not regard monetary matters as needing to 
be carried out by governments. Indeed, history shows that when governments control central 
banks they often cause considerable financial and monetary mischief. Contestable central 
banking looks beyond central banks as instruments of short-termist and/or inflationary policies. 
The concept thus takes account of such actual developments as the transfer of debt management 
out of central banks and the private delivery of public account operations. It also envisages a 
change of emphasis in the role of central banks towards financial data collection, as in the 
example of the recent the BOE Act, which gave the Bank the right to collect from any source 
all kinds of data pertaining to a full analysis of the functioning of the economy. Finally, 
contestable central banking entails taking the international or global context as a primary frame 
of reference, and is thus compatible with free banking concepts of denationalised money. 
, ., 
It is here not claimed that contestable central banking equates with free banking, but 
that.: it may describe a transition route towards it 
-a natural evolution away from 
interventionism to contextual influence. White (1995) arguing that the rationale of free banking 
is simply that of a spontaneously evolved or `natural' monetary order also shares this approach. 
Under free banking, at the centre of the economy is a clearinghouse for financial institutions 
based both on competitive issue and competitive backing. In this system, financial data are 
generally available and the onus is on the user to assure himself that he is not accepting `bad' 
money. E-money can only enhance the transparency and general availability of data that free 
banking contemplates. Similarly, as its name implies, contestable central banking distinguishes 
between central banking and central auditing, referring to arrangements in which central bank 
functions have been reduced and focussed on to the collection and analysis of financial data, 
rather than direct management of money flows. Money-become-information becomes the 
medium for making sound judgements for otherwise market-based activities, enabling the 
markets to do the work of the central bank, especially with regards to monetary policy and 
financial supervision. In this sense, a contestable central bank acts as a societal agent in its own 
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right, focusing on contextual decisions, but otherwise leaving the direct provision and 
management of financial flows to the markets, a concept that very much reflects free banking's 
clearinghouse. 
A concrete indication may be the latest developments in the case of the BOE. As well as 
having made price stability the focus of its monetary policy, pursued in the framework of 
central bank independence, the Bank has devolved supervision. It has also set up a Monetary 
Policy Committee (the MPC) as a body of financial and economic experts with a clearly 
economic remit 
- 
to deliver price stability. Whether or not the Bank can be seen as a model, the 
fact seems certain that it illustrates a clear trend in central banking to allow central bankers to 
take decisions in accordance with market initiatives, rather than government interests. As a 
result, central banks have started to publish informative reports explaining current and expected 
monetary conditions. This trend towards market orientation may be a step towards full 
dependence on the `invisible hand' working of market forces. From the denationalisation of 
money point of view, the ECB may provide a similar example in this argument as Euro is an 
international currency in character. More than that, actual dollarisation is already effective in 
some Latin American countries. These examples may show that traditional monetary 
framework is already under a transitory process. 
It is in this sense that contestable central banking can be seen to mark a possible 
transition from a central banking-based monetary policy framework towards free banking. 
Therefore, contestable central banking could be characterised in the following way: 
1. Societal but market-oriented institutions 
2. Expertise based, rather than government appointed monetary policy committees focussed 
on market solutions instead of interventionist policy instruments. 
3. Exclusion of debt management. 
4. Exclusion of liquidity management relating to public accounts. 
5. Exclusion of financial supervision. 
6. Exclusion of Issue Department through privatisation of bank note issuance and the Mint. 
7. Maximum transparency on decision making process. 
8. Maximum efficiency in data analysis and risk management. 
This' operational definition of contestable central banking presupposes the image of the 
central, bank as a societal agent in its own right, mandated by and reporting directly to 
parliament (or its equivalent). The main purpose of the mandate is to spell out in constitutional 
and legislative terms what the central bank is responsible for and to ensure its autonomy both 
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from the government of the day and financial interests. The legislative context also sets out 
how the bank's mandate is to be reviewed and revised and how conflicts are to be resolved. The 
bank operates in a context of democratic accountability. Not, however, by way of electoral 
procedures, but by acting in a clear and transparent manner, and by reporting in a clear, regular, 
and meaningful way to parliament or its equivalent, not necessarily to a national but possibly 
international as well. It operates in a contestable capacity as regards the workings of economic 
life generally with the same data being also available internationally. Its ability to work in this 
way is strengthened by complete freedom in terms of when, how, and what it communicates, 
provided its transparency and reporting requirements are enhanced thereby. The central bank is 
essentially charged with supporting the well being and even operation of the economy as a 
whole, for `systemicity'. The essential concept here is the promotion of a stable level of 
economic activity through the maintenance of price stability. Enhanced consumer awareness 
for financial services by e-money can only help such a framework to be efficient and effective. 
Described thus, contestable central banking is clearly not synonymous with free 
banking, but it may be setting the stage for a more fundamental change of regime. It could, for 
example, result in central banks behaving as central agencies to help financial institutions find 
opportunities to reduce operating costs (e. g. payment system standardisation). They could 
distribute financial data for all economic entities, thus facilitating its analysis by anyone, while 
also publishing its own financial reports parallel to independent sources. This would serve to 
inhibit over-issue of any type of e-money (whether backed, indexed, or simple fiat), thus 
helping guarantee monetary and financial stability by preventing the systemic risk caused by 
regulatory illusion. With all the above in place, it would then be a relatively simple step for 
central banks to allow private money issue, eliminating legal tender in favour of competitive 
issue 
-not perhaps within single economic areas such as the Eurozone, but between the Euro 
and the US dollar, for example. 
Thus, contestable central banking can be seen as a means for promoting the integrity of 
money, 'under free markets as 
far as possible and of limiting interventionism with regard to 
interest rates, foreign exchange rates and similar financial indicators. It is directly accountable 
to society in the first place but has well defined responsibilities to report to and be audited by 
parliament. It reports to the public through periodical reports, even daily when this is needed to 
maintain confidence in the integrity of money and stability of financial markets. Contestable 
central banking rejects any kind of political interference in policy instruments and disdains the 
creation of moral hazard. Market settlement and market transmission mechanisms are given top 
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priority and stability is defended through expertise with increased risk management and data 
analysis techniques. The main function of contestable central banking is to fulfil the 
`centralised' characteristics of the financial system, which is a common feature of both central 
and free banking, with centralised here meant in an operational, rather than power sense. It also 
offers a transition path out of `incompetent' central banking. Central banks compete with each 
other to sustain the integrity of their monies within free market rules and they do not prefer to 
create barriers to entry to their currency zones with any means including legal tender 
arrangements. End users are allowed to have the right to choose the money that they want to 
have and they have the right to contract on the money they prefer. Whether this leads to 
`competent' central banking or free banking will remain to be seen. In either scenario, e-money 
is a parallel phenomenon that enriches the solutions to the problems of current monetary policy 
regimes. 
-- 
- 
Transforming Seigniorage: As rehearsed already, the concept of contestable central 
banking distinguishes between three main aspects or tasks 
- 
the conduct of monetary policy, 
supervision of the financial markets, and maintaining the integrity of the unit of account 
- 
and 
then envisages their articulation or devolution. Such an image of the development of central 
banking has a profound implication in that the seigniorage relation disappears and, with it, the 
possibility that seigniorage can be abused or highjacked by the government of the day for non- 
economic purposes. Omitting any mention of it might have suggested that this aspect of the 
financial system would be unaffected, an unlikely event that it would have been disingenuous 
to ignore. 
Current developments may result in a redefinition of seigniorage, away from the 
"irrational" and inflationary habit of "printing money" to pay debt, a concept of seigniorage 
that should be confined to immature approaches to central banking. The expectation here is that 
money is sufficiently understood nowadays, at least in the developed economies, so as to be 
beyond the mis-management entailed by such practices. The latest financial turmoil in Russia, 
for example, had much to do with not having appreciated that the inflationary effects of 
manipulating the domestic monetary base would invite currency substitution and thus 
undermine the financial system. In the Russian case, it is likely that any seigniorage gains 
expected were more than cancelled out by the punishing short-run interest rates that the mis- 
management incurred, as has been the case in other such situations72. This hardly makes a case 
72 In 1994, the overnight interest rates in Turkey have jumped above 1000 % 
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for seigniorage. On the contrary, seeking income from the printing of money is likely only to 
cause distortions in the money stock, leading to monetary and financial crises. Consequently, it 
may be better to limit the definition of seigniorage to the amount of profit from money business 
made by public authorities through their production, distribution and management of money. 
In recent years, for example, especially in developed economies, a significant portion of 
profit has come from the interest earnings from the bond and bill holdings of monetary 
authorities used to back the amount of currency in circulation. For example, the US Treasury 
earns around 5% seigniorage on the issuance of dollars. The BOE also profits from bank note 
issue through its Issuing Department (see Chart 7.2.4), so that even in current circumstances 
central banks can make a profit without dealing with banknotes and coins, since the Issue 
Department of the BOE is accounted separately. As the chart shows, the Banking Department is 
independently profitable, with some of its profit even being transferred to HM Treasury. At the 
same time, the cost of central banking has been diminishing along with that of conventional 
banking, thanks in part to the effects of cheaper computing and communicating costs. 
7.1.7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Especially in the last decade, there seems to be a general interest on laissez-faire 
banking. It might have been started as an academic interest on the topic without many support 
from the financial world but currently, it may be argued that even central bankers (Greenspan, 
1997 and 1998; Issing 1999) started to re-evaluate free banking experience in an historical 
perspective and reach to new decisive conclusions about free banking as an alternative or 
complementary approach the current financial system. 
Three basic reasons might have played an important role in these developments. The 
first one is that central banks are not a source for national pride as it was during the evolution 
of central monetary authorities. The globalisation of financial markets allowed different 
national currencies to compete each other both in retail and wholesale transactions and many 
countries, seem willing to give up a national central bank for further monetary stability and 
efficiency. The ECB and dollarisation proposal may be given as empirical evidence for this 
argument. Secondly, technological developments such as smart cards and financial innovation 
undermined seigniorage-orientation among central banks and increased dedication to price 
stability as financial globalisation created an international demand for a safe and sound 
financial -. system in addition to domestic pressures. Thirdly, an overview of free banking 
experiments seems to provide detailed information for an alternative for central banks as some 
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additional evidence has been put forward in favour of free banking even though a full 
agreement has been reached yet. 
The emergence of e-money products seems to play an important role for laissez-faire 
banking. But, it may be an underestimation for the potential of e-money products if this process 
is judged only as an elimination of banknotes and coins. To sum up, the impacts and effects of 
e-money are broad ranging and far-reaching. They may be summarised three areas in particular: 
1. For two main reasons, e-money may lead to a new era for free banking type practices. 
Firstly, innovation in payment technology is reducing the fixed costs of banking business. 
Being cheaper than printing, distributing and retrieving banknotes through banking systems, the 
creation of digital strings of money is likely to reduce the cost of maintaining a payment system 
infrastructure for the economy as a whole. This may attract more economic entities to provide 
financial services, as the natural barriers to entry to the banking sector become less effective. 
Secondly, as the computing power increases, risk management and data processing with huge 
amounts of entries might become risk-free and less costly to process. It may then be possible 
that the information monopoly of banks relating to financial services may deteriorate, giving 
further opportunities for non-banks to supply financial services to customers. Such a 
development may decrease the special treatment of banks over against other firms, so that the 
argument about the private positions of banks in an economy may become even harder to 
defend. 
-.,, 
2. The development of e-money further implies radical changes with regard to money, 
banking, and finance due to the manner in which it `befriends' markets solutions to monetary 
problems. Its impact in terms of the lender of last resort function, currency backing, and 
multiple currencies is likely to be especially powerful. 
3. Technically, e-money may have different impacts for different functions of money. 
With regard to the unit of account function, it may be expected that e-money would decrease 
network externalities by both decreasing the fixed cost of networking (for example private 
clearing systems are already available) and by lowering the cost of switching from one local 
network to the other (choosing alternative units of account without difficulty provided legal 
tender laws are adjusted to allow `freedom to contract' in preferred currencies). 
With regard to the medium of exchange function, e-money would facilitate currency 
competition by allowing economic entities to provide technically efficient and effective 
alternative monies to reach end-users. Competitive issue is not necessarily national in 
character; it may be international as well, witness the competition between the Euro and the US 
200 
dollar. Even at its current stage of development, e-money in banking services provision of 
`multiple currency-based individual accounts' that are transferable to any currency at any 
moment of time, while one bankcard may allow to spend in different denominations anywhere 
in the world. E-money thus offers local, national and international solutions to settlement 
problems, thereby enriching the cover of money. Through LETS, anything from bread to time 
may be defined as money as long as there is a community willing to accept it and such `local' 
solutions may be extended to wider regions provided the supply of the instrument manages to 
create enough demand. E-money enables anything - from gold to seashells - to be distributed 
electronically within local or international networks. Such a development increases people's 
understanding of money and financial markets and puts pressure on financial institutions to be 
more transparent to the society they serve. It brings good money in reach of anybody on earth 
as far as they have a network connection, and increases the awareness of the growing 
importance of stable currencies at the international as well as the national level. 
With regard to the store of value function, e-money would increase the quality and 
quantity of information available. This would greatly help to reduce imperfect information 
possibilities, to increase data processing and risk management techniques, and to make easier 
portfolio selection procedures. Secondly, it would decrease barriers to entry to financial service 
provision, a fact already observable in the financial industry. With regard to systemic problems 
for the financial industry, it is likely that e-money will support individual assessment of the 
safety and soundness of particular financial institutions. This would allow individual treatment 
of troubled financial institutions, decreasing contagious trends. By reducing the 
interdependence of financial service providers in this way, the risk of systemic problems may 
also be reduced as a consequence of e-money. Lastly, in the sense that e-money also implies or 
refers to the wider phenomenon of electronic finance generally, it is having a profound impact 
in the banking system. Taken as a whole, online banking, telephone banking, mobile-phone 
banking, computer-based accounting systems, and so on, are making entry into banking ever 
easier by making explicit and replicable processes that previously were not generally 
understood and were the province of experts. 
Although explanations of them may not say so in so many words, current developments 
in the financial world seem to unfold along the lines indicated in this section. They approximate 
certain features of free banking, although not as a result of free banking advocacy, and they are 
reinforced, even accelerated by the emergence of electronic finance and c-money. Their 
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appearance suggests that, unless `repackaged' in a contestable way, the future of central 
banking may become uncertain. 
From this point of view, the advent of so-called e-money is both a technological and 
monetary phenomenon, and care should be taken not to underestimate its significance. If the 
`incompetence' argument is accepted, the fact that e-money is of relevance in both central 
banking and free banking contexts indicates that it will increase the efficiency and productivity 
of the future of monetary systems, whether conducted within existing or revised arrangements. 
7.1.8. APPENDIX: SOME INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL SERVICES 
In this following part, relevant developments and products will be given as examples for 
further implications of e-money products for laissez faire banking. 
Internet Banks and Electronic Cheques: Internet technology has been under 
discussion for a while but efficient banking on the Internet has gathered a pace recently as more 
attention is paid for its potential. Egg73 is the banking arm of an insurance company and started 
as a telephone banking but converted fully as an Internet-based service provider and as of July 
1999, it currently pays one of the highest interest for small value deposits in the UK. Within a 
year from the establishment of the company, the amount of deposits that the company collected 
from around half a million savers reached to £5 billion as of April 1999. The comparative 
advantage of the company against banks is to guarantee (at least up to 2001) to pay a deposit 
rate higher than the BOE base rate. But this is not a special case for the UK as an American 
based bank74 named Netb@nk is also on the Internet and again offers an interest rate equals to 
the FED's base rates for the small scale deposits. Interestingly, the Bank accepts deposits up to 
a certain amount to give a Federal Deposit Insurance Company guarantee for its services 
whereas the minimum amount is $100 and pays daily interest on accounts. 
The two banks seem to prove business cases for Internet-based financial services. 
Obviously, direct debit and credit infrastructures, wholesale payment system infrastructures, 
shared ATMs infrastructure contributed to the successful entrance of these banks to the banking 
industry. But there could be found more reasons for the sustainability of their success as they 
have an option for electronic cheques. In June 30,1998, the US Treasury sent its first ever- 
electronic cheque over the Internet to a company for services rendered on a military contract. 
73 www. egg. co. uk provided all the details about the company and online application is possible for banking 
services. 
74 www. netbank. com provides all the details of the services of the company. 
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This electronic payment solution is the result of a collaborative effort between members of the 
Financial Services Technology Consortium (FSTC)75. Electronic cheque may give a 
momentum for sustainable banking services on the Internet in a non-cash basis with direct 
credit of revenues and direct debit of expenditures. Such a banking service may be provided to 
help deposit holders for their accounting practices as the financial data could be shared on a 
digital format and manipulated for accounting purposes with the permission of account holders. 
This stage was foreseen by Hayek (1990) when he argued that accounting might play an 
important role on the denationalisation of money. 
E-gold: Electronic presentation of purchasing power for national currencies or fully 
electronic on-line real-time banking services through the Internet may not be the only 
challenges for the current financial system to be transformed to a freer environment. The 
technological developments and financial innovation could provide e-gold circulation with 
perfect liquidity and full convertibility to any other purchasing power presentations including 
all the national currencies. The company presented its product as "gold itself circulated 
electronically, the ultimate world-wide free market currency"76. Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc. 
named77 some of the services provided with an e-gold account as: Balance: To view current e- 
gold account balance. The weights of each of up to 4 e-metals (gold, silver, platinum, 
palladium) that owned are displayed. InExchange is to exchange government issued money 
(currency) for e-metal. OutExchange is to exchange e-metal for government issued money 
(currency). Redeem is to order delivery of your e-metal in specie held by the reserve. Spend is 
to spend some of e-metal to another person. Metal-to-Metal is to exchange one type of e-metal 
(gold, silver, platinum, palladium) for another. 
An e-gold account could provide an alternative to current fiat money structured 
financial system services as it puts gold within reach for small investors. One very interesting 
application that may be supplied to end-users may be to allow actual gold or platinum (fully 
backed by the metals in real sense) cards being used for credit card transactions. In theory, any 
financial institution may issue these cards at the moment even they may have some exchange 
risk for the settlement date. The system may operate in this order. One bank may issue a 
payment card that spends actual metals such as gold or silver etc. The holder may spend any 
currency in any credit card accepting outlet. During the settlement date, the bank calculates all 
" www. echeck. org 76 www. e-gold. com 
77www. e-gold. com/acct/manager. htm 
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the spending and makes the necessary payment from the actual gold or silver account with the 
current prices of gold or silver on the 'spent' currencies on the market at that moment of time. 
A Currency for the Internet: Beenz: This approach to the presentation of purchasing 
power is quite different than other approaches as it is not an electronic presentation of a 
national currency and it is not backed with any other metal or commodity. It is just a unique 
presentation of purchasing power on the Internet. Currently, Beenz can be earned78 by visiting 
Web pages that offers Beenz for visiting, shopping or downloading a service. The account 
holder has to visit in order to get Beenz, and how many Beenz can be collected plus how often 
Beenz can be collected would be decided by Beenz providers. Beenz is not convertible at the 
moment to any other currency but those earned Beenz can be spent on Web-sites that offer 
products for Beenz. Recently, the concept has moved one step forward: Beenz earned on the 
Internet may be downloaded to a smart card and be spend on outlets on high streets, if any. 
Examples such as e-cheque, pure Internet-based financial services companies, e-gold 
and Beenz may provide insights about the transformation of the financial services industry. It 
may be argued that new technologies in banking industry including payment systems 
innovations, digitalisation of financial assets and e-money already strengthened free banking 
supporters. 
Local Currencies and LETS: Good (1998a) argued that even without a proven 
business case, there seems to be an increasing attention on cyber-money but people in general 
neglect the fact that high-tech payment systems are best defined as a form of private currency. 
The author defined private money as a currency, which is not backed by any government entity 
and cited that it can have all the characteristics of money as a medium of exchange, unit of 
account and store of value. It was mentioned that private money is not prohibited in the US if it 
complies with regulations such as to be smaller in size than the US dollar and issued in 
denominations valued at a minimum of $1. At the same time, any income received in private 
money must be reported to tax agencies. 
Good analysed two different forms of current challenges to the US dollar. First one was 
named as local currencies, which are local, low-tech community arrangements to accept a 
medium of exchange other than the national currency. Ithaca Hours, which is an equivalent of 
`one hour work' and equals to $10, was particularly named among around 30 low-tech local 
currencies. The author mentioned that a local currency is only as good as its acceptability 
72 http: //www. beenz. com/tour. ihtml 
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within the community and their success may be influenced by alternative medium of exchanges 
as wide-acceptance is a key to success. 
The second one was named by the author as LETS, which is a computer-based 
membership organisation in which transactions generate credits to be spent within the 
predetermined community on a membership basis as a network supported by its own internal 
currency. Around 470 different LETSs were mentioned by the author in five different countries 
namely the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK. A LETS was supposed to 
function as a clearing-house and information system as well as an account network with an 
advantage of having an unlimited amount of transaction depending of the network power. 
Maybe, only e-money may not shape a future to create alternative financial systems to 
the current monetary arrangements itself without the parallel developments in financial service 
providers. However, at least one bank79, which is among the global top-ten list, already offered 
a current account that will allow to translate savings into any currency that the deposit holder 
prefers, anytime and anywhere around the world using its ATM network in the US dollar, Euro 
and Sterling. The bank advertised that commission fees would not be charged for the multi- 
currency accounts. Consequently, it may be argued that financial service providers have already 
started to adjust themselves to extend the dimensions of free banking discussions by offering 
competing deposits to savers. 
7.2. MONETARY POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF E-MONEY 
The aim of this section is to investigate two particular implications of e-money for 
money multiplier and velocity. There are some important issues with regard this investigation. 
The first issue is the definition of e-money. Unless e-money is included in the calculation of the 
monetary base, it will be difficult to statistically track changes in the "true" definition of money 
supply. Exclusion or ignorance of e-money balances may therefore result in confusion similar 
to the effects of financial innovations that influenced monetary policy in the UK especially 
during 1980s. By disregarding e-money, the authorities may underestimate the strength of 
money supply, complicating the conduct of monetary policy. 
The second issue is data collection. As c-money is electronic by definition, both the 
costs of related data collection may be cheaper, and management might be quite easier and 
more efficient compared to conventional methods. There may also be new opportunities to 
79 The Economist, June 26"', 1999, Page: 107. 
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deepen strategic analysis of money databases as collected data may provide more insights for 
monetary authorities on the behaviour of economic entities. 
Apart from the definition and data collection, the third issue is statistical analysis of 
data. Here, the traditional methods for financial data analysis and financial aggregation would 
play the critical role. Once e-money is defined carefully covering all the aspects of 
conventional money, then monetary aggregates might need to be redefined as to include e- 
money balances in monetary base. Although it seems very easy to collect all e-money balances 
and add it to conventional monetary base, things may get complicated in a world of competing 
currencies. If e-money is just a replacement of conventional monetary symbol such as pound 
sterling (representative e-money), then it may be right to add it to conventional monetary base 
and Divisia indices where applicable. For monetary policy authorities, the critical problem here 
is to analyse alternative e-money proposals carefully (independent or competitive issue). They 
need to decide whether issuance of e-money provides a potential to represent a particular 
currency in electronic form or whether it creates a totally new medium of exchange that can 
replace conventional money in the economy. If e-money ends up being an independent new 
currency, the central bank might start to lose influence of monetary base as individuals 
substitute conventional currency holdings with alternative e-values. 
Central Banks may not take the right decision unless they understand the nature of e- 
money. One of the most critical issues here seems to be the relationship between payment 
systems and e-money issuance. If e-money is treated as a threat to eliminate currency in 
circulation, then it may be useful to take a look at the historical developments in the area of 
payment systems. Because, there has been a decreasing demand for banknotes and coins as a 
medium of exchange as a result of alternative instruments provided by financial industry. The 
following part will look at the general developments in the payment systems industry from a 
historical point of view. 
7.2.1. MONEY AND PAYMENT TECHNOLOGIES 
Frazer (1985) named three great ages of payments: first notes and coins, then paper 
payments and, lastly, electronic payments. Without the help of technological development in 
the computer industry especially in data storage and data processing, it might not have been 
possible to observe so many developments in payment systems. Especially after 1960, there 
have been many revolutionary developments in the way that money is used in transactions with 
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credit cards, debit cards, EFTPOS systems and ATMs. Below is a short description of these 
developments including the instruments. 
Credit Cards: Frazer (1985) defined a credit card as an identification document, 
identifying the holder for possessing a credit account that allows the customer to accumulate 
purchases, paying off the account, fully or partially, at regular intervals. The first example of 
credit cards was in financial service market as `metal addressograph plates' before 1920 in the 
United States. By the help of the developments in information technology, many banks started 
to develop different types of credit cards in 1950s and private companies such as Diner's Club, 
Mastercard and Visa started to invest in credit card markets in co-operation with retailers and 
banks. Nowadays, credit cards are widely accepted throughout the world by many banks and 
retailers. On the other hand, after improvements in debit card system technologies, credit-based 
payment systems seem to have lost their competitive advantage to debit-based systems. This 
trend and its extrapolation are clearly exhibited in the following chart for the UK: 
CHART 7.2.1: CREDIT, CHARGE AND RETAILER CARDS VS DEBIT CARD PAVNMENT VOLUMES 
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I The data up to 1997 is the realised figures and the rest is APACS projections. The chart 
illustrates the assumption that debit-based payment systems have overtaken credit card 
payments in volume terms and is projected to continue to do so in the next decade. 
Cheque Guarantee Systems: Cheque is a written paper, which lets a receiver to 
transfer the indicated amount of money from the writer's bank account. The National 
Provincial Group took the first British cheque guarantee system in 1965. Its `Travel Card' 
could be used by customers to cash cheques of up to £20 at any bank branch within the group 
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(Frazer, 1985). In the following decades, the amount guaranteed has risen by different banks 
more than £100. By now, electronic cheque is in financial service markets that guarantee the 
amount with an on-line real-time basis by controlling the account balance. It is recently argued 
that80: Electronic cheque, a new payment instrument combining the security, speed and 
processing efficiencies of all-electronic transactions with the familiar and well-developed legal 
infrastructure and business processes associated with paper cheques, is the first and only 
electronic payment mechanism chosen by the United States Treasury to make high-value 
payments to the public over Internet. For the past year, e-cheque has been in active use for the 
U. S. Treasury payments in the United States and, is under development in Singapore, and is 
under consideration elsewhere. E-cheque is the result of a co-operative effort undertaken by 
over fifteen banks, government entities, technology vendors and e-commerce organisations. 
ATMs: According to Frazer, (1985) the very first cash dispenser in the world was built 
by De La Rue and installed at Barclays Bank's Branch at Enfield in 1969. Until the innovation 
of plastic cards with a magnetic stripe, ATM's only function was to give money with coded 
paper. During 1970s, ATMs started to give cash or to print an account balance. Recently they 
operate like a bank branch from giving cash to transferring money from one account to another 
and from currency exchange to buying and selling bonds and bills on-line real-time. An ATM 
is a machine, which is capable to recognise the customer who can use the machine for many 
different kinds of banking services. 
EFTPOS: This is an electronic system which allows the buyer to transfer the cost of 
purchase from an account at the point of sale on a real time basis to the seller's account. The 
functioning of debit cards which lets the holder to use his/her bank account in making 
payments on an on-line basis may be the best example for an EFTPOS transaction. 
Direct Debit: With the help of data processing technology, banks can provide direct 
debiting services to their customers. A direct debit is an order to a bank to pay a certain amount 
or a certain type of bill such as telephone or electricity for a certain period of time to a certain 
third party. After a direct debit order, the customer does not need to follow the payments 
because bank will realise it at the specified payment dates. By this technique, all the telephone 
bills of a country may be paid (with an assumption of an account with a direct debit order for 
all the users) without the involvement of telephone users. Direct debit is obviously different 
8° http: //www. echeck. org/ 
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than standing orders, which is a periodically fixed amount of payment arising from a certain 
type of contracts with instalments. 
Chart 7.2.2 shows trends in payment systems in the UK up to 1997 and gives APACS' 
projections until 2007. 
CHART 7.2.2: PAYMENT SYSTEM TRANSACTION VOLUMES 
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The chart indicates that paper-based payments are not the most favoured instrument as 
it has been so until 1996. Then, plastic payment instruments such as debit and credit cards will 
be the preferred payment methods. Second best choice seems to be automated payment systems 
such as direct debit and credit. Especially direct credit seems getting popular all around the 
world through electronic benefit transfer systems and direct payment of wages (public and 
private sector) and allowances to bank accounts. 
Electronic Payment Systems (EFT): Japanese Zengin system started to operate in 
1973 as a centralised computer database for all the financial service companies to provide on- 
line authorisation for money transfers (Frazer, 1985). Like Fedwire in the USA, CHAPS in the 
UK and EFT in Turkey many countries have a kind of centralised electronic payment systems 
to make payments and transactions easier and easier. This kind of systems have been started for 
wholesale payments but with the help of technological innovation, the capacity of these 
systems became enough to support retail transactions, too. Even the international transfers may 
be supported by a similar system, which is called as SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication). 
209 
Telephone Banking: Telephone banking may be understood as a banking service, 
which is provided by a bank on direct contact with the customers on the phone (like First Direct 
in the UK). The new technology supports the banks to provide such a service. Mobile phone 
technology may support a radical approach to financial services with increased functions (WAP 
banking). 
Internet Banking: Recently, there seems to be a trend to concentrate on Internet for 
banking. Some institutions even prefer and offer Internet-only banking such as 
www. smile. co. uk and www. first-e. co. uk. This may mean that the level of electronisation in 
banking industry is developed enough to sustain all kind of financial services without a `brick 
and mortar' bank. An Internet bank seems to cost not more than a million the US dollar 
according to the latest figures, which extends the implications of Internet banking further 
(Gosling, 1999). Obviously, almost all the major international banks have opened their Internet 
Banking services as well. In order to understand why Internet Banking is so attractive from the 
cost of services point of view, the following figures may provide some insights. According to 
the US Department of the Treasury (2000), one transaction costs $1.02 in the branch, $0.54 on 
the telephone, $0.27 from the ATM full service, $0.02 on PC banking but only $0.01 with 
Internet Banking. 
The following part looks at the electronic purse, which is the technology that created the multi- 
purpose prepaid cards and open the way to the possibility of making money electronic. 
Electronic Purse81: is defined as a reloadable multipurpose prepaid card, which can be 
used, for retail or other payments by the BIS (1996b). Electronic purses differ from other 
cashless payment instruments because they are supplied in advance with generally accepted 
purchasing power. Their potential to reduce significantly the use of notes and coins is even 
greater than that of other debit instruments since they are the first cashless instrument which 
would be used for very small amounts. Wenninger and Laster (1995) defined c-purse as a 
prepaid card in which the record of funds can be increased as well as reduced. They assumed 
11 Some relevant definition on e-purses: The relationship between technological development and financial service 
innovation may best be observed in single purpose prepaid cards. A Single Purpose Prepaid Card may be 
defined as a card that is bought in advance in order to buy a single kind of good or service like using public phones 
or travelling through the underground or at public bus chains. These cards started to get smarter and smarter and 
with the help of new technical discoveries. BIS (1996b) defines Multi-purpose Prepaid Cards as cards that can 
be used for a wide range purposes and has the potential to be used on a national or international scale but may 
sometimes be restricted to a certain area. These cards have a microchip embedded on them and as a result, they are 
able to make more than one job so that they can be used as a credit card and identity card at the same time. 
Whereas single-purpose prepaid cards may not replace money due to the lack of general acceptance; multi-purpose 
prepaid cards may be used as money depending on the level of general acceptance. 
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the stored-value cards same as the electronic purse and define it as a multi-purpose-prepaid 
card the size of a credit card. They argued that if e-purse is successfully implemented, it might 
fundamentally alter the way in which people spend money. 
Chip Card (also known as Integrated Circuit) may be defined as a card containing 
one or more computer chips circuits for identification, data storage or special-purpose 
processing used to validate personnel identification numbers (PINs), authorise purchases, verify 
account balances and store personal records. Smart Card82 may be defined as an integrated 
circuit card with a microprocessor that is capable of performing calculations. According to a 
report on prepaid cards (EMI, 1994) technological developments have enabled further 
improvements in the use of plastic cards. In this respect the introduction of the chip or "smart" 
card was seen as an important development. A chip card contains a microcomputer, consisting 
of a microprocessor and a memory component, which is embedded in the card, thereby 
allowing remote verification and, accordingly purchases at a local level which previously could 
only be executed, for security reasons, after on-line reference to a central computer. 
The use of such a card need not be restricted to payment transactions, but could be 
extended to, for instance, the registering of retailers' promotional activities or even to totally 
unrelated functions such as the storage of medical information amounts (EMI, 1994). It is this 
technology that created the electronic purse, which has the potential to replace cash. Because, 
for an instrument to be defined as e-money, it should have no direct contact to an account at a 
financial service provider at the real time of transaction. Otherwise, the instrument is merely 
an another form of payment - not an independent representation of purchasing power. 
Telephone cards, for example, are stored-value cards, which are capable of storing purchasing 
power but just for a single purpose `to make phone calls'. This purchasing power should not be 
accepted as money, electronic or not, but just a payment instrument, because money is a 
medium of exchange that can be used in any kind of transactions. The name `prepaid card' 
implies an advance payment of purchasing power to be stored in a card but it does not have to 
be so. Technically, once money can be stored in a card, it may be prepaid or it may be earned. 
Software Purse: Other than storing prepaid value in a card; after the developments in 
cryptography, it is also possible to store prepaid value in a personal computer. Software purse 
$2 The US Treasury Department (2000) gave the figures for smart card circulation around the world as 1.3 billion in 1997 and almost 67% of it was in Europe. The Projections for 2004 is estimated as 5.7 billion, a figure that may be accepted as a clear evidence of how smart cards may radically change the way economic entities pay and 
receive payments. 
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may be defined as multipurpose prepaid software, which can be used for any kind of payments 
on open networks (conventional or mobile). It should be re-loadable and have all the similar 
specialities of money. Software purse converts money to software records like bits and bytes. 
The purchasing power converted into a computer record with the help of cryptography in order 
to guarantee the security and with the help of encryption, records can be sent securely from one 
computer to another. Digital signature increases the level of secure authentication. 
The reality of e-money in this process is that software purse83 can be spent 
independently from a financial service account. Software purse may especially be preferred for 
payments through conventional or mobile networks. Open network such as Internet may be 
accepted as unsecured because anybody can reach to any kind of message in an open network. 
Without security measures such as cryptography, it may not be possible to circulate e-money in 
networks such as Internet. 
All the above developments in payment systems have resulted in making the handling 
of money easier and easier. Because, with every development in payment systems, bank 
customers became more confident to find a particular instrument other than money to make 
transactions. 
As analysed in this section, payments have been electronised especially in the last two 
decades even if it started in 1960s. In many countries such as the UK and Finland the plastic 
cards per capita has risen above one implying that many people prefers holding more than one 
card. One common limitation for all access products is the telecommunication cost that stops 
them being capable of electronising micro-payments. In the UK, debit cards may already be 
used to buy a chewing gum in some high street retailers' chains but this is not possible in 
corner-shops. In this sense, it may be argued that e-money will be the final frontier for 
transaction demand for banknotes and coins in circulation. In this regard, payment system 
" Some definitions may contribute to the investigation of software purses: Cryptography is "the application of 
mathematical theory to develop techniques and algorithms that can be applied to data to ensure goals such as 
confidentiality, data integrity and/or authentication" (BIS, 1996b). Asymmetric cryptography "(also called 
public key cryptography) is a set of cryptographic techniques in which two different keys (private and public keys) 
are used for encrypting and decrypting data. The private key is kept secret by its holder, while the public key is 
made available to communicating entities. Symmetric cryptography is a set of cryptographic techniques in which 
devices share the same secret key in combination with algorithms. For encryption, the same key is used for 
encrypting and decrypting and the decrypting algorithm is the reverse function of the encrypting algorithm" (BIS, 
1996a). Encryption is "the use of cryptographic algorithms to encode clear text data (plaintcxt) into ciphertext to 
prevent unauthorised observation" (BIS, 1996b). Ciphertext is "the encrypted form of data" (BIS, 1996a). Digital 
Signature is "a string of data generated by a cryptographic method that is attached to a message to ensure its 
authenticity as well as to protect the recipient against repudiation by the sender" (BIS, 1996a). 
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technology improvements will only help to decrease the cost of sustainable e-money 
infrastructures. 
The aim of above synopsis has been to emphasise that without even e-money, 
improvements in payment technologies have already decreased the weight of base money on 
the total money supply. In following sections the relationship between money multiplier and e- 
money will be investigated followed by an analysis on velocity. 
7.2.2. MONEY MULTIPLIER AND E-MONEY 
Sloman (1999) defined money multiplier as the number of times greater the expansion 
of money supply is than the expansion of the monetary base caused by that expansion, and 
formulated it as OMs/DIM where Ms represents total money supply and Mb monetary base. 
The author stated that in the UK, the money multiplier is given by OM4/OMO and demonstrated 
how it is calculated: 
The total money supply is represented by M4 in the UK and may be divided into two as 
deposits in the financial institutions such as banks and building societies (D) and cash held by 
the public (C). Then, a rise in the money supply is be given as: 
AM4 = AD + AC (1) 
The monetary base in the UK is represented by MO and consists of bank and building 
society reserves (R) plus cash held by the public. As a result, a rise in the monetary base is 
given by: 
OMO = OR + AC (2) 
Money multiplier m is defined as OM4/OMO. Then, by substituting equations (1) and 
(2). 
m= (OD+AC)/(OR+OC) (3) 
If it is assumed that financial institutions prefer to hold a given fraction (r) of any rise in 
deposits in the form of reserves, then; 
r=OR/OD (4) 
and the public prefers to hold a given fraction (c) of any rise in its deposits as cash, 
then; 
c=OC/OD (s) 
If the top and bottom of equation (3) is divided by AD, 
m= ((OD / OD) + (AC / AD)) / ((AR / OD) + (AC / AD) (6) 
or, 
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(i + (AC / AD)) / ((AR / en) + (AC / AD) (7) 
or, 
m=(1+c)/(r+c) (8) 
The money multiplier would be defined as OM4/OMO in investigating money multiplier 
implications of e-money. According to this definition the trend of money multiplier is exhibited 
in the following chart from a historical perspective and starting form 1970 with the UK data: 
CHART 7.2.3: MONETARY BASE TO BROAD MONEY RATIO IN THE UK 
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As the chart indicates, the weight of monetary base on the total money supply decreased 
from 16% in 1970 to less than 4% in 1998. This result may have implications for c-money 
discussions because the erosion of the monetary base has been a long-run trend. Clearly, it may 
be argued that even without e-money, central bank banknotes are already under threat as 
alternative payment systems provide better solutions to transaction demand for money. 
Monetary aggregation is another issue here. When central banks need to make changes 
and adjustments on the definition and coverage of individual aggregates, there seems to be no 
reason not to do so. As the BOE made many changes since 1970, c-money may only cause just 
another alteration on the definitions, especially narrow ones. 
Analysis of developments in the stock of money can help in an assessment of the state 
of the inflationary pressures in the economy. On the other hand, the relationship between 
money and inflation is complex because of variations in the level of wealth, financial 
innovations and disintermediation. For that reason, monetary aggregates are used as 
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information variables by the UK monetary authorities when analysing the appropriate stance of 
monetary policy, rather than as intermediate targets (Salmon, 1995). 
After the experience gained during 1980s relating to monetary targeting, it may be 
accepted that UK monetary policy evolved step by step to a kind of monetary information 
management. The monetary information is used to define the variables that are analysed on the 
Monetary Policy Committee (the MPC) meetings and is shared with economic entities in full 
transparency. But, monetary aggregates are still regarded as indicators during the monetary 
policy decision making process. Recently, the high-powered (narrow) money definition in the 
UK is MO and it is defined by the BOE (1998) as: 
" sterling notes and coin in circulation outside the BOE including bank's and building 
societies' tills plus, 
" 
Banks' operational deposits with the BOE. 
Broad money is named as M4 but there is more than one definition for it as given by the 
BOE (1998): 
M4 Retail (M2): The UK private sectors': 
" 
Holdings of sterling notes and coin. 
" 
Sterling denominated retail deposits with the UK monetary financial institutions (MFI). 
M4 Lending is the sterling lending by MFI to the M4 private sector. 
M4: The M4 private sector's: 
" 
Holdings of sterling notes and coin. 
" 
Sterling deposits, including certificates of deposits, commercial paper and bonds, floating 
rate notes and other instruments of up to and including five year's original maturity. 
" 
From 1995, liabilities arising from repos at the UK MFI. 
" 
Estimated holdings of sterling bank bills. 
" 
From end-1986,95 % of the domestic sterling inter-MFI difference (allocated to other 
financial corporations, the remaining 5% being allocated to transits). 
From 1993, the Bank also publishes time-series for a Divisia index of money for 
personal and corporate sector and for the whole economy. Divisia money weights the 
components of simple-sum monetary aggregates to reflect estimates of the extent to which the 
component provide transactions services. As a result of this approach, time deposits component 
of M4 carries a low weight in Divisia money whereas MO components off, higher weights as 
coins, banknotes and transaction balances are used largely for transactions purposes. The 
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growth rate of Divisia money measures the growth in transaction services provided by the 
financial sector as M4 component assets by adding their growth rates. Individual weights may 
vary over time depending on the presentation of transaction services but weights of all assets 
for a particular period adds always to one. Divisia money supports the decision making process 
in monetary policy framework by providing more information about different liquidity 
characteristics of monetary aggregate components separately and overall (Janssen, 1996). The 
Bank publishes another monetary aggregates as M3H for the purpose of European relations and 
this aggregate adds all the foreign exchange deposits in the UK financial sector to M4. 
Changes in the Definitions of Aggregates: An important point in monetary 
aggregation in the UK is that the definitions of the aggregates have been changed almost totally 
from time to time. There is no aggregate such as £M3, which was an official target before. It is 
the same for PSL2. These changes are important in e-money discussions because if e-money 
has a potential to influence or even change the component of monetary aggregates, necessary 
adjustments may need experience to re-define influenced aggregates. Some of the changes in 
the definitions discussed by Goacher, (1993) may contribute to the analysis of e-money: 
In 1987, £M3 was relabelled as M3 and the former M3 became M3c. M4 was 
introduced and the former PSL2 was relabelled as M5. PSL1 was abandoned. M4 embodied 
bank and building society liabilities and M5 embodied private sector liquidity. 
In 1989, M1, £M3 and M3c were abandoned, as they comprised solely the UK non- 
bank private sector holdings of notes and coins with various groupings of bank deposits. 
Monetary targeting of £M3 failed almost every year except one and it was concluded that it was 
distorted as a measure of private sector purchasing power by changes in financial service 
industry especially through financial innovation and degree of deregulation. Instead M4c was 
introduced. 
In 1991, publication of We and M5 were abandoned. In 1992, M4 was officially 
recognised as an important monetary aggregate by the Chancellor. M311 was introduced with 
an aim to cover foreign exchange deposits. M2, which was introduced in 1982 was redefined 
with an emphasis upon the definition of retail deposits and renamed as M4 Retail. The only 
stable measure is MO. It was introduced in 1984 and stayed as a monetary target between 1984 
and 1993. The Bank still publishes MO regularly as analysed above. 
It may be agreed from these historical developments that monetary aggregates may be 
redefined or totally abandoned, as there happens to be a structural change in the financial 
service industry. It may even be a necessary step to introduce new definitions as it has been 
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done in the UK for so many years. It may be concluded that if e-money may create a need for 
revision of monetary aggregates then, central banks including the BOE have enough experience 
to do so. 
The Role of Money in the UK Monetary Policy: It was 1970 when Goodhart and 
Crockett concluded that to the extent that price stability ceases to be an accepted norm, and 
expectations of inflation, or even accelerating inflation become wide spread, this claim that the 
rate of growth of the money stock may be a better indicator of the direction of policy, than the 
level of interest rate takes on merit. But because there will always be multiple objectives -for 
example the balance of payments, the level of employment, the distribution of expenditure etc: 
no single statistic can possibly provide an adequate and comprehensive indicator of policy. 
After 27 years, Astley and Haldane, (1997) confirmed that money still has an important role to 
play, over both short and medium-run horizons, when gauging incipient inflationary pressures- 
as originally intimated by Goodhart and Crockett. They, on the other hand, found out that 
monetary aggregates have in the recent past not offered sufficient robust early-warning signals. 
Although information was found in money, it may not be a reliable indicator on itself as other 
indicators could provide information as well. These other indicators are recently analysed in the 
Inflation Report of the BOE in detail. It may be argued, as a result, that the role of the monetary 
aggregates is best seen as a complement to, and sometimes no more than a corroboration of, the 
messages from other indicators. 
Breedon F. J. and Fisher P. G. (1993) looked at the leading indicator properties of MO as 
base money with respect to inflation and found out that it is remarkably robust. They, on the 
other hand, argued that it is difficult to formulate to a clear structural story, which explains the 
link between MO and inflation. Relating to broad money, Thomas (1996) concluded that it 
continues to be an important variable in the assessment of inflationary pressures. But, because 
the transmission of both nominal and real shocks to the rest of the economy involves a complex 
interaction between money, credit, interest rate and nominal activity, the message it conveys is 
often difficult to disentangle. 
From the above discussions relating to the role of money, it seems that money is still 
given importance in the analysis of inflation and it plays a role in monetary policy as Inflation 
Report discusses monetary issues in a separate section. But, instead of discussing monetary 
aggregates as defined, disaggregating money into personal and corporate balances and 
calculating Divisia Index in order to clarify liquidity properties of different components has 
become more useful in understanding the real functioning on money in the UK economy. For 
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example, the MPC places less weight on an increase in broad money if it is related to the build 
up of cash by other financial institutions (OFIs) as it is likely to have little implication for 
aggregate demand. Conversely, an increase in broad money due to large increases in consumer 
credit would be seen as an important signal of inflationary pressure. 
Back to the money multiplier, Berentsen (1997) investigated implications of e-money 
for it and argued that the liquidity effect of a conversion of central bank money into e-money 
balances depends on whether reserve requirements are in place. It was assumed that with 
reserve requirements, the marginal rate of return on loans is larger than the marginal cost of 
deposits. In the UK monetary policy framework, there is no binding reserve requirement other 
than a small proportion as cash ratio deposits. The author also demonstrated that the potential 
effect might mostly influence the conversion on narrow money. It was argued that if e-money 
balances are not included in the definition of narrow money, monetary base might either 
increase or decrease depending on whether the decrease in central bank money outweighs the 
increase in deposits. 
In summary, the impact of e-money on base money and the money multiplier depends 
on the way e-money balances have been integrated to the monetary aggregates. What is clear is 
that e-money issuance will complicate the calculation of base money and therefore the money 
mutliplier. This will be the complicating factor for a central bank (such as the ECß) that targets 
monetary aggregates in conducting monetary policy. And it will complicate the "indicator" 
properties of multiplier analysis even for a central bank that uses aggregates as leading 
indicators rather than targets. 
As the Bundesbank has already started to add e-money balances to the coverage of 
monetary base, a general agreement for the nature of e-money may come closer. The main 
influence may be reflected on central banks balance sheet because as e-money replaces 
currency in circulation, the balance sheet may shrink. The BOE balance sheet is almost ideal to 
analyse such a phenomenon, because it separates Issue and Banking Departments and it lets to 
analyse central banking and money printing business differently. Below is the last version of 
Bank Return, which is published weekly on the Internet: 
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TABLE 7.2.1: THE BOE' S BANK RETURN: ISSUE DEPARTMENT 
Notes In Circulation......... 26.568.995.005 Government Securities....... 13.493.719.965 
Notes in Banking Department 
. 
11.004.995 Other Securities 
............... 
13.086.280.035 
Total 
........................... 
26.5 80.000.000 Total 
........................... 
26.5 80.000.000 
Source: http: //www. bankotengland. co. uk/bankreturn/001011. pdf as of 12"' Oct 2000. 
It may be argued that e-money may mainly influence Issue Department's part of the 
BOE's balance sheet. As a central bank that is targeting the inflation rate directly instead of 
favouring intermediate monetary targets, Banking Department part of the balance sheet may 
still support monetary policy instruments. The next table shows the Banking Department part of 
the balance sheet. 
TABLE 7.2.2: BOE'S BANK RETURN: BANKING DEPARTMENT 
Capital 
............................... 
14.553.000 Government Securities........ 1.501.752.573 
Public Deposits 
................... 
400.833.591 Advances...................... 37.714.681.204 
Banker's Deposits 
.............. 
1.443.175.360 Premises & Equipment 
........ 
2.635.539'. -249 
Reserves 
....................... 
40.004.448.880 Notes & Coin...................... 11.040.805 
Total 
........................... 
41.863.010.831 Total........................... 41.863.010.831 
source: nnp: uwww. DanKOiengiana. co. wvnanKretunvuulol 1. pdf as of 12"' Oct 2000. 
Under normal circumstances, total daily intervention of the BOE in the open markets 
seems not to exceed £2 billion. On average, it may be argued that it stands around £1 billion. 
As a result, even if e-money replaces all the banknote and coins in circulation, the Bank may be 
able to conduct monetary policy without any serious difficulty. 
It may be worth looking at the operating expenses of the BOE here in order to analyse 
the sustainability of a central bank without currency circulation by looking at the profitability 
of banking and issue departments of the BOE separately: 
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CHART 7.2.4: THE BOE PROFIT TRANSFERS TO HM TREASURY 
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Above chart exhibits the total profit transferred by the BOE to HM Treasury. In general, 
all the profit from issuing department has been transferred without any deduction but this is not 
the case for banking department as some of the profit (agreed in advance with the consultation 
with HM Treasury) has been retained. Even so, the amount of profit transferred to the Treasury 
from banking department has reached to a level more than £10 million in 1982 and recently it is 
£70 million for 1998 and 1999 both. These numbers may be interpreted as the reality that 
central banks can make profit without issuing currency and still afford to finance their 
operational expenses. 
In this respect, it seems that multiplier analysis approach to the conduct of monetary 
policy may be ignored under representative issuance of e-money. This is because central banks 
can set interest rates as an alternative to monetary base control. This is important given that the 
definition of base money would be complicated by e-money issuance. That said, the impact of 
e-money on the monetary base and therefore the money multiplier may complicate the 
"indicator" properties of money supply so that central banks may place even less weight on 
monetary indicators to gauge inflationary pressure on the economy. 
In addition, central banks through their activities in their banking departments are able 
to generate enough revenue to sustain their financial independence. This suggests that fears that 
central banks will lose their operational independence because of the shrinkage of their 
revenues (leaving them dependent on government support) is unfounded. 
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7.2.3. VELOCITY IMPLICATIONS OF E-MONEY 
Anna J. Schwartz defined the income velocity of money in Foreword to Bordo and 
Jonung (1987) as the ratio of the money value of income to the average money stock that the 
non-bank public holds in a given period. Velocity is in general calculated on a yearly basis. 
Different money stock definitions (monetary aggregates) need different calculations. 
The importance of velocity in monetary policy arises from the fact that unless velocity 
is calculated correctly, successful monetary targeting in order to reach a particular level of 
inflation is impossible because as velocity changes, money base necessary for a particular level 
of output and inflation fluctuates. In this section how e-money issuance may complicate the 
calculation of velocity and therefore the conduct of monetary policy will be considered. 
Bordo and Jonung (1987) discussed the long-run behaviour of the income velocity of 
`broad' money showing that velocity has exhibited a secular U-shaped pattern over the past 
century prominently in the US, Norway, Canada and Sweden. The monetisation process 
consisting of two interrelated developments reflecting the spread of money economy was given 
as explanation of the downward trend: the growing use of money as medium of exchange in 
expense of barter and the rise of a commercial banking system supplying the public with 
banknotes. Upward trend of velocity was explained by financial sophistication referring to the 
emergence of money substitute and the developments of methods of economising on cash 
balances and to improved economic stability. The institutional variables used by Bordo and 
Jonung (1987) were: 
" 
As a measure of monetisation process, the share of labour force in non-agricultural pursuits. 
" 
As a measure of the spread of the commercial banking, the currency-money ratio. 
" 
As a measure of financial development, the ratio of total non-bank financial assets to 
financial assets. 
" 
As a measure of the influence of growing economic stability, a six-year moving standard 
deviation of the annual percentage change in real per capita income. As an alternative, total 
government expenditures both including and excluding defence expenditures as a share of 
the national income. 
Capie and Wood (1986) contributed to the literature with three possibilities that have to 
be kept in mind in a study of the behaviour of velocity over the longer term. First one was that 
any apparent path might be chance 
-the accidental by-product of changes in tastes. Second one 
was that the `trend' may be the result of movements in the variables, which normally enter the 
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demand function 
-income and interest rates and finally, institutional factors might have exerted 
a systematic long run influence. They found no evidence to support a secular U-shaped velocity 
pattern for the UK, a result that is the same as Bordo and Jonung (1987). The explanations to 
this result were given as because banking was well advanced in the UK before 1870 and 
because explanations to the behaviour of velocity in the UK between 1870 and 1980 must be 
sought along the conventional money demand lines. Institutional factors that were taken into 
account in this study were, urbanisation, the currency/deposit ratio, the number of bank 
branches, bank deposits per head, the number of cheque clearings per head, the growth of 
building society deposits, life insurance premiums and pension funds, the growth of the amount 
of government securities, the growth of credit finance companies, six yearly moving average 
standard deviation of the annual percentage change in national income per head and the 
percentage of GNP spent on social services. 
A very important aspect of velocity was pointed out by Capie and Wood (1986) by 
noting that the emergence of money substitutes is likely to impinge rather more sharply on the 
velocity of the narrow aggregate. It was argued that it is quite possible that substitution affect 
may be too small to be seen for broad aggregate. As a result, it may be concluded that e-money 
will first of all have an influence on MO for the UK. Consequently, velocity analysis in this 
study will concentrate on narrow money namely MO from then on. 
There is more than one research and working papers among the BOE publications on 
the analysis of MO in the last couple of decades. For example, Trundle and Temperton (1982) 
investigated changes in the use of cash in the UK and argued that the total level of cash 
balances held by the public is demand-determined and only insignificant amount of cash held 
overseas84. The authors concluded that cost of making non-cash payments would be the main 
determinant for demand for cash and the sections of the population with a bank account would 
be a barrier for a potential cash-less society. 
Breedon and Fisher (1993) confirmed the leading indicator properties of MO for 
inflation and investigated the trend in velocity describing that since the Second World War, it 
has been rising. Rising trend was explained within two stages: First, as the fall in the cash- 
84 They named the factors that influence demand as high nominal interest rates to economise on cash balances, 
rising unemployment with decreased earnings through unemployment benefits, the exchange rate to effect 
speculative demand for foreign currencies and the use of banking services reflected in the increasing proportion of 
wages and salaries that are paid directly into bank accounts. Factors like the introduction of cheque guarantee 
cards, credit cards and cash dispensers to decrease the amount of cash to meet unexpected transactions were 
addressed, too. 
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financed part of the economy due to the increases in national output and second as the payment 
systems technology developments to decrease demand for cash for transaction purposes. 
Janssen (1996) discussed the downward trend in MO velocity that became a new trend 
since 1990. The new trend was explained by a slowdown in cost-saving financial innovations in 
payments technology in recent years and by the move to a lower inflation in the 1990s85. 
Janssen (1998) discussed the effects of the switch away from salaries being paid in cash, easier 
access to cash from financial institutions, the increase in the proportion of the population with 
bank accounts and the introduction of non-cash payment mechanisms like credit and debit 
cards on MO velocity and reached similar results to Janssen (1996)86. The author assumed that 
after 1992 with direct inflation targeting, the UK economy became a lower and less variable 
inflation and lower nominal interest rates economy. 
Some of the implications of the above literature for the analysis of e-money may be 
seen as quite helpful. First of all, MO velocity seems to be affected by many factors other than 
transaction demand for money and recent level of payment technology may have reached to its 
potential. Secondly, the effects of e-money on MO velocity may not be so strong at the 
beginning stage of the technology as it was observed in other financial innovations. Lastly, MO 
velocity is still expected to increase in the long run due to further financial innovation both 
excluding and including e-money due to, for example, cash-back transactions in more outlets 
other than supermarkets. 
Regarding to the current trends in velocity in the UK economy, below chart may help to 
enrich the analysis: 
gs The percentage of employees paid in cash in the UK was around 60 percent in 1976 and it decreased to around 
20 percent in 1988 but from that time, there was no real change in that proportion. The same trend was observed 
for the percentage of adults with a current account, which was slightly above 40 percent in 1976, around 70 
percent in 1988 and since then it only reached to a level of 80 percent. According to 1994 figures, it was found out 
that the number of credit, debit and cheque cards in UK is equal to the number of adults. However, some adults 
may have more than one card. Two observations according to above trends were summarised by the author. One is 
that financial innovation takes a long time to reach full market coverage. The other is that recent pace of financial 
innovation slowed significantly. It was concluded that the proportion of adults being paid in cash could fall further 
and access to a current account facility may be available to more customers, but new proposals such as e-money 
are unlikely to have much effect in the near future. Janssen (1996). 
96 Janssen (1996) gave three additional channels to lead to an increase in the demand for MO. The first one was 
given as lower nominal interest rates lead to an increase in the demand for narrow money by reducing opportunity 
costs of holding cash balances relative to interest-bearing money. The second one was given as lower inflation and 
interest rates may increase the interest semi-elasticity of narrow money demand. The third one was given as lower 
and less variable inflation may also affect the demand for MO separately by reducing the opportunity cost of cash 
relative to real goods. 
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CHART 7.2.5: MO (MONETARY BASE) VELOCITY IN THE UK 
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As the chart indicates, the increase in the velocity seems to have stopped after 1990. On 
the literature cited on this section, many different reasons were given. Cash has been used for 
so and so many different transactions from supermarket shopping to a single egg in a very 
small village at the top of nowhere and digitalisation of all but only all potential transactions 
can make cash-less society a reality. As a result, it may be concluded that exaggerations on the 
assumptions for the monetary base velocity should be avoided. 
With e-money added to this picture, there are different possibilities under different 
definitions. If e-money only replaces currency in circulation, then there may be no direct 
influence when e-money balances is added to the monetary base. Because this only means a 
perfect substitution of banknotes and coins in circulation for electronic bits and bites presenting 
exact purchasing power of conventional money that was being replaced. In this scenario, it is 
obviously assumed that e-money does not create an alternative medium of exchange (not 
independent or competitive) but it represent national (or international in case of Euro) 
conventional money (representative) without creating no further purchasing power into 
circulation. 
If e-money not only replaces banknotes and coins in circulation but can also replace 
deposits, especially demand deposits held for transaction purposes, then; it may even decrease 
velocity when e-money balances is added to the monetary base. The reason for this is that 
demand deposits are not traditionally added to monetary base in most cases. When e-money 
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can provide perfect substitutes for demand deposits for transaction purposes, then, a part of 
total money supply will be covered by monetary base aggregate and as a result monetary base 
weight in total money supply will increase. Consequently, velocity will show a downward trend 
as soon as e-money starts to replace demand deposits held for transaction purposes. This 
analysis does not cover potential currency hoarding and demand for banknotes from 
unregistered economy, so called shadow economy. 
On the other hand, if financial authorities do not add e-money balances to monetary 
base calculations, then as conventional monetary base goes close to zero with full replacement, 
velocity goes closer to infinity. This option may be regarded as a very low probability as 
Bundesbank has already started to add e-money balances to monetary base calculations. The 
main mistake here may arise when monetary authorities fail to realise alternative medium of 
exchange entering to their economic zone. If e-money does not represent conventional money 
already in circulation but comes as a competing or alternative medium of exchange, then; 
monetary authorities should think about how to calculate real level of monetary base in the 
given economic zone with implications on free banking (Section 7.1) Below chart shows 
CHART 7.2.6: MONETARY BASE PER PERSON 
500 
450 
400 
350 
300 
kuI 250 
200 
150 
100 
50 
1110 / POPULATION 
Data Source: The DOG, Datastream and Ecnomic Trends (ONS) 
6ý ^y to P CO, 
`ý+ý ` ``ý, 
1' 
`` 
aý`' ` apl° ý+1 , cýý YEARS 
°f 
current level of banknotes per person in the UK since 1970. 
The chart indicates that average holding of banknotes and coins in circulation per 
person in the UK has reached to a level of £500. The number may seem quite high as average 
household is expected to hold around £50 to £100 at any time. But, this latter range ignores 
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commercial and retail holdings of banknotes such as corner shops and pubs. There may be 
demand for idle cash for liquidity reasons from small companies and there may be currency 
hoarding. In one way or another, there seems to be an abnormal level of currency in circulation 
per head. In the UK economy, Trundle and Temperton (1982) found only insignificant amount 
of cash held overseas, opposite of a significant overseas demand for US dollar. There may also 
be a kind of demand for banknotes from unregistered economy but when there is a technology 
such as e-money, central banks may not be allowed to provide medium of exchange for 
unregistered economic activities as most of them may be accepted as illegal in the first place. 
It may be concluded that velocity may be effected by e-money developments but the 
direction of this potential influence seems directly related to accounting techniques that will be 
implemented on e-money balances. It may not be right to argue whether velocity will be 
increased or decreased by e-money replacement of conventional money. Because the final 
effect totally depends on the aggregation techniques and on the potential of e-money to replace 
only banknotes in circulation, or replace both currency in circulation and demand deposits. 
7.2.4. MONETARY POLICY, E-MONEY AND TIIE BOE 
It may be worth mentioning some current developments on monetary policy with regard 
to money multiplier and velocity implications of e-money by looking at the current monetary 
policy framework in the UK. First of all, without predictable velocity, conduct of monetary 
policy may not be successful under monetary targeting. The Bundesbank of Germany with a 
predictable velocity has implemented a successful monetary targeting in order to control 
inflation in the economy even missing targets many times whereas the BOE became 
unsuccessful on the control of inflation by using monetary targeting alternative during 1980s. 
Until the mid-1970's, monetary policy in UK was based on a subsidiary supportive role 
to fiscal policy. Demand management techniques were used to `fine-tune' the economy. It was 
after the 1976 international payments problems and pressure from International Monetary Fund 
(arising from the substantial amounts of foreign currency borrowed) that more positive role was 
adopted for monetary policy in this country. In 1979, primary policy objective became the 
defeat of inflation through a strict control of money supply growth. The Medium Term 
Financial Strategy was introduced in 1980 with an aim to reduce inflation, the proportion of 
national resources taken by for public sector use and the burden of taxation on income in order 
to boost entrepreneurship and encourage long-term economic growth (Goacher, 1993). 
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Monetary aggregate targeting started in 1979-80 as £M3 was targeted to grow within a 
range of 7-11 %. A year later, a projection was given for the following four years updating the 
ranges every year. In 1982, two more aggregates were targeted as being M1 and PSL2 just for 
two years. In 1984, MO was included in targets as M1 and PSL2 were excluded. £M3 was not a 
target after 1986 leaving only MO. Lipsey and Chrystal (1995) provided a summary of targets 
and actual growths in aggregates: The two years that £M3 target was achieved were in 1982/83 
and in 1983/84, which were the only success relating to monetary targeting87 for £M3, M1 and 
PSL2. MO growth, on the other hand, was in the targeted ranges almost every year. 
Although monetary targeting was still announced after the mid-80s; during the second 
half of the 1980s, sterling exchange rate movements became more influential in monetary 
policy decision making process with an ultimate step in October 1990 being the placing of 
sterling in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Until 1992, the objective of the monetary 
policy was to achieve a pre-determined exchange rate leaving money supply growth as just 
observed indicators. The aim, although never announced, was to keep sterling exchange rate 
around 3 Deutsche Mark at most, and lock in to Germany's enviable record of sustained low 
inflation. (Goacher 1993) (George, 1997a). 
In September 1992, sterling was withdrawn from ERM and in October 1992, direct 
inflation targeting without any intermediate targets became the new framework of monetary 
policy. The target range was chosen as 1% -4% for RPIX with the further objective of being in 
the lower part of that range by the end of the Parliament. It was revised in June 1996 as `2.5 % 
or less' again measured by RPIX. This objective was valid until the recent changes in the 
monetary policy framework. On the evolution of policy framework, it was argued that during 
1980, there was no stable short-term relationship between money growth and nominal income 
or inflation. (George, 1997a). 
"Definitions of monetary aggregates targeted during the period were defined by the B0E (1982): M1 
-Notes and 
coin in circulation with the public + Private sector non-interest bearing sterling sight bank deposits. + Private 
sector interest bearing sterling sight bank deposits. Sterling M3 - MI + Private sector sterling time bank 
deposits-original maturity of up to two years + Private sector holdings of sterling certificates of deposits. + Private 
sector sterling time bank deposits- original maturity of over two years. + Public sector sterling sight and time bank 
deposits. PSL2 = M1 + Private sector sterling time bank deposits- original maturity of up to two years + Private 
sector holdings of sterling certificates of deposits + Private sector holdings of money-market instruments (bank 
bills, Treasury bills, local authority deposits) and certificates of tax deposits + Private sector holdings of building 
society deposits (excluding term shares and SAYE) and national savings instruments (excluding certificates, 
SAYE and other longer-term deposits) 
- 
Building society holdings of money-market instruments and bank deposits 
etc. This item is excluded from the summation of the all items listed above. 
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The table below looks at the monetary aggregating targeting in the UK and the actual 
results. 
TABLE 7.2.3: MONETARY TARGETS UNDER MEDIUM TERM FINANCIAL STRATEGY 
TARGET YEAR 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 ACTUAL 
£M3 
1979/80 7-11 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85 
1985/86 
1986/87 
1987/88 
1988/89 
MI AND PSL2 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85 
1985/86 
MO 
1984/85 
1985/86 
1986/87 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1991/92 
1992/93 
1993/94 
16.2 
7-11 18.4 
6-10 6-10 12.8 
5-9 5-9 8-12 11.1 
4-8 4-8 7-11 7-11 9.5 
6-11 6-10 6-10 11.9 
5-9 5-9 5-9 16.3 
4-8 4-8 11-15 18.7 
3-7 3-7 
2-6 2-6 
1982 1983 M1 PSL2 
8-12 12.3 11.5 
7-11 7-11 14.0 12.4 
6-10 6-10 
5-9 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 ACTUAL 
4-8 5.4 
3-7 3-7 4.1 
2-6 2-6 2-6 3.5 
1-5 1-5 2-6 2-6 6.4 
0-4 0-4 1-5 1-5 1-5 6.8 
1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 5.0 
0-4 0-4 0-4 1-5 3.2 
0-4 0-4 0-4 1.2 
-1-3 0-4 5.1 
-1-3 6.8 
Another option for monetary policy framework may be direct inflation targeting without 
relying on intermediate targets. This may be accepted as the current trend among central banks 
as more banks leave monetary targeting in favour of inflation targeting. This may be assumed 
as in-advance preparation for a world of e-money. Additionally, as central banks become more 
successful on direct inflation targeting, their reaction may soften against e-money as they get 
convinced that inflation control is possible without clear monetary targeting and without a 
predictable velocity. 
228 
The New Bank of England: It was argued that 1998 is a year of the most important 
after the nationalisation of the BOE in 1946 (Rodgers, 1997). There have been a lot of changes 
both in the governance of the Bank and the framework of monetary policy. Here, the 
developments in 1998 will be summarised, and the new monetary policy framework including 
the monetary transmission mechanism will be addressed. The aim of this section is to 
understand the recent functions of money and its place in monetary policy framework in the 
UK and to find out the influences of e-money developments in this framework. 
Changes with the new BOE Act, which received Royal Accent on 23 April 1998 and 
came into force on 1 June 1998, were summarised by Rodgers (1998) as: 
1. A statutory basis for the functions of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). 
2. Transfer of the responsibility for the supervision and surveillance of banks from the BOE 
(BOE) to the FSA but the Bank still remains responsible for the overall stability of the 
financial system. 
3. Changes in the governance of the BOE as the new Act reforms the constitution, 
composition and duties of Court and the Bank's Board of Directors. 
4. New Provisions relating to the funding, the accounts and the profits of the Bank. Cash Ratio 
Deposits (CDRs)-money that commercial banks place interest-free with the Bank to finance 
its operations by investing in money markets- became statutory and covers institutions 
authorised under the Banking Act 1987, European Bank Branches and Building Societies. 
The Bank's dividend to the Treasury is determined as 50 % of post-tax profits for the 
previous financial year or `such other sum as the Treasury and the Bank may agree'. 
5. Collection of the monetary statistics by the Bank is backed by legislation for the first time. 
6. Transfer of debt management from the Bank to the Treasury. (Including Government's cash 
management). 
7. Publication of the Bank's Inflation Report each quarter became a statutory requirement as a 
means of setting out and justifying the Bank's analysis of the economy, and of explaining 
how the Bank intends to meet inflation target and support the Government's economic 
policy. 
Among above changes, maybe the most influential one is the formation of the MPC as a 
decision-making mechanism for the short-term interest rate, which is recently the single 
instrument for monetary policy (George, 1998b). With the creation of the MPC, the Bank has 
full operational independence. Core purposes of the BOE, according to the 1998 Annual Report 
and Accounts, are: 
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1. Maintaining the integrity and value of the currency: This involves above all maintaining 
price stability, as defined by the inflation target set by the Government, as a precondition 
for achieving the wider economic goals of sustainable growth and employment. 
2. Maintaining the stability of the financial system, both domestic and international. In 
exceptional circumstances, in consultation with the FSA and HM Treasury as appropriate, 
the Bank may also provide, or assist in arranging, last resort financial support where this is 
needed to avoid systemic damage. 
3. Seeking to ensure the effectiveness of the UK's financial services. 
The aim of above mentioned core purposes is to achieve the main objective of the BOE 
as defined by the Act 1998: 
(a) to maintain price stability, and 
(b) subject to that, to support the economic policy of Her Majesty's Government, including its 
objectives for growth and employment. 
The definition of price stability is left to the Government and needs to be confirmed at 
least once in every period of 12 months. This requirement confirms that the BOE has no goal 
independence. For 1998, the Bank was given a price stability target of 2.5 %88 for retail price 
inflation excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX) measured by the 12-month increase. 
The MPC is required to achieve above-mentioned target for which it will also be 
accountable by adjusting short-term interest rates accordingly. The MPC meeting process has 
been continuing to shape but recent process is explained by George (1997b, 1998a, 1998b), 
Rodgers (1997,1998) and Budd (1998). The MPC members are presented a detailed 
information (generally by economists of the Bank working on monetary analysis and markets 
area) about; monetary conditions, demand and output, labour market, prices, financial markets, 
prospects for inflation. The MPC members are supported by the whole range of the Bank's 
monetary, economic, statistics and market expertise, supplemented by the intelligence from the 
Bank's network of twelve regional Agencies (Rodgers, 1997). 
The meeting results are expected being announced as soon as practicable with a 
statement as to whether it was decided at the meeting that the Bank should take any action. The 
88 No range was given for this target and if it moves away from the target for more than 1% in either direction, the 
Governor is required to write a letter to the Chancellor explaining; why inflation has moved away from the target 
by more than 1 percentage point; the policy action being taken to deal with it; the period within which inflation is 
expected to return to the target; how this approach meets the Government's monetary policy objectives. (Budd, 
1998). The letter would refer to Inflation Report, too. The measure of the Bank's success will be how close RPIX 
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MPC normally (with a few exceptions) meets every month on Wednesday and Thursday 
following the first Monday of each month and announce the decision reserving the right to 
delay announcement of a decision to intervene in financial markets if it is believed that the 
announcement may negatively effect the success of a possible intervention. (Budd, 1998). The 
MPC is required to publish minutes of its meetings within six weeks. The publication is 
expected to include the voting reference of members who took part in the vote on the decision. 
Recently, it is published two weeks after the meeting. 
The BOE Act 1998 makes a statutory requirement to prepare and publish a quarterly 
Inflation Report as a means of explaining the Bank's intentions to meet the inflation target and 
support the Government's economic policy. The report is expected to contain (i) a review of the 
monetary policy decisions published by the Bank in the period to which the report relates, (ii) 
an assessment of the developments in inflation in the economy of the UK in the period to which 
the report relates, and (iii) an indication of the expected approach to meeting the Bank's 
objectives. The inflation report legally needs the approval of the MPC, as it is the responsible 
committee for inflation rate objective. 
Accountability of the MPC and the BOE: The BOE is accountable to the House of 
Commons through Treasury Select Committee, that can also hold hearings on the appointments 
of the MPC members. The accountability is measured by the reports and evidence given to 
House of Commons through Treasury Select Committee. The Chancellor lays the annual report 
of the Bank (it is a legal requirement to be published by the Bank including the balance sheet 
and profit and loss account) before the Parliament for a debate (Rodgers, 1997 and 1998). 
Economic entities measure the accountability of the Bank through the transparency of 
the monetary policy discussed and published on Minutes of the MPC Meetings and Inflation 
Report. It may be argued that it is easier to monitor the performance of the Bank after the 
clarification of the inflation target with an operational independence. King (1997) argued 5 
ways of the Bank's accountability. Firstly, the MPC announces a decision after every meeting 
and minutes of meetings are published within six weeks. Secondly, the Inflation Report gives 
information to outsider commentators to judge the MPC explanations. Thirdly, after the 
publication of each inflation report, a member of the MPC may be asked to appear before the 
Treasury Select Committee (TSC) which makes it possible for the TSC to hold the Bank to 
comes to 2.5 % on average over time as the Treasury said that it expected the same target to remain in force for at least the current Parliament (Rodgers, 1998). 
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account for its own actions. Fourthly, the MPC is required to reveal in public its proposed 
reaction to large shocks, which is measured by 1% changes in inflation rate in either side of the 
main target. Finally, the Court of the Bank is required to report annually to Parliament on the 
conduct of the MPC and Parliament debates the Annual Report of the Bank. 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism in the UK: Another issue about monetary policy 
and e-money is the transmission mechanism analysis within a given economy. In economies 
such as Germany with a strong relation between money and economic activity especially in the 
short and medium run, monetary aggregates may fully provide leading indicators for the control 
of inflation. But, in countries such as the UK with technological development and financial 
sophistication, the relationship between money and economic activity may be unreliable and 
alternative techniques may be needed for the successful control of inflation. Currently preferred 
option for this is to define monetary transmission mechanism within the economy. Three broad 
mechanisms through which an increase in interest rates might operate were named by Easton 
and Stephenson (1990) as: 
1. The cost of borrowing by affecting the relative attractions of spending today and spending 
later. As saving becomes more attractive, present expenditure on consumption and/or 
investment goods falls. 
2. The effects on incomes and wealth depend on the balance between holding of interest- 
bearing assets and liabilities, and on the sensitivity of the relevant interest rates to the 
market conditions. The difference between interest receipts and interest payments 
determine the final affect. There is another mechanism that comes from the influence of 
interest rates on the value of certain assets such as housing, equities and government stocks. 
As values of these assets tend to fall because of an interest rate rise, the reduction in wealth 
may tend to reduce personal expenditures. 
3. The last mechanism is that a rise in interest rates relative to other economies may lead to an 
exchange rate appreciation. As a result, import may increase while export may start to 
decrease depending on the level of relative price changes. The exchange rate mechanism is 
less clear when compared to cost of borrowing and income and wealth mechanism. 
It was suggested by Britton and Whitley (1997) that a change in interest rates would 
have a greater short-term output cost in the UK than France and Germany. 
From discussion in this section, general conclusions may be summarised as follows: 
1. In the UK, inflation targeting shapes the new monetary policy framework. 
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2. Money and monetary aggregates still play an important role in the economy but not as 
much as a target but only as a leading indicator complementary to several other indicators 
as discussed in the Inflation Report. 
3. The Bank has a limited (to overall stability) responsibility in supervision of financial sector 
and payment systems as this was transferred to the FSA. As a result, regulation of e-money 
products and services will be under the responsibility of that Authority, which informs the 
Bank about its activities in general. 
4. The influence of e-money may be observed on MO as it is generally expected that currency 
in circulation will be the main target of e-money products to replace in order to get a float 
earning. But, it may also influence M4 as the potential of e-money products develops. 
Because some of the components of M4 provide transaction services that may be replaced 
by those products. 
5. As the Bank is divided into two as Banking and Issue Departments, it may be easy to 
calculate a potential decrease in seigniorage revenues from banknote issue, as it can be 
calculated as the amount of profit that is gained by the Issue Department and transferred 
totally to the Treasury. It was above £1 billion for 1998. 
6. The potential influence of e-money on monetary policy seems to be analysed by the Bank 
when it is thought that it has a potential to influence decisions of Monetary Policy 
Committee. It will be up to the Committee Members to decide whether there is a need for 
policy action against e-money or not. 
Under the above mentioned monetary policy framework, the Bank does not take money 
into account as the only variable to be used in monetary policy judgements. As being 
experienced on financial deregulation and innovation since 1980s, it may be argued that the 
Bank may approach e-money developments relatively more liberally as compared to many 
other central banks such as the ECB with monetary targeting policies around the world. 
This is the analysis of how interest rate changes effect economic entities and different 
sectors. Once, monetary transmission mechanism is correctly found out, it may be easier to find 
out equilibrium level of short-term interest rates for the desired level of inflation, which is 2.5 
% in the case of the UK. The MPG prefers to analyse very different sets of data from all parts 
of the economy in order to decide on the level of short-term interest rate. Instead of relying on 
monetary aggregates, almost all economic data is put on the econometric models for simulation 
of data to reach reliable results on the conduct of economy. In fact, money does not have an 
exogenous (i. e. independent) role in the Bank's macro-econometric model. The new Bank Act 
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allows the BOE to reach to any kind of economic statistics that is believed to be relevant for the 
conduct of monetary policy. The Bank has legal support for data collection. 
It may be argued that e-money may allow extremely sophisticated data analysis 
techniques to develop. As electronic in nature, e-money may allow to create perfect sets of data 
and to eliminate unreliable data analysis that may mislead the settlement of short-term interest 
rate. It is not only macroeconomic data that e-money may increase both quantity and quality 
but even microeconomic data may enter to the picture in order to increase reliability of 
monetary transmission mechanism techniques on the conduct of monetary policy. 
On the shrinkage of central bank balance sheet, it may be argued that currency in 
circulation is not the only open market operation tool available to a central bank. Daily liquidity 
management may be conducted with very different instruments like increasing or decreasing 
reserve requirements, buying or selling foreign exchange and buying and selling bills and 
bonds. Under normal circumstances, total amount of daily operations has no big impact on the 
total balance sheet, as daily operations constitute only a small amount of total assets. Under 
abnormal circumstances, even the strongest balance sheet may not support the control of a 
financial crisis. It may as a result, be concluded that e-money is no threat for the conduct of 
monetary policy because even without e-money, central banks such as the BOE has already 
implemented a successful monetary policy by directly targeting inflation. By using monetary 
transmission mechanism techniques, it has become possible to support sustainability of 
financial and monetary stability. Money multiplier analysis may still be a very helpful tool to 
analyse monetary aggregates' behaviour and it may be worth looking at the developments on 
the velocity; but; their role on the conduct of monetary policy seem to have diminished in any 
case regardless of the introduction of e-money. 
In the current analysis of the monetary transmission mechanism in the UK, the BOE 
argued that, even the money supply play an important role, it is not a monetary policy 
instrument. But monetary aggregates are still important indicators especially for the long run 
analysis because, sustained increases in prices cannot occur without accompanying increases in 
the monetary aggregates. The Bank successfully conducts the monetary policy through the 
short-term interest rate as the private sector is due to pay money to the Bank at the end of every 
each day. They have to borrow. The shortage is almost guaranteed by the operations in the 
weekly or ad hoc Treasury bill auctions by the Debt Management Office as part of cash 
management transactions. The way interest rate influences other economic variables in the UK 
is summarised in this figure: 
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FIGURE 7.2.1: THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM OF MONETARY POLICY IN THE UK 
The next section will provide the official respond of the BOE to e-money in the form of 
an answer to a questionnaire that was sent to the Bank: 
7.2.5 APPENDIX: A QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE BOE ON E- MONEY 
Submitted to: Christopher J. Bailey, Deputy Secretary, The BOE; Responded by: Jill Paterson, 
Market Infrastructure Division and Edward Nelson, Monetary Assessment and Strategy 
Division HO-2; December, 1999) 
Question 1: How does the Bank of England (BOE) define electronic money (e-money)? 
Answer: The Bank refers to 'electronic money' as stored value or pre paid products which 
allow customers to make small-value transactions using chip or smart cards, or over computer 
networks such as the internet: products which are intended to be used as a general, multi- 
purpose means of payment, rather than single purpose schemes. 
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Source: The BOE; "The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy" April 1999 
Question 2: How does the BOE define an `e-money institution'? What type of 
institutions will the BOE monitor or impose surveillance and/or regulation on, with regard to 
the issuance and/or operation procedures of e-money products? 
Answer: The FSA is monitoring e-money developments and is considering how it would treat e- 
money issuers, how the proposed EU legislation to be carried into UK law. In the meantime, 
where a bank is involved in an e-money scheme, the FSA takes into account the overall effect 
that this involvement has on the bank's risk exposures. 
Question 3: What is the legal framework for the regulation of e-money and e-money 
institutions in the UK? Which current laws and regulations apply to them? What future changes 
and amendments may be at the legal enforcement agenda? 
Answer: Proposers of schemes which were not to be operated by banks are advised to 
approach the Bank of England and the FSA supervisors at an early stage. They would be 
encouraged to take their own legal advice on the question of whether their particular product 
fell within the 1987 Banking Act. As the law currently stands, issuers of products which do not 
represent deposit-taking (within the meaning of the Act) are not subject to supervision, except 
where they are owned by commercial banks and thus subject to consolidated supervision. It has 
been established that the issue of electronic money does not contravene the 1844 Bank Charter 
Act, which made the new issue of notes in England and Wales a monopoly of the central bank. 
Question 4: Did the BOE ever supervise and/or regulate an e-money institution up to now? 
Answer: Since 1 June 1998, the Bank of England has no longer been responsible for the 
prudential supervision of banks. The statutory responsibility for supervision passed to a new 
body, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which is responsible for the regulation of all 
financial services activities including insurance, securities trading, investment management 
and building societies. 
Question 5: What kind of supervisory and/or regulatory role with regard to e-money and 
e-money institutions is left to the BOE after the establishment of the FSA? 
Answer: The Bank of England retains its role in monitoring overall systemic stability. The 
Bank and FSA co-operate closely on electronic money policy. 
Question 6: Which of the currently existing e-money trials and/or institutions have been 
(or will be) monitored or supervised by the BOE? For example, are Mondex and Visa Cash 
treated as e-money institutions and monitored or regulated accordingly? 
Answer: The Bank has collected monthly data on e-money issued by banks since September 
1997. 
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Question 7: Is there any limits on the type of institutions that can issue e-money in the 
UK? Can supermarkets and/or insurance companies and/or telecommunication companies 
and/or digital television service providers issue e-money? 
Answer: The Bank will arrange to collect data on issues by non-banks if/when the amounts 
become material. The ECB's 1998 report on electronic money (ECB, 1998) recommended that 
the activity of issuing e-money should be restricted to credit institutions. The Bank of England 
does not accept that the regime for regulating credit institutions would necessarily be 
appropriate for all issuers of electronic money; the risks presented by this activity are of a 
different character to those encountered in general banking business. Such issues are under 
discussion in EU forums considering proposed EU legislation on this issue and the Bank has 
been involved in these discussions. 
Question 8: What is the division of responsibility and authority between FSA and the 
Bank of England on the regulation of e-money and e-money institutions? 
Answer: The Bank of England retains its role in monitoring overall systemic stability. The 
Bank and FSA co-operate closely on electronic money policy. 
Question 9: Which BOE Act declares pound sterling as `legal tender' and how is it 
being preserved? 
Answer: The 1844 Bank Charter Act made the new issue of notes in England and Wales a 
monopoly of the central bank. However it has been established that the issue of electronic 
money does not contravene the 1844 Bank Charter Act. 
Question 10: Does the BOE treat e-money balances as `bank deposits' that would be, as 
a result, subject to insurance protection? 
Answer: With regard to the Banking Act 1987, which restricts the taking of deposits to 
authorised institutions, the position of e-money schemes in general is not clear. Schemes set up 
in a certain way might fall under the Act, but many schemes are sufficiently unlike deposit 
taking to escape the Act's scope. At present, the Government is reviewing financial markets 
and services legislation as part of the process of transferring regulatory responsibilities from 
various organisations to the FSA. The position with regard to electronic money schemes will 
also be affected by forthcoming EU legislation. 
Question 11: How does the BOE co-operate with the ECB on the regulation of e- 
money? Does the BOE agree to the ECB requirements for the issuance of e-money, especially 
those concerning redeemability and reserve requirements? 
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Answer: The ECB's 1998 report on electronic money recommended that the activity of issuing 
e-money should be restricted to credit institutions. The Bank of England does not accept that 
the regime for regulating credit institutions would necessarily be appropriate for all issuers of 
electronic money; the risks presented by this activity are of a different character to those 
encountered in general banking business. Such issues are under discussion in EU forums 
considering proposed EU legislation on this issue and the Bank has been involved in these 
discussions. 
Question 12: Does the BOE have any initiative on the international co-operation for 
creating an internationally acceptable set of rules on the regulation of e-money and e-money 
institutions? 
Answer: The Bank agrees with the conclusions of the G-10 study on monetary policy 
undertaken during 1996. The Bank fully supports the conclusions of the G-10 Task Force on 
Security of Electronic Money. Issues (ECB 1998 Proposals) are under discussion in EUforums 
considering proposed EU legislation on this issue and the Bank has been involved in these 
discussions. Features that would make e- money products particularly attractive for money 
laundering include unlimited transferability (including via telephone or the Internet), a high or 
no limit on the value stored on cards, and anonymity of users. Strict adherence to "know your 
customer" criteria, and suitable "fit for purpose" limits will help to overcome the risk of 
money laundering on a significant scale. The provisions of the Money Laundering Regulations 
1993 
- 
which implement the EU Money Laundering Directive 
- 
apply to all forms of e-money. 
A second EU Money Laundering Directive is expected in the future and this is likely to make 
specific reference to e- money schemes. The FSA encourages prospective scheme providers to 
contact relevant law enforcement agencies. The Bank fully supports the conclusions of the G-10 
Task Force on Security of Electronic Money. An assessment of technical security and of 
systems and controls should be part of a banking supervisor's examination of an e-money 
system (possibly undertaken by external consultants specialising in the field). Products 
developed abroad could give rise to further issues if regulatory/security standards were lower. 
Question 13: Does the BOE collect any data on the issuance of e-money in the UK? If 
yes, since when? 
Answer: The Bank has collected monthly data on e-money issued by banks since September 
1997. The Bank has, to date, considered that, question of interoperability, standardisation and 
contracts with cardholders are best determined by market forces, but part of its monitoring role 
is to watch for evidence of market failure. 
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Question 14: How does the BOE evaluate e-money in the case of cash-ratio deposits? 
May e-money balances be subject to cash-ratio calculations? 
Answer: 
Question 15: Does the BOE include e-money balances into any monetary aggregate, 
especially MO? If not, are there any future plans to do so? 
Answer: 
Question 16: What may be the influence of a successful launch of a `network-based' e- 
money scheme such as Digicash on national regulatory approaches to e-money institutions 
(arising from the fact that a network-based e-money scheme is by definition international)? 
Answer: As yet no significant cross-border activity involving UK institutions or customers is 
taking place, although this may change in the future. In the case of EEA institutions using a 
passport to offer such services, supervision would largely be the responsibility of the home 
state regulator, once the proposed EU legislation comes into force. Any other foreign scheme 
being offered in the United Kingdom would be subject to the same treatment as domestic 
schemes. 
Question 17: What is the BOE's view on the alternative payment instruments, other 
than e-money, that may challenge `medium of exchange' function of money? For example, 
what may be the BOE's reaction to electronic gold in the UK? 
Answer: The Bank is in favour of developments, which increase the efficiency and convenience 
of payment systems, including electronic money. There may, however, be implications of such 
schemes for monetary policy, systemic risk consumer protection and law enforcement, and this 
need to be considered in detail. The Bank does not undertake detailed oversight of retail 
payment systems, and has no formal statutory power to do so. It is improbable that, in the 
short or even medium term, e-money systems will present greater concerns for the efficiency of 
payment systems than those presented by conventional retail systems such as the cheque 
clearing. However, the Bank will continue to monitor the potential risks posed by e-money 
settlement systems to the stability of other payment systems, notably in the case that counterfeit 
e-money were to be discovered. In a world of electronic transactions in real time; financial 
assets and real goods and services would be priced in terms of a unit of account. The choice of 
a unit of account (perhaps a commodity standard, which would produce broad stability in the 
price level) would be a matter for public choice and regulation, along the lines of existing 
weights and measures inspectors. Final settlement could be made without any recourse to the 
central bank. Only if the unit of account was managed would there be a role for a body such as 
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central bank Whether unit of account should be determined by a mechanical rule, as other 
weights and measures, or managed in a discretionary way depends on some deep issues about 
the nature of `nominal rigidities' in such an economy. 
Question 18: What may be the implications of e-money for the conduct of monetary 
policy in the UK? Does the Bank of England expect any necessary modifications to the 
monetary policy instrument because of a potential replacement of monetary base by c-money? 
Answer: Refer to the answer to Question 21. 
Question 19: What is the expectation of the BOE on the potential influence of e-money 
on the velocity of (monetary aggregate) MO? Might e-money also affect the velocity of M4? 
Answer: In so far as e-money reduces the fraction of transactions mediated through base 
money, the influence of e-money would be to raise the velocity of MO. However, e-money is 
only one possible factor that could affect MO velocity. MO velocity rose by approximately 50 
per cent in both the 1970s and 1980s, but was basically flat over the 1990s as a whole. This 
suggests that, if there has actually been any upward pressure on MO velocity from greater 
influence of e-money, it has so far been dominated by factors such as lower interest rates and 
lower inflation in the 1990s, which have tended to reduce MO velocity. 
Question 20: What might be the money multiplier implications of e-money? Does the IIOE 
expect any changes in the monetary policy transmission mechanism because of e-money? 
Answer: Due to the relationship between money multiplier and velocity, refer to answer to the 
Question 19. 
Question 21: What may be the implications of a full replacement of currency in 
circulation by e-money with regard to the conduct of monetary policy? May there be a need to 
change monetary policy instrument to sustain price stability? 
Answer: Electronic transactions in real time (with the help of technological innovation) hold 
out the possibility that advances in technology will mean that the arbitrary assumptions 
necessary to introduce money into rigorous theoretical models will become redundant, and that 
the world may come to a pure exchange economy. There is no reason, in principle, why final 
settlements could not be carried out by the private sector without the need for clearing through 
the central bank The practical implementation of such a system would require much greater 
computing power than is at present available. But, there is no conceptual obstacle to the idea 
that two individuals engaged in a transaction could settle by a transfer of wealth from one 
electronic account to another in the real time. Eligible assets would be any financial assets for 
which there were market clearing prices in real time. Without a role in settlements, central 
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banks, in their present form, would no longer exist. The need to limit excessive money creation 
would be replaced by a concern to ensure the integrity of the computer systems used for 
settlement purposes. A regulatory body to monitor such systems would be required. Existing 
regulators, including central banks, would no doubt compete for that responsibility. Moreover, 
in just the same way as the Internet is unaware of national boundaries, settlement facilities 
could become international. The key to any such development is the ability of computers to 
communicate in real time to permit instantaneous verification of the creditworthiness of the 
counterparts, thereby enabling private sector real time gross settlement to occur with finality. 
Any securities for which electronic markets exist could be used as part of the settlement 
process. There would be no unique role for base money, and hence the central bank monopoly 
of base money issue would have no value. Central Banks would lose their ability to implement 
monetary policy. The successor to Bill Gates would have put the successors to Alan Greenspan 
out of business. Societies have managed without central banks in the past. They may well do so 
again in the future. 
Question 22: What may be the influence of e-money on the BOE's balance sheet? 
Answer: The effect of e-money on monetary policy and on seigniorage revenues is likely to be 
negligible during its initial stages. 
Question 23: Does the BOE have any plan for the future to issue e-money, which may 
result in a direct competition with the financial service providers? 
Answer: No. 
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8. REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MONEY 
In this chapter, regulation of e-money will be analysed. As it is a new financial 
phenomenon, it may be expected to be one of the most challenging issue for regulatory 
agencies as they seem to be at the middle of a transforming stage as independent regulators has 
been created other than central banks. In the UK, for example, FSA has been given supervisory 
power, as the regulatory function of the BOE is limited to overall stability of the financial 
system. At the same time, international financial bodies such as the BIS seems to provide ever 
increasing proposals in addressing financial regulatory issues around the world. 
In the first part, there will be a summary for the arguments to regulate financial 
services, especially banks including the criticisms and counter arguments. In the second part, 
the separation of regulatory affairs in the UK among the FSA, the BOE and HM Treasury will 
be analysed. Section third will overview current approaches and trends to the regulation of e- 
money in different countries including current proposals relating the regulation of e-money. 
Section four will explore the FSA's analysis of e-money in the UK and its role in the European 
regulation regarding e-money including questionnaire and interview results. The final part will 
discuss whether e-money can technically be regulated or not. The end of the section will 
provide questionnaire and interview notes to explore the FSA's respond to the questions raised. 
8.1. REGULATION OF BANKS AND FINANCIAL SERVICES 
It may be argued that there is no generally agreed literature on the regulation of 
financial services. In this section, some of the basic arguments will be summarised with the 
help of recent literature. Lastra (1996) summarised general grounds to justify regulation of 
banking industry by a government. Seven different grounds were named by the author to justify 
government regulation of banking industry including first of all acceptance of general 
governmental responsibility for a stable and sound financial system resulting in an aim to 
control risk in banking business and in overseeing the payment systems. The second ground 
was named as the acceptance of governmental responsibility for the conduct of monetary policy 
resulting in a special treatment of deposits. The third ground was argued to be concerns relating 
to the safety and confidence of individual depositors and investors resulting in a special 
treatment of bank creditors. The fourth ground was mentioned as aims to limit concentration of 
financial resources and economic power. The fifth ground was underlined as concerns with the 
credit allocation to different sectors of the economy. The sixth ground was given as aims to 
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sustain national autonomy from international corporations and the final ground was put as 
historical interest in preserving particular types of financial institutions. Not all of these 
quantifications may directly be relevant but it may be generally agreed that regulation of 
banking arises basically from at least one of above. Consequently, those grounds may influence 
regulation of e-money as well. 
Lastra (1996) also gave an analysis of the characteristics of banking business, which is 
worth taking into account in this section. Because without understanding banking, it may 
be 
difficult to explain the reasons to regulate it at all. Additionally, these arguments are generally 
agreed within the central bank advocates although they are highly criticised by the free banking 
supporters. There seems to be three common characteristics in a typical bank's 
balance sheet in 
this sense: (i) The mismatch between assets and liabilities. (ii) Low capitalisation: Capital 
adequacy has even become an international issue nowadays as BIS renewed its directives with 
an aim to create an internationally accepted regulatory framework to be accepted in both 
national and international banking. (iii) Risky asset portfolios, banks might need to take into 
account the total amount of risk when deciding their desired level of return and regulators may 
need to check whether banks take excessive risk to disrupt safety and soundness of the financial 
system a whole. 
Bank supervision, which may be defined as the process of establishing rules both 
relating to acts of the legislator and statutory instruments or rules of the competent authorities, 
may be analysed in four stages namely licensing, supervision, sanctioning, and crisis 
management and bank regulation (Lastra, 1996). Maybe, licensing would be the critical issue in 
the regulation as it determines who will be allowed to do business in banking and when adapted 
to e-money, licensing will most probable play the critical role in determining the future. 
Because, licensing will determine whether e-money will strictly be restricted to financial 
institutions or non-bank institutions will be allowed for explorations of its potential as well. 
Prudential supervision may be executed through individual reports provided by the financial 
institutions. Ratings may be useful instrument as well both internal and/or independent 
external. The last two options for supervision named by the author are in-house surveillance 
and consultations with senior management and reporting from independent external auditors. 
Sanctioning part of supervision may also play a critical role especially against e-money 
because if e-money is accepted as a threat, different sanctions may be imposed to e-money 
operators even if they are licensed in advance. For example, full redemption of e-money 
balances against a national currency may function as a sanction as it may be used by regulators 
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as a treat as historical examples of free banking proved this kind of acts to be used in order to 
attack rivals. Relating to crisis' management phase of supervision Lastra (1996) named (i) 
lender of last resort function of central banks, (ii) deposit insurance schemes and (iii) bank 
insolvency procedures. Lender of last resort doctrine was based upon four pillars by the author: 
1. Lender of last resort is expected to prevent illiquid but solvent financial institutions from 
going bust just because of a temporary liquidity mismatch in the short-run. 
2. The lending should be free but with a penalty charge. 
3. Accommodation of financial institutions should be with good collateral and valued at pre- 
panic-prices. 
4. The readiness to lend freely should be declared in advance clearly. 
Two more operating principles were added to above four pillars as (i) lender of last 
resort function should not be mandatory but it should be discretionary and (ii) the lender of last 
resort should assess systemic risk potential in an operation in order to keep solvent banks from 
failing. 
According to the author, once a bank went bust, it may either be rescued by an agreed 
package or open bank assistance or it may be taken over or merged or it may be liquidated. 
Relating to a systemic problem in banking, alternatives were given to deal with the problem. 
They included direct government injection of capital, liquidation in a large scale of banking 
business, debt restructuring techniques, mix of government assistance and private assistance, 
and finally creation of a centralised agency in order to dispose assets of aided institutions 
(Lastra, 1996). 
Above analysis may be accepted as a general framework for financial regulation but 
dynamic analysis when thinking of financial regulation is more preferably. In a current study, 
Goodhart et al (1998) gave three reasons for public sector regulation including the protection of 
customers against monopolistic exploitation, to protect small and less informed clients against 
adverse selection and to sustain systemic stability of the financial system. Four main 
considerations were listed as being traditional rationales for bank regulation. The first 
consideration was named as banks critical position on clearing and payment systems. The 
second consideration was given as systemic risks namely bank runs. The third consideration 
was mentioned as term mismatch in bank contracts with short-term deposits to long-term 
lending and the final consideration was put as the risks of adverse selection and moral hazards 
arising from the lender of last resort executions and consumer protection schemes such as 
deposit insurance. 
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The answer to the question why banks are so special to attract more regulatory attention 
from the public sector was explained with a comparison of non-financial sector activities to 
banking activities. It was argued by the authors that non-banking financial services do not 
deserve so much regulatory pressure from central authorities because; (i) systemic risk does not 
arise in non-financial services; (ii) there is no contagion risk in non-bank businesses; (iii) 
payment systems are not at risk because of the non-bank activities; (iv) as there is generally no 
lender of last resort execution in non-bank business, there is no risk for moral hazard problems 
and (v) the main difference between security firms and banks in a regulatory perspective is that 
security firms may liquidate their assets easily in secondary markets (Goodhart et al, 1998). 
There may be some counter arguments to above reasoning according to current 
developments. For example, payment system risk may arise from telecommunication 
companies, as especially electronic payments are totally dependent on well functioning of 
telecommunication services. Even those companies are not banks, their functioning may have 
systemic characteristics. Additionally, LTCM operation of the FED may be a case for situations 
to create a systemic risk to financial system out of banking business practices as LTCM was not 
a bank but a hedge fund. 
Goodhart et al (1998) listed 27 policy conclusions relating to financial regulation. There 
are some conclusions that may have implications for the regulation of e-money. For example, if 
regulation is demanded because of market imperfections and failures arising from externalities 
and asymmetric information and if technology including e-money can decrease or even 
eliminate them, then; objectives of regulation may not be clearly defined and circumscribed. In 
other words, improvements in technology and risk management techniques may eliminate the 
demand for regulation. As the authors' first policy conclusion was to clearly define and 
circumscribe the objectives of regulation, e-money may make it difficult to identify them 
clearly. 
Second policy conclusion was limiting expectations about regulation to a realistic level 
and increasing consumer awareness about financial transactions. This conclusion may imply 
that e-money should be allowed to develop on its own initiative with regards to consumer 
protection, mainly insuring policies for e-money schemes. As regulation is expected not to 
impede competition, which is the third policy conclusion, e-money initiatives may be better to 
be allowed to develop on their own nature without disrupting competition through `early' 
regulatory measures without having a proven business case. The following policy conclusion 
was also about market discipline as regulation is expected not to reinforce or replace it. The 
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fifth policy conclusion asked for practitioner input into the regulation, which indicates that 
regulatory authorities should not try to impose regulation on e-money without discussing the 
issues with operators and innovators. The problem may arise here as some of the operators and 
most of the innovators seem to be non-banks. Another policy conclusion was to limit deposit 
insurance coverage. With regard to e-money, which seems to be developing mostly through 
private initiatives, it may be better to wait for private solutions for insurance coverage of purse 
balances at the first place. 
Goodhart et al (1998) also mentioned substantially changing financial service industry 
and changing behaviour of financial intermediaries which may even gain speed through e- 
money technology supported by mobile telephony, personal computers connected to the 
Internet and digital television as they all create new distribution channels for financial 
intermediary services. They concluded that the cost of regulation might not be disregarded. 
Relating to the cost of regulation, e-money may decrease especially data collection and 
processing cost as it could provide on-line real-time data available anytime and anywhere. Data 
analysis and risk management techniques may gain more importance compared to data 
collection process. 
Other than these contributions to the discussions of financial regulation, Llewellyn 
(1999a) analysed the potential benefits of efficiently framed regulation in a currently published 
occasional paper. The author named six main routes of regulation. The first route was reduced 
transactions, information and monitoring cost for consumers to the extent that the cost of 
regulation does not offset the reduction as the data collection, processing and analysis is 
centralised. The second route was efficiency gains through ameliorating market breakdown or 
gridlock. The third route was enhanced consumer confidence. The fourth route was the possible 
generation of positive externalities. The fifth route was removal of hazardous (solvency and 
conduct of business) firms through efficient authorisation procedures and the route named was 
enforced disclosures, which enhance the ability of consumers to make informed judgements, 
and increase the transparency of contracts. 
The author investigated the economic rationale for regulation and supervision in 
banking and financial services mostly agreeing some of the arguments mentioned in the earlier 
section of this chapter but also added that there is a demand from consumers for regulation in 
order to gain a degree of assurance and lower transactions costs. It was noted that there is a 
clear need for monitoring financial firms, an activity that creates economies of scale when 
organised by a single institution. 
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Regulation of financial services is not a totally agreed area in the literature. Despite 
above drawn general framework, there have been different approaches as well. For example, 
Benston (1998) agreed to consumer protection from the loss of investment, fraud and 
misinterpretation, unfair treatment, and insufficient information and concerns about negative 
externalities89 (defined as costs borne by people other than those who deal directly with 
financial institutions that fail and perform poorly) as justifications of regulation but added three 
different reasons that were not mentioned so often. These reasons and justifications for 
subjecting financial services to governmental regulation were (i) benefits to government and 
those in power from direct and indirect taxation of financial institutions and services; (ii) 
benefits to popularly elected officials to appear to have taken measures that benefit consumers 
and `solve' (brackets in the original text) serious problems and (iii) benefits to the regulated 
financial institutions, including greater efficiency and consumer confidence and protection 
from competition by alternative sources of financial services. 
Two comparative advantages of governments in producing money were named by the 
author as the power to declare government money as legal tender and the power to punish 
counterfeiters. These advantages may decrease competitive power of alternative e-money 
proposals. 
Benefits of the regulated financial institutions from regulation were listed by the author 
as (i) greater efficiency from government-imposed standardisation; (ii) enhanced consumer 
confidence in the safety of their investments and (iii) the quality of financial products and 
protection from competition by alternative sources of financial services. All these benefits 
mentioned here are relevant to e-money discussions. The European Committee for Banking 
Standards, for example, has already started to impose standardisation in almost every aspect of 
e-purse applications including the technical equipment. The ECB, on the other hand, proposed 
89 Benston (1998) listed these externatilies as: 1)The failure of a financial institution might impose costs on non- 
contracting third parties. 2) The failure of a financial institution might result in runs on other solvent institutions, 
which would be costly to them and might cause them to fail. 3) Failures of financial service firms might result in 
the collapse of the payment system, security markets and other important aspects of the financial system, with the 
result that there could be a serious adverse effect on the economy generally. 4) The failure of an institution with 
deposits explicitly or implicitly insured by the government or of the insurance companies might impose cost on 
taxpayers. 5) Concerns about the solvency of financial institutions and the terms and risk of financial instruments 
might impose unnecessarily high information costs on potential users and result in financial instruments being 
used less than is optimal. 6) Poor performance by financial service providers might result in potential borrowers in 
the providers' market areas being badly served, with negative effects on other people and businesses in these areas. 
The author argued that only four and fifth aspects provide economically valid reasons for financial service 
regulation. 
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that `only banks' should be allowed to issue e-money, which might have decreased the chance 
of other companies. 
Relating to the cost of financial regulation, Benston (1998) made a distinction between 
intended (operating expenses of regulatory agency including direct salaries financed through 
general tax receipts, fees imposed on regulated institutions, seigniorage and required reserves) 
and four unintended cost namely: (i) Instability of the financial system because financial 
institutions are prohibited from diversifying their activities effectively. (ii) Costs that have 
escalated beyond the level originally intended. (iii) Costs to financial institutions of regulations 
that once were beneficial to them, but now primarily increase their costs and prevent them 
serving customers effectively and finally. (iv) The cost to consumers and the economy from the 
absence of less costly products because some suppliers were prevented from competing with 
established firms. 
Especially the last unintended cost may be overruled because e-money may create a 
chance for non-bank institutions especially telecom companies to compete with financial 
service providers. Some insurance companies and supermarkets may also provide financial 
services as in the UK. 
Despite all the criticism, Benston (1998) is not against the regulation of financial 
services and instead made some proposals on the optimal regulation aiming to reduce or even 
eliminate the cost of negative externalities in (i) government provided deposit insurance, (ii) 
government mandated third-party liability insurance and (iii) lower-than-optimal use of life 
insurance and annuities. The author agreed that regulation could be effective for monitoring 
financial institutions' solvency and consumer protection especially from fraud, unfair dealing 
and invidious discrimination but mentioned that consumer protection may also be sustained by 
private initiatives. The optimal regulation of financial services covered high relative capital 
requirements including subordinated debt, structured early intervention and resolutions 
imposed on depositories and insurance companies. 
Alternative approaches to regulation in general and financial services regulation in 
particular is not limited to Benston (1998). An interesting contribution came from Blundell and 
Robinson (1999) as they approached regulation as a voluntary industry initiative that is 
imposed by the service providers and relied on independent examiners when conflicts arise. 
The authors did not go against the need to regulate but because of clear reasons such as (i) the 
tendency of regulatory agencies to expand continuously, (ii) the risk that established firms may 
use regulation as a barrier to entry, (iii) the risk that regulated may capture regulator, and (iv) 
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the popularity of regulation for politicians; they argued that regulation should not be imposed 
by the state. Instead, they stated, private initiatives might sustain beneficial values of regulation 
in order to sustain consumer confidence and in order to increase creative solutions to industry 
problems by using private skills that may be limited by state regulation. 
This approach may find a very useful place for the regulation of e-money without 
government involvement because in order to gain consumer confidence, any independent e- 
money operator such as e-gold may need to declare clear business rules and code of conduct in 
order to convince consumers about the efficiency of the product. As there seems to be a relative 
non-regulatory approach from many countries for regulation of emerging e-commerce and e- 
business industries, voluntary regulation by any industry on its own may also find a chance to 
be tested for efficiency and effectiveness. The main trend here is to limit central banks 
regulatory responsibilities to the overall stability of financial system and leave the prudential 
supervision to an independent authority with direct information-sharing arrangements with the 
central bank and the treasury. Obviously, there will never be a 100 % guarantee for the endless 
stability of the financial system. The argument here is that, individual responsibility of end 
users put on the scene for the control of financial integrity of service providers might increase 
the efficiency and social gains of regulation. In this chapter, the perception for regulation is 
closer to private initiatives driven regulation that has been observed by a societal regulatory 
institution to increase the efficiency. 
In the next section, the general framework for the financial regulation in the UK by the 
FSA will be investigated in detail. 
8.2. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY AND REGULATION IN TIIE UK 
The first stage of the transformation of the regulatory framework in the UK was 
completed in June 1998 as responsibility of prudential supervision has passed to the FSA from 
the BOE. The second stage was the Financial Services and Markets Act, which was published 
as a first draft in July 1998 and submitted by the Government to the Joint Committee of the 
Commons and Lords for pre-legislative scrutiny that reported in April and June 1999. Final 
stage started as the Bill was introduced to the House of Commons in June 1999 and it received 
Royal Assent on 14 June 2000. On 18 July 2000 the Economic Secretary announced a target of 
about a year's time for the coming into force of the Financial Services and Markets Act. 
According to Her Majesty's Treasury, there will be a further announcement on timing before 
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Christmas. Within this time horizon, the Treasury, the FSA and the financial industry are 
expected to complete the preparations for the new regulatory framework9o. 
The FSA acquired its full range of powers as the single statutory regulator for all 
financial business (FSA, 1999b). Four statutory objectives of the FSA are named as follows: 
(FSA, 1999a), 
1. Maintaining market confidence in the UK financial system including reducing systemic 
risk, monitoring high business conducts and preventing market abuse. 
2. Public awareness meaning to promote public understanding of the financial system 
including to promote financial literacy. 
3. Consumer protection meaning to secure the appropriate degree of protection for consumers 
including to take enforcement actions against firms in order to protect the interest of 
investors, policyholders and depositors, to develop arrangements for single compensation 
and Ombudsman schemes and to guide regulated firms to protect consumers' interest. 
4. Reduction of financial crime meaning to reduce the extent to which it is possible for a 
business carried on by a regulated person to be used for a purpose connected with financial 
crime including to combat money-laundering. 
The FSA declared to bear in mind the need to be efficient and economic in the use of 
resources, the responsibilities of regulated firms' own management, the desirability of 
facilitating innovation in the financial sector and the value of competition between financial 
firms. 
One of the important questions in the creation of an independent regulatory authority 
such as the FSA was to clearly identify the relationship among the central bank, regulatory 
authority and the treasury. This was done by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
among three institutions in the UK and announced in 27 October 1997. According to this 
MOU, the BOE's responsibility was limited to the overall stability of the financial system 
involving (i) stability of the monetary system; (ii) financial system infrastructure, in particular 
payments systems at home and abroad; (iii) broad overview of the system as a whole (iv) being 
able in exceptional circumstances to undertake official financial operations, in order to limit the 
risk of problems in or affecting particular institutions spreading to other parts of the financial 
system and finally (v) the efficiency and effectiveness of the financial sector, with particular 
regard to international competitiveness including promoting the City (FSA, 1997). 
90 http: //www. treasury. gov. uk/fsma/wayahead. html 
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The Memorandum identified the FSA responsibilities as: 
1. The authorisation and prudential supervision of banks, building societies, investment firms, 
insurance companies and friendly societies. 
2. The supervision of financial markets and of clearing and settlement systems. 
3. The conduct of operations in response to problem cases affecting firms, markets and 
clearing and settlements systems within its responsibilities like (but not restricted to) 
changing of capital or other regulatory requirements and the facilitation of a market 
solution involving, for example, an introduction of new capital into a troubled firm by one 
or more third parties. One condition for this responsibility is to inform the Treasury in 
advance in order to give the Chancellor of the Exchequer the option to refuse support action 
and inform the BOE about any major policy changes. The operations should also not fall 
within the ambit of the BOE responsibilities. 
4. Regulatory policy in these areas: The Financial Services Authority advises on the 
regulatory implications for firms, markets and clearing systems of developments in 
domestic and international markets and of initiatives, both domestic and international, such 
as EC directives. 
According to the Memorandum, the FSA and the BOE try to avoid separate collection 
of the same data and they fully share all the data collected, which is relevant to financial 
stability. As the Financial Services and Markets Act has Royal Assent now, it will replace the 
Memorandum mentioned above as soon as it is brought into force, which is expected to happen 
within a year. 
The relevance of this Memorandum and the above mentioned Act to e-money is to 
clearly identify by whom e-money developments will be followed and to make a division of 
responsibilities on the policy-making about e-money regulations. The role of the Financial 
Service Authority in the regulation of e-money will be analysed further in the following parts. 
8.3. CURRENT TRENDS IN THE REGULATION OF E-MONEY 
The first official report known on the regulation of e-money was written by Working 
Group on European Union (EU) Payment Systems (EMI, 1994) on a request by the Committee 
of Governors of the EU central banks. The aim of the report was to improve the understanding 
of the functioning of multiple purpose prepaid cards also named as electronic purses which 
were accepted to have a potential to reduce the use of coins and banknotes significantly in retail 
transactions. The consequences of the electronic purse for central banks were analysed. It was 
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concluded that the creation of electronic purse must be evaluated carefully, because if it 
develops, it might affect central banks in the long run (i) as overseers of their countries' 
payment system; (ii) as the authorities in charge of monetary policy, and (iii) as issuers of 
banknotes. 
According to EMI (1994), all EU central banks are concerned with the integrity, 
stability and efficiency of their countries payment systems. This concern was argued to cover 
not only the wholesale (large-value) payment systems but also retail payments and payment 
media because of the systemic risks involved. As a result, two main problems relating to the 
overseeing payment systems were named. The first one was the soundness of the issuer (which 
makes the card available to the user, is the beneficiary of issued value and is responsible for 
clearing or reimbursing). The second one was the soundness of the electronic purse instrument 
(which should maintain public confidence in retail payments by preventing the possibility of 
counterfeiting and fraud risks). 
The money received by the issuer of an electronic purse was, in economic terms, 
assumed by EMI (1994) to be the same as bank deposits and indicated that if non-credit 
institutions issue electronic purses, banking regulations that aims to protect customers deposits 
and deposit guarantee schemes may not be applied. This may threaten the money transmission 
system stability and banks may have difficulties in competing with unregulated non-credit 
institutions. 
In the name of monetary policy implications, e-money was considered as a substitution 
of one form of money for another and not a serious impact on monetary policy was expected in 
the short run. However, it was argued, with a widespread use of prepaid cards in the long run, 
three implications were expected for the conduct of monetary policy. First is the need to 
include the amount of prepaid value to the narrow money aggregates as this value may be 
accepted as a perfect substitute for notes and coins and sight deposits up to a certain extent. 
Second is the potential influence of prepaid value on the velocity of money. Third is an 
accelerating shrinkage of central bank balance sheets, which may result in a decrease in the 
ability to influence interest rates by conducting market operations. EMI (1994) provided five 
scenarios for central bank action, which has been evaluated in section 6.3.2 at which the 
different perceptions towards e-money has been analysed. 
The second regulatory proposal came as Opinion of the EMI Council on the issuance of 
e-money and was published in EMI 1997 Annual Report. These opinions are mostly covered by 
the ECB (1998). It was mentioned that a majority excluding Denmark, Sweden, the United 
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Kingdom and Luxembourg adopted the opinions mentioned. The ECB published, a new report 
in 1998 on e-money and proposed further regulations relating to e-money including software- 
based products. A regulatory approach was defended to e-money arising basically from 
concerns relating to, first of all, the need to preserve price stability and the need to preserve the 
unit of account function of currency. Especially the second concern seems inconsistent with the 
historical experience, where the unit of account function of money was preserved under free 
banking areas around the world, especially in France, which was discussed under section 7.1. 
ECB (1998) argued that if e-money is issued as a consequence of credit, the interest 
charged on the credit extended for the provision of e-money may be equal to the credit risk 
premium plus the cost of payment service. As the risk premium and cost of service falls, the 
interest rate may also decrease. It was concluded from this assumption that lowering the level 
of interest rate by the above-described mechanism could endanger the maintenance of price 
stability which seems doubtful as this approach seems to ignore a similar process caused by 
credit cards without endangering the price stability. The risk of over-issue was addressed, and it 
was argued that redeemability requirement will be more important than a competitive 
environment undervaluing the invisible hand argument which was especially successful in 
Scottish free banking experience. 
Six additional concerns has been indicated by ECB (1998) included first of all the 
efficient functioning of payment systems and confidence in payment instruments as float 
mismanagement, intrusion of counterfeit value, major and/or ultimate technical failures that 
may cause a lack of confidence in payment systems. The second concern was given as the 
protection of consumers and merchants. The third concern was named as stability of financial 
markets relating to the avoidance of systemic risk. The fourth concern was mentioned as 
protection against criminal abuse as e-money schemes may be vulnerable to counterfeit and 
fraud including money laundering and tax evasion. The fifth concern was addressed as 
implications for monetary policy strategy as e-money is likely to affect the behaviour of 
monetary aggregates by mainly three effects including (i) creating a close substitute for central 
bank money, (ii) increasing velocity and (iii) sustaining a potential for interest bearing financial 
assets for transaction purposes. Final concern was underlined as operational target implications 
as e-money implies a reduction of base money and the shrinking of the central bank's balance 
sheet making it more difficult for a central bank flexibly absorb a liquidity shock, and 
decreasing the ability of the central bank to control a short-term money market interest rate as 
its operational target. 
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After declaring above mentioned arguments relating to the reasons behind the 
regulation of e-money, ECB (1998) regarded it as essential seven minimum requirements that 
needs to be fulfilled by e-money issuers as being investigated in section 6.3.2. ECB clearly 
declared its intention to monitor future developments and to reassess monetary policy and 
payment system implications of e-money to identify new policy conclusions including the 
issuance of e-money by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) itself, if it is believed 
necessary. 
The ECB (or EMI) is not the only European institution that display opinion on e-money. 
European Commission showed interest as well. The aim and mandate of the European 
Commission was explained in Explanatory Memorandum for the Commission Proposal for 
European Parliament and Council Directive (EU, 1998) on the taking up, the pursuit and the 
prudential supervision of the business of e-money institutions. According to the memorandum, 
the aim and mandate in relation to e-money was to build and help unfold the single market in 
financial services with a focus to remove barriers for carrying on financial business activities 
across borders and to follow developments of new techniques and products. The Commission 
seemed conscious of the regulatory and supervisory issues associated with e-money issuance. It 
was argued by the memorandum that the financial integrity and the operations of e-money 
issuers and the stability and soundness of issuers must be secured. It must also be ensured that 
the failure of any one individual issuer does not result in loss of confidence in this new and 
developing means of payment. It was believed that the proposal would create a harmonised 
single market in the provision of e-money in the European Union and will reinforce stability 
and substantially eliminate the associated prudential risks. 
The memorandum declared basic requirements for e-money institutions as (i) prior 
authorisation; (ii) minimum capital requirements not less than ECU 500.000 (e-money 
institutions were also required to have at all times own `funds equal to or above 2% of the 
higher of the current amount or the average of the preceding 6 months' total amount of their 
financial liabilities related to outstanding e-money); (iii) fit and proper management (iv) sound 
and prudent operation and initial and ongoing owner control. The proposal also required that 
funds received in exchange for issued e-money should only be invested in highly liquid assets. 
This requirement aimed to impose a relatively low-risk investment policy to help to ensure the 
stability and soundness of the issuers in order to protect the e-money system and consumers in 
general. 
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It may be argued that, one of the basic aim of the memorandum was to define an e- 
money institution as a credit institution, which is defined as an undertaking whose business is 
to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own 
account. The reason for this aim is that the ECB can only apply reserve requirements to credit 
institutions within the Euro-system and as clearly declared by ECB (1998), reserve requirement 
for e-money is an intention. 
Even there is no proven business case on e-money other than many national and 
international trials around the world, regulation has created two different approach between EU 
and USA, which has been analysed in depth in section 6.3.2. Issing (1999) even argued that e- 
money is seen by ECB as a threat for the unit of account function of money and full 
redeemability is required for purse balances (ECB, 1998). In another initiative against e-money, 
ECB submitted its opinion on the potential European Parliament and Council Directive on the 
Taking up, the Pursuit and the Prudential Supervision of the Business of Electronic Money 
Institutions in January 1999 (ECB, 1999). According to the Opinion, the ECB asked for the 
exclusion of all other institutions other than banks and e-money institutions (they were not even 
allowed to issue credit or debit cards or use the term `bank' in their trade names) being 
prohibited from issuing e-money. Guarantees, loss-sharing and insurance schemes were advised 
to protect consumer and free redemption was asked to preserve the unit of account function of 
Euro. The ECB asked for redeemability for all size of e-money schemes without any exception. 
Additionally, a minimum level of regulation at the Community level was asked and the 
possibility of imposing minimum reserve requirement on e-money institutions including 
statistical data collection was addressed to be added to the potential Directive. 
After two years of discussion throughout the European directive making procedures, the 
EU Directive on e-money has been finalised in October 2000 and within 18 months of 
publication in the Official Gazette, all the EU countries are legally responsible to adjust the 
national acts and laws accordingly. According to the final version of the Directive 2000/46/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Taking up, Pursuit of and Prudential 
Supervision of the Business of Electronic Money Institutions, Member States shall prohibit 
persons or undertakings that are not credit institutions from carrying on the business of issuing 
electronic money. The business activities of electronic money institutions other than the issuing 
of electronic money is restricted to: (a) the provision of closely related financial and non- 
financial services such as the administering of e-money by the performance of operational and 
other ancillary functions related to its issuance, and the issuing and administering of other 
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means of payment but excluding the granting of any form of credit; and (b) the storing of data 
on the electronic device on behalf of other undertakings or public institutions. Electronic 
money institutions are not allowed to have any holdings in other undertakings except where 
these undertakings perform operational or other ancillary functions related to electronic money 
issued or distributed by the institution concerned. 
The Directive imposed heavy redeemability requirement for e-money issuance at par 
value in coins and bank notes or by a transfer to an account free of charges other than those 
strictly necessary to carry out that operation. The contract between the issuer and the bearer are 
required to state clearly the conditions of redemption. The contract is only allowed to stipulate 
a minimum threshold of not exceed EUR 10 for redemption. 
The directive also imposed initial capital and ongoing own funds requirements to 
electronic money institutions to have an initial capital, of not less than EUR 1 million. These 
institutions are demanded to have at all times own funds which are equal to or above 2% of the 
higher of the current amount or the average of the preceding 6 months' total amount of their 
financial liabilities related to outstanding electronic money. Their investment strategies have 
been regulated as well, which is expected to an amount of no less than their financial liabilities 
related to outstanding electronic money in the following assets only: (a) asset items which are 
sufficiently liquid; (b) sight deposits held with certain credit institutions (c) debt instruments 
which are sufficiently liquid. 
Finally, electronic money institutions are to have sound and prudent management, 
administrative and accounting procedures and adequate internal control mechanisms. The 
directive even addressed the financial and non-financial risks to which there might be an 
exposure including technical and procedural risks as well as risks connected to its co-operation 
with any undertaking performing operational or other ancillary functions related to its business 
activities and the management 
is expected to be capable of handling these risks. The waiver, 
which has been addressed in section 6.3.2 was the item where the EU directive went against 
ECB demands to not to allow any kind of exemptions on the issuance of e-money. 
Most of the above-cited literature might seem to treat e-money as a financial instrument 
that should be covered by financial regulation as soon as possible. There have been alternative 
contributions as well. For example, Good (1997) argued that payment system is recently a 
complex set of instruments, processing infrastructures, laws, rules and regulations and 
institutions and stated that future payment system will provide more choices, be more high tech 
and become more complex. The author suggested payment systems would be a challenge for a 
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policymaker who must find a fine line between providing safety and stifling innovation. Good 
(1997) is not alone in taking a liberal approach to the regulation of e-money. Solomon (1999) 
investigated the relation between national and international consolidations of banks and 
concluded that technological innovation such as e-money has contributed to the current 
consolidation trends. The author advised a grey approach to the regulation of e-money instead 
of black or white in order to support current innovations even further, to allow banks to create 
joint ventures with telecommunication, encryption and the-like firms relevant to e-money 
technologies and to create private initiatives for e-money insurance. 
Additionally, Good (1998b) reached six conclusions for the future prospects relating to e- 
money systems in the US; which has been summarised in section 6.3.2. The accelerating 
acceptance of innovation is exhibited in the following table: 
TABLE 8.3.1: ACCELERATING ACCEPTANCE OF INNOVATIONS 
DATE INVENTION YEARS BEFORE MASS USE 
1873 Electricity 46 Years 
1876 Telephone 35 Years 
1886 Gas Automobile 55 Years 
1906 Radio 22 Years 
1926 Television 26 Years 
1953 Microwave Oven 30 Years 
1975 Personal Computer 16 Years 
1983 Mobile Phone 13 Years 
1991 The Web 6 Years 
source: vooa, i 'oi 
. 
According to the author, regulators should observe and monitor the evolution of e- 
money systems in order to prepare themselves to make recommendations unless regulation 
becomes vitally important. Regulation demand was expected to come from the e-money 
industry as the market develops. The US government involvement was also mentioned to be 
limited to broader policy issues, similar to the position taken on tariffs and taxes on Internet 
commerce. 
Greenspan (1997) argued in a parallel line of opinions that significant part of safety and 
soundness of regulation should come from market forces and institutions and government 
regulation may be an add-on to try to identify presumed market failures for creating official 
rules to fill in the gaps. It was mentioned that as financial system gets more complex, detailed 
rules and standards become burdensome and ineffective or even counterproductive and as a 
result concluded that e-money should not be regulated in order to foster financial innovation by 
letting it develop without rules. In-advance regulation of e-money was also criticised because 
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of illusions of government interference to resolve the uncertainty through standards, regulation 
or other government policies as only consumers and merchants can ultimately determine what 
new products are successful in the marketplace. This last description is almost exactly 
reflecting what has been happening in the EU as banking standards have already been imposed 
on electronic purse products and there is a strong incentive to regulate e-money almost as soon 
as possible. 
One additional view on the regulation of e-money from the FED came recently. 
Gramlich (1999) who is a member of FED Board argued that government intervention on e- 
money is both economically unwise and politically unlikely. 
Among these rich literatures, the final outcome seems to reach to an end as the EU 
directive on e-money has been finalised and the FED still prefers to collect data on the 
emergence of e-money. 
It may be generally agreed that one of the main arguments for the regulation of financial 
services is the risky nature of financial services in general and banking in particular. Risks in e- 
money business gain a lot of importance at this sense and deserve a closer investigation. The 
risks surrounding e-money business has been analysed in detail in current publications. For 
example, the BIS (1998) investigated risk management techniques for electronic banking, 
which referred to the provision of retail and small value banking products and services through 
electronic channels and e-money activities. Potential operational risks were named as 
unauthorised system access, employee fraud, counterfeiting of e-money, service provider risk, 
obsolescence of systems, outdated staff and management expertise, inadequate customer 
security practices and customer repudiation of a transaction. According to the BIS (1998), 
reputational risks in e-money activities may be named as significant and widespread system 
deficiencies, a significant breach of security and problems with or misuse of same or similar 
systems or products by another institution. 
Legal risks were given by the BIS (1998) as uncertain or ambiguous applicability of 
laws and rules, money laundering, inadequate disclosure of information to customers, failure to 
protect customer privacy, problems with a linked Internet site, certificate authority risk and 
exposure to foreign jurisdictions. Default of borrowers who applied for credit via remote 
banking and default of an e-money issuer were named as credit risks. Other risks identified by 
the BIS (1998) were illiquidity of e-money issuer as liquidity risk, unanticipated interest rate 
changes for the instruments in which an e-money issuer invests as interest rate risk, foreign 
exchange risk arising from acceptance of foreign currencies in payment for e-money as market 
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risk and transfer risk arising from foreign-based service provider, and finally foreign 
participants in an e-money scheme as country risk. 
Cross border issues were also investigated as well by the BIS (1998) arguing that 
different national authorities may expose banks risk with non-compliance with different 
national laws and regulations including consumer protection laws, record-keeping and 
reporting requirements, privacy rules and money laundering laws. Relating to the management 
of above-mentioned risks, the BIS (1998) advised a process that includes the three basic 
elements: assessing risks, managing and controlling risks and monitoring risks. 
Some of these risks seem to be common to financial services in general but there are 
also unique risks that may need special treatment in e-money business. However, any e-money 
operator may be expected as keeping an eye on these risks just from the beginning of the 
business as money needs user confidence at the first place and no e-money may be issued 
unless end-user is fully satisfied about the quality and non-risk characteristic of the product. As 
these risks need to be identified and managed carefully, then; e-money may find more users to 
gain wide-acceptance, which is one of the basic requirements of being money in general. 
Other than risk management techniques relating to e-money business, money laundering 
has been an issue in financial services as well. Its popularity seems to be increasing recently as 
it has even become an international issue. Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money 
Laundering, which is an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the development and 
promotion of policies to money laundering, investigated some of the e-money schemes in 1997. 
FATF (1997) argued that e-money has a potential to make it easier for criminals to hide the 
source of their proceeds and move those proceeds without detection. On the other hand, it was 
stated that it is premature to consider prescriptive solutions to theoretical problems as e-money 
schemes are still in their infancy. FATF has forty recommendations on money laundering 
relating to customer identification and record-keeping rules, increased diligence of financial 
institutions and measures to cope with the problems of countries with no or insufficient anti- 
money laundering measures (FATF, 1996). It may be better to indicate here that even money 
laundering may find new ways through e-money technologies, it may also be prevented with 
additional analytical channels that may be constructed by using e-money technology. Because 
e-money is electronic in definition and it may be easier to monitor money movements by using 
advanced database management techniques with increased computer power. One of the most 
effective way is obviously to limit the maximum amount of e-money that can be downloaded to 
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any individual e-money instrument. From the user's point of view, this may not be a big issue 
as the main target of e-money is to address micro-payments. 
8.4. THE FSA APPROACH TO THE REGULATION OF E-MONEY 
Although there is no official guidance on the regulation of e-money in the UK published 
by the FSA, its chairman defined a strategy for e-regulation. (Davies, 1999). First of all, 
Internet-based financial services including e-money was described as beneficial for consumers 
by bringing cheaper transactions and bringing good quality of information for investors and 
savers. The chairman described the general framework as going against some other regulators, 
whose instinct is to seek to constrain or even ban new entrants to financial service industry as 
they (European regulators) argue that only banks should be able to issue e-money. This 
approach was refused, as it would disrupt the more imaginative new approaches to payment 
methods, approaches, which could well bring important benefits to consumers. The attitude was 
explained as to find a way of adapting the regulatory environment to new technology, not 
adapting the new technology to the old regulatory rules. This approach seems closer to the US 
approach as it disagrees the EU applications explicitly. Internet-based financial services was 
especially addressed by the chairman as it was argued that Internet will help regulators by 
providing more and fast real time data about the market and by allowing regulators to 
communicate with the investors directly. The proposed strategy composed of five components: 
1. Surveillance meaning to obtain information through FSA staff, industry, consumer 
associations, the public, the police and the media. 
2. Education of investors to promote consumer understanding of newly emerging financial 
services including e-money. 
3. Co-operation on the international issues on the regulation of emerging technologies and 
their implications for the financial markets both national and international. 
4. Securi checks on the financial transactions. 
5. Enforcement to protect investors where appropriate. 
As e-money is an emerging phenomenon, the FSA did not yet address e-money 
developments directly through official publications. As a result, alternative sources of 
information collection were preferred and a questionnaire was sent to the FSA, which is 
presented in the Appendix at the end of this chapter. The aim of this particular questionnaire 
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was to get the first hand information from the FSA about its approach to the regulation of e- 
money. 
According to the responses given to the questionnaire by the FSA, the general 
framework of the regulation of e-money in the UK will inevitably be shaped by the European 
Parliament and Council Directive regarding e-money and e-money institutions. As the FSA has 
no veto right on the shaping of the Directive, the only influence is to express the official views 
during the working group discussions to advice the final draft of the Directive. The final 
decision is taken on a democratic voting and all the members are expected to respect the 
outcome. The result of this mechanism is that the FSA may need to take regulatory steps on the 
regulation of e-money and e-money institutions even if there is no intention to do so with 
regards to the UK financial markets and services. 
In accordance with above mentioned legislative restrictions, the FSA defines both e- 
money and e-money institutions as the final version of the European Directive defines them and 
the current definition is given as the latest version of the Directive proposal puts them. Until 
now, no single e-money institution was supervised or regulated by the FSA but e-money 
developments have been followed within the banking system as a whole as banks and other 
financial institutions have been supervised and regulated. One reason for that is because e- 
money issuance is not an authorisable activity in the UK at the moment and there seems no 
immediate intention to impose any kind of regulation. The initiative was left to European 
Directives, as even a different approach may not be sustained due to European Treaties. The 
major aim of the FSA seems to get involved in the discussions, to follow the developments and 
to analyse all the examples of e-money activities, which can be executed by banks, non-banks, 
in short by any company that may find an interest in e-money potential. 
Licensing e-money institutions is within the responsibilities of the FSA but as e-money 
business is not regulated at the moment, the FSA can only apply to the Court if a company 
refuses to be treated as a deposit taker when there is a conflict. But it may not be a common 
expectation to see an e-money institution to challenge the regulatory powers of the FSA in 
order to operate in the UK. If there is a demand for an opinion whether an activity is involved 
in deposit taking or not, then the FSA is expected to give a reply. Sometimes the FSA publishes 
Guidance for developing regulatory issues as it was done on `Treatment of Material on 
Overseas Internet World Wide Web-sites Accessible in the UK but not Intended for Investors 
in the UK'. It may be expected that if there is a demand for opinion before the European 
261 
initiatives reach a conclusion, then the FSA will provide help for the clarification of the 
problems arising from the e-money activities. 
Regarding the ECB proposals, it may be argued that the FSA is not willing to be pro- 
active on the regulation of e-money but it is worth noting that the final decision-maker on the 
regulation of e-money in Europe is not the ECB. The European Parliament and Council 
approve the final Directive. 
The details of the FSA approach to the regulation is questioned and analysed in dept in 
the appendix. Before finalising this section, it may be worth mentioning that the FSA argued 
that e-money and e-money institutions could be regulated if there is a strong incentive to 
regulate under normal circumstances. 
8.5. CAN E-MONEY BE REGULATED? 
When discussing the regulation of e-money, it is quite important that recently all the 
available e-money trails around the world are almost all at the beginning stage. There is an 
important case regarding Digicash. As it is analysed in the second case study, e-cash has been a 
mature scheme and found many participants in the implementation including six international 
banks. But, the company later declared bankruptcy and finally taken over by another e-money 
innovator. The problem here is that when EMI (1994) published its report on prepaid cards, the 
paper did not cover network-based money such as Digicash but when ECB (1998) included it 
on its report, the company went bust. This special case may show that in order for a sustainable 
regulatory framework for e-money, first of all, a stable scheme with a proven business case 
needs to be observed. Due to the collapse of the company, consumers did not have any trouble 
converting their e-cash balances to desired currencies at all because of the on-line real-time 
convergence opportunities. 
Digicash is not the only case with special cases for the regulation of e-money. Defining 
e-money, even before regulating it, seems to be premature due to endless new technological 
developments and new trials around the world. For example, Beenz as the `currency of the 
Internet' may not be regarded as money as it is not a generally accepted medium of exchange 
but so as cigarettes that were used as money during the German hyperinflation. There are other 
examples such as air miles by airline companies and supermarket shopping points. The 
importance of e-money technology here is that it creates an opportunity to issue `a kind of 
purchasing power' in a technically secure and flexible environment. As not only wholesale 
payment systems but retail as well gets more and more digitised and gets more electronic; 
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issuing money, distributing and collecting through a payment infrastructure becomes cheap and 
sustainable. If the current predictions are realised relating to Internet, DTV and mobile 
telephony, then it may not be possible to imagine what kind of alternative payment instruments 
may be put on the market. May it be e-gold, for example? Or may it be kind of `purchasing 
power indexed to FTSE 100? Or may it be index to Retail Price Index? Until a proven business 
case for e-money related technologies emerges, all the regulatory approaches may be 
ineffective. Because of the speed and unexpected nature of innovation, it may not be possible to 
adopt in advance regulation to rapidly changing alternative solutions supplied for economic 
units. 
Current e-money trials around the world seems to develop as electronic presentations of 
national monies which results in a decrease in the circulation of banknotes and coins but e- 
money is not the only reason to decrease the circulation of national banknotes. The aim of the 
regulation should not be to defend Euro banknotes in Europe or dollar banknotes in the US 
because alternative developments in credit and debit card technology schemes have already 
been decreasing the circulation of money. Debit cards may be used just to buy a piece of 
chocolate for less than 30p especially in nation-wide supermarkets in the UK. As a result, if the 
aim of regulation of e-money is to support circulation of national banknotes and coins, it would 
not be delivering any success. Additionally, the developments in payment technologies (plus 
parallel developments in related fields) have decreased currency in circulation for a few 
decades in almost every developed nation. The potential of e-money here is to address the 
problem of micro-payments that only cash as a payment instrument is available in a world of 
digital payments. This potential may further decrease demand for banknotes and coins. 
On the other hand, money is not only a short-term medium of exchange. It may be a bit 
imaginative to argue that an alternative medium of exchange can replace a stable national 
money within one or two years at least because of long-term contracts. Any money needs to 
prove itself in order, as a medium of exchange, as a store of value and as a unit of account 91. 
As far as current monies around the world are sound and safe, then e-money's potential might 
be limited to create alternative payment instruments to challenge unit of account function of 
national currencies. As currency substitution in developing countries decreases the circulation 
of unsound national currencies, e-money may increase the degree of substitution. Even in 
91 The only exemption for that could be gold, silver or other valuable metals that have been nationally and international accepted as unit of account and store of value items for so many years but had difficulties to reach to the end users as medium of exchange. 
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developed countries, economic units may be given additional options to decide on the type of 
money that they want to prefer as medium of exchange and store of value and unit of account 
with the increasing capabilities of e-money circulating channels including PCs, DTV and 
mobile phones. But, because of medium and long-term contracts such as mortgages and long 
term gilts, a challenge to a national currency by providing an alternative medium of exchange 
and followingly an alternative unit of account might be dependent on the failure of national 
currency in terms of safety and soundness deterioration. 
A few years ago in 1997, Deutsche Bundesbank started to add e-purse (prepaid card 
loading amount) balances into the money stock M1 leading to the inclusion of e-money 
balances to all monetary aggregates. The Bank argued that if e-money replaces cash only, the 
final influence on broad money (M3) would be negligible. But in a recent report (Bundesbank, 
1999), it was argued that there is a possibility of network-based e-money circulation to become 
independent of monetary policy. In the same report, it was given that the amount of e-money 
circulation is about 60 million Euro. However, as far as monetary policy is conducted on a safe 
and sound currency, what can create a demand for an alternative payment instrument such as a 
network-based e-money? 
The implications of this analysis for Euro is that if there is a kind of financial crisis 
within Eurozone, then, it may be very easy for countries especially such as Belgium, Finland 
and Sweden to leave Euro. The transformation from national monies to a single currency in 
Europe has been taken many years but going back may not be so difficult with the help of 
electronic circulation of monetary base. The reason for that is the infrastructure that is needed 
for a successful e-money scheme. Once, there is a complete e-money structure in a country 
with a perfect combination of PCs, DTV, ATM network and mobile telephony (in short all kind 
of technical infrastructure to support full reliability) and once the circulation of banknotes and 
coins is not needed anymore because of the reliable e-money networks, then; it takes just a 
short time to change the type of money that circulates digitally in this network. Maybe this is 
the main reason for the heavy regulatory proposals from the ECB regarding e-money. But, such 
a network is not only supported by e-money technologies but a wide range of supporting 
technologies play the same role. For example, if mobile phone technology develops in such a 
way that the cost of mobile communications becomes so cheap, then the transaction cost 
through mobile phones may compete against the transaction cost of cash even for micro 
payments. More than that, there has been a lot of speculation about the digital age and if life 
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gets digital, then; money may need to follow the trend as well. It may be argued, as a result, 
that e-money is not avoidable. 
Another problem with the regulation of e-money is that if some countries prefer to leave 
e-money developments to the market when other countries prefer to regulate in advance, then, 
there may be a comparative disadvantage in heavily regulated countries as regulation may limit 
alternative approaches for alternative solutions, in a sense further innovation. Consequently, 
because of in-advance regulation, some countries may loose the chance of leading the way to 
the digitalisation of money. This may result in digitally dollarisation (or any other currency) of 
national monies in these countries as e-money technology allows to circulate more than one 
currency in a single card (up-to five currencies may be downloaded to Mondex cards). This 
may be treated as an extension of currency substitution to the level of medium of exchange, 
instead of store of value, increasing the impact of substitution and decreasing the power of 
national monetary authorities to enforce the circulation of an unsound and unsafe currency. 
On the regulation of e-money, another important problem is that Internet has been 
allowed to mature itself without any regulation arising from the new contract mechanism that is 
created by Internet-based business. Recently, Internet's full potential does not seem to be 
discovered fully. The critical potential here is that if Internet applications eliminate the cost of 
calculation and telecommunication, then; electronic circulation of money would almost be 
costless, creating a chance to eliminate transaction cost, which is one of the main reason to 
have money in the first place 
-to decrease transaction cost as much as possible to ease division 
of labour. In accordance with the free evolution of Internet, it may also be more appropriate to 
leave e-money to evolve itself. Because, one reason Internet is not regulated heavily is that, it is 
not known what may be imposed as regulation on Internet applications as there has been no 
information accumulation about it. Different applications have been allowed to develop itself, 
holding the regulation back but at the same time collecting data to be used for the possible 
future approaches on Internet issues. It may be argued that Internet applications and e-money 
have so much in common in the name of regulation. 
On the other hand, there are alternative possibilities for the regulation of financial 
industry, which may automatically cover the development of e-money without disturbing its 
emergence with guidance-oriented regulatory proposals. In this framework, Llewellyn (1999b) 
proposed a regulatory regime instead of pure regulation and gave seven components including 
rules established by regulatory agencies and monitoring and supervision. He proposed an 
increased role for market discipline and monitoring and increased role of corporate governance 
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in financial firms. Such an approach may be a more appropriate way of introducing regulation 
into e-money business. 
When the discussion is about the regulation of e-money, it may be worth to mention 
brave approaches from the central bankers and especially one of them deserves more attention. 
A member of Monetary Policy Committee and Deputy Governor of the BOE Mervyn King 
recently argued that technological innovation would put the central bankers out of money 
business technically but mentioned that it is a great matter of trust to get involved in money 
business as an alternative to central banking. As long as this trust is maintained by central 
banks, he argued, central banking could find a place for itself in the financial structure of the 
future. Otherwise, financial sector would manage itself without central banks as it happened 
during free banking eras in the past. (King, 1999). Before imposing regulation on e-money, this 
argument may need to be evaluated carefully as unless central bank money is safe and sound, 
the demand for alternative medium of exchange may not be expected to arise. But, if there is 
chaos and turbulence in the financial markets, especially such as hyperinflation, societies may 
have better options than cigarettes to be used as medium of exchange and followingly store of 
value and unit of account. During chaos, even the hardest regulatory frameworks may not be 
used efficiently. The basic difficulty in regulation of e-money lies on its technical potential to 
create a sustainable monetary regime with the help of technology and unless current financial 
system is reliable, there may be no demand for an alternative. 
It is important in this regard that any regulatory framework will be effective as far as the 
integrity of money has been sustained with sound and stable monetary and fiscal policies. Once 
the integrity is endangered, e-money will help to increase `the right to choose' from any 
alternative arrangements that might convince the end users as a better monetary framework. To 
give an example, the regulation of financial services during the far-east financial crises or the 
late Russian financial turmoil or the Turkish financial problems in 1994 failed to be effective 
totally because of the collapse of the integrity of the domestic currency. No amount of 
regulation at whatever form can stop people voting with their feet to substitute to a more stable 
currency. 
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8.6. APPENDIX: A QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE REGULATION OF E- MONEY 
Submitted to: Rebecca Jones, The Financial Services Authority (Submitted: October 4th; 
Received October 15th, and Interviewed October 19`'1999 and Interview update on 24th October 
2000 with Dominic Peachey) 
Question 1: How does the Financial Services Authority (FSA) define electronic money 
(e-money)? 
Answer: The FSA uses the definition found in the most recent version of the draft Directive on 
the Taking up, the Pursuit and the Prudential Supervision of the Business of Electronic Money 
Institutions'. 
Information: The definition is given in section 4.1.1. 
Question 2: How does FSA define an `e-money institution'? 
Answer: According to the definition found in the aforementioned draft Directive. 
Information: The Directive's definition92: 'electronic money institution' shall mean an 
undertaking or any other legal person, other than a credit institution, which issues means of 
payment in the form, of electronic money. 
Question 3: What type of institutions will FSA monitor or impose regulation on, with 
regard to the issuance and/or operation procedures of e-money products? 
Answer: If the draft Directive is agreed and its provisions are subsequently carried into UK 
law, then the FSA will monitor and impose regulations on electronic money institutions. It 
already monitors the electronic money activities of the banks under its jurisdiction as part of its 
ongoing supervision process of the risks undertaken by these banks. 
Question 4: Did FSA ever supervise and/or regulate an e-money institution up to now? 
Answer: No. 
Interview Notes: The FSA mentioned that as banking system is under supervision, any banking 
service including e-money is naturally covered by the regulation process indirectly even if it is 
not directly. 
Question 5: If not, when does FSA anticipate starting the regulation of e-money 
institutions? 
92 Piia-Noora Kauppi, Finnish European Parliamentarian who is the secretary of the directive, mailed the final 
version of the Directive, which has been finalised now. 
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Answer: The FSA anticipates regulating e-money from the date that the issuance of e-money 
becomes an authorisable activity in the UK. 
Interview Question: Does this mean the FSA prefers to wait for the EC regulation and to adopt 
UK's regulation in accordance with the EC Directives? 
Interview Answer: As the general approach of the FSA is to adopt regulation to the technology 
but not to adopt technology to the regulation, there is no individual incentive to the regulation 
of e-money itself. But as part of European Union, once there is a Directive from the European 
Parliament and Council, then UK legislation needs to be adapted within 18 months after the 
publication of the Directive. As a result, the FSA is prepared for the regulation of e-money in 
accordance with the EU regulation. 
Question 6: Which of the currently existing e-money trials and/or institutions have been 
(or will be) monitored or supervised? For example, are Mondex and Visa Cash treated as e- 
money institutions and monitored or regulated accordingly? 
Answer: The FSA has attempted to keep abreast of all e-money developments, in order to 
improve its understanding of this nascent industry. 
Interview Question: How does the FSA try to improve its understanding of e-money industry? 
Is it through interviews and product overviews or through direct co-operation with innovative 
companies? 
Interview Answer and Notes: It may be worth to mention once again that as current e-money 
schemes are mostly within the banking industry at least through joint trials, even if there is no 
direct monitoring or supervision, it may not mean that e-money is totally out of regulatory 
framework. It was also mentioned that sometimes, innovative companies might come to the 
FSA in order to explain a project, which may in one way or another be related to the 
responsibility areas and ask for an opinion. It seems that, the FSA prefers to collect as much 
information as possible through formal and informal means about the current projects and to 
follow the developments with all means including personal applications by companies 
interested in e-money and individual interviews and group meetings. All the current channels 
for data collection and supervision may be used by the FSA when necessary. 
Question 7: Is there any limit on the type of institutions that can issue e-money in the 
UK? Can supermarkets and/or insurance companies and telecommunication companies and/or 
digital television service providers issue e-money? 
Answer: The issuance of electronic money is not generally an authorisable activity in the UK, 
therefore any firm may undertake such activity. 
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Question 8: Does an e-money operator need a banking license or any other FSA 
approved license in order to issue e-money in the UK? If yes, what would qualify an 
institution to obtain a license? 
Answer: Whether a banking license is required is dependent upon the nature of the scheme. If 
the scheme involves deposit taking, as defined in the banking act, then authorisation is 
required. 
Interview Question: Does the FSA think that e-money scheme involves deposit taking? What 
are the conditions to define e-money as deposit taking? If an e-money scheme is purely credit- 
based, does that mean the scheme does not involve deposit taking? 
Interview Answer and Notes: Within the current regulatory framework, it is not fully clear yet 
how the definition of deposit will be clearly provided. However, account-based e-money 
proposals seem closer to the concept of deposit than unaccountable token specific e-money 
schemes. It seems that the FSA prefers a wait-and-see approach to the definition of deposit and 
if any e-money scheme seems to be involved in deposit but arguing that it is not, then legal 
action will be put forward. It will be a court decision whether the scheme involves in deposit 
taking or not according to Banking Act. There seems to be no hurry to adopt recent definition 
of deposit to emerging e-money schemes, as it may be difficult to evaluate the nature of the 
schemes due to their infantry. 
Question 9: Does an e-money operator based in the UK need a banking license or any 
other FSA approved license in order to issue e-money in countries other than the UK? If yes, 
what are the basic requirements for the license? 
Answer: The requirements in other countries vary considerably. However credit institutions 
authorised in the EEA have a passport' which allows them to conduct authorisable activities 
in other EEA countries without having to obtain authorisation in that country. Currently banks 
that issue e-money benefit from this. In the future, electronic money institutions will generally 
have the passport too. 
Interview Question: What about non-EEA countries like African, Latin American and Asian 
Countries? 
Interview Answer and Notes: As the FSA prefers to wait for the EU Directives, international 
issues are not officially addressed. It may be argued that the FSA's preferences on e-money 
issues are to judge every e-money scheme individually and commend accordingly. The FSA 
does not seem to be in a hurry to decide all the potential issues surrounding money unless there 
arise a time for immediate action. 
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Question 10: If e-money operators do not need a banking license or any other FSA 
approved license for e-money business, does that mean they do not need an approval from the 
FSA for e-money business? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question 11: Does FSA collect any data on the issuance of e-money in the UK? If yes, 
since when? 
Answer: Not routinely. 
Interview Question: How often? 
Interview Answer and Notes: There is no direct decision to collect regular e-money data but as 
part of the banking supervision, all the required information regarding to banking services is 
collected. E-money is not treated as an important part of the banking services as it is only an 
emerging service yet. Once it gets widespread, the FSA has all means to collect all the 
information that is needed. 
Question 12: Does FSA treat e-money balances as `bank deposits' that would be, as a 
result, subject to insurance protection? 
Answer: If the balances fit the definition of a deposit in the Banking Act then they obviously 
benefit from the deposit protection scheme. If the balances do not constitute a deposit then 
there is no such protection. 
Interview Question: Which institution will decide whether e-money balances fit the definition 
of deposit? 
Interview Answer and Notes: It is the FSA that will decide whether an e-money scheme fits the 
definition of deposit. In case of a conflict, the FSA will bring the case to a Court and the Court 
will take the final decision. It is up to e-money operator to argue that the scheme does not fit 
the definition of deposit and the FSA will defend its case accordingly. 
Question 13: What is the legal framework for the regulation of e-money and e-money 
institutions in the UK? Which current laws and regulations apply to them? 
Answer: There is currently no legal framework unless the scheme involves deposit taking. 
Interview Question: What happens if the scheme involves deposit taking? 
Interview Answer and Notes: As it was mentioned in other responses, there is no clear legal 
framework for the regulation of e-money in the UK but there is a legal process in the European 
entities which is expected to result in a legal framework for all EU countries. The FSA actively 
participates all the discussions and forums regarding the legal process, and defends its own 
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opinion on the regulatory approaches in a democratic decision-making process. As a result, 
there is no clear answer to this question because it will be responded by the EU regulation. 
Question 14: What future changes and amendments may be in the legal enforcement 
agenda? 
Answer: If the draft Directives are agreed then UK legislation will be amended accordingly. 
Interview Question: Is there any possibility of conflict with the UK legislation and the 
Directives? 
Interview Answer and Notes: It is legally impossible to have a conflict with the UK legislation 
and the Directives and the EU Treaties impose all the EU countries to adapt their legislation in 
accordance with EU Directives. As a result, once there is an e-money and e-money institution 
directive, the UK legislation needs to be adopted within the given time period as mentioned in 
every Directive individually. 
Question 15: Is there any other institution other than the FSA that will be responsible 
for the regulation of e-money and e-money institutions? 
Answer: The FSA will be the sole financial regulator in the UK once the Financial Services 
and Markets Act is completed. 
Question 16: What is the division of responsibility and authority between FSA and the 
Bank of England on the regulation of e-money and e-money institutions? 
Answer: The FSA is responsible for supervising individual institutions. The FSA therefore has 
the following objectives: protecting consumers of financial services, promoting public 
understanding of the financial system, maintaining confidence in the financial system and the 
reduction of financial crime. The Bank of England has responsibility for stability of the 
financial system as a whole Le. stability of the monetary system, financial system 
infrastructure, broad overview of the system as a whole, official financial operations in 
exceptional circumstances, efficiency and effectiveness of the financial system. 
Question 17: How does FSA cooperate with the European Central Bank on the 
regulation of e-money? Does FSA agree to the ECB requirements for the issuance of e-money, 
especially those concerning redeemability and reserve requirements? 
Answer: FSA and ECB co-operate as fully as possible. 
Interview Question: Are there any disagreements? 
Interview Answer and Notes: A clear disagreement was not confirmed by the FSA but Davies 
(1999) clearly mentioned the existence of different approaches to the regulation of e-money. 
An important point here is that the legislative power of European Central Bank is limited to 
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send its opinion to the European Parliament and it is the Parliament's choice to decide whether 
to take these opinions into account or not. Currently, it may be argued that not all the ECB 
opinions may be adopted into the legislative framework regarding e-money and e-money 
institutions. 
Question 18: What is the FSA's view on the proposed `European Parliament and 
Council Directive on the Taking up, the Pursuit and the Prudential Supervision of the Business 
of Electronic Money Institutions'? Is FSA's approach to the regulation of e-money and e- 
money institutions in disagreement with the Directive? 
Answer: The FSA has been fully involved in the European Council Working Group handling 
the draft e-money directives. 
Interview Question: Does this mean the FSA agrees all the outcome of the Directive? 
Interview Answer and Notes: Decisions on the Parliament is taken on a democratic basis and 
after expressing its views on the Working Group level, the FSA is expected to respect the final 
outcome. The FSA has no veto rights regarding to e-money and e-money institutions 
Directives. 
Question 19: What were the formal and informal ways in which FSA influenced the 
proposed `European Parliament and Council Directive on the Taking up, the Pursuit and the 
Prudential Supervision of the Business of Electronic Money Institutions'? 
Answer: The FSA attended all relevant Council Working Group meetings. 
Question 20: Does FSA have any initiative on the international co-operation for creating 
an internationally acceptable set of rules on the regulation of e-money and e-money 
institutions? 
Answer: The FSA is involved in discussions on e-money in Brussels and Washington. 
Interview Question: Summary of the discussion results if possible? 
Interview Answer and Notes: The international initiatives seem to gather around the Bank for 
International Settlement, which has published many publications directly addressing e-money. 
The FSA joins all the related discussions and actively participates on the developments around 
the world. 
Question 21: What may be the influence of a successful launch of a `network based' e- 
money scheme like Digicash on national regulatory approaches to e-money institutions (arising 
from the fact that a network based e-money scheme is by definition international)? 
Answer: FSA has considered the development of network money in developing its general 
approach to e-money. The FSA co-operates fully with other national supervisors. 
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Interview Question: A short summary of the general approach? 
Interview Answer and Notes: As the Internet is an open platform, the FSA believes that it can 
be justified whether a network-based e-money may threaten the mission of regulation. If it is 
believed that an action is required, then it may be possible to find enough space within the 
current legal framework or ask for the additional legal framework adjustments. It may not be so 
difficult to quantify and fully analyse a network-based e-money, as it has to be on an open 
platform, which is the Internet or alike. 
Question 22: What is FSA's view on the alternative payment instruments, other than e- 
money, that may challenge `medium of exchange' function of money? For example, what may 
be the FSA's reaction to e-gold in the UK? 
Answer: Monetary issues are something that the Bank of England handles. Although the Bank 
is not a supervisor of institutions, and will therefore not take a detailed regulatory view on any 
such schemes, development of alternative payment instruments is obviously a matter of great 
interest to the Bank This is made clear in a recent speech by Mr King, one of the Bank's 
Deputy Governors, entitled "Challenges for Monetary Policy: New and Old" on August 1999. 
Interview Question: Can e-money be regulated? 
Interview Answer and Notes: It is not impossible to regulate e-money. What is required is a full 
understanding of the nature of e-money schemes and related institutional framework. Financial 
regulation has been paying even greater attention on the nature of risks on financial services 
and what is needed is to clearly identify all the risk surrounding e-money and take the 
necessary steps under the light of general approach to regulation. On the final analysis, even the 
distribution channels of financial services may change, the basic framework may not be 
expected to change extremely. As a result, the FSA would be able to regulate e-money when it 
proves itself as a part of financial world. 
FURTHER COMMENTS ON THE INTERVIEW: On the responses to the 
questionnaire, it may not be argued that the FSA defends an early action for the regulation of e- 
money but it seems clear that all the European initiative was shared and the final decision from 
the Parliament and Council as a Directive shapes the future of regulation of e-money in the UK. 
He next step is to adapt the Directive to the UK regulatory framework even the initial approach 
may best be summarised as the adoption of regulation to the technology but not the opposite.. 
Additionally, the FSA represents the UK approach to the regulation of e-money in the 
international forums. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis, first of all, addressed the issue of the definition of e-money with its 
expected functions, features, and potential. It also covered an evaluation of the demand for e- 
money including major problems and the basic implications for central banking. The ECB's 
definition is used by default but with caution. The reason for this was technological 
developments relating to e-money products that can have an influence on the definition as an 
unexpected innovation can change some basic features of e-money. On the other hand, there is 
a clear difference between just representative e-money (such as e-Euro or e-Dollar or e-Turkish 
Lira) and the electronic issue of independent e-money (such as e-gold). In the latter, the 
monetary value is held by the electronic device does not represent any given national or 
international currency. As a result, anything (such as time, stock indices or money market 
funds) can be circulated as money on an electronic environment with smart cards, the 
conventional and mobile Internet, PDAs, DTV and any other electronic instruments. There is 
currently at least one company that has been trying to circulate gold digitally as a medium of 
exchange. As a result, it is better to be cautious not to limit the definition of e-money to prepaid 
instruments as the ECB has done. Because, e-money is not limited to represent a given national 
monetary frameworks' medium of exchange. It may be an independent part of a competitive 
monetary arrangement (with parallel currency issuance). 
The functions for e-money are regarded as no different than conventional money, but it 
is argued that medium of the exchange function will be the first that should be fulfilled, before 
other functions. The features that can empower e-money are described as acceptability, 
portability, divisibility, atomicity, consistency, isolation, durability, homogeneity, 
recognisability, and unforgability, economy on transaction cost, interoperability, conservation 
of the value, security, user friendly for simplicity, and preferably anonymity. On the issue of 
the demand for e-money, the thesis notes that micro-payments, virtualisation of life and 
followingly electronification of transactions to enable international micro-trade are the actual 
sources of demand not for the future but even for the current conditions. 
The thesis, then, provided two case studies basically covering the card and software- 
based e-money schemes by analysing Mondex and Digicash (chapter 5). That also gave 
attention to operating system proposals for smart cards, because of their critical importance for 
the realisation of e-money's full potential. 
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Mondex can be seen as a close substitute for cash on a card-based e-money system, as it 
seems to be one of the rare projects to allow person-to-person transactions with a serious 
potential to replace banknotes and coins' circulation. It has an international character that has 
already extended to more than 70 countries. The Mondex scheme has its own clearing, and 
settlement mechanism to create alternatives to central bank controlled wholesale and retail 
payment systems. Once the circulation of Mondex e-cash is fully supported by conventional 
channels such as card readers and retail machines and the virtual channels such as the Internet, 
DTV, PDAs and mobile phones, anonymous circulation may be ensured with disposable cards 
that will carry e-cash. Those address privacy concerns from the general public. 
In the second case study, the thesis realises that other than card-based e-money 
schemes, network-based solutions became quite mature even if they failed to prove a fully 
acceptable business case. eCash Technologies has taken over the payment solutions within the 
product portfolio of Digicash' s original e-cash with person to person payments. The company 
offers debit services with unique ability to transform traditional funds into electronic payments 
that can be offered globally with PCs and PDAs or mobile phones. With cash equivalent 
electronic payment method with a stored value, gift certificate, loyalty, and mobile e-money 
options, the intention of the company seems to address any kind of virtual payment that may 
emerge in the future. 
The relationship between e-money and multi-application operating systems is related to 
the definition of money, which is generally and immediately accepted medium of exchange. 
Smart cards are accepted to have a technical power to create a natural infrastructure by 
enjoying multi-application potential to reach every economic entity including households and 
provide transactions using e-money, which is accepted in `every' intention and `everywhere' 
just like money. The operating system's importance is described as to support this 
infrastructure by creating a common platform for all e-money schemes to operate under any 
circumstances. The analysis on operating systems completes the argument because it may be 
expected for the future that all the e-money forms will, in one way or another, be similar to the 
cases that were investigated here as they cover almost all the potential aspects of e-money. 
Chapter six investigated three sets of data that were collected with three surveys, two in 
the UK and the last one in the US respectively. The first survey reflected innovators' and 
operators' e-money perceptions in Europe. This was extended by the second survey. The third 
survey compared European findings to the US in order to find out whether different perceptions 
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between central banks on both sides of the Atlantic were supported by divisions between 
innovators and operators as well. 
The first survey confirmed that e-money has the potential to replace central banks 
monies. Moreover, central banks or their replacements are expected by innovators and 
operators to regulate e-money business in advance. Innovators and operators did not regard the 
ECB proposals on e-money as an impediment to innovation in e-money technology nor to 
competition among different operators. Concerning the privatisation of money, the majority 
rejected the idea. However, the monopoly of central banks in issuing money as a medium of 
exchange is not totally unchallenged. Innovators and operators contest the banks' right to 
monopolise the e-money business and feel that e-money technology can reduce barriers to entry 
to the banking industry. They almost agree on a combined card and software base as the e- 
money infrastructure for the future. The main obstacles to e-money replacing central bank 
money are seen as the cost of technical infrastructure and interoperability. 
In the second survey, innovators and operators named potential future access products 
for e-money applications as PCs, followed by mobile telephones and digital television. 
Regarding the choice of operating system, they believe that rather than a single operating 
system, the e-money environment will be shaped by two or even more operating systems (most 
likely interoperable). Smart cards are pointed as the most critical technology for the future 
success of proposed e-money schemes. The lack of co-operation with banks are underlined as 
the main reason for failures of earlier e-money proposals, probably because of the banks' 
comparative advantage, especially in payment systems. The survey results also confirms that 
despite a strong position, historically proven success, and adaptation to Internet payments, 
credit and debit cards can be driven out by e-money instruments. The potential impact of e- 
money on the financial services industry is expected to be an ease of barriers to entry to the 
financial service industry. Telecommunication companies are rated as the most competitive 
against banks. Regarding the issuance of e-money, innovators and operators are of the view that 
banks should not be given highest status as payment system experts. Moreover, less than half of 
the participants perceive banks as the main players in the financial service industry. Central 
banks are seen under threat to lose their power, at least to an extent, as sole providers of 
monetary base. The re-emergence of a free banking era that can be triggered by e-money is 
seen as a possibility. Regarding the creation of a world currency, nearly one-third of the 
innovators and operators in the EU felt it was a possibility as well. The final conclusion from 
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the second European survey is that respondents expressed opposition to central banks' 
monopoly of e-money issuance. 
The third survey represents the difference and similarities between innovators' and 
operators' perception in the EU and the US. The first conclusion is the confirmation of the 
potential that e-money can replace central bank money. The American innovators and operators 
and their European counterparts were in agreement. Additionally, e-money innovators and 
operators guess that the replacement of banknotes and coins by digital bits and bites 
representing monetary value would happen sooner rather that later. The innovators and 
operators on the other side of the Atlantic are somehow relatively more concerned than their 
European counterparts about the negative impact of innovation and they are more involved in 
the discussion as they share the same belief with respect to competition. The main obstacles for 
e-money to replace central bank money are regarded quite differently in the US and the EU. 
Security and privacy are regarded as the leading problems for a successful e-money take-off in 
the US. The American side gave more support to ATMs and hand-held devices while the 
Europeans paid more attention to DTV technology in case of future access mediums for e- 
money schemes. Again, according to the third survey results, e-money `infrastructure' for the 
future are perceived almost the same in primary preferences. However, with respect to 
secondary priorities; the US participants place less reliance on smart card-related common 
solutions, but they feel that virtual and conventional financial transactions might require a 
combined solution. The operators and innovators in the US feel that, instead of a single and 
dominant medium, e-money would be shaped by two or even more operating systems as they 
give even stronger support to this views, compared to their European counterparts. The US 
perception is almost totally different on another issue, as more of the participants gave clear 
support for banks to defend their positions in the future as the main players in the financial 
service industry. 
The remaining part of the third survey showed closer perceptions among the EU and 
American innovators and operators. In sum, seven questions that are addressed here underline 
different perceptions, whereas the rest of 23 questions reflected closer opinions. As an overall 
conclusion, there seems not to be a clear consensus among innovators and operators in Europe 
and the US that can form the basis for explaining the differences between the e-money 
perceptions of the FED and the ECB. Similar thoughts, perception and approaches to e-money 
among innovators and operators clearly surpass the differences. The differences are mainly 
limited to the position of banks within the financial industry, access media for e-money, 
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operating systems, innovation and competition-related issues, the potential e-money issuers and 
the main obstacles to an e-money take-off. 
The chapter following after the survey results looked at the implications of e-money for 
monetary policy. The first section considered free banking discussions and its relation to e- 
money; and the rest of the section looked at the relation between e-money and, payment system 
instruments, money multiplier, and monetary base velocity. The chapter provides the official 
response to e-money in the UK by the BOE with the help of a questionnaire. 
In the first section of the chapter 7, the possibility of laissez-faire banking as an 
alternative for central banks is noted as some additional evidence has been put forward in 
favour of free banking even though full agreement has not been reached. The emergence of e- 
money products could play an important part. There seems a risk of underestimation of the 
potential of e-money products if e-money emergence is judged only as an elimination of 
banknotes and coins. The impact and effects of e-money should better be taken as broad 
ranging and far-reaching. First of all, there are two main reasons why e-money could lead to a 
new era for free banking practice: (i) Innovation in payment technology is reducing the fixed 
costs of banking business and (ii) the computing power of new generations of computers is 
increasing almost endlessly. These developments can decrease the special treatment of banks 
over against other firms, so that the argument about the private positions of banks in an 
economy may become even harder to defend. The development of e-money further implies 
structural changes with regard to money, banking, and finance due to the manner in which it 
supports market-based solutions to monetary problems. This includes financial regulation 
through its impact in terms of the lender of last resort function, currency backing, and multiple 
currencies would be especially powerful. E-money can decrease network externalities by both 
decreasing the fixed cost of networking (for example private clearing systems are already 
available) and by lowering the cost of switching from one local network to the other. It can 
facilitate currency competition by allowing economic entities to provide technically efficient 
and effective alternative monies to reach end-users. 
E-money is seen as enabling anything 
- 
from gold to bread 
- 
to be distributed as 
electronic purchasing power within local or international networks. It can, as a result, bring 
good money in reach of anybody on earth as far as they have a network connection, and 
increases the awareness of the growing importance of stable currencies at the international as 
well as the national level. It can reduce imperfect information possibilities with increased data 
processing and risk management techniques, and to make easier portfolio selection procedures. 
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Emergence of e-money appearance suggests that, unless `repackaged' in a contestable 
way, the future of central banking may become uncertain. However, central banks can be 
transformed in conformity with free banking philosophy and principles. Underestimation of e- 
money's significance can result in uncertainties on the future of central banks. 
On the relation of e-money and payment instruments, the thesis obverses that payments 
have already been electronised and in many countries such as the UK and Finland where plastic 
cards per capita have risen above one showing that many people prefers holding more than one 
card. It is argued that e-money can be the final frontier for transaction demand for banknotes 
and coins in circulation. 
The third part of chapter seven concluded that e-money as representative of 
conventional currency was not a threat to the conduct of monetary policy. Central banks such 
as the BOE have developed a monetary policy framework of directly targeting inflation. With 
monetary transmission mechanism analysis, sustainable financial and monetary stability seem a 
rigid adherence to money supply control. In a current analysis of the monetary transmission 
mechanism in the UK, the BOE argues that, while the money supply play an important role, it 
is not their primary focus. Though, monetary aggregates are still important indicators especially 
for the long run analysis. With regards operating expenses, a central bank without currency 
circulation seems still profitable through service charges for clearing and custody services. The 
BOE Banking Department has made no loss since 1970. 
Chapter seven also considered implications of e-money to the velocity of monetary 
base. The thesis finds that velocity may be affected by e-money developments, but the direction 
of this influence will be determined by accounting techniques that will be implemented on e- 
money balances. It is not clear whether velocity will be increased or decreased by e-money 
replacement of conventional money. The final effect depends on the aggregation techniques 
and on whether e-money can replace banknotes in circulation, or replaces demand deposits as 
well. 
The final chapter before the conclusions investigated reflections of e-money on the 
regulatory agenda. It overviews the current framework, discusses whether e-money can be 
regulated and gives the official views of the FSA on e-money matters, which have been 
collected through a questionnaire and interviews. 
The thesis underlines that a regulatory framework can be effective as far as the integrity 
of money has been sustained with sound and stable monetary and fiscal policies. Under any 
critical collapse of money supply, e-money can help to increase ` the right to choose' from any 
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alternative arrangements that might convince the end users as a better monetary framework. No 
form of regulation can sustain effective power and people can substitute to a more stable 
currency that is easily available through e-money potentials. 
With regard regulation of e-money in the UK, it seems that the EU directive will be 
shaping the future other than the influence during the decision making process within the EU 
law making rules and circumstances. This directive naturally assumes that independent issue of 
e-money can also be supervised, an assumption that might have no grounds in case of financial 
turmoil, a case where even the strongest currency may face substitution. 
Direction of Future Research: There are many options for the future. One important 
issue may be an evaluation of why earlier versions of e-money schemes turned out to be 
unsuccessful. The failures may provide positive feedback for the success of future proposals. 
Another possibility may be to look at the retail payment system interoperability all 
around the world and its relations to e-money. Local and national retail payment systems may 
be the main source of payment infrastructure for future national and international e-money 
rollouts. Compatibility among them may provide more ready-to-use retail machines and card 
readers. This research includes, for example, mass-transit payment projects and their influence 
on e-money proposals. 
The relationship between technology and e-money seems to be endless. In this regards, 
the effect of third generation mobile networks may be searched in their potential of coming up 
with an almost cost-less mobile payment solution so as to ensure all kind of payments, (micro 
and macro) anywhere, everywhere. 
Another direction may be to extend case studies and create a database for all kind of 
proposals and make comparative analysis. This research may compare the confusion between 
e-money and payment instruments as well. 
More than that, a direction can also look at contestable central banking potential 
between the ECB and the FED from an independent e-money issuer point of view against each 
other. This research may investigate the implications of independent issue of e-dollars in the 
Eurozone and independent issue of e-Euro in the US. 
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